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JEFFERSON
COUNTY
PHARMACEUTICAL
ASSOCIATION,
INC.

Cert to CA 11
(Vance,
F. Johnson:
~~~ T. Clark,

5

v.

ABBOTT
LABORATORIES,
et al.
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~
Whether the Robinson-Patman

SUMMARY:

Act's prohibition

of price discrimination applies to purchases for resale when made
by state-operated hospitals.
2.

FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW:

This case involves a suit by

local retail pharmacies who claim they have been injured by the
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lower prices being charged by drug manufacturers to competing
~---------------------~

pharmacies operated in conjunction with the County Hospital and

~-~---------------------------------

the hospitals and clinics of the Medical College of the State
University.

The petr, a trade association to which the claims of

its member pharmacies have been assigned, alleged that sales by
the state-owned pharmacies are in violation of the RobinsonPatman Act, 15

u.s.c.

§13, which forbids any person engaged in

commerce to discriminate in price between different purchasers
where the effect of such discrimination is to substantially
lessen competition.

The resps requested dismissal on the grounds

that sales of goods made to a governmental agency are exempt from
the Act.
The DC (Pointer) agreed. 1

Although recognizing that the

issue is a close one, the DC relied upon Congress' failure to
overturn the long-standing interpretation that governmental
purchases are beyond the intended reach of the Act.

The authors

of the Robinson-Patman Act had expressed the opinion that the
legislation did not apply to sales to governmental institutions.
This has also been the consistent position of commentators, the
Attorney General, and every judicial decision on the question.
Twice Amendments were defeated that would have brought
governmental purchases within the Robinson-Patman Act.

1The DC first found that the petr Association could
maintain the action as an assignee for the private pharmacies and
that the Eleventh Amendment at least did not bar the request for
injunctive relief.
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The DC found additional support for its conclusion in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426

u.s.

833 {1976):

"The policy considerations discussed in National
League, resulting in rejection of a federal
statute specifying minimum prices to be paid by
governmental bodies for labor comparable to that
required of private institutions, appear to be no
less cogent when deciding whether another federal
statute should be interpreted to specify minimum
prices to be paid by governmental bodies for
goods comparable to that required of private
institutions."
The DC also distinguished Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435

u.s.

389 {1978)

{governmental agencies are not

automatically exempt from antitrust laws), and Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggist Ass'n, 425

u.s.

1 {1976)

{sales to private, nonprofit hospitals within Robinson-Patman
Act).

Louisiana Power involved claims under the broader Sherman

Act and challenged activities that had been undertaken
volitionally by municipalities independent of any state directive
or policy.

Abbott Laboratories was concerned with sales to

nongovernmental hospitals and indeed noted without criticism that
the trial court had dismissed counts based on sales to
governmental hospitals for failure to state a claim.

425 U.S. at

4, n.2.

~
On appeal, a majority of the CA 5 {now CA 11) panel
affirmed, adopting the DC's opinion.

Judge Clark dissented,

arguing that when a state moves outside its traditional sphere of
activity and into retail competition with private enterprise it
should be treated in precisely the same manner as its
competitors.

This position is implicitly endorsed by Abbott

Laboratories and by statements in the legislative history that

-4-

the Act would not limit the government only so long as the state
functions as a consumer rather than as a competitor.

The key to

Abbott Laboratories is that a nonprofit institution's act of
exemption to Robinson-Patman does not apply when hospitals act as
competitors instead of consumers.

Finally, National League of

Cities is completely inapposite since the retail sale of drugs is
hardly a traditional government function or an incident of state
sovereignty.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Clark's dissent.

The petr essentially reiterates Judge

The case is inconsistent with Abbott

Laboratories and with the legislative intent that Robinson-Patman
should have a broad reach.

Governmental purchasing should be

exempt only insofar as it is not in competition with private
entities. 2

Having argued that the decision conflicts with Abbott

Laboratories, petr goes on to claim that the issue is one of
first impression (!) that should be resolved by this Court.
Resp notes that the issue of whether Robinson-Patman was
intended to apply to governmental purchases was not before the
Court in Abbott Laboratories.

Although this Court has never

decided the issue, other courts have consistently found such an
exception over the past thirty years.

In view of this consistent

interpretation and application of the Act, petr's policy argument
2Petr points to an exchange in a House Committee hearing
where Representative Teegarden, co-author of the Act, stated that
"if two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should
say then the fact that one is operated by the City does not save
it from the Bill." Petn., p. 8.

-5-

should be addressed to Congress.

Finally, applying the Act would

emasculate Alabama's statutory policy to obtain the lowest price
possible for its pharmaceutical purchases and would interfere
with the operation of its State Hospital and University in
violation of the considerations discussed in National League of
Cities.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Petr's argument that the state exemption

should not extend beyond purchases for its own consumption is a
strong one.

The legislative history does not support an

\

exemption when the government purchases products for resale.
Certainly the retail sale of pharmaceuticals is not a traditional
state activity protected by National League of Cities.
On the other hand, it is probably difficult to differentiate
between government purchases for consumption and for resale.

The

requirement of a separate purchasing system by the latter may
well interfere with the former.

Thus it may not be unreasonable

to simply exempt all governmental purchasing from the Act.

The

only other recent CA decision is Champaign-Urbana News Agency,
Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 632 F.2d 680 (CA 7 1980), holding
that a military exchange service is a governmental
instrumentality exempt from Robinson-Patman.
Given the absence of a conflict, I recommend a denial.
There are two responses.
December 10, 1981
ME
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 81-827.

Decided January-, 1982

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The question in this case is whether the Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13, applies to state and local governments
that have entered the commercial marketplace as retailers of
goods to the general public in competition with private firms.
Because this is a substantial question, and because I think
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit answered the question incorrectly, I dissent from the denial of
certiorari.
I
Petitioner is an association of retail pharmacists doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama. Respondents are 15
drug companies and certain state and county pharmacies operated in conjunction with state and county hospitals. 1 In
its complaint, petitioner alleged that the state and county
pharmacies were receiving preferential prices from the drug
manufacturers and were using their favored position to compete with private pharmacies in retail sales to the general
public. Petitioner alleged that these preferential wholesale
prices, followed by retail sales to consumers, violated the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13. 2 Petitioner sought
' The respondent pharmacies include those operated by the county hospital and by the hospitals and clinics of the Medical College of the University of Alabama.
2
Under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality . . . where such commodities are sold
for use, consumption or resale within the United States ... , and where the

2
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injunctive relief and treble damages. 3
The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama dismissed the complaint. The court found that
sales to governmental agencies are "beyond the intended
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." Pet. at 20a. In reaching this
conclusion the court relied primarily on statements by H. B.
Teegarden, the chief draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman Act,
and by other commentators and government officials indicating that sales to governmental agencies are beyond the intended scope of the Act. 4 The court cited several district
and appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to
governmental purchases, 5 and indicated that such a holding
was supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
... injure ... competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U. S. C. § 13.
3
The District Court found that one of the defendants-the Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama-was immune from any claim to
damages by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed
from suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief.
'See W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30-32
(1963). But Congressman Patman did not address the question whether
the Act applies to governmental purchases for retail resale. The district
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General indicating that the
Act did not apply to sales to the federal government. Again, however, the
question was assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies."
38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936).
The District Court also relied on the fact that Congress has on two occasions considered, without enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable
to sales to governmental agencies. See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). However, neither of
these bills was specifically directed to the question of sales to governmental
agencies for resale to the general public. But see Champaign-Urbana
News Agency, Inc. v. J . L. Cummins News Co., 632 F. 2d 680, 688 (CA7
1980). Moreover, "several equally tenable inferences [can] be drawn from
the failure of the Congress to adopt an amendment in the light of the interpretation placed upon the existing law by some of its members, including
the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered
change." United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405, 411 (1962).
5
In only two of the cited cases, however, did the district court hold that
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of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U. S. 833 (1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the
basis of the District Court's opinion. Judge Clark dissented.
II
As Judge Clark explained in his dissenting opinion, the
Court of Appeals blurred the fundamental distinction between government purchases for its own consumption and
government purchases for resale to the general public. 6 It
may be agreed that the legislative history of the RobinsonPatman Act, and subsequent interpretations of the Act, indicate that governmental bodies are not subject to the Act
when purchasing for their own consumption. Such an exemption properly may be implied because, as a consumer, the
government does not use the advantage of cheaper wholesale
prices to injure competition. Thus, Teegarden explained in
his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that the
federal government would continue to be able to purchase
goods at discounts not available to other purchasers:
"The Federal Government is not in competition with
other buyers from these [wholesalers] .... [T]o have a
discrimination, there must be a relative position between
sales to governmental agencies in competition with private firms were not
covered by the Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not reach
the question. See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp. , 378 F. 2d 212
(CA9 1967); Portland R etail Druggists Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510
F . 2d 486 (CA9 1974), remanded on other issues, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). Cf.
Champaign-Urbana N ews Agency, Inc . v. J. L. Cummns News Co., 632
F. 2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military exchange store for resale to
military personnel are not subject to the Robinson-Patman Act); General
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603
(W.D. Ky. 1941), affd on other grounds , 132 F. 2d 425 (CA6 1942) ("Neither the government nor a city in its purchase of property . . . is in competition with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling the
article.") (emphasis added).
6
Petitioner only argues that purchases by the government pharmacies
for the purpose of resale to members of the general public are covered by
the Robinson-Patman Act. Petitioner does not contend that purchases for
the purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered by the Act.
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.

the parties to the discrimination which constitutes an injury to one as against the other. I think the answer is
to be found in that .
"In other words, if seller A makes a price to a retailer
in New York and a different price to a retailer in San
Francisco, all other things aside, no case of discrimination could be predicated there, because the two are not
in the same sphere at all.
"The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction, not of location but of function. They are not in
competition with anyone else who would buy." 7

.

In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase for retail
resale is a completely different animal from a purchase for
consumption." Pet., at 29a. An exemption for government
purchases for consumption rests on considerations of policy
and legislative intent wholly inapplicable to government purchases for resale to the public generally. Indeed, this Court
recognized just such a distinction in its decision in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 425 U. S. 1
(1976). The issue in that case was whether the purchase of
drugs by pharmacies in nonprofit hospitals was exempt from
the Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption provided in the Non profit Institutions Act. The exemption is
limited, extending only to "purchases of . . . supplies for
their own use by schools ... hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 15 U. S. C. § 13c. The Court
held that to the extent the drugs had been purchased for reHearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to
Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added).
The quotation in text is included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting
opinion. Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of this case is
Teegarden's response to the question put to him by Congressman Hancock
as to whether a wholesaler could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper
price than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would have to answer it in this way. . . . If the two hospitals are in competition with each
other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city does
not save it from the bill. If they are not in competition with each other,
then they are in a different sphere." !d., at 209.
7

:

'
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sale to former patients, for dispensation to employees and
students (other than for the personal use of themselves or of
their dependents), and for resale to members of the general
public, the exemption was not available. The Court noted
that to extend the exemption to cover retail resales to walkin customers "would make the commercially advantaged hospital pharmacy just another community drug store open to all
comers for prescription services and devastatingly positioned
with respect to competing commercial pharmacies." 425
U. S., at 17-18.
This case is indistinguishable in principle from Portland
Retail Druggists. When a hospital acts as a competitor
rather than a consumer it loses its claim to exemption.
When it acts solely as a consumer, it may claim exemption
because the basic purpose of the Act-protection of competition-is no longer at issue. Thus, whether or not the Nonprofit Institutions Act applies directly to government hospitals, 8 the distinction it draws between purchases for
consumption and purchases for re~ale to the general public is
equally applicable to government hospitals as to private nonprofit hospitals.
Nor do I think that the Tenth Amendment is a barrier to
the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to the state and
county hospitals. The retail sale of drugs to members of the
general public is hardly an attribute of state sovereignty. See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Regulation Assn,
- u. s. - (1981).
III
We have stated repeatedly that "the antitrust laws and
Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed liberally,
and that the exceptions from their application are to be construed strictly." Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail
Druggists Assn, supra, 425 U. S., at 11. And we have said
that implied antitrust immunity is not favored. Ibid. This
sseeLafayette v. Louisiana Power& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 397 n. 14
(1978).

6
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is true whether the institution seeking the exemption is private or the political subdivision of a state. See Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978).
Yet despite these principles, despite the purposes and legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and despite the
Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists, the Court of
Appeals implied an exemption for sales to government pharmacies that compete in the retail market with private pharmacies. The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was "to
curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained
discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of
their greater purchasing power." FTC v. Henry Brock &
Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960). It is not easy to assume that
Congress intended to protect small business from what was
seen as the unfair competition of large corporations only to
leave these very same businesses vulnerable to the greatest
potential competitor of all-the government. The decision
of the Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important,
anQ I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 81-827.

I

Decided February-, 1982

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins,
dissenting.
The question in this case is whether the Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13, applies to s~nd local governments
that have enteredJhe comme~arketl:)lac~ ~retailers of
goods to the general public in competition with private firms.
Because this is a substantial question, and because I think
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit answered the question incorrectly, I dissent from the denial of
certiorari.
I
Petitioner is an association of retail pharmacists doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama. Respondents are 15
drug companies and certain state and county pharmacies operated in conjunction with state and county hospitals. t In
its complaint, petitioner alleged that the state and county
pharmacies were receiving pref~ential prices from the drug
manufacturers and were using their favored position to compete with private pharmacies in retail sales to the general
public. Petitioner alleged that these preferential wholesale
prices, followed by retail sales to consumers, violated the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13. 2 Petitioner sought
'The respondent pharmacies include those operated by the county hospital and by the hospitals and clinics of the Medical College of the University of Alabama.
2
Under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality ... where such commodities are sold

198!

k

2
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injunctive relief and treble damages. 3
The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama dismissed the complaint. The court found that
sales to governmental agencies are "beyond the intended
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." Pet. at 20a. In reaching this
conclusion the court relied primarily on statements by H. B.
Teegarden, the chief draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman Act,
and by other commentators and government officials indicating that sales to governmental agencies are beyond the intended scope of the Act. 4 The court cited several district
and appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to
for use, consumption or resale within the United States ... , and where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
... injure ... competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U. S. C. § 13.
3
The District Court found that one of the defendants-the Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama-was immune from any claim to
damages by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed
from suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief.
• See W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30-32
(1963). But Congressman Patman did not address the question whether
the Act applies to governmental purchases for retail resale. The district
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General indicating that the
Act did not apply to sales to the federal government. Again, however, the
question was assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies."
38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936).
The District Court also relied on the fact that Congress has on two occasions considered, without enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable
to sales to governmental agencies. See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). However, neither of
these bills was specifically directed to the question of sales to governmental
agencies for resale to the general public. But see Champaign-Urbana
News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummins N ews Co., 632 F. 2d 680, 688 (CA7
1980). Moreover, "several equally tenable inferences [can] be drawn from
the failure of the Congress to adopt an amendment in the light of the interpretation placed upon the existing law by some of its members, including
the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered
change." United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405, 411 (1962).
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governmental purchases; 5 and indicated that such a holding
was supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light
of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U. S. 833 (1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the
basis of the District Court's opinion. Judge Clark dissented.
II

As Judge Clark explained in his dissenting opinion, the
Court of Appeals blurred the fundamental distinction between government purchases for its own consumption (aild)
government purchases for resale to t~. 6 l t
may be agreed that the legislative history of t e RobinsonPatman Act, and subsequent interpretations of the Act, indicate that governmental bodies are not subject to the Act
when purchasing for their own consumption. Such an exemption properly may be implied because, as a consumer, the
government does not use the advantage of cheaper wholesale
prices to injure competition. Thus, Teegarden explained in
his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that the
federal government would continue to be able to purchase

(

5
In only two of the cited cases, however, did the district court hold that
sales to governmental agencies in competition with private firms were not
covered by the Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not reach
the question. See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F. 2d 212
(CA9 1967); Portland Retail Druggists Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510
F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974), remanded on other issues, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). Cf.
Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummns News Co., 632
F. 2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military exchange store for resale to
military personnel are not subject to the Robinson-Patman Act); General
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W
D Ky. 1941), affd on other grounds, 132 F. 2d 425 (CA6 1942) ("Neither
the government nor a city in its purchase of property ... is in competition
with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling the article.") (emphasis added).
6
Petitioner only argues that purchases by the government pharmacies
for the purpose of resale to members of the general public are covered by
the Robinson-Patman Act. Petitioner does not contend that purchases for
the purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered by the Act.
Pet. for Cert. 9.

JEFFERSON CTY. PHARM. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS.

4

goods at discounts not available to other purchasers:
"The Federal Government is not in competition with
other buyers from these [whole~have a
discrimination, there must be a relative position between
the parties to the discrimination which constitutes an injury to one as against the other. I think' the answer is
to be found in that.
"In other words, if seller A makes a price to a retailer
in New York and a different price to a retailer in San
Francisco, all other things aside, no case of discrimination could be predicated there, because the two are not
in the same sphere at all.
"The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction, not of location but of function. They are not in
competition with anyone else who would buy." 1
In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase for retail
resale is a completely different animal from a purchase for
consumption." Pet., at 29a. An exemption for government
purchases for consumption rests on considerations of policy
and legislative intent wholly inapplicable to government purchases for resale to the public generally. Indeed, this Court
recognized just such a distinction in its decision in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 425 U. S. 1
(1976). The issue in that case was whether the purchase of
drugs by pharmacies in nonprofit hospitals was exempt from
the Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption provided in the Nonprofit Institutions Act. The exemption is
7

Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to
Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added).
The quotation in text is included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting
opinion. Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of this case is
Teegarden's response to the question put to him by Congressman Hancock
as to whether a wholesaler could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper
price than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would have to answer it in this way. . . . If the two hospitals are in competition with each
other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city does
not save it from the bill. If they are not in competition with each other,
then they are in a different sphere." !d., at 209.
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limited, extending only to "purchases of ... supplies for
their own use by schools ... hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 15 U. S. C. § 13c. The Court
held that to the extent the drugs had been purchased for resale to former patients, for dispensation to employees and
students (other than for the personal use of themselves or of
their dependents), and for resale to members of the general
public, the exemption was not available. The Court noted
that to extend the exem tion to cover retail resales to walKin customers "woul make e commerciallx_ a._Enta_ge!!_hospital pharmac just anotfier communit drug store open to all
comers for prescnption services and devastatingly positioned
with respect to competing commercial pharmacies." 425
U. S., at 17-18.
This case is indistinguishable in principle from Portland
Retail Druggists. When a hospital acts as a competitor
rather than a consumer it loses its claim to exemption.
When it acts solely as a consumer, it may claim exemption
because the basic purpose of the Act-protection of competition-is no longer at issue. Thus, whether or nOrthe NOnprofit Institutions Act applies directly to government hospitals, 8 the distinction it draws between ·purchases for
consumption and purchases for resale to the general public is
equally applicable to government hospitals as to private nonprofit hospitals.
Nor do I think that the Tenth Amendment is a barrier to
the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to the state and
county hospitals. The retail sale of drugs to members of the
general public is hardly an attribute of state sovereignty. See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Regulation Assn,
- u. s. - (1981).
III
We have stated repeatedly that "the antitrust laws and
Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed liberally,
8

See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 397 n. 14
(1978).
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and that the exceptions from their application are to be construed strictly." Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail
Druggists Assn, supra, 425 U. S., at 11. And we have said
that implied antitrust immunity is not favored. Ibid. This
is true whether the institution seeking the exemption is private or the political subdivision of a state. See Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978).
Yet despite these principles, despite the purposes and legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and despite the
Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists, the Court of
Appeals implied an exemption for sales to government pharmacies that compete in the retail market with private pharmacies. The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was "to
curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained
discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of
their greater purchasing power." FTC v. Henry Broch &
Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960). It is not easy to assume that
Congress intended to protect small business from what was
seen as the unfair competition of large corporations only to
leave these very same businesses vulnerable to the greatest
potential competitor of all-the government. The decision
of the Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important,
and I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari.
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I

·JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins,
dissenting.
The question in this case is whether the Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13, applies to state and local governments
that have entered the commercial marketplace as retailers of
goods to the general public in competition with private firms.
Because this is a substantial question, and because I think
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit answered the question incorrectly, I dissent from the denial of
certiorari.
I
Petitioner is an association of retail pharmacists doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama. Respondents are 15
drug companies and certain state and county pharmacies operated in conjunction with state and county hospitals. 1 In
its complaint, petitioner alleged that the state and county
pharmacies were receiving preferential prices from the drug
manufacturers and were using their favored position to compete with private pharmacies in retail sales to the general
public. Petitioner alleged that these preferential wholesale
prices, followed by retail sales to consumers, violated the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13. 2 Petitioner sought
The respondent pharmacies include those operated by the county hospital and by the hospitals and clinics of the Medical College of the University of Alabama.
2
Under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality ... where such commodities are sold
1
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injunctive relief and treble damages. 3
The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama dismissed the complaint. The court found that
sales to governmental agencies are "beyond the intended
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." Pet. at 20a. In reaching this
conclusion the court relied primarily on statements by H. B.
Teegarden, the chief draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman Act,
and by other commentators and government officials indicating that sales to governmental agencies are beyond the intended scope of the Act. 4 The court cited several district
and appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to
for use, consumption or resale within the United States ... , and where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
... injure ... competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U. S. C. § 13.
3
The District Court found that one of the defendants-the Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama-was immune from any claim to
damages by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed
from suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief.
'See W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30-32
(1963). But Congressman Patman did not address the question whether
the Act applies to governmental purchases for retail resale. The district
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General indicating that the
Act did not apply to sales to the federal government. Again, however, the
question was assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies."
38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936).
The District Court also relied on the fact that Congress has on two occasions considered, without enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable
to sales to governmental agencies. See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong. , 1st Sess. (1953). However, neither of
these bills was specifically directed to the question of sales to governmental
agencies for resale to the general public. But see Champaign-Urbana
N ews Agency , Inc . v. J. L. Cummins News Co ., 632 F. 2d 680, 688 (CA7
1980). Moreover, "several equally tenable inferences [can] be drawn from
the failure of the Congress to adopt an amendment in the light of the interpretation placed upon the existing law by some of its members, including
the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered
change." United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405, 411 (1962).
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governmental purchases, 5 and indicated that such a holding
was supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light
of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U. S. 833 (1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the
basis of the District Court's opinion. Judge Clark dissented.

..

II

As Judge Clark explained in his dissenting opinion, the
Court of Appeals blurred the fundamental distinction between government purchases for its own consumption and
government purchases for resale to the general public. 6 It
may be agreed that the legislative history of the RobinsonPatman Act, and subsequent interpretations of the Act, indicate that governmental bodies are not subject to the Act
when purchasing for their own consumption. Such an exemption properly may be implied because, as a consumer, the
government does not use the advantage of cheaper wholesale
prices to injure competition. Thus, Teegarden explained in
his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that the
federal government would continue to be able to purchase

l

6
In only two of the cited cases, however, did the district court hold that
sales to governmental agencies in competition with private firms were not
covered by the Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not reach
the question. See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F. 2d 212
(CA9 1967); Portland Retail Druggists Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510
F . 2d 486 (CA9 1974), remanded on other issues, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). Cf.
Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummns News Co., 632
F. 2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military exchange store for resale to
military personnel are not subject to the Robinson-Patman Act); General
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W
D Ky. 1941), affd on other gr-ounds, 132 F. 2cl 425 (CA6 1942) ("Neither
the government nor a city in its purchase of property ... is in competition
with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling the article.") (emphasis added).
• Petitioner only argues that purchases by the government pharmacies
for the purpose of resale to members of the general public are covered by
the Robinson-Patman Act. Petitioner does not contend that purchases for
the purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered by the Act.
Pet. for Cert. 9.
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goods at discounts not available to other purchasers:
"The Federal Government is not in competition with
other buyers from these [wholesalers] .... [T]o have a
discrimination, there must be a relative position between
the parties to the discrimination which constitutes an injury to one as against the other. I think-the answer is
to be found in that.
"In other words, if seller A makes a price to a retailer
in New York and a different price to a retailer in San
Francisco, all other things aside, no case of discrimination could be predicated there, because the two are not
in the same sphere at all.
"The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction, not of location but of function. They are not in
competition with anyone else who would buy." 7
In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase for retail
resale is a completely different animal from a purchase for
consumption." Pet., at 29a. An exemption for government
purchases for consumption rests on considerations of policy
and legislative intent wholly inapplicable to government purchases for resale to the public generally. Indeed, this Court
recognized just such a distinction in its decision in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 425 U. S. 1
(1976). The issue in that case was whether the purchase of
drugs by pharmacies in nonprofit hospitals was exempt from
the Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption provided in the Non profit Institutions Act. The exemption is
' Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to
Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added).
The quotation in text is included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting
opinion. Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of this case is
Teegarden's response to the question put to him by Congressman Hancock
as to whether a wholesaler could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper
price than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would have to answer it in this way. . . . If the two hospitals are in competition with each
other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city does
not save it from the bill. If they are not in competition with each other,
then they are in a different sphere." Jd., at 209.
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limited, extending only to "purchases of . . . supplies for
their own use by schools . . . hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 15 U. S. C. § 13c. The Court
held that to the extent the drugs had been purchased for resale to former patients, for dispensation to employees and
students (other than for the personal use of themselves or of
their dependents), and for resale to members of the general
public, the exemption was not available. The Court noted
that to extend the exemption to cover retail resales to walkin customers "would make the commercially advantaged hospital pharmacy just another community drug store open to all
comers for prescription services and devastatingly positioned
with respect to competing commercial pharmacies." 425
U. S., at 17-18.
This case is indistinguishable in principle from Portland
Retail Druggists. When a hospital acts as a competitor
rather than a consumer it loses its claim to exemption.
When it acts solely as a consumer, it may claim exemption
because the basic purpose of the Act-protection of competition-is no longer at issue. Thus, whether or not the Nonprofit Institutions Act applies directly to government hospitals, 8 the distinction it draws between purchases for
consumption and purchases for resale to the general public is
equally applicable to government hospitals as to private nonprofit hospitals.
Nor do I think that the Tenth Amendment is a barrier to
the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to the state and
county hospitals. The retail sale of drugs to members of the
general public is hardly an attribute of state sovereignty. See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and R egulation Assn,
-u.s.- (1981).
III
We have stated repeatedly that "the antitrust laws and
Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed liberally,
• See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 n. 14
(1978).
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and that the exceptions from their application are to be construed strictly." Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail
Druggists Assn, supra, 425 U. S., at 11. And we have said
that implied antitrust immunity is not favored. Ibid. This
is true whether the institution seeking the exemption is private or the political subdivision of a state. See Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978).
Yet despite these principles, despite the purposes and legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and despite the
Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists, the Court of
Appeals implied an exemption for sales to government pharmacies that compete in the retail market with private pharmacies. The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was "to
curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained
discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of
their greater purchasing power." FTC v. Henry Brock &
Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960). It is not easy to assume that
Congress intended to protect small business from what was
seen as the unfair competition of large corporations only to
leave these very same businesses vulnerable to the greatest
potential competitor of all-the government. The decision
of the Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important,
and I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari .
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins,
dissenting.
\ The question in this case is whether the Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13, applies to state and local governments
that have entered the commercial marketplace as retailers of
goods to the general public in competition with private firms.
Because this is a substantial question, and because I think
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit answered the question incorrectly, I dissent from the denial of
certiorari.
I
Petitioner is an association of retail pharmacists doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama. Respondents are 15
drug companies and certain state and county pharmacies operated in conjunction with state and county hospitals. 1 In
its complaint, petitioner alleged that the state and county
pharmacies were receiving preferential prices from the drug
manufacturers and were using their favored position to compete with private pharmacies in retail sales to the general
public. Petitioner alleged that these preferential wholesale
prices, followed by retail sales to consumers, violated the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13. 2 Petitioner sought
' The respondent pharmacies include those operated by the county hospital and by the hospitals and clinics of the Medical College of the University of Alabama.
2
Under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality ... where such commodities are sold
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injunctive relief and treble damages. 3
The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama dismissed the complaint. The court found that
sales to governmental agencies are "beyond the intended
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." Pet. at 20a. In reaching this
conclusion the court relied primarily on statements by H. B.
Teegarden, the chief draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman Act,
and by other commentators and government officials indicating that sales to governmental agencies are beyond the intended scope of the Act. 4 The court cited several district
and appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to
for use, consumption or resale within the United States ... , and where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
... injure ... competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U. S. C. § 13.
3
The District Court found that one of the defendants-the Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama-was immune from any claim to
damages by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed
from suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief.
'See W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30-32
(1963). But Congressman Patman did not address the question whether
the Act applies to governmental purchases for retail resale. The district
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General indicating that the
Act did not apply to sales to the federal government. Again, however, the
question was assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies."
38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936).
The District Court also relied on the fact that Congress has on two occasions considered, without enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable
to sales to governmental agencies. See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). However, neither of
these bills was specifically directed to the question of sales to governmental
agencies for resale to the general public. But see Champaign-Urbana
News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummins News Co., 632 F. 2d 680, 688 (CA7
1980). Moreover, "several equally tenable inferences [can] be drawn from
the failure of the Congress to adopt an amendment in the light of the interpretation placed upon the existing law by some of its members, including
the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered
change." United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405, 411 (1962).
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governmental purchases, 5 and indicated that such a holding
was supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light
of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U. S. 833 (1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the
basis of the District Court's opinion. Judge Clark dissented.
II
As Judge Clark explained in his dissenting opinion, the
Court of Appeals blurred the fundamental distinction between government purchases for its own consumption and
government purchases for resale to the general public. 6 It
may be agreed that the legislative history of the RobinsonPatman Act, and subsequent interpretations of the Act, indicate that governmental bodies are not subject to the Act
when purchasing for their own consumption. Such an exemption properly may be implied because, as a consumer, the
government does not use the advantage of cheaper wholesale
prices to injure competition. Thus, Teegarden explained in
his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that the
federal government would continue to be able to purchase
5

f

In only two of the cited cases, however, did the district court hold that
sales to governmental agencies in competition with private firms were not
covered by the Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not reach
the question. See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F. 2d 212
(CA9 1967); Portland Retail Druggists Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510
F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974), remanded on other issues, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). Cf.
Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummns News Co., 632
F. 2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military exchange store for resale to
military personnel are not subject to the Robinson-Patman Act); General
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W
D Ky. 1941), affd on other grounds, 132 F. 2d 425 (CA6 1942) ("Neither
the government nor a city in its purchase of property ... is in competition
with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling the article.") (emphasis added).
6
Petitioner only argues that purchases by the government pharmacies
for the purpose of resale to members of the general public are covered by
the Robinson-Patman Act. Petitioner does not contend that purchases for
the purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered by the Act.
Pet. for Cert. 9.
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goods at discounts not available to other purchasers:
"The Federal Government is not in competition with
other buyers from these [wholesalers] .... [T]o have a
discrimination, there must be a relative position between
the parties to the discrimination which col!stitutes an injury to one as against the other. I think the answer is
to be found in that.
"In other words, if seller A makes a price to a retailer
in New York and a different price to a retailer in San
Francisco, all other things aside, no case of discrimination could be predicated there, because the two are not
in the same sphere at all.
"The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction, not of location but of function. They are not in
competition with anyone else who would buy." 7
In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase for retail
resale is a completely different animal from a purchase for
consumption." Pet., at 29a. An exemption for government
purchases for consumption rests on considerations of policy
and legislative intent wholly inapplicable to government purchases for resale to the public generally. Indeed, this Court
recognized just such a distinction in its decision in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 425 U. S. 1
(1976). The issue in that case was whether the purchase of
drugs by pharmacies in nonprofit hospitals was exempt from
the Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption provided in the Non profit Institutions Act. The exemption is
; Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to
Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added).
The quotation in text is included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting
opinion. Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of this case is
Teegarden's response to the question put to him by Congressman Hancock
as to whether a wholesaler could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper
price than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would have to answer it in this way. . . . If the two hospitals are in competition with each
other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city does
not save it from the bill. If they are not in competition with each other,
then they are in a different sphere." I d., at 209.
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limited, extending only to "purchases of . . . supplies for
their own use by schools ... hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 15 U. S. C. § 13c. The Court
held that to the extent the drugs had been purchased for resale to former patients, for dispensation to employees and
students (other than for the personal use of themselves or of
their dependents), and for resale to members of the general
public, the exemption was not available. The Court noted
that to extend the exemption to cover retail resales to walkin customers "would make the commercially advantaged hospital pharmacy just another community drug store open to all
comers for prescription services and devastatingly positioned
with respect to competing commercial pharmacies." 425
U. S., at 17-18.
This case is indistinguishable in principle from Portland
Retail Druggists. When a hospital acts as a competitor
rather than a consumer it loses its claim to exemption.
When it acts solely as a consumer, it may claim exemption
because the basic purpose of the Act-protection of competition-is no longer at issue. Thus, whether or not the Nonprofit Institutions Act applies directly to government hospitals, 8 the distinction it draws between purchases for
consumption and purchases for resale to the general public is
equally applicable to government hospitals as to private nonprofit hospitals.
Nor do I think that the Tenth Amendment is a barrier to
the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to the state and
county hospitals. The retail sale of drugs to members of the
general public is hardly an attribute of state sovereignty. See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Regulation Assn,
- u. s. - (1981).
III
We have stated repeatedly that "the antitrust laws and
Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed liberally,
See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 n. 14
(1978).
8
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and that the exceptions from their application are to be construed strictly." Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail
Druggists Assn, supra, 425 U. S., at 11. And we have said
that implied antitrust immunity is not favored. Ibid. This
is true whether the institution seeking the exemption is private or the political subdivision of a state. See Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978).
Yet despite these principles, despite the purposes and legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and despite the
Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists, the Court of
Appeals implied an exemption for sales to government pharmacies that compete in the retail market with private pharmacies. The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was "to
curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained
discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of
their greater purchasing power." FTC v. Henry Broch &
Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960). It is not easy to assume that
Congress intended to protect small business from what was
seen as the unfair competition of large corporations only to
leave these very same businesses vulnerable to the greatest
potential competitor of all-the government. The decision
of the Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important,
and I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari.
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MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, Inc. v.
Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827
Questions Presented
1.

Are sales made to state and local governmental agencies

ordinarily exempt per se from the proscriptions of the RobinsonPatman Act?
2.

If sales to state and local governmental agencies are

ordinarily exempt per se from the proscriptions of the R-P Act, does
that general exemption extend to sales to state or local
governmental agencies that compete in the public marketplace with
privately owned business enterprises?

•.,

.

.

"""

.

Background
Petr, a nonprofit corporation comprised of pharmacists
thoughout Jefferson County, Alabama, brought suit alleging that resp
drug manufacturers were selling drugs to resps University of Alabama
Pharmacy, Russell Ambulatory Center Pharmacy (both subdivisions of
the University of Alabama Medical Center) and Cooper Green Hospital
Pharmacy (a county hospital) at discriminatory "bid prices," and
that these pharmacies were selling drugs procured by "bid
purchasing" to the general public in direct competition with
----------------------~--~'------------------------privately owned pharmacies. Petr contended that resp governmental
---------~~~
purchasers
knowingly induced such lower prices and that sales by
these pharmacies were in violation of the R-P Act.

Petr sought

injunctive relief and monetary damages for compensation of injuries
suffered as a result of the violations.

---

All resps filed motions to dismiss petr's cplt, stating as
grounds for dismissal, among other things, that sales of goods made
to a governmental agency or instrumentality are exempt as a matter
of law from the sanctions of R-P Act.

The DC held "that

governmental purchases are, without regard to 15 U.S.C. §13c, beyond

--

-

------

the intended reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act,

,.
at least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other
traditional governmental purposes."

A panel of the then CAS

affirmed on the basis of the DC's opinion, with Judge Thomas Clark
~ ssenting,

stating that the majority's decision

c ~s

Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists, Inc., 425
(1976).

with

u.s.

1

j.

Summary of the Parties' Contentions
1.

Petr.
____..

-

The R-P Act contains no reference to any exemptions

f/Jt:..

other than the nonprofit institution exemption found in §13c.

There ~

is no explicit exemption in favor of sales to state or local

~

governmental agencies on the face of the Act and to hold otherwise
would amount to an expansion of the exemption that does appear.

The

legislative history at least indicates that Congress did not intend
to exempt from the proscriptions of the R-P Act sales to state or
local governmental agencies where those agencies are competing in
the public marketplace with privately owned business enterprises.
2.

Resps.

The R-P Act does not cover governmental purchasers.

The legislative history of the Act exhibits a congressional intent
to exclude government from its scope and a belief by Congress that
the exclusion would be recognized without the need for explicit
statutory language.

That conclusion is supported by the rule of

statutory construction that prohibits an interpretation that poses a
significant constitutional question absent clear expression that
such interpretation was Congress's intent.
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).

Se~LRB

v. Catholic

Application of the Act to

the states would interfere with the integral operations of state
functions and threaten rights reserved to the states by the lOth A.
Discussion
I.
A.

Statute and Statutory Construction

Face of the Statute.

The Act does not state whether it

applies to sales to state and local governmental agencies.

The

Court has affirmed, however, the comprehensive coverage of the
antitrust laws and has recognized that they represent "a carefully

studied attempt to bring within the[m] every person engaged in
business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial
intercourse among the states."
Underwriters Association, 322

United States v. South-Eastern

u.s.

533, 553 (1944).

The terms

"persons" and "purchasers" are sufficiently broad to cover
governmental bodies.

See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking

Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)

(citing with approval Rangen,

Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 858-859 (CA9 1965)
(holding that, under §13(c) and circumstances of case, "any person"
includes state governmental procurement officers)).

The Court has

held that the word "person," as used in the Clayton Act and the
Sherman Act, includes states and their political subdivisions.
Community Communications Co., Inc.

835,

843 ~(" [The

v. ~:y

See

of Boulder, 102 S.Ct.

antitrust laws], like other federal laws

imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course apply
to municipalities as well as to other corporate entities."); City of

~afayette
(1978)

v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435

u.s.

389, 394-397

(plurality opinion).

The Act expressly applies to discrimination in prices between
the purchasers of like commodities "where such commodities are sold
for use, consumption, or resale."

15

u.s.c.

§13(a).

A price

discrimination in favor of a purchaser who buys for his own use or
consumption violates the Act no less than does a discrimination in
favor of a purchaser who resells, provided that there is injury to
competition.

If, therefore, governmental purchases are subject to

the Act, absent some exemption, it applies regardless of the
government's intended use of the goods.

B.

Rule of Statutory Construction.

Petr argues that there is

no ambiguity in the R-P Act and that the face of the Act contains no
per se exemption in favor of sales to state and local governmental
agencies.

Petr contends that there is thus no need to resort to the

legislative history of the Act to determine whether Congress
intended to exempt sales to state and local governmental agencies
from its proscriptions.
(1949).

E. g., Ex parte Collett, 337

u.s.

55, 61

The Court, however, has retreated from this principle and

held that legislative history should be considered even though the
language of a statute appears to be clear.
Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981)

c.

See, e. g., Watt v.

(POWELL, J.).
Resps argue that the prospect that
/b~

its purchases--not only for its

v

universities and hospitals, but also for its highways, highway ~
patrol, ~r isons /~~ourts, etc. --might be subject to the R-P Act (
raises substantial questions under the lOth A.

.
In Cat h ol1c

~
. h~
BlS
op,

the Court stated that, where the application of a statute to a

p~

1-c~
"would give rise to serious constitutional questions," the Courtt ? A J

must first identify 'the affirmative intention of Congress clear~
expressed' before concluding that the Act" applies.

440 U.S., at

Cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-30

501.
(1937)

(in light of lOth A challenge, duty to adopt interpretation

"[e]ven to avoid a serious doubt" of constitutionality).
II.
A.

-

Constitutional Problem

lOth A Problems for Blanket Application of Act to State and

Local Governmental Purchasing.

In United Transportation Union v.

Long Island R.R., 102 S.Ct. 1349 (1982), the Court set forth three

.,.,.

conditions for finding that a statute conflicts with the lOth A:

(1}

the statute regulates the states as states; (2} it addresses matters
that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty; and (3} it
directly impairs the states' ability to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional functions.

Id., at 1353 (quoting

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc.,
452

u.s. 264, 287-288 (1981}}.
1.

States as States.

Resps argue that, if the Act were to

be construed as applicable to state institutions, it would regulate
the states as states.

Such regulation includes the regulation of

state institutions, because they "derive their authority and power
from their respective States" and provide "integral governmental
services" within the ambit of the lOth A protection.

National

League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 n.20 (1976}.

Because

the CAll's judgment would apply to all state institutions, it is
difficult to contend that it would not act on the states as states
as to at least some governmental functions, if not to the hospital
and the university here.
2.

"Attribute of State Sovereignty."

Resps contend that, if

the R-P Act interferes with the relationship between a state and its
suppliers by removing the state's freedom to negotiate prices below
prevailing trade levels for goods purchased, then the Act regulates
an attribute of state sovereignty to no less an extent than did the
FLSA in National League of Cities when it attempted to interfere
with the state's freedom to compensate its employees less generously
than does private industry.

Similarly, because a state's execution

of its functions depends upon the expenditure of state funds to

purchase various goods, the attributes of state sovereignty
necessarily include appropriation of state funds, the state's
purchase of goods, and the state's disposition of those goods.

It

would seem that each of those attributes is affected when the price
the state pays for the goods, and the price at which it resells
goods, is subject to federal control.
3.

Integral Operation of Traditional State Functions.

Resps

argue that, without some immunity, the Act impacts upon every
function of state government, including its most traditional
functions, because the Act constitutes an across-the-board
regulation of purchasing, is not limited to any particular goods,
supplier, or industry, and is expressly applicable to all purchases,
whether for resale, use, or consumption.
Act in indistinguishable from the FLSA.

In this respect, the R-P
This Court expressly

recognized in National League of Cities that "schools and
hospitals ••• provid[e] an integral portion of those governmental
services which the States and their political subdivisions have
traditionally afforded their citizens."

426 U.S., at 855.

If the R-P Act applies to state purchases for consumption,
because a favorable price could cause competitive injury at the
primary line of competition, see Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 (1967)

("Sellers may not sell like goods to

different purchasers at different prices if the result may be to
injure competition in either the seller's or the buyers'

{4 market ..•• ")

~

/f
l

(emphasis added), the state would be a potential deft

in a case brought by a competitor of the state's supplier every time
the state purchases goods for its many functions.

Because the Act

would thus treat states as it does private businesses and prevent
them from securing favorable discounts, higher prices for
governmental operations would translate into a some mix of fewer
governmental services or higher taxes.

This is the same impact

found fatal in National League of Cities.
4.

Conclusion.

The Court's opinion in Catholic Bishop would

suggest that, because the extension of the R-P Act's coverage to
state and local governmental purchasing presents "a significant
risk" that the lOth A will be infringed, and because "[t]here is no
clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress" to include

as }

state and local governmental purchasing, the Act should be read

at least exempting certain state and local governmental purchasing (

'j;--

from its scope.

---

__..-

B.

Tenth Amendment Challenge to a Limited Application.

In

your dissent from denial of cert in this case, you indicated that
National League of Cities would

~t

pose a problem to coverage of a

state's retail operations, because "[r]etail sale of drugs to
members of the general public is hardly an attribute of state
sovereignty."

I~

Although the activities of a hospital clearly

implicate a public interest, it is true that the functions performed
by it have not been traditionally associated with sovereignty, and
have long been at least partly in the private domain rather than the
prerogative of the state.

Thus, its activities--including

so clearly governmental in nature as to
a public function.
Conclusion.

Application of the R-P Act to the state's

.
\\pure h as1ng
.
" woul d g1ve
.
.
.
t'consumpt1on
r1se
to ser1ous"
lOth A concerns.

ctJWr\, ~'>

Petr's interpretation of the Act as fully applicable to all state
and local governmental purchasing must be rejected unless there

is ~

an "affirmative intention" "clearly expressed" to provide such
coverage.

Application of the R-P Act to the retail activities

challenged here raises no significant constitutional concerns.

---

The

question as to that limited coverage is whether there is any basis

---

in_the statute or in the legislative history for contending that

Congress intended such an interpretation of the Act's scope.
III.

----------------------------------------Legislative History and Application of Act
to All Governmental Purchases

It is fair to say that the immediate purpose of the R-P Act was
not to regulate competitive bidding by state and local governmental
agencies, but to curb the purchasing power of chain stores.
~,

See,

~

1 ABA Antitrust Section, The Robinson-Patman Act: Policy and Law

8-19 (ABA Monograph No. 4, 1980).
A.

Original Legislation.

1.

Reports.

There is apparently nothing in the Senate or

House committee or conference reports discussing the issue.
2.

Debates.

There is apparently nothing in the Senate or

House floor debates addressing the issue presented.
3.

Hearings.

In testimony given before the House Judiciary

Committee by H.B. Teegarden, a representative of the

u.s.

Wholesale

Grocers Association and principal draftsman of the R-P Act, the
following exchange took place:
Mr. Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent
the granting of discounts to the United States Government?
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act
does so. So far as that problem is concerned, it is no

different from that which exists under the present Clayton
Act.
Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge
discounts. Take that electric fan, for instance. You go
to the ordinary store and the list price is $35. The
Procurement Division procures them delivered, one at a
time, for $13.18. Now, would that discount be barred by
this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a
discount contrary to the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law--would be barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal
Government is not in competition with other buyers from
these concerns. Therefore a discrimination--it is so
applied universally in interstate commerce law, in the
railroad law--to have a discrimination, there must be a
relative position between the parties to the
discrimination which constitutes an injury to one as
against the other.
I think the answer is to be found in
that.
In other words, if seller A makes a price to a
retailer in New York and a different price to a retailer
in San Francisco, all other things aside, no case of
discrimination could be predicated there, because the two
are not in the same sphere at all.
The Federal Government is saved by the same
distinction, not of location but of function. They are
not in competition with anyone else who would buy.
Mr. Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding
all along the line, would it not, in classes of goods that
would be covered by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on
Government orders?
Mr. Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality.
Mr. Teegarden:
Mr. Michener:
it, would you?

No~

I think not.

If it did do it, you would not want

Mr. Teegarden: No~ I would not want it.
It
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding anywhere
else, and I do not see how it would with the Government.
Mr. Hancock: You would have to bid to the city,
county, exactly the same as anybody else, same quantity,
same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden. No.

Mr. Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city
hospital any chea~er than they would to a privately-owned
hospital, under t is bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way.
In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous
questions of fact in a particular case.
If the two
hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not
save it from the bill. If they are not in competition
with each other, then they are in a different sphere.
Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to
Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935)
(emphasis added)

[hereinafter 1935 Hearings].
"I......_

l . tt en b r1e
. f t o th e
Mr. Teegar d en su b sequen tl y su bm 1. tt e d a f wr1
House Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Teegarden then not only interpreted

the Act's prohibitions as directed to nongovernmental entities, but
he also stated that the Act's benefits would accrue to private
entities.

See 1935 Hearings, supra, at 261 (recommending passage

"for the protection of private rights").

More specifically, he

stated:
2. Would the bill prevent competitive bidding on
Governmental
purchases
below trade price levels?
L-_ ____________
_
This question was raised by a member of the committe
at the hearing. The answer is found in the principle of
statutory construction that a statute will not be
construed to limit or restrict in any way the rights,
prerogatives, or privileges of the sovereign unless it so
expressly provides--a principle inherited by American
jurisprudence from the common law •..•
The further insertion of the clause proposed under
topic 4 below, requiring a showing of effect upon
competition, will further preclude any possibilty of the
bill affecting the Government.

lr~~
~

I

Id., at 250 (emphasis added).

~ps

contend that the principle

"

regarding application of a statute to the sovereign applies to both
state and ___fu§~ral governments.

Although Mr. Teegarden may have

intended to include both state and federal governments in the

' '·

•'

principle, the principle itself generally means that the government,
in passing a law, does not give up what it does not expressly
surrender.

At most, the rule of statutory construction supports an

exemption for the federal government's purchases.
"'::::--~

States v. Cooper Corp., 312

Compare United

u.s. 600, 606 (1941) (United States not

"person" within meaning of §7 of Sherman Act), with Georgia v.
Evans, 316

1.

u.s. 159, 162 (1942) (state is person within meaning of

AG's Comments.

A contemporaneous construction of a new law

by an official charged with its enforcement is highly persuasive of
the statute's proper meaning.
U.S. 1, 16 (1965).

See, e. g., Udall v. Tallman, 380

Six months after the Act was passed, the U.S. AG

responded to an inquiry by the Secretary of War regarding the Act's
application "to government contracts for supplies."
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 31 (1963) •

W. Patman,
In ruling that

such contracts are outside the Act, the AG explained his conclusion
on the same grounds cited by Mr. Teegarden:
[Statutes] regulating rates, charges, etc., in
matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily apply the
Government unless it is expressly so provided; and it does
not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make
such statutes applicable to the Government ..••
The Act of June 19, 1936, merely amended the Act of
October 15, 1914 .•• and, in so far as I am aware, the
latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as applicable
to Government contracts.

Ibid (later in the letter using phrase "Federal Government").

The

AG therefore had several reasons "for avoiding a construction that
would make the statute applicable to the Government in violation of
the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters, in the absence
of any clear indication that it intended to depart from that policy
in this instance."

Id., at 32 (relying upon Emergency Fleet Corp.

v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275

u.s.

415, 425 (1928), in which

this Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates to a
federal corporation that competed with private enterprise).
It is difficult to read the AG's opinion as saying anything
about the Act's applicability to state and local governmental
agencies.

The AG's statement of the principle of sovereign immunity

does not extend to state and local governments, particularly when
they act in a proprietary capacity.

The AG's argument, however,

that discounted sales to the federal government seldom would cause
the competitive injury required to find a violation of the R-P Act
reinforces the fact that the opinion does not contemplate a
situation involving governmental competition with private
enterprises.
2.

Patman.

Rep. Patman, however, interpreted the AG's opinion

as exempting local and state governmental purchases:
No. 62. Question. If a manufacturer sells to
government, municipal, or public institutions at a lower
price than he sells to his wholesale customers, is he in
violation of the law if he does not make the same price
for the same quantity available to the wholesaler to whom
he sells?
Opinion. The Attorney General of the United States
has ruled that the Act does not apply to the government.
No. 63. Questions. If a manufacturer sells his
product to wholesalers, and also sells to government,
municipal, or public institutions at a price lower than he

·•'

sells to his wholesale customers to meet the price of his
competitor, how does the law apply?
Opinion. The Robinson-Patman Act does not apply.
W. Patman, The Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963).
Rep. Patman's interpretation of the Act is certainly entitled
to weight, but here he seems to be relying on the AG's opinion,
which may not, as noted above, be applicable to state and local
governments.
\\..

C.

Subsequent t t egislative Events.

~ (u~fo~~ na ~ y)

It is now established

that post-enactment action or inaction by Congress

in the face of judicial or administrative construction of a statute
provides evidence of legislative intent.

Se ~errill Lynch, Pierce,

Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1839 (1982); FTC v.
Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349, 351-352 (1941)

(rejecting a proposed

interpretation of the Clayton Act because, among other reasons, the
FTC had never asserted such an interpretation despite 25 years of
administrative enforcement of a statute that Congress had not
amended) .

--

1938 Exemption for Nonprofit Institutions.
because Congress addressed

the question of

Petr contends

exemptions when it

for sales to nonprofit institutions, the Legislative

--

clearly and succinctly, did not see fit to include
exemption for sales to state and local governmental agencies.
~

-~

Because the Nonprofit Institutions Act of 1938 did not exempt

~'~)overnment
~~~ace

purchases, application of the Act to such purchases would

the government in a less favorable position than eleemosynary

~~~ titutions.
~al

Resps, on the other hand, argue that the only

interpretation is that Congress did not include

governmental agencies in the 1938 Act because they were not covered
by the R-P Act in the first place.
Merely the existence of an exemption for nonprofit institutions
is poor support for either party's contentions.
2.

1951 and 1953 Bills.

In 1951 and 1953, Rep. Patman

introduced bills to amend the Act by adding a new section,
immediately following §2(f)

(pertaining to liability of buyers) to

define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any
political subdivision thereof."

H.R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.

(1951); H.R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).

Rep. Patman's

amendments would not have imposed liability upon the state as a
purchaser by merely defining "purchaser," because the Act does not
impose liability upon a "purchaser," but rather upon any "person"
who (i) discriminates in price between "purchasers," §2(a), or (ii)
knowingly induces or receives a discrimination in price, §2(f).

His

bills would, however, have imposed liability upon any manufacturer
that discriminates in price between government (state or federal)
and other customers.

The bills apparently would have applied to

purchases for consumption as well as resale.

It is arguable that,

if the word "purchaser" did not (absent an amendment) include
government, then the word "person" did not include the government.
3.

Hearings.

In 1967 and 1968, Congress conducted public

hearings on the drug industry.

The House committee learned that

drug manufacturers often sell to governmental (federal, state,
county, and city) agencies at favorable prices.

See Competitive

Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on

~-

.

'

..,;

Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 15, 1094.
a.

NARD.

Two examples of the testimony will suffice:

Earl Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, who appeared

on behalf of NARD, stated: "When a drug supplier sells drugs to
Federal, State, or municipal government institutions, the price
charged by the supplier may be without regard to the Robinson-Patman
Act."

H. Rep. 90-1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968)

(citing as

authority Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16
(SDNY 1955)

(dicta), aff'd, 234 F.2d 959 (CA2 1956); F. Rowe, Price

Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 84-85 (1962)).

"To the

extent that these governmental purchasers resell or redistribute the
drugs to confined patients, there would probably be no adverse
competitive effects in any event because the community pharmacies
are not functionally in competition with such institutions for such
drug sales, under settled Robinson-Patman precedent."
1983, supra, at 7.

H. Rep. 90-

Mr. Kintner then construed the Act as applicable

to purchases by private institutions if purchased for resale.

Id. ,

at 8.
b.

Dixon.

-

FTC Chairman Paul Dixon discussed, in a letter to

the House Subcommittee, the practice of granting discounts to
hospitals: "This agency, of course, does not have, nor does it seek,
control or influence over State or Federal health care programs or
their potential effect on private markets."

Id., at 74.

The FTC

was expressly aware of
"the eroding influence--on the market of retail druggists-presented by expanding Federal, State and private group
health care programs, the ability of the Federal
Government to purchase from a number of drug manufacturers
at substantially below wholesale cost and in some

instances hospitals, both nonprofit and proprietary,
selling to outpatients or even nonpatients. Id., at 73.
This disclaimer of any authority over transactions involving state
health care programs by the FTC, which is entrusted with enforcement
of the Act, is entitled to weight.
4.

Committee Action in 1968.

The Committee concluded that the

Act should "be applied to discriminatory drug sales favoring
nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to
the extent there is prescription drug competition at the retail
level with disfavored retail druggists."
added).

Id., at 79 (emphasis

See e. g., id., at 77 (noting "[t]he difference between

drug pri9es charged retailers and wholesalers as compared to those
charged institutional and governmental customers"): id., at 78
(singling out "[n]ongovernmental health-care institutions" for their
"competition with neighboring retail druggists").
C.

~ clu~

It is safe to say that there is no

"affirmative intention" "clearly expressed" to include all
governmental purchasing within the scope of the R-P Act.

~

petr's interpretation must be rejected.
t

Thus,

On the other hand, although

subsequent legislative inaction would suggest that Congress is not

~atisfied

with the general belief that governmental purchases are

exempt from the R-P Act, there is also little basis for a per se
exemption for all state and local governmental purchasing.
IV.
A.
construe

Limited Exemption

General Principles.

Petr contends that the Court could

o support an exemption for state-supported activities
(

where the state or local government is functioning as a consumer
"
rather than as a competitor. The Court has stated, however, that

'

any exemptions from the antitrust laws should be construed narrowly.
See, e. g., Portland Retail Druggists, 425 U.S., at 11-12: FMC v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973).

~

B.

~~
~

,1/'f~~o

Legislative History.

The

for nonprofit institutions

~ly exemptiory from

containe~ ,

which

years after the R-P Act was enacted: "Nothing in the [R-P Ac

shall apply to purchases of their supplies for their own use by

~ ~chools, ~lleges, ~iversities,vpublic libr ;ries,~hurches,

~ ~x; -l:"2.s_12it~ls, ~-!hari table
~~

e House and

~~pplyin~

~-

~
Y'

S ~nate

institutions not operated for profit."

Reports specifically refer to this Act as

to eleemosynary

inst : tuti~~s,

which are commonly understood

to mean £rivate charitable entities, and neither speaks of the
amendment applying to aqy governmental agency.

See S. Rep. No.

1769, 75th Cong., 3d/sess. (1938): H.R. Rep. No. 2161, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938).

It is at least questionable whether Congress

included in the 1938 Act government schools, libraries, or
hospitals--the only three entities mentioned that might be
governmental--and thus treated these bodies more favorably than
numerous other governmental agencies not named.
Petr and the NARD contend, however, that §13c was intended to
protect governmental institutions to the extent they purchased
supplies for their own use.

Rep. Walter, sponsor of the Nonprofit

Institutions Act, was involved in one floor debate on the subject:
Mr. Sabath: Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to
object, may I inquire of the gentleman whether this bill
~{.Y) .. f' \ will also apply to institutions that are maintained and
L ~
controlled by municipalities and cities. Many of the
~~
institutions that are financed by municipalities and by
,\
p tate might come a o '~ nder its provisions?

,L
vJVV-

~~-eiJ· ~~ . ~~~
tfp) ~P-~LY)./~ j}~
~c~?/r~
't

Mr. Walter: The bill clearly covers that class of
institution. All cha~itable institutions are cove' e by
the provisions o'f this "1'hll. c~r i- ~
Mr. Sabath: Does the gentleman think a county
hospital or a city sanitarium wholly financed by a city,
county or State, would come within the provisions of this
act?
Mr. Walter: Yes, I do.
81 Cong. Rec. 8706 (1937).

But see id., at 8705 ("The purpose of

the bill is to enable an institution maintained by public
subscriptions in whole or part to receive discounts for purchases of
"
goods for t lu1ts own use.").

This is the strongest evidence of
.

'

Congress's intent whether the R-P Act applies, at all, to state and
local governments.
536, 553 (1960)

--- Inc., 363
But see FTC v. Anheuser-Buscn,

(warning against reliance "upon a statement of a

single Congressman").

The Court has implicitly agreed with this

See~ty of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397 n.l4 (plurality

reading.
opinion)

u.s.

(noting that Congress included within the 1938 jet "public
........

~

libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by local
government").
I

Thus, it is a defensible interpretation that

purchases by all nonprofit hospitals and universities, governmental

---

and private, fit within this exemption as long as they are for the

--

.............

institution's
...._________"own use."

~---------------

See Portland Retail Druggists, 425 U.S.,

at 14 (exempting only drug purchases made by a nonprofit hospital
for use that "promotes the hospital's intended institutional
operation in the care of persons who are its patients").
C.

Conclusion.

"intended"

It is probably fair to say that, if Congress

~exemption,

<"'

such an exemption was to cover purchases

--

for government consumption only.

It seems relatively certain that

Congress did not intend to sanction anticompetitive bid purchasing

,.

by governmental agencies for the purpose of those agencies competing
with private enterprise.

Congress probably did not foresee

------

governmental agencies entering the retail market for pharmaceutical
drugs or any other consumer item.
Summary
The DC and CA's holding is that governmental purchases, at
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional
governmental purposes, are beyond the intended reach of the R-P Act.
Thus, the Court need only to reverse that ruling and does not
,,. l\..\
necessarily have to find or create an exemption for consumpt1ve
purchasing.

As the memo shows, however, I have found it difficult

to discuss the former without discussing the latter, and the Court
probably should not worry about making a somewhat broader ruling
than is absolutely necessary.

Under current doctrine, the analysis

would probably proceed in this manner:
1.

Find Catholic Bishop problem for no exemption,

~

problem

/\

for limited exemption.

------

2.

Find legislative history supports a §13c exemption, as
·"" /
u
,,
defined in Portland Retail Druggists, for comsumption purchasing by
governmental hospitals and schools.
3.

Reverse.

job 11/07/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories, No. 81-827

I was unable to track down all the legislative history upon
which the parties (and I in this memo) rely.

What materials I did

find, however, gave me some asssurance of the accuracy of the
quotations cited and of the thoroughness of research reflected in
the briefs.

81-827 JEFFERSON CO. PHARMACEUTICAL v. ABBOTT
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Argued 11/8/82
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job 11/09/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories, No. 81-827

You asked me to outline the steps necessary to find an
exemption under §13c for the consumption purchasing of public
schools, hospitals, and libraries, but reverse the CAll's finding of
a broad exemption for all governmental purchasing.

I also set forth

another possible route of decision.
I.
1.

Bench Memo's Suggestion

Petr's Argument.

Although petr's arguments are not always

consistent, it is fair to say that petr makes two alternative
arguments:

(1) the Robinson-Patman Act applies to all governmental

purchasing; and (2) the R-P Act only applies to that governmental
purchasing not exempted by §13c.
a.

The options are thus:

Catholic Bishop Problem for Blanket Application.

Blanket

application of the R-P Act to all governmental purchasing would
create lOth A problems.

Under NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,

440 U.S. 490 (1979), where the application of a statute to a party
"would give rise to serious constitutional questions," the Court
must first identify 'the affirmative intention of Congress clearly
expressed' before concluding that the Act" applies.

The issue is

thus whether blanket application of the R-P Act to all governmental

2.

purchasing was the "clearly expressed" "affirmative intention" of
Congress in 1936.
b.

Limited Application of Act to

·~

Purchasing for Resale.

This limited application raises no lOth A problem, because retail
sale of drugs is not a traditional state function.

The issue here

is whether there is sufficient basis for finding that Congress
intended §13c to apply to governmental agencies.
c.

CAll's View.

The issue here is whether Congress intended

such a broad exemption.
3.

Statutory History.

congressional intent.

All the Court's choices depend upon

There is little support for the CAll's

position in the legislative history, and no affirmative intention
clearly expressed of Congress's intent to apply the R-P Act to all
governmental purchasing.

The strongest evidence is for some §13c

exemption for the consumption purchasing of governmental libararies,
schools, and universities.

The Court's holding in Abbott

Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists, 425

u.s.

1 (1976), would

thus be equally applicable to governmental drug purchasing for
retail sale.
II.
If youj

Another Route

are willing to disregard (or discard) Catholic Bishop's

unprincipled statutory construction rule, you could--most fairly-find little legislative history to support~ exemption for
governmental purchasing.

You then could say that, if the R-P Act is

limited, it must be by the lOth A.

The Court need not define that

limit in this case, because the cplt here does not implicate a
traditional state function •
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.JUST ICE .JOHN PAUL S TEVENS

November 12, 1982

Re:

81-827 - Jefferson Co. Pharmaceutical
v. Abbott Laboratories

Dear Chief:

~

l

After further reflection I have decided to vote to
affirm. I am now persuaded that the approach that Bill
Rehnquist took in his Blue Chip opinion should be followed
here. Regardless of how the Court might have regarded the
availability of a lOb(S) cause of action if it had
confronted the question in the 1940's or 1950's, the general
recognition of such a claim in the intervening years really
compelled the Court to accept such claims as a legitimate
part of our law.
In a way this case presents the other side
of a similar coin. Even though I would have sustained the
claim such as the petitioners if it had arisen in the 1940's
or 1950's, it seems wrong to ignore the consistent and
virtually uniform understanding of the legal and business
community that the Robinson-Patman Act simply does not apply
to sales to governmental entities. Even without any ruling2
from this Court, the considerations that underlie the
_1 ~
doctrine of stare decisis seem fully applicable.
~~

f-

A multitude of marketing relationships have
unquestionably been developed on the assumption that the
statute is wholl ina licable to this area of the economy.
I am inclined to elieve tna~ tne vast maj o rity of those
relationships would remain undisturbed by a holding that the
statute is applicable because few would pose any practical
threat to competition. Nevertheless, the process of reexamination with its attendant litigation costs would give
rise to the adverse consequences that the doctrine of stare
decisis is intended to forestall.
Moreover, if we take the petitioner's counsel at his
word and assume that not only all sales for the university's

....

- 2 -

own use but also all sales for resale to students, faculty,
and possibly their families as well, are beyond the reach of
the Act, that which remains seems relatively insignificant.
In sum, although I would have voted otherwise thirty or
forty years ago, I am now inclined to let the sleeping dog
lie.
Respectfully,

~~
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

lfp/ss 12/20/82

ABBOTT SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Dec. 20, 1982

81-827 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n
This memorandum records general impressions on
the basis of a hurried reading of your draft.

It is

evident that you have done an enormous amount of research,
and you have used the materials thoughtfully and - for the
most part - persuasively.
I nevertheless would like to discuss with you a
different organization of the opinion.
with some hesitation as I
1
~~~~~~~,

haQ'~

but I did want to

separate for the holidays.

I suggest this

only gtrne through vout
~ 1-1-.A.t•l~ to ~~u before we

6

2.

The present structure of the opinion, after Part
I, seems to me to be as follows:
Part II leads off with some excellent quotations
as to the comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws.
Commencing on p. 7, and continuing top. 13, the draft
addresses primarilv the "issue" whether a state or local
hospital may be a "purchaser" or a "person" under the Act.
Part III-A discusses legislative history, III-B
is limited to the opinions of the u.s.A.G., and that of
the California A.G., but with a full footnote on
Representative Patman (n. 28).
Part III-C addresses respondent's reliance

~~~-

~-

-----~- This

on--~

extends from p. 19 top. 26, and seems a

0
good bit too long.

3.

Part IV is a nice closing jury

argument ~ t;-loJat ~

~·
Certainly the foregoing organization is an
acceptable way to write the opinion.

But let me try out

on you a different organization:
First:
before us.

make clear the narrowness of the issue

We are not concerned with federal government

purchases and sales; only those to a state and stale and

loca~ndeed,
~

we are not concerned in this case

by purchases for use in traditional governmental
functions.

Rather, the only issue before us involves

aA
purchases and sales for the non-government function of
~

competing in the retail pharmacv and drug store market
with private enterprise.

Yet, the court helow held - and

respondents contend - that the Act exempts all purchases

J1- J.t.~~p~ LA.---~~~

t--1-

4.

~~~~ ,L.v · ~-

~~~
and sales by a

purchase and use of the goods purchased.
Part II could ~ open ~ with a paragraph to the
foregoing effect.

.. tv-IL~
Then, i • tR.e-rQ -R-ei! mer-i'h 4-n f
11

opinion in the

structu ~the

~~~,·-~

customary · way ~ R

congressional intent?

-t-

whiefi ue esceFtaiR

We commence

by~~ting

the

~~~

You state this very well in the first sentence of the
opinion on p. 1.
is

.

~ ~ ~ ~LAA-.-.,..'""LA-~&<..o{
ORe of COiigi eS"s4.GRa;J.

We

Dl{

~

iR ~ •

. ~fW.e__
~ look to the language itself. AI ~fi:i:Hk ~
~

-

~~.u~~~~
-een-ttl argue that the plain langua~~ controls. ~ In u;i.w·z ~
>

~t-H.-~l~~~ P-1~~~)
q

~~ broad scope,( the burden ~Y is on those who

.

<'

~
.

~·

5•

~

,) t.Q.

state and

loca ~ nti ties/\

exemption is viewed as extending to purchases
competing in the private market.
As a part of the "plain language" point, you can
dispose of whether state and local governmental agencies
come within the terms "purchaser" and "person".

My

recollection is that respondents do not deny being
included within these terms.

It therefore seems

unnecessary to make the rather extended argument presently
in pp. 8-13.

You do have some excellent language from

these cases that

~~~the opinion

at some other point.

We oculd, of course, in

acknowledging respondent's concession in this respect, say
that this was compelled by several decisions of this

assuming ambiguity,

comprehensive coverage

of

. 5 and
legislative history discussion logically would come next.
I would be a little more affirmative at the beginning (p.
11) .

~~fiape

k/e could say that in view of the purpose of

the Act, and the absence of any relevant exemption
language, the legislative history falls far short of
supporting respondent's claim.

. ,.,.

his is certainly

Such an opening could be followed with the
stronger portions of your section on legislative history.
Perhaps you could at least reduce the length of n. 26.
I would not be inclined, at least in our initial

~

circulation, to include the twoAparagraphs on attorney

generals' opinions.

~ld~~

lead into the U.S.

Attorney General's opinion by a citation to Udall.
fAA-

4:-~

Rather, can we not dismiss the
1\

u.s.

Attorney General's

opinion as clearly applying only to the federal
government.
Finally, we

~

come to what is probably the

toughest part of our opinion:
interpretation of the Act.

\ '

dealing with the judicial

My impression is that the

8.

present discussion is a good deal too long and detailed.

~bI am not f am1'1'1ar

~

positively

a~ ta~

. h t he
w1t
~~~iR~

case ~

I b e 1'1eve we can state

that this Court has never held

or suggested that the claimed exemption must be read into
the Act.

I believe you say - and if so it is important -

that until CAS's decision in this case no Court of Appeals
had so held.

This would leave us with the District Court

cases to deal with.

It is not entirely clear to me from

your draft whether there is even a single District Court

decis~n

on the issue before us:

Whether, assuming that

the federal government is entirely exempt and further
assuming - without deciding - that state and local
entities may be exempt with respect to governmental
$"

function, has any case held that an exemption exists that
1\

9.

enables state and local entities to compete

"'0 0

~

A

~

,<...

in the private markets?

* * *
The foregoing is quite sketchy, and I have not
been nearly as thoughtful as you have been.

I have

dictated the foregoing primarily for purposes of a
discussion with you.
In our brief discussion yesterday, you raised a
question whether we should anticipate - as fully as you
have - what the dissenting opinion will say.

My

inclination is not to go quite so far, or so fully in
anticipation, as the present draft.

We certainly need to

address the principal arguments made by

this~be

responde~,
-

._;I

but

done quite as judiciously as you have done.

1\

After all, as Potter Stewart once told me, when writing

. ,,'

10.

~~~
for the Court vou are an advocate and want your opinion to
t\

be affirmative and convincing.

A judge - particularly a

Justice here - also must be fair and
principal arguments against his view.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

,,

... ~. ·~\...

~t

recognize the
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ABBOTT SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Dec. 20, 1982

81-827 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n
This memorandum records general impressions on the
basis of a hurried reading of your draft.

It is evident

that you have done an enormous amount of research, and you
have used the materials thoughtfully and - for the most part
- persuasively.
I nevertheless would like to discuss with you a
different organization of the opinion.
some hesitation,

I suggest this with

but I did want to discuss this before we

separate for the holidays.
The present structure of the opinion, after Part
I, seems to me to be as follows:
Part II leads off with some excellent quotations
as to the comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws.
Commencing on p. 7, and continuing top. 13, the draft addresses primarily the "issue" whether a state or local hospital may be a "purchaser" or a "person" under the Act.
Part III-A discusses legislative history, III-B is
limited to the opinions of the U.S.A.G., and that of the
California A.G., but with a full footnote on Representative
Patman (n. 28).

2.

Part III-C addresses respondent's reliance on judicial decisions.

This extends from p. 19 to p. 26, and

seems a good bit too long.
Part IV is a nice closing jury argument.
Certainly the foregoing organization is an acceptable way to write the opinion.

But let me try out on you a

different organization:
First:
before us.

make clear the narrowness of the issue

We are not concerned with federal government

purchases and sales; only those to a state as8

et~te

and

local government entities. Indeed, we are not concerned in
~~
this case p(purchases for use in traditional governmental
functions.

Rather, the only issue before us involves pur-

chases and sales for the non-governmental function of competing in the retail pharmacy and drug store market with
private enterprise.

Yet, the court below held - and respon-

dents contend - that the Act exempts all purchases and sales
by a state and its agencies regardless of the purpose of the
purchase and use of the goods purchased.

If

hY~~
~

is an im-

~

plied exemption, it does not extend to non-governmental purposes.
Part II could open with a paragraph to the foregoing effect.
Then, we could structure the opinion in the customary way where the issue is congressional intent f' We commence by restating the question.

You state this very well

3.

in the first sentence of the opinion on p. 1.

The answer

turns on what Congress intended.
We look first to the language itself.

We can ar-

gue that the plain language controls. No such exception is
expressed, and in view of the purpose and broad scope of the
Act's language, the burden is on those who would argue that
Congress intended - but did not choose to say so - that
state and local entities could compete unfairly with private
business.
As a part of the "plain language" point, you can
dispose of whether state and local governmental agencies
come within the terms "purchaser" and "person".

My recol-

lection is that respondents do not deny being included within these terms.

It therefore seems unnecessary to make the

rather extended argument presently in pp. 8-13.

You do have

some excellent language from these cases that can be worked
into the opinion at some other point.

We could, of course,

in acknowledging respondent's concession in this respect,
say that this was compelled by several decisions of this
Court.

These could be cited either in the text or a

footnote.
Perhaps we should concede that, despite the absence of an express exemption, it is unlikely that Congress
would have intended the Act to apply to purchases for governmental use as contrasted with entering private markets.
We look to the legislative history to see whether the latter
also could have been intended.

The legislative history dis-

4.

cussion logically would come next.

I would be a little more

affirmative at the beginning (p. 11) •

We could say that in

view of the purpose of the Act, and the absence of any relevant exemption language, the legislative history falls far
short of supporting respondent's claim.
I would make the point that before Congress considered leaving state entities free to compete unfairly with
the private sector, surely it would have held hearings on an
issue of such importance.

Such an opening could be followed

with the stronger portions of your section on legislative
history.

Perhaps you could at least reduce the length of n.

26.

I would not be inclined, at least in our initial
circulation, to include the two present paragraphs on attorney generals' opinions.

Nor would I lead into the

torney General's opinion by a citation to Udall.
can we not dismiss in a note the

u.s.

u.s.

At-

Rather,

Attorney General's

opinion as clearly applying only to the federal government.
Finally, we come to what is probably the toughest
part of our opinion:
tion of the Act.

dealing with the judicial interpreta-

My impression is that the present discus-

sion is a good deal too long and detailed.

Although I am

not familiar with the cases, I believe we can state positively that this Court has never held or suggested that the
claimed exemption must be read into the Act.

I believe you

say - and if so it is important - that until CAS's decision
in this case no Court of Appeals had so held.

This would

5.

leave us with the District Court cases to deal with.

It is

not entirely clear to me from your draft whether there is
even a single District Court decision on the issue before
us:

Whether, assuming that the federal government is en-

tirely exempt and further assuming - without deciding - that
state and local entities may be exempt with respect to governmental functions, has any case held that an exemption
exists that enables state and local entities to compete unfairly in the private markets?

* * *
The foregoing is quite sketchy, and I have not
been nearly as thoughtful as you have been.

I have dictated

the foregoing primarily for purposes of a discussion with
you.
In our brief discussion yesterday, you raised a
question whether we should anticipate - as fully as you have
- what the dissenting opinion will say.

My inclination is

not to go quite so far, or so fully in anticipation, as the
present draft.

We certainly need to address the principal

arguments made by respondents, but this need not be done
quite as judiciously as you have done.

After all, as Potter

Stewart once told me, when writing for the Court you are an
advocate for the majority and want your opinion to be affirmative and convincing.

A judge -particularly a Justice

here - also must be fair and recognize the principal arguments against his view.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

~:

!·~
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ABBOTT SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Dec. 20, 1982

,.,

81-827 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n
··~

This memorandum records general impressions on the

r

'

basis of a hurried reading of your draft • .· It is evident

.

that you have done an enormous amount of research, and you
have used the materi~ls thoughtfullY and - for the most part
-~- ~;·

different organization of the opinion.
_(l

some hesitation,

I sugqest this with

but I did want to discuss thi.s before we
~

separate for the holidays.

'-~<

iff,

'I

~

"

• }

-..~

-~

~·-·-~ 1·-· ,.:"'

The present structure of

th~

opinion, after Part

>t''

I, seems to me to be as follows:
~~~.~~

'';.,~

" -r~ "',''

,.}

.\!

~-!

.:'f·~:~~

Part "II

lea~s

off with some excellent quotations

; d./

as to thP comprehensiva coverage of the antitrust laws.
Co~mencing
dresse~

:.:

'~f;

_.,,·

on p. 7, and continuing top. 13, the draft ad-

primarily the "issue" whether a state or local hos-

pital may be

·£

"~

a, ~ "purchaser"

or a "person" under the Act.

Part III-A discusses legislative history, III-B is
limited to the opinions of the u.s.A.G., and that of the
California ~ A.G.,

•

Patman (n. 28) •

•.

£

but with a full footnote on Representative

2.

Part III-C addresses respondent's reliance on judicial decisions. "'t'his extends from p. 19 to p. 26, and

'I

seems a good bit too long.
~

Part IV is a nice closing iury argument.
Certainly the foreqoing organization is an
able way to write the opinion.
different organization:
First:

we

before us.

·'':

acc~pt-

ft

But let me try out on you a
,;,.":

•

make clear the narrowness of the issue

are not concerned with federal government

purchases ~~d ~ales7 only those to a state and state and
local government entities.

Indeed, we are not concerned in

this case by purchases for. use in traditional governmental '
functions.

Rather:, the only issue before us involves pur-

'

·*·t

···'

11:

chases and sales for the non-governmental function of competing in the retail pharmacy and drug store market with
private enterprise.

Yet, the court below held - and respon-

dents contend - that the Act exempts all purchases and sales
by a state and its agencies regardless of the purpose of the

!,~

~

''.:1>:
~~

"

purchase and use of the goods purchased.

If this is an im-

j

)

li

'"'

plied exemption, it does not extend to non-governmental pur- ·

"

I~

'

·~·

'

tomary way where the issue is congressional intent?
mence by restating the question.

'.\

I

~

ing effect.
Then, we could structure the opinion in the cus-

l

!

L

poses.
"
Part II could open with a paragraph to the
forego-

.

'·,,'

We com-

You state this very well

...

"'

3.

in the first sentence of the opinion on p. 1.

The answer

turns on what Congress intended.
I

We look first to the ·language itself.

We can ar-

;~

gue that the plain language controls. No such exception is
expr'e ssed ,~ and in view of the purpose and broad scope of the
Act's language, the burden is on those who would argue that
Congress intended - but did not choose to say so - that
state and local entities could compete unfairly with private
'

business.

'

''

As a part of the "plain language" point, you can

''

I
~

dispose of whether state and local governmental agencies
come within the terms "purchaser" and "person".

My

recol- • "

lection is that respondents do not deny being included within these terms.

It therefore seems unnecessary to make the

rather extended argument presently in pp. 8-13.

You do have
'ij

some excellent language from these cases that can be worked
into the opinion at some other. point.

We could, of courRe,

, in acknowledging respondent's concession in this respect,
say that this was compelled by several decisions of this
Court.

These could be cited either in the text or a

footnote.
Perhaps we should concede that, despite the absence of an express exemption, it is unlikely that Congress
would have intended the Act to apply to purchases for governrnental use as contrasted with entering private markets.
We look to the legislative history to see whether the latter
also could have been intended.

'

••

.

..

.

The legislative history dis-

l,o

.;,•::

"'

cussion logically

4•

~

~ould

come next.

I would be a little more

affirmative at the beginning (p. ·1 1). , We could say that in
view of the purpose of the Act, and the absence of any relevant exemption language, the legislative history falls far
short of supporting respondent's claim •
. ;: r ,would make the poi.nt that before Congress con- i~

sidered leaving

state .~ entities

free to compete unfairly with

,,.,'

the private ; sector, surely it would have held hearings on an
issue of such

importance ~ .

Such an opening could be followed

with th'e ~ stronger portions of your ~·section on legis1.ative
history.

"

I

you could at . least
reduce the "length of n.
.
~.

~·

I would not be inclined, at least in our in it tal " .
'

circulationi to include the two present paragraphs on attorney generals' opinions.

Nor would I lead into the

torney General's opinion by a citation to Udall.
can we not dismiss in a note the

u.s.

Attorney

l

..

u.s .. AtRather;

General's ~

opinion as clearly applying only to the federal government.
~

~i!'lally,

we come to what is probably the toughest

part of our opinion:
tion of the Act.

dealing with the judicial fnterpreta- ~,

My impression is that the pres·ent discus-

sion is a good deal too long and detailed.
not famili.ar with

l

th~

Although I am

'

cases, I beU.eve tore can state posi.-

tively that this Court has never held or suggested that the
claimed exemption must be read into the Act.

I believe you

'say - and if so it is' important - that until CAS's decision
in this case no Court of Appeals had so held.

This would

,,

.

'

'I

5.

leave us with the District Court cases to deal with.

It i5

not entirely clear to me from your draft whether there is
even a sinqle District Court decision on the issue before
us: · t.-lhether, assuming that the federal government is entirely exempt and further assuming - without deciding - that
state and local entities may be exempt with respect to gov- :,
ernmental functions, has ' any case held that an exemption
',

exists that enables state and local entities to compete
fairly in the private markets?
'

* * *
is quite sketchy,
been nearly

a~

thoughtful as you have been.

I have dictated

the foregoing primarily for purposes of a discussion
you.
In our brief discussion yesterday, you raised
question whether we should anticipate - as fully as you have
- what the dissenting opinion will say.

My inclination is

not to go quite so far, or so fully in anticipation, as the
present draft.

We certainly need to address the principal

arguments made by respondents, but this need not be done
quite as judiciously as you have done.
Ste~art

After. all, as Potter

once told me, when writing for the Court you

a~e

an

advocate for the majority and want your opinion to be affirmative and convincing.

A judge -particularly a Justice

here - also muRt be fair and recognize the principal arguments against his view.

',

,,

Nov~mber

15, 1982

81-827 Jefferson Co. Pharmaceutical v. Abbott Laboratories

Dear Chief:
John's letter of November 12 (that just came to my
attention) records a change in his vote in this case. This
leaves five votes to reverse, including one or more that was
tentative.
The case is close. If you follow your usual
practice of assiqninq it to the Justice who wrote a "dissent
from denial of cert", I will be glad to try my hand at an
opinion that will hold five votes.
In view of the "iffiness" of this case, I would be
more than glad to take two other cases.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

•.
:·:1 ::

..
·~

";'

"J

lfp/ss 12/27/82
MEMORANDUM

DATE:

TO:

Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Dec. 27, 1982

81-827 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association
I spent a fair part of Christmas Eve (in addition
to December 23) working on our draft of December 21.
was not as dull as it might have been.

This

I would like to win

this one, and I think the second draft - as should be the
case - is more persuasive.
You reorganized it in record time.

As a result, a

good deal of editing seemed necessary.
I am sure some of my editing will require
revision, and I want you to look at all of it critically
both with respect to form and substance.
I make the following specific comments:

2.

1.

The second draft is narrowly focuses on the

only issue before us:

whether purchases by a state or it
VV'-

agencies for resale aad competition with private business
1\

are impliedly exempted.

We reserve decision - express no

opinion - as to whether an exemption may be implied for
purchases by a state or its agencies for consumption or use
in traditional governmental purposes.

This being so, is

there a purpose in continuing to emphasize that we are
talking about a per se exemption?
2.

I do not think we have made clear anywhere in

the draft that traditional state uses or purposes include
not only "consumption" (e.g., drugs used in state

~rhospitals), but purchases are made to enable the carrying on
~

of traditional monopolies (e.g. electric utility as in City
of Lafayette).

Perhaps it is just as well to stay away from

talking about the traditional state operated monopolies.
For example, what would we say about a city gas company that

..

3.

competes with a private gas company, and does so with the

.
•,

benefit of discounted prices for the purchase of gas from an
interstate gas transmission company?

In such a sitaution,

there would be competition at the retail level.

I am

inclined, therefore, to think that it is best not to talk
about the traditional monopolies but continue to talk in

~~ ll-~~~~k..J~
terms of competing in the private market at the retail
1\

·.'

."

level.
3.

It is desirable, I think, to use the language

of §2a (which 1 assume is the same as 15
wherever this is appropriate.

u.s.c.

§13(a))

For example I am thinking

5
,,
about use of the term "commodities of like grsde and

1

q~"

AA.t.L
s to "discriminate in price

between different purchasers" - precisely what we have in
this case.
4.

The testimony of Chariman Dixon seems to me to

be the strongest post enactment event.

I assume you have

,.

··1~'"

•'·

.'

4.

used Dixon's most damaging statement.

Justice O'Connor is

certain to rely on his testimony.

* * *
In view of all of my scribbling - for which I
apologize - I think a third triple spaced draft is probably
desirable.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

lfp/ss 12/27/82
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Dec. 27, 1982

81-827 Jefferson County
This memo addresses pp. 19-21 where we talk
about the 1960 hearings and Chairman Dixon's statement.
Should we not identify the subject matter of
those hearing?

Dixon's statement seems to be the single

most damaging piece of evidence.

Is there anything

helpful to us in the general context in which he made the
statement?

In any event, I would omit the sentence on

page 20 commencing with the word "although".

Dixon's

statement certainly will be emphasized by Justice
O'Connor, and we can reply as best we

can.~

have

2.

indicated, in my scribbling on page 20, that this may be
place to reply on cases that discount the relevance of
post-enactment commentary.

But if we add this to the

opinion, it should come at the end of our brief discussion
of the 1960 hearings.
I suggest revising the paragraph commencing at
the bottom of page 20 to read as follows:
"It is clear from the report of the House
Committee that it was not focusing at all on the
question presented by this case. Its report did
include the ~~ awkwardly worded
statement: '[T]here is no basis apparent • • .
why the mandate of the Robinson-Patman Act
should not be applied to discriminatory drug
sales favoring non-governmental instituional
purchasers, profit or non-profit, to the extent
there is prescription drug competition at the
retail level with disfavored retail druggists."
Id., at 79 (emphasis added) .27

Jv

Althogh not entirely clear, this seems to say

~~:

only that private instituional purchasers may not lawfully
1\

facilitate unfair competition at the retail level by sales

3•

at discriminatory prices.

Thus, the 1960 hearings shed no

light even as to congressional intent at that time with
respect to state purchases for resale in the private

market. ~

Note to Jim:

With the changes suggested, do you

think we will have dealt fairly with the 1960 hearings.
My guess is they will be a major factor in any dissent.
But we need not anticipate all that will be said so long
as we cannot be attacked for omitting some significant
evidence against us.
If my changes are fair and not vulnerable to
successful attack, perhaps we need to say little in our
first circulation about the relative weight to be accorded
post-enactment commentary before or by Congress.

It would

4

be sufficient, I think, to add a footnote with an
appropriate citation before moving to discuss court
decisions.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

,·..,·

0

January 24, 1983
MEMORANDUM
TO:

JIM BROWNING

FROM:

LFP, JR.
81-827

JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL

Although I am recluctant to interrupt your concentration on the abortion cases, I think some response to Justice
O'Connor's dissent is appropriate.

I am dictating this at

home, and do not have our opinion with me.

Some of the com-

ments below therefore may not be entirely relevant.
The statements or points in the dissent that caught my
attention are as follows.
1.

The dissent repeatedly emphasizes that Congress did

not focus on the issue in 1936.
reasons.

This is irrelevant for two

If there was no "focus", it was because in 1936

the likelihood of state entities competing in the private
sector was remote.

But the absence of any such focus is

immaterial if the plain language applies.
itself is an example of this.
since its enactment.
example?

The Sherman Act

It has been vastly extended

Is the Philadelphia Bank case a good

And certainly Section 1983 now is applied broadly

to many areas never contemplated in the 1870's.
one example.

Parratt is

The Court held that an allegation by a prison

inmate of the negligent loss of a $23.00 package violated
his property rights, and that a remedy existed under Section
1983.

Also, cases like Monell, and City of Independence

may be other examples.

My guess is that you can find ex-

2.

plicit statements by this Court that failure to focus at the
time of enactment is irrelevant when the language covers the
action of
2.

~at

issue.

On p. 4, the dissent says we have cited no cases

holding that a state entity is a "person" for purposes of
exposure to liability as a "purchaser".
to this?

What is the answer

I have thought that a purchaser who knowingly re-

ceives a price that enables it to discriminate unfairly
against its competitors did violate the Act.

Moreover, it

has occurred to me that the pharmacuetical companies - defendants here - may not be as guilty as the state.

The com-

plaint alleges, as I recall, knowing participation by these
companies.

Yet, the seller may well assume that a state is

purchasing for use in its sovereign capacities, and not know
that the state is competing in the private market.
3.

The dissent argues, as we anticipated, that there

has been wide spread reliances on the assumption that the
Act was not applicable.

We should add the information you

dug up showing that discounted prices generally are not made
available to states.

Again, a good deal of the dissent's

argument - especially as to a supposed assumption or understanding - applies only to sales to a state in its sovereign
capacity.

Have we adequately emphasized the distinction

between consumption in traditonal government functions as a
sovereign, as comtrasted with the competition we have here?
Perhaps we have, although it is an important point.

3.

Have we cited cases that make this distinction?

What

about Hodel, and the Court's three-part test to determine
whether League of Cities applies?
4.

On page 8, the dissent tries to make something out

of our mention that sales to indigents may be in a different
category.

The answer is that special solicitude for the

plight of indigents is a traditional concern of government.
The dissent speaks of "resale to indigent citizens".

There

is very little "selling" in public welfare.
~' The

dissent's emphasis on the general understanding -

as the dissent views it - is substantially undercut by the
Justice Department's Task Force Report in 1978 that you were
diligent enough to find.

I would select one of the

dissent's statements, and rebut it with a cross-reference to
our footnote - quoting relevant language.
~ See, for example, the dissent's discussion in

part III.

It refers to states and manufacturers having

"structured their marketing relationships" on the "longstanding assumption" that the Act was inapplicable.

The

only example Justice O'Connor cites relates to state sover-

~
/

eign functions.

There is no evidence in the record of

"structuring" of any kind, and certainly none to facilitate
state head-to- head competition in private retail markets.*

*Did br:{fs claim "structuring" to facilitate competition?

..
4.

Again, the Justice Department Task Force Report is relevant
here.

There may be - at the margin - some close calls.

But

broadly speaking, the distinction between the traditional
and sovereign functions of the state and competing in private markets is widely understood and accepted.

* * *
This long-winded memorandam suggests a more detailed
response that I think is necessary.

I have merely recorded

thoughts as they came to me in reading the dissent.

I

sug-

gest that you select the most vulnerable statements and
draft footnotes that reply.

~~r.P.

L.F.P., Jr.

vde

>

'
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P.1F.MORANDUM
TO:
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81-827
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JE~FERSON

COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL
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2.

plicit statements by this Court that failure to focus at the
time of

~nactrnent

action of that
2.
.,
~·

is irrelevant whc?"n the language covers the

i~5ue.

On p. 4, the dissent says we have cited no cases

holding that a state entity is a "person" for purposes of
exposure to liab:!.li ty as a "purchaser".
to this?

~That

i.s the answer

I have thought that a purchaser who knowingly re-

ceives a price that enables it to discrimtnate unfairly
against its competitors did violate the A.ct.

"1oreover, it

has occurred to me that t.he pharmacuet ical companies - flefendants here - may not be as guilty as the state.
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com-

plaint alleges, as I recall, knowi.nq participation by these

!t

companies.

Yet, the seller may well assume that a state is

purchasinq for u6e in its sovereign capacities, and not know
that the state is competing in the private market.
3.

~he

dissent argues, as we anticipated, that there

has been wide spread reliances on the assumption that the
Act was not applicable.

\'Je should add the information you

dug up showing that discounted prices gc-merallv are not made
available to states.

Again, a good deal of the dissent's

argument - especially as to a supposed assumption or underztanoing -applies only to sales to a state in its sovereign
capacity.

Have we adequately emphasized the distinction

between consumption fn

tr~ditonal

government functions as a

sovereign, as comtrasted \dth the competition we have here?
Perhaps we have, although it is an important point.

,,

..

~·

..

3.

Have we cited cases that make this distinction?

What

about Hodel, and the Court's three-part test to determine
whether League of Cities applies?
On page 8, the dissent

4.

tri~s

to make something out

of our mention that sales to indigents may be in a different
category.
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answer is that special solicitude for the

ollqht of indiqents is a traditional concern of government.
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RE:

January 24, 1983

No. 81-827 Jefferson Co. Pharmaceutical Association
v. Abbott laboratories

Dear Sandra:
Please join me in your dissent.

Sincerely,

M
Justice o•connor
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

January 24, 1983
Re:

No. 81-827 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical
Assn. v. Abbott Laboratories

Dear Sandra:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.

sincerelr

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference
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To: The Chie( Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
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From:

Justice O'Connor
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Recirculated:

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-827

JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
The issue that confronts the Court is one of statutory construction: whether the Robinson-Patman Act covers purchases of commodities by state and local governments for resale in competition with private retailers. 1 The Court's
task, therefore, is to discern the intent of the 1936 Congress
which enacted the Robinson-Patman Act. I do not agree
with the majority that this issue can be resolved by reference
to cases under the Sherman Act or other statutes, or by reliance on the broad remedial purposes of the antitrust laws
generally. The 1936 Congress simply did not focus on this
issue. The business and legal communities have assumed for
the past four decades that such purchases are not covered.
For these reasons, as explained more fully below, I respectfully dissent.
'This case does not require us to consider, as the cases cited by the majority suggest, ante, at 7, whether compliance with other federal statutes
necessitates an implied exemption from the provisions of the Act. The
question is simply one of congressional intent-i. e., what Congress intended when it enacted the Robinson-Patman Act with respect to coverage
of governmental purchases for resale.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81--827

JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
The issue that confronts the Court is one of statutory construction: whether the Robinson-Patman Act covers purchases of commodities by state and local governments for resale in competition with private retailers. 1 The Court's
task, therefore, is to discern the intent of the 1936 Congress
which enacted the Robinson-Patman Act. I do not agree
with the majority that this issue can be resolved by reference
to cases under the Sherman Act or other statutes, or by reliance on the broad remedial purposes of the antitrust laws
generally. The 1936 Congress simply did not focus on this
issue. The business and legal communities have assumed for
the past four decades that such purchases are not covered.
For these reasons, as explained more fully below, I respectfully dissent.
'This case does not require us to consider, as the cases cited by the majority suggest, ante, at 7, whether compliance with other federal statutes
necessitates an implied exemption from the provisions of the Act. The
question is simply one of congressional intent-i. e., what Congress intended when it enacted the Robinson-Patman Act with respect to coverage
of governmental purchases for resale.

81--827-DISSENT
2

JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS.

I
A

The majority relies extensively on the interpretation this
Court has given to the term "person" under the Sherman Act
and other statutes as a guide to whether the terms "person"
and "purchasers," as used in § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.
730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (the Act), 49
Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13, include state and local governmental entities. See ante, at 4-6. In my view, such reliance is misplaced. The question of the Robinson-Patman
Act's treatment of governmental purchases requires an independent examination of the legislative history of that Act to
ascertain congressional intent. 2 Indeed, the cases cited by
the majority emphasize that the key question regarding coverage or noncoverage of governmental entities is the intent of
Congress in enacting the statute in question. 3 Resolution of
2
The majority cites Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308
(1978), as a case in which the Court applied Sherman Act cases to construe
the Clayton Act, which the Robinson-Patman Act amends. Ante, at 7, n.
14. In Pfizer the Court held that a foreign nation is a "person" entitled to
bring a treble damages action under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 15. As the Court acknowledged, id., at 311, § 4 is a reenactment of the
virtually identical language of § 7 of the Sherman Act. In fact, § 7 was
eventually repealed as redundant. § 3, 69 Stat. 283; seeS. Rep. No. 619,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1955). Reliance on prior interpretation of § 7 of
the Sherman Act was therefore uniquely appropriate.
3
See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, supra, at 315 (1978) (§ 4 of
the Clayton Act) ("The word 'person' ... is not a term of art with a fixed
meaning wherever it is used, nor was it in 1890 when the Sherman Act was
passed."); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161 (1942) (§ 7 of the Sherman
Act) ("Whether the word 'person' ... includes a State or the United States
depends upon its legislative environment."); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
360, 370 (1934) (Rev. Stat. §§ 3140, 3244) ("Whether the word 'person' or
'corporation' includes a state . . . depends upon the connection in which it is
found."). See also United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604-605
(1941) ("[T]here is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the
subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive in-

81-827-DISSENT
JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS.

3

the statutory construction question cannot be made to depend upon the abstract assertion that the term "person" is
broad enough to embrace States and municipalities. 4 For
these reasons, the mere fact that in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 n. 14 (1978), a
Sherman Act case, the Court referred to the RobinsonPatman Act in its discussion of the breadth of the term "person" cannot resolve the question now before us.
Further, the majority opinion propounds a misleading syllogism when it (1) suggests that the term "person" in the
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should be construed similarly, (2) cites Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251
(1972), for the proposition that the Clayton Act applies to
States, and (3) then opines that the terms "person" and "purchasers" under § 2 therefore should be construed to include
terpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the
law.").
It is also worth noting that many of the cases upon which the majority
relies involved construction of the term "person" for the purpose of determining whether a particular governmental entity is a "person" entitled to
sue. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, supra; United States v. Cooper
Corp., supra (United States is not "person" entitled to sue under§ 7 of the
Sherman Act); Georgia v. Evans, supra (State is "person" entitled to sue
under § 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906) (municipality is "person" entitled to
sue under § 7 of the Sherman Act).
• I would also note that the majority overstates the significance of Senator Robinson's remarks in connection with its observation that "[t]he word
'purchasers' has a meaning as inclusive as the word 'person.'" Ante, at 5,
n. 11. The remarks of Senator Robinson should not be read to suggest
that the word "purchasers," as used in the Robinson-Patman Act, embraces States or municipalities. The senator's observation reflects an affirmative response to Senator Vandenberg's concern that, although the bill
was drafted with a view toward the problems of large chain-store buying
power in the retail merchandising field, the Act would apply to private enterprise in the field of industrial production as well. See 80 Cong. Rec.
6429--Q430 (1936).

l
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state purchases. Ante, at 6. Because, as the majority observes, ante, at 6, n. 13, the definitional section of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 12, was intended to apply to the Robinson-Patman Act, I do not dispute the first proposition.
However, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. stated only that a
State is a "person" for purposes of bringing a treble damages
action under § 4 of the Clayton Act. 405 U. S. , at 261. 5
Conspicuously absent from the majority's discussion is any
authority holding that States or local governments are persons for purposes of exposure to liability as purchasers under
the provisions of the Clayton Act. 6 Although Congress
might now decide that the purchasing activities of States and
local governments should be subject to the limitations imposed by § 2, that is a policy judgment appropriately left to
legislative determination.
B
Nor do I find persuasive the majority's invocation of presumptions regarding the liberal construction and broad reme5

Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 351 (1943) ("In a dual system of
government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority,
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and
agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.").
6
Indeed, one basis for the United States Attorney General's conclusion
in 1938 that the Robinson-Patman Act is inapplicable to purchases of supplies by the Federal Government was the absence of any judicial decision
construing the Clayton Act, prior to its amendment by the RobinsonPatman Act, to apply to governmental contracts. 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539,
540 (1938).
Prior to 1929, courts interpreted the original § 2 as addressed only to the
problem of primary line competition-i. e., injury to competition among
sellers. See, e. g., National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 F. 733 (CA2), cert.
denied, 266 U. S. 613 (1924). Not until1929 did this Court hold that § 2
also protected against the type of injury alleged in the present case-i. e.,
secondary line injury, or injury to competition among buyers . . See George
Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245, 253 (1929).
The Robinson-Patman amendment to § 2 clarified that the Act was designed to redress the latter type of injury.
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dial purposes of the antitrust laws generally. Without derogating the usefulness of those principles or suggesting that
they should never play a role in the Robinson-Patman context, one may nevertheless candidly acknowledge that the
Court also has identified a certain tension between the Robinson-Patman Act, on the one hand, and the Sherman Act
and other antitrust statutes, on the other. The Court frequently has recognized that strict enforcement of the antiprice-discrimination provisions of the former may lead to
price rigidity and uniformity in direct conflict with the goals
ofthe latter. See, e. g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
FTC, 440 U. S. 69, 80, 83 n. 16 (1979); Automatic Canteen
Co. v. FTC, 346 U. S. 61, 63, 74 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 249 & n. 15 (1951). 7
At the very least, this recognition raises doubts that the
Court should liberally construe the Robinson-Patman Act in
favor of broader coverage. Those doubts are enhanced by
the fact that Congress' principal aim in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act was to protect small retailers from the competitive injury suffered at the hands of large chain stores. 8
It is consistent with that intent for Congress also to have displayed special solicitude for the well-established, belowtrade price buying practices of governmental institutions.
II
As the majority documents, ante, at 9, n. 17, the legislative
history of the Robinson-Patman Act clearly indicates that
Congress envisioned some sort of immunity for governmental
7
Indeed, the tension between the Robinson-Patman policy of protection
of competitors and the Sherman Act goal of protection of the competitive
process has prompted the Court to achieve a partial reconciliation of the
two by liberal interpretation of the "meeting competition" defense under
§ 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U. S. C.§ 13(b). See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 251 (1951).
8
H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1936); S. Rep. No.
1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936); see FTC, Final Report on the Chain
Store Investigation, S. Doc. No.4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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bodies. 9 The question before the Court is the extent of that
immunity-in particular, whether the purchase of goods by
state and local governments for resale in competition with
private retailers is within the intended scope of the Robinson-Patman Act. As the majority acknowledges, ante, at 9,
the 1936 Congress that enacted the Robinson-Patman Act did
not focus on the precise issue before the Court. N otwithstanding this admission, the majority announces the surprising conclusion that "[t]o create an exemption here clearly
would be contrary to the intent of Congress." Ante, at 19
(emphasis added).
9

Members of the House expressed concern with the effect of the bill on
the established below-market buying practices of federal, state, county,
and municipal governments. Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1935). In
response H. B. Teegarden, a principal draftsman of the Act, assured members of the House Judiciary Committee that he "would not want" the Act if
it prohibited, all along the line, the competitive bidding practices of those
governments. Id.
Moreover, with respect to subsequent legislative history, I find significant the fact that later attempts in Congress to expressly include governmental entities within the coverage of the Act failed. See H. R. 4452, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1952); H. R.
5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H. R. 722, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957);
H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 430, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961). In particular, I would not dismiss as readily as does the majority,
ante, at 11, n. 19, the bills introduced by Representative Patman in 1951
and 1953 to amend the Act to define "purchasers" to include "the United
States, any State or any political subdivision thereof." The majority speculates that Representative Patman introduced these bills to reaffirm his
original intent that these entities would be covered. In light of Representative Patman's agreement in his book, W. Patman, The RobinsonPatman Act 168 (1938), with the United States Attorney General's construction of the Act to exclude purchases by the Federal Government and
his extension of the Attorney General's rationale to "municipal and public
institutions," id., it is more plausible to infer that he viewed the bills as
extending the Act's coverage.
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The majority is correct in stating that it is not the business
of this Court to engage in "'policy-making in the field of antitrust legislation'" in order to fill gaps where Congress has
not clearly expressed its intent. Ante, at 19 (quoting United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 606 (1941)). It is precisely because I concur in that admonition that I would refrain from attributing to Congress an intent to cover the
state and local governmental purchases in question here. 10
A
In attempting to supply the unexpressed intent of Congress, the majority fails to offer satisfactory guidelines for
determining the scope of the Act's coverage of governmental
agencies. 11 The majority assumes, "without deciding, that
Congress did not intend the Act to apply to purchases for
10
My resolution of the statutory issue here should not be construed to
reflect a policy judgment that the Robinson-Patman Act should protect "a
State's entrepreneurial capacity." City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 422 (CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring).
We are not concerned here with whether the kind of activity in which these
governmental entities are enaged appropriately exposes them to antitrust
liability under the Act. Cf. id., at 418. That question raises policy concerns lying peculiarly within the institutional province of Congress. "A
court, without the benefit of legislative hearings that would illuminate the
policy considerations if the question were left to Congress, is not competent in my opinion to resolve this question . . . . It is regrettable that the
Court today finds it necessary to rush to this essentially legislative judgment." Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S., at 331 (POWELL,
J., dissenting). Because the question before us is one of congressional intent and it is far from clear that Congress has supplied an answer to that
question, I would refrain from substituting the policy judgments of the judiciary for those Congress might embrace. Cf. id., at 320 (CHIEF JUSTICE
BURGER, dissenting); id., at 33()...331 (POWELL, J., dissenting).
11
To the extent the majority purports to "divine" the will of Congress, it
comes as no surprise, given Congress' inattention to this precise question,
that no "bright lines" for coverage and noncoverage emerge from its
opinion.
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consumption in traditional government functions" and suggests that state purchases of pharmaceuticals for the purpose
of resale to indigent citizens may not expose the State to antitrust liability. Ante, at 4 & n. 7.
The majority's assumption, however, is inconsistent with
the principles of statutory construction upon which it purports to rely. If, absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary, the plain language of the statute controls, then by the majority's own assertions one would have
to conclude that even purchases for the State's own use or for
resale to indigents would fall within the Act's proscriptions.
For, as the majority remarks, ante, at 4, the terms "person"
and "purchasers" are broad enough to include governmental
entities, and the legislative history is "ambiguous on the
application of the Act to state purchases for consump- J
,J
tion .... " Ante, at 9-10.
()t\'uS5IO
Moreover, to the extent the majority implies that a State's
coverage or noncoverage under the Act turns on the distinction between purchases for resale and purchases for consumption, 12 that distinction is inconsistent with the competition rationale elsewhere suggested, ante, at 19, to underlie
the prohibitions of § 2(a). For example, a state university
hospital might limit the use of its pharmacy to its own faculty
and staff, thereby falling within the "for their own use" exception. 13 Nevertheless, the university pharmacy may be in$ c,.,)
flicting competitive injury on private pharmacies that the
1

/o~IS

The majority thus suggests, though it refrains from holding, that the
scope of coverage under § 2(a) is coextensive with the "for their own use"
line drawn by the Non profit Institutions Act of 1938, 15 U. S. C. § 13c, and
interpreted by the Court in Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Association, Inc., 425 U. S. 1 (1976).
This proposed
resale/consumption distinction has no foundation in the language of § 2(a),
which prohibits discrimination "in price between different purchasers of
commodities ... , where such commodities are sold for use, consumption,
or resale .... " 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) (emphasis added).
·
3
' See Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Association,
Inc., supra, at 16-17.
12

-~
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university's faculty and staff might otherwise patronize. 14
Thus, the majority's conflicting suggestions leave in doubt
what principle-the presence of functional competition or the
consumption/resale dichotomy-guides the determination
whether a state or local government's purchases fall within
the Act's proscriptions.
B

Against the backdrop of a legislative history that even the
majority concedes does not focus on the issue before us
stands the general consensus in the legal and business communities that sales to governmental entities are not covered
by the Robinson-Patman Act. The majority devotes considerable effort to distinguishing or undercutting the authorities
cited by the respondents. In so doing, and in observing that
these authorities cannot reveal Congress' intent in 1936,
ante, at 14 & n. 24, the majority misunderstands the significance of this evidence. These authorities simply illustrate
the virtually unanimous assumption over the past forty-seven
years of noncoverage of governmental entities-an assumption that has served as the basis of well-established governmental purchasing practices and marketing relationships.
In the past the Court has relied upon the widespread understanding of the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act in limiting the scope of the Act's prohibitions. 15 To do so here is no
less appropriate.
Despite its attempt to discount the significance of the judicial authorities cited by the respondents, the majority cannot
dispute that no court has imposed liability upon a seller or
14

Or, to take another example, a cafeteria operated by a governmental
agency for the benefit of its employees also might inflict some competitive
injury on restaurants in the same area that otherwise might enjoy the employees' patronage.
15
See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 246-247 (1951) (reliance
on widespread understanding that the meeting competition proviso of
§ 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, provides a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination) .

..
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buyer, under either § 2(a) or § 2(f), 15 U. S. C. §§ 13(a) and
(f), in a case involving an alleged price discrimination in favor
of a federal, state, or municipal governmental purchaser. 16
Commentators confirm the general judicial consensus that
sales to States and municipalities are not covered by the
16
See Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L . Cummins News
Co., 632 F. 2d 680, 688--{)89 (CA71980) (Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable
to purchases by instrumentality of Federal Government for resale); Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories Pharmaceutical Products Division, No. C-77-0094 (Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (order
of consent dismissing with prejudice Robinson-Patman claims based on
sales to any governmental entity), affd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980); Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., No. 4--66--5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion) (sale of
bowling equipment to State not within provisions of Act; alternative holding that sales exempt under 15 U. S. C. § 13c), affd, 378 F. 2d 212, 217
(CA9) (sales to state university within § 13c exemption), cert. denied, 389
U. S. 898 (1967); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development
Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 96 (EDNY 1957) (disclaiming, on motion for
reargument, any intention that original opinion could be "construed to suggest that sales to the Government can be thought to be subject to the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act"); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) ("It is doubtful at best whether the
Robinson-Patman Act applies at all to sales to Government agencies, state
or federal.") (holding Act inapplicable to sales by liquor distiller to state
liquor commissions; alternative holding that no competitive injury suffered
by plaintiff liquor wholesaler), affd on opinion below, 234 F. 2d 959 (CA2),
cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD Ky. 1941) (alternatively holding that
Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable to sales to municipal housing commission and suggesting that "the Act does not apply to sales to the government, states, or municipalities"), affd, 132 F. 2d 425 (CA6 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780 (1943).
While one may concede that most of these cases do not focus on the precise situation of purchases by state or local governments for resale, they
nonetheless reflect the consensus of judicial opinion that governmental
bodies are not subject to liability under § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act. The majority would dismiss many of these
cases with the simple observation that they predate the Court's decision in
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978).
Ante, at 16, n. 29. For reasons already noted, however, in my view City
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Act. 17 Moreover, Congress' failure to enact bills extending
Robinson-Patman coverage to these entities buttresses this
interpretation of the Act. Seen. 9, supra.
This same understanding has been expressed in testimony
before Congress. In 1967 and 1968 a congressional subcommittee conducted public hearings on the problems of
of Lafayette does not resolve the issue before us in this case.
Moreover, cases that the majority suggests are supportive of its position, ante, at 17, n. 30, are similarly distinguishable. For example, both
Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633
(Alaska 1982), and Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F.
Supp. 393 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d, 851, 858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966), indicate only that the Robinson-Patman Act
may apply where the State, as in Sterling, or the municipality, as in
Hitachi, is the victim of commercial bribery under § 2(c), 15 U. S. C.
§ 13(c), rather than the favored customer.
17
E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 224 (1979) (2d ed. 1979) ("In
spite of [any] contrary indications [among state attorneys general], it is
generally believed that the exemption applies to governmental purchases
at any level."); W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson Patman Act
30 (1963) (indicating the Act is inapplicable to sales to government, municipal, or public institutions); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 84 (1962) ("The preponderance of reasoned opinion
treats State or municipal bodies on a par with the Federal Government's
exemption."); 4 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation
§ 24.06 at 24-70 (1982) ("[T]he prevailing view is that such sales [to states
and municipalities] are excluded from Robinson-Patman liability."). See
also 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973) (indicating that lower federal courts have generally held the Act inapplicable to
sales to states and municipalities, that one lower federal court has held the
Act may be applicable if the State is the disfavored customer, and that
opinions among state attorneys general are divided).
Although not specifically addressing any consumption/resale distinction,
a past Attorney General of the United States also has opined that purchases by state and local governments are not within the Act's prohibition
against price discrimination. Report of the Attorney General Under Executive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962)
(identical bidders on contracts with state and local governments cannot
contend that the Act prohibits bidding below the schedule price, because
the Act is not applicable to government contracts).
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small businesses in the phannaceutical industry. The subcommittee heard testimony from both representatives of
phannaceutical manufacturers and retail phannacists regarding the industry-wide practice of price discrimination in sales
of phannaceuticals to governmental purchasers-federal,
state, county, and municipal. 18 Several witnesses also directly expressed their assumption that the Robinson-Patman
Act does not apply to such sales. 19
18
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 48 (1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Merritt Skinner,
community pharmacist); id., at 258 (William Apple, executive director of
the American Pharmaceutical Association); id., at 296, 318-319 (Hyman
Moore, H.L. Moore Drug Exchange, Inc.); id., at 500 (Henry DeBoest,
vice president of Eli Lilly & Co.); id., at 705 (Donald van Roden, vice president and general manager of pharmaceutical operations for Smith Kline &
French Laboratories); id., at 792 (Joseph Ingolia, vice president and general manager of Schering Laboratories); id., at 817 (Lyman Duncan, vice
president of American Cyanamid Co.).
Based upon this overwhelming evidence, the Select Committee on Small
Business concluded in its report to the House: "The difference between
drug prices charged retailers and wholesalers as compared to those
charged .. . governmental customers is extremely substantial, often being
over 50 percent." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968).
19
See 1967-1968 Hearings, at 15-16 (Earl Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, counsel for the National Assocation of Retail Druggists) (''When
a drug supplier sells drugs to Federal, State, or municipal governmental
institutions, the price charged by the supplier may be without regard to
the Robinson-Patman Act, because such sales are probably exempt from
the Robinson-Patman Act."); id., at 731 (W. Abrahamson, president of Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.) ("[T]he only special pricing we have ever engaged in are [sic] in bidding situations to [federal, state, or local government] agencies excluded from the Robinson-Patman Act."); id., at 1069 (C.
Stetler, president of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association)
("There is nothing immoral or unlawful about incremental cost pricing in
cases-such as sales to the Government .. .-where the Robinson-Patman
Act does not apply.").
Even one congressman on the subcommittee expressed his understand-
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In 1969 and 1970, the same House subcommittee investigated the problems of small businessmen under the Robinson-Patman Act. In these hearings witnesses again expressed the view that gove~mental purchases at any level
are not covered, highlighting the problem of favorable prices
on governmental purchases for resale and making a plea for a
change in the law. 20
ing that the Act does not apply to governmental purchasers. See id., at
1092 (Rep. Corman) ("[I]f there were no exemption under RobinsonPatman for the Government, what would be the situation as to their purchases?"). The colloquy that followed Representative Corman's question
further evidences the assumption that governmental purchases are outside
the scope of the Act, even in the case of resales.
"Mr. Stetler. If there was no exemption under Robinson-Patman, I
presume some of these practices would be illegal under Robinson-Patman.
Mr. Cutler. If I could try to answer that, [Representative] Corman.... [A]bsent the one case of these resales . . . , I suppose the lack of
exemption would make no difference, because the Robinson-Patman Act
would not apply for other reasons, because you are not discriminating between two people engaged in commerce and competing with one another.
Further, there is a real question as to whether the Robinson-Patman Act
applies under any circumstances where you are bidding under a competitive bid. So for both of these reasons, the answer to your question would
be that the same pricing practices might still lawfully prevail under Robinson-Patman without the exemption for the government . ... "
Id. (emphasis added).
20
William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs for the National Association of Wholesalers, testified:
"Over the years, the Robinson-Patman Act has not been extended to
cover sales to the Government. In the days when Government purchases
constituted a relatively small volume in the marketplace, this exemption
posed few problems. But today, with the vast growth in Government purchases, Federal, State, and local, ... the continued exemption creates
many unfair competitive situations.
We believe that Congress must turn its attention to this problem."
Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act, Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of
the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives,
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III
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act clearly
reveals that Congress intended to exclude governmental entities from the Act's proscriptions to some extent. However, Congress did not focus on the issue before us and therefore did not provide a clear rationale governing coverage and
noncoverage. In an area in which bright lines are needed to
guide state and local governments in their purchasing practices, the majority fails to identify any principle triggering inclusion or exclusion.
Moreover, one cannot doubt that state, county, and municipal governments and manufacturers of commodities have
structured their marketing relationships with each other on
the longstanding assumption that the Robinson-Patman Act
does not apply to those transactions. That understanding
finds substantial support among the courts and commen91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73-74 (1969-1970). See id., at 76-77 (Everette
Macintyre, acting chairman of the Federal Trade Commission) (affirming
that sales to the Federal Government, even in the resale context, are not
subject to the Robinson-Patman Act).
Harold Halfpenny, legal counsel for the Automotive Service Industry
Association, focused most precisely on the problem of which petitioners
complain-i. e., competitive injury to private industry when governmental
entities receive more favorable prices on purchases of commodities for
resale.
"[W]hile the Act is silent on the subject, its legislative history and subsequent interpretation support the proposition that sales made to Federal or
State governmental bodies are not subject to the provisions of the Act.
This may be injurious to competition in several ways. . . .
[T]here are 'second line' situations where competition exists between the
Government and private indsutry in the resale of commodities.
The Federal Trade Commission has not recommended legislation to
make the Robinson-Patman Act applicable to sales to governmental purchases. However, in our opinion, Congress should consider acting on its
own volition."
!d., at 623 (emphasis added).
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tators. State and local governments have developed programs for providing services to the public, including medical
care to the indigent and the medically needy, 21 based on the
same assumption. The majority's holding that sales of commodities to state and local governments for resale in competition with private enterprise are covered by the Act will engender significant disruption-not only through government
and industry reexamination and restructuring of marketing
relationships, but also, unfortunately, through possible termination of services and supplies to needy citizens 22 and
through litigation associated with the process of reexamination. 23 The Court rests its decision primarily on one statement in the legislative history, 24 taken in isolation from other
remarks designed to assure concerned House members that
the Act would not force the abandonment of governmental
below-market buying practices which the majority's holding
now calls into question. Given Congress' failure to delineate
the extent of the Robinson-Patman Act's coverage or
noncoverage of state and local governments, I would allow
Congress to speak on this issue rather than disrupt long21
See, e. g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. §§ 14100-14126 (1980 & Supp.
1982); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, ~~5-1 to 5-14 (Supp. 1982-83); Mont. Code
Ann. §§ 53-&-103 to 53-6-144 (1981); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 365, 365-a
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982); Tex. Human Res. Code Ann.
§§ 32.001-32.037 (1980); Va. Code§§ 63.1-134 to 63.1-144 (1980).
22
The administrative burden of developing internal accounting and
recordkeeping procedures to segregate commodities purchased for resale,
plus the additional financial strain of paying higher prices for these purchases, may induce state and local governments to terminate programs and
services already in place. More significantly, however, the uncertainty
generated by the majority's failure to establish clear lines of demarcation
for coverage and noncoverage and the fear of exposure to treble damages
liability might well cause cautious legislators facing budgetary dilemmas to
eliminate these programs.
23
I note that the Court has not indicated that today's holding will have
only prospective effect.
24
See ante, at 10.
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standing practices and programs and judicially arm private
litigants with a powerful treble damages action against these
governments. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment
below.

lfp/ss 12/27/82

Rider A, p. 5 (Jefferson County)

JEFFS SALLY-POW
The issue presented by this case is a narrow
one.

We are not concerned with sales to or purchases by

the federal government.

Nor are we concerned with state

purchases for consumption or use in traditional
governmental functions.

Rather, the issue before us

involves only state purchases for the purpose of competing
- with the advantage of discriminatory prices - in the
retail pharmacy market with private enterprise.
The courts below held, and respondents contend,
that the Act exempts all state purchases regardless of the
purpose of the purchase.

We may assume, without deciding

that Congress did not intend the Act to apply where state
purchases are for traditional governmental functions, and

~

<

·i '

2.

that therefore such purchases are exempt per se.

If there

is such an implied exemption, we do not think it applies
where a state has chosen to compete in the private market
with the advantage of discriminatory prices.
III
In construing a statute, we look, of course, to
the language of the statute itself.

Jim:

Do you not think the "call" for what is now note 7

should be relocated?

'

.

..

1/4/83
Rider B

The effect of our decision today on the pricing
policies, though perhaps critically important for small
retail pharmacies, may be minimal on drug manufacturers.
The investigating Subcommittee in the 1960s obtained
written responses from about 50 manufacturers to questions
about pricing.
Appendix.

See 1967-1968 Hearings, supra note 21, in

Although some of the answers were incomplete or

ambiguous, as a whole they indicate industrywide reliance
on any alleged exemption for state purchases.

Only six

manufacturers indicated that they gave greater discounts
to state agencies than they gave to individually owned
community pharmacies.

Id., at A21, A23, A29, A78, A88,

2.

A95.

Indeed, two indicated that independent retailers

received greater discounts.

Id., at A24, A26.

The

manufacturers split on whether to give chains larger
discounts than state agencies, but the overwhelming number
of manufacturers indicating any difference in catalog
~

prices stated that wholesalers received a larger~iscount
than state agencies.

v

Thus, as one would expect, pricing

is more closely related to the volume of purchases than to
whether the purchaser is a governmental of private entity.

( \0
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Rider F, p. 4 (Jefferson Co.)

JEFFF SALLY-POW
7.

Special solicitude for the plight of

indigents is a traditional concern of state and local
governments, and a state's aid to indigents is an exercise
of its sovereign powers.

If, in special circumatances,

sales were made by a state to a class of indigents, the
question presented, that we need not decide, is whether
such sales would be "in competition" with private
enterprise.

The District Court correctlv assumed that the

private and state pharmacies in this case are "competing
pharmacies", 656 F.2d, at 98.

See also note 8, infra.

rRIDER B

a~tJ'~~s

/-~~l~~
~STIGB ~~

~

would create rules of statutory construction
.

for the Robinson-Patman Act different from those that the Court has
used for

~

other antitrust laws.

The only distinction offered is

a "certain tension" between the policies behind the Act and the
Sherman Act.
her dissent

See post, at 5.

~ ' is

Our task in this case, however, as

to determine congressional intent in
~~

passing the Robinson-Patman Act, and our familiar Fulco ef.
construction

A

~the

antitrust laws

~~s

rQprei!Hitltative of
•

the longstanding judicial understanding that Congress intended the
~
a~~r~&t laws to have a broad scope.

·'

lfp/ss 02/09/83

Rider H (Jefferson County)

JEFF SALLY-POW
Justice Stevens agrees that state and local
governments are "purchasers" within the meaning of the
Act.

See post, at 1.

He joins in the dissent, however,

on the basis of a novel theory:

that state and local

agencies are never "in competition" with private parties
within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act.

Post, at

This, of course, is an economic fiction.

If in

fact a state particulates in the private retail
pharmaceutical market, it is competing with the private
participants.

Moreover, this is an allegation of the

compliant before us.

Justice Stevens relies on one

statement by witness Teergarden in the 1935 House
Hearings, but

~~ther

statement by the same

2•

witness that if "two hospitals are in competition with
each other, I would say then that the fact that one is
operated by the city does not save it from the bill".
1935 Hearings, supra, n. 17, at 209.

Nor does Justice

Stevens explain why there was public competition with
private enterprise in City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389
(1978) and (Denver cable television case).

See

RIDER H

JUSTICE STEVENS

::s

h~~ RQ p~~ agree~

witR ue that state and

local governments are "purchasers" within the meaning of the Act.
See post, at 1.

He disagrees

wit~

~,

however, that such a

conclusion is dispositive of the case before us.

For him, it is

necessary to find new grounds for affirming the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

JUSTICE STEVENS would hold that that state and

local agencies are never "in competition" with private parties.
Although this is generally a factual inquiry in other RobinsonPatman Act cases, and no one disputes actual competition from the
State in this case, see supra n. 7, or in the pharmaceutical
industry as a whole, see post, at 12-13 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting),
JUSTICE STEVENS believes that he is obligated to engage in this
legal fiction solely because of one statement in Mr. Teegarden's
testimony in the 1935 House hearings.

On its face, Mr. Teegarden's

statement that "[t]he Federal Government is saved by the same
distinction, not of location but of function" refers only to Federal
purchases.

But more important is Mr. Teegarden's answer to a

question that clearly did relate to the applicability of the Act to
state purchasing: "In the final analysis, it would depend upon
numerous questions of fact in a particular case.

If the two

hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then that
the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the
bill."
clear:

See 1935 Hearings, supra n.l7, at 209.

Two things are

(i) Mr. Teegarden did not understand a state purchaser could

2.

never be "in competition" with a private entity; and {ii) "in
competition" cannot be determined any way but on the facts of the
case.

See also id., at 250 {remarks of Mr. Teegarden)

showing of effect upon competition").

{"requiring a

To contend that Mr. Teegarden

was "equivocal" in his answer on this point is to introduce
ambiguity where none has been thought to exist.

Thus, JUSTICE

STEVENS's novel interpretation of the Act to require a conclusive
presumption of no competition when the state is a purchaser has no
basis in the only passage of legislative history that he cites as
support.
Interestingly, the "in competition" element of a RobinsonPatman claim was seen by Representative Hancock as extending the Act
to state purchases rather than limiting it.
Mr. Hancock. I do not want to appear too stupid here,
but your answer seems to be predicated upon a premise that
this bill would only prevent discrimination in price as
between purchasers engaged in competition. I do not find
that in the bill.
Mr. Teegarden. I think it is implicit in the term
"discrimination."
Mr. Hancock. Why should you say that? •••
Why do you not add, "between different purchasers
engaged in competition"?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not think there would be any
serious objection to adding that.
Mr. Hancock: As it reads now, you can see why it
would not prevent the city or the State or the Federal
Government from buying below the regular established price
paid by a private corporation or an individual. You have
to read something into the law.
Mr. Teegarden. The legal history of the term,
"discrimination", and its application for some 40 or 50
years by the Interstate Commerce Commission-Mr. Hancock: Implies competition?

3.

Mr. Teegarden: It involves the concept of
competition.
Now, in these cases of discrimination which have
come, where it has proved possible to show a tangible
discrimination, the court has relied upon the fact that
the parties to the discrimination were in competition with
each other.
Id., at 212-213 (emphasis added).

RIDER G

'77-- ~~-~ ~~ ~~~

~ USTICE O'CONNOR~ lgs ~er e ase, not on the words of
statute, or
~~ t:J-

~

~

tAe legislative history , of the 1936 Aet, but
(i)
~1.4.-Ud J
~ ugeneral consensus in the legal and business communities that

r

'\

1\

sales to governmental entities are not covered by the RobinsonPatman Act," post, at 9r and (ii) the fa€t "that state, county, and
municipal governments and manufacturers of commodities have
structured their marketing relationships with each other on the
longstanding assumption that the Robinson-Patman Act does not apply
to those transact ions," id., at 14-15.

See also post, at 4

B~===:e:llyeiB are ~k

{STEVENS, J., dissenting).
:i:u~.

Fit,..s~F --e~lthou~-i'S

cl.e.ar, /J. s JUSTICE O'CONNOR points out,

see post, at 12-14 nn. 19 & 20,

~

some in the business and legal

~~

co~unity

thougat that an exemption existed for all state

purchases~

A~~~ ~ ,.,~ i..-L1\t QI\c;d 1 thi• tl:'!ouEjl"lt a "consensus" is to disregard the opinion of
~

commentators, see note 31, suprar the views expressed that

the Act is applicable to state purchases, see infra, at 11 & n. 19,
18 & n. 33r and the most recent, relevant opinion of the Department
of Justice, see infra, at 18

&

n. 34.

It is more

~
~rl'\

to say that

there was an unsettled question of federal law that demanded this
Court's attention.
Second, although
anufacturers

da as n
~e

i~

zJ

be cleaF that some

pharmaceutical ~

wz.J.A.,. ~ ~ ~

ot as clear as the dissent would have us believe that this price

.

.~.·

I

diEcriminate in favor of state purchasers,
., it is

- 2.

discrimination is attributable solely to any perceived exemption.
The investigating Subcommittee in the 1960s obtained written
responses from about 50 manufacturers to questions about pricing.
See 1967-1968 Hearings, supra note 21, in Appendix.

Although some

of the answers were incomplete or ambiguous, as a whole they do not
indicate industry-wide reliance on any alleged exemption for state
purchases.

Only six manufacturers indicated that they gave greater

discounts to state agencies than they gave to individually owned
community pharmacies.

Id., at A21, A23, A29, A78, A88, A95.

Indeed, two indicated that independent retailers received greater
discounts.

Id., at A24, A26.

The manufacturers split whether to

give chains larger discounts than state agencies, but the
overwhelming number of manufacturers indicating any difference in
catalog prices stated that wholesalers received a larger discount
than state agencies.

Thus, as one would expect, pricing closely

correlates with volume, and it may be that the generally large size
of governmental orders is more determinative of manufacturers'
pricing and the "structur[ing] of their marketing relationships"
than specific reliance on any exemption •

..

f

"
f
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, repeatedly
emphasizes that Congress in 1936 did not focus specifically on the
issue presented here.

See post, at 6, 7 & n. 10, 14, 15.

is irrelevant, for two reasons.

This fact

First, the likelihood of state

entities competing in the private sector was remote in 1936, and it
cannot be contended seriously that Congress specifically intended to
allow the competition at issue here.

Second, the absence of

congressional focus is immaterial if the
rejecting an argument similar to that of the dissent's here,
•
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Appellees argue that the Congress knew, as doubtless
some of its members did, that this Court had prior to 1890
said that insurance was not commerce and was subject to
state regulation, and that therefore we should read the
Act as though it expressly exempted that business. But
•••• we fail to find in the legislative history of the Act
an expression of a clear and unequivocal desire of
Congress to legislate only within that area previously
declared by this Court to be within the federal power.
We have been shown not one piece of reliable evidence that
the Congress of 1890 intended to freeze the proscription
of the Sherman Act within the mold of then current
judicial decisions .•..
322 U.S., at 356-358.
U.S. 335, 339 {1941)

See, e. g., Browder v. United States, 312
{"Old laws apply to changed situations.

The

reach of the act is not sustained or opposed by the fact that it is
sought to bring new situations under its terms.")

{footnotes

omitted); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 197 {1901)

{"While a

statute is presumed to speak from the time of its enactment, it
embraces all such persons or things as subsequently fall within

~·.

2.
scope.").

The dissent certainly has not shown "an expression of a

clear and unequivocal desire of Congress" to use the word "person"
differently from the broad definition that we consistently have
found it intended in the other antitrust laws.

RIDER A

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, criticizes our use
of antitrust cases to define a word common to the antitrust laws.
She would distinguish all of these cases, which uniformly hold
States to be included in the word "persons," because none has held
"that States or local governments are persons for purposes of
exposure to liability as purchasers under the provisions of the
Clayton Act."

Post, at 4 (emphasis in original).

She apparently

concedes, however, that if such a case existed it would be
dispositive here.

See id., at 3-4.

Thus, JUSTICE O'CONNOR must be

making the odd argument that there is no case support for our
holding because the Court has never so held before.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR takes no notice of our decision last term in
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 835, 843
(1982), in which the Court stated that the antitrust laws, "like
other federal laws imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon
'persons,' of course apply to municipalities as well as to other
corporate entities."

Rather, she creates a distinction between

"persons" entitled to sue under the antitrust laws and "persons"
subject to suit under those laws, without citing any support for
this distinction.

It is interesting to note that not even JUSTICE

STEVENS, who joins her dissenting opinion, agrees with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR on this legal conclusion.
dissenting).

See post, at 1 (STEVENS, J.,

RIDER B

JUSTICE O'CONNOR would create rules of statutory construction
for the Robinson-Patman Act different from those that the Court has
used for the other antitrust laws.

The Qnly distinction offered is

a "certain tension" between the policies behind the Act and the
Sherman Act.

See post, at 5.

Our task in this case, as her dissent

concedes, is to determine congressional intent,
rules of construction

~t~ust

laws are

~

7kL

eur familiar

themse~ves

representative of the longstanding judicial understanding

th~a~t~--

~~..._

Congress intended the antitrust laws to have a broad scope.
rinciple, with the rules of statutory construction that
eveloped to give it force in cases that come before us, is thus
to our present inquiry than are some perceived
the application of the Act to an economy also covere
y the Sherman Act.

It is impossible to conclude otherwise than

at the dissent, despite its disclaimers, construes the Act "to
lect a policy judgment," id., at 7 n. 10

~~ ~ ~- /)~~ cL..I-

w .__
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~~4~~~

~

-"'-1

Hu.-

~ ~-

RIDER E

Although it fails to list the state entities that compete with
private business and will thus be affected by our decision, JUSTICE
O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion cites a host of practical problems
that application of the Act to state purchasing will create.
post, at 14-15.

See

Assuming such burdens are proper considerations

given Congress's intent to include States within the coverage of the
antitrust laws generally, it is not clear why the dissent considers
the burdens of compliance with the Act uniquely different from the
burdens of compliance with the other antitrust laws, which do
include States within their coverage.

...

RIDER C

/j
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~
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Our holding is limited to finding that sales to state
purchasers for resale in competition with private enterprises are
not exempt from the limitations of the Robinson-Patman Act.

We use

the Act's familiar analytical distinction between purchases for
consumption and purchases for resale to show that Congress at least
intended the Act to cover state purchases for resale in the private
market.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, criticizes us

for not creating "bright lines" to guide state purchasing practices,
see post, at 7 & n. 11, but such criticism is really a complaint
that our holding is no broader than it has to be to decide the case
before us.

The discussion that the dissent desires is not necessary

to our review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which held
that the Act did exempt state purchases for resale.

We need not

decide the outcome of other governmental purchasing issues that are
more appropriately presented and resolved in concrete factual
situations than abstractly on review of a District Court's summary
judgment.

l
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To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Jefferson County, No. 81-827

I have prepared you several riders in response to the two
dissents.

I am sure that you will only want to make a few--if any--

of the comments, but these give you some variety.
that at least Rider I be put into the draft.

I would recommend

JUSTICE STEVENS uses

that quote, and it looks better for you too to quote it when you are
quoting the passage in full.

'dB ~~~
,,~/...~~):

~~~

R1er

The effect of our decisi6tr t oda ~on ~ pricing pol ~~

~ drug _:a ~~ct~ay

be minima)!

The investigating Subcommittee

in the 1960s obtained written responses from about 50
manufacturers to questions about pricing.
supra note 21, in Appendix.

d ~a g

~

See 1967-1968 Hearings,

Although some of the answers were

incomplete or ambiguous, they do not indicate

~ ~ th~

rs

a~

industrywide reliance on any alleged exemption for state purchases.
d) nly six manufacturers indicated that they gave greater
~

discounts to state agencies than they gave to individually owned
community pharmacies.

Id., at A21, A23, A29,

~~~ 5.

Indeed, two indicated that independent retailers

~ greater

-"\

discounts.

Id., at A24, A26.

give chains

~~~iscounts

tn-c-

The manufacturers split whether to

1
than state agencies, but the

overwhelming number of manufacturers

in

whol~~s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

catalog" a..z.
prices
stated
that
~
~.4?'~
state agencies. Thus, ~pricing
surp r isjggl¥,
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JUSTICE
questions

O'CONNOR,

our

use

of

in

dissenting

her

anti trust

common to the antitrust laws.

cases

to

opinion,

define

a

word

She would distinguish all

u-1-

of these cases, ~ uniformly hold States to be included
in the word "persons," because none has held "that States
or local governments are persons for purposes of exposure
to

liability

as

Clayton Act."
dissent

takes

purchasers
Post,

no

at

notice,

under

the

(emphasis

4

however,

the

antitrust

of

in original).

of our

term in Community Communications Co.
102 s.ct. 835, 843

provisions

decision

the
The
last

v. City of Boulder,

(1982), in which the Court stated that

laws,

"like

civil

or

criminal

apply

to

municipalities

other

sanctions

authority

as

federal

upon
well

entities."

No

is

distinction

between "persons"

laws

'persons,'
as

cited

to
for

entitled

imposing
of

course

other

corporate

the

dissent's

to sue under

the

antitrust laws and "persons" subject to suit under those
laws.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion,

~ur

use

of antitrust cases to define a word common to the antitrust laws.

f.~IL ?..t;;be wettl-d-iM~i.•~l
T~ -

~

of thef t

ca_:~~~

uniformly hold

States to be included in the word "persons," because none has held
"that States or local governments are persons for purposes of
exposure to liability as purchasers under the provisions of the
Clayton Act."

nw..~

Post, at 4 (emphasis in original). /\-8-fre takes no

notice, however, of our decision last term in Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 835, 843 (1982), in
which the Court stated that the antitrust laws, "like other federal
laws imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course
apply to municipalities as well as to other corporate entities."

~
~~"'~~~~~
Rat'A ~;=~
:!'! a.,..-distf'nction between "persons" entitled to sue
under the antitrust laws and "persons" subject to suit under those
laws,.

w~tl:lont

ei t i ng aft¥ :!ll~~er.t .€or.. this cHstiflet-io~.
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The dissent of JUSTICE O'CONNOR relies in large part, not on
the words of the statute, or its legislative history, but on
assertions that a "general consensus [existed]

in the legal and

business communities that sales to governmental entities are not
covered by the Robinson-Patman Act."
4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

Post, at 9.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR is

See also post, at
~1~~

correct

that some in the business and legal community did think that an
exemption existed for all state purchases.
19 & 20.

See post, at 12-14 nn.

But to say there is a "consensus" is to disregard the

opinion of commentators, see n~ ~' supra; the views expressed
that the Act is applicable to state purchases, see infra, at 11 & n.

2~~,

18 & n. 3)f; and the most recent, relevant opinion of the
'7

Department of Justice, see infra, at 18 & n.
accurate to say that

~ was

3A.

It is more

an unsettled question of federal law

that demanded this Court's attention.

RIDER H

JUSTICE STEVENS agrees that state and local governments may be
"purchasers" within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act.
post, at 1.

See

He joins in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent, however, on the

basis of a novel theory: that state and local agencies may never be
in "competition" with private parties within the meaning of the Act.
See ibid.

This, of course, is an economic fiction: If in fact a

State participates in the private retail pharmaceutical market, it
is clear that it is competing with the private participants.
JUSTICE STEVENS relies on one statement by witness Teegarden in the
~~
-1-t:>
1935 House Hearings, but disreg~d• e~e significance of a further

"

statement by the same witness: "In the final analysis, it would
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case.

If the

two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from
the bill."
S

See 1935 Hearings, supra n. ) (, at 209.
conclusive presumption of the Act has
of legislative history that

r9
RIDER D

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, repeatedly
emphasizes that Congress in 1936 did not focus specifically on the
issue presented here.

See post, at 6, 7 & n. 10, 14, 15.

~~~ 1:; fi:~-o~ Fi • st,

This

the likelihood of state

entities competing in the private sector was remote in 1936 1
cannot be contended

~hat

~ jt

Congress specifically intended to

...fA-4

A~~ ;~,

Seco~,

allow the competition at issue here.
congressional focus is immaterial

f~

~
~

-'\

tne absence of

the plain language applies.

See, e. g., Browder v. United States, 312

u.s.

335, 339 (1941): De

Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 197 (1901): South-Eastern Underwriters,
322 U.S., at 356-358.

Rider B
For example, in 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961, Representative Keogh
also unsuccessfully introduced bills to extend the Act to federal
purchases only for resale.

See H.R. 430, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1961); H.R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 722, 85th
Con g • , 1st S e s s • ( 19 5 7 ) ; H• R . 5 213 , 8 4 t h Con g • , 1 s t S e s s • ( 19 5 5 ) •
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Rider B

The effect of our decision today on

~ pricing

policies, though perhaps critically important for small
retail pharmacies, may be minimal on drug manufacturers.
The investigating Subcommittee in the 1960s obtained
written responses from about 50 manufacturers to questions
about pricing.
Appendix.

See 1967-1968 Hearings, supra note 21, in

Although some of the answers were incomplete or

ambiguous, as a whole

the~icate

industrywide reliance

on any alleged exemption for state purchases.

Only six

manufacturers indicated that they gave greater discounts
to state agencies than they gave to individually owned
community pharmacies.

...

Id., at A21, A23, A29, A78, A88,

·''

... .

2.

A95.

Indeed, two indicated that independent retailers

received greater discounts.

Id., at A24, A26.

The

manufacturers split on whether to give chains larger
discounts than state agencies, but the overwhelming number
of manufacturers indicating any difference in catalog

J.prices stated that wholesalers received a large vS iscount
than state agencies.

Thus, as one would expect, pricing

is more closely related to the volume of purchases than to

en.
whether the purchaser is a governmental

~ private

entity.

v
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FIRST DRAFT: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association,
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether sales to and purchases
by
for

state and
resale

local hospitals of pharmaceutical products

in competition with private retail pharmacies

are exempt per se from the proscriptions of the Clayton
Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,
49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. §13 (the Act).
I

Petitioner
pharmacists

and

is

pharmacies

Court

commenced
for

the

defendants

the

association

doing

business

of
in

this

Northern

action

in

District

1978
of

in

the

Alabama,

retail

Jefferson

Petitioner, as assignee of its

County, Alabama.
claims,

trade

a

members~
District

naming

as

(

respondent

pharmaceutical

manufacturers;

the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama

(the

University); and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy.

The

University operates a medical center, including hospitals,
in

conjunction

with

the

State

university

and

medical

2.

school.

Located in the university medical center are two

pharmacies.

Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital,

existing as a public corporation incorporated pursuant to
Alabama law.
The
relief
§§15,

complaint

under
26,

for

Clayton Act,

u.s.c.

§§4

seeks
and

16

alleged

as

of

the

damages

by

the

and

Clayton Act,

violations

amended

§§13(a),(f).

treble

of

injunctive
15

§2(a), (f)

U.S. C.
of

the

Robinson-Patman Act,

Petitioner contends

15

that respondent

manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their products to
the

University's

two

pharmacies

and

to

Cooper

Green

( ~ ~la..&. ~*~-~<·l-1->')
Hospital Pharmacy at prices lower than those at which they

"'

sold like products to petitioner's assignors.

1 rn relevant part, 15

u.s.c.

Petitioner

§13(a) provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality, where either or any of
the purchases involved in such discrimination
are in commerce, where such commodities are sold
for use, consumption, or resale within the
United States ... , and where the ef feet of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of
them ....

in

3.

~-;:::1-e

further alleges that the governmental purchasers knowingly
induced such lower prices in violation of §2(f} 2 and that

fl.t'{
these

governmental

pharmaci~

,\

were

selling

drugs

so

procured to the general public in direct competition with
privately owned

pharmacies.

that

discrimination

the

price

There
is

also
not

are

allegations

exempted

from

the

proscriptions of the Act by 15 u.s.c. §13c.3
Respondents
failure

to

moved

state

a

to

claim,

dismiss
setting

the
forth

complaint

for

as grounds

for

tfttr~ (
dismissal

that

instrumentality
sanctions

sales
are

of § 2.

made

to

a

}t VI'

"'

I

~overnmental

of

goods

exempt

as

a matter of

law from

the

In granting

respondents'

motions,

the

District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations
that

local

retail

pharmacies

had

been

injured

by

the

2 section 2 (f), 15 u.s.c. §13 (f), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
commerce,
in the course of such commerce,
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination
in price which is prohibited by this section.

in

3section 13c provides:
Nothing in sections 13 to 13b and 2la of this title,
shall apply to purchases of their supplies for
their
own
use
by
schools,
colleges,
universities,
public
libraries,
churches,
hospitals,
and
charitable
institutions
not
operated for profit.

I

~

4.

challenged price discrimination and that at least some of
the governmental purchases were not exempt under

--o----...ial.JddJmt1l-i-i.fiR~i~~rltT:1~a~tE"t1Vvt!e---±
inntt~e!"!r~~~r~e~taatt-4::te-erntl!~~,r---~

"governmental purchases are,
§l3c,
Price

beyond

the

intended

Discrimination

§ 13c. 4

held

that

without regard to 15 U.S.C.
reach

of

at

least

Act,

the

Robinson-Patman

with

respect

to

purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental
purposes."

656 F.2d 92, 102. 5

The Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit affirmed, per curiam,

"on the basis of

the district court's Memorandum of Opinion."

656 F.2d, at

93. 6

4 656 F.2d 92, 98 (CAS
Court's opinion in Appendix).

1981)

(reprinting

District

5 Petitioner's
antitrust
claims
were
dismissed
solely on the basis that State and municipal hospital
purchases were exempt per se from the Robinson-Patman Act.
See 6 56 F. 2d, at 10 3 ("The court does not here base its
decision upon the 'state action' doctrine as explicated in
Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 [ (] 1943) .... "). We thus have
no occasion to determine whether some other rule of law
might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman
Act claims.
6The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals,
agreed that "[t)he claims against the Board must ... be
treated as equivalent to claims against the State itself."
656 F.2d, at 99.
Accordingly, both courts held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision.

5.

We granted certiorari because the issue presented is
an

important

question

of

federal

law

that

should

be

settled by this Court, and now reverse.?
II
On

numerous occasions,

comprehensive

coverage

of

this Court has
the

antitrust

affirmed
laws

and

the
has

recognized that those laws represent "a carefully studied
attempt to bring within the [antitrust laws] every person
engaged

in

monopolize
United
U.S.

q
.

~

r

~.. ~.~~~

0 ... vV

~~~

~#"':~
~~-~ /~
~

~
"T

A. . . .

~

LJ.,..(

r

~

w~

~~

t.

business

commercial

States

533,

whose

553

v.

activities

intercourse

South-Eastern

(1944) . 8

might

among

restrain or
the

Underwriters

states."

Ass'n,

322

As the CHIEF JUSTICE stated for

7 The dissenting op1n1on in the Court of Appeals
found
the majority's decision
inconsistent with the
purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act because, to the
state's great purchasing power,
"the court adds the
advantage of a license to make use of price discrimination
in its wholesale purchases."
656 F. 2d, at 9 3-94 (Clark,
J., dissenting).
The dissent Sftent 01'1 to StiitiQ that i:t
would "hold that, for the purposes of the Robinson-Patman
Act, when a state moves outside its traditional sphere of
activity
and
into
retail
competition
with
private
enterprise, it should be treated in precisely the same
manner as its competitors." We need not, however, decide
the breadth of the Robinson-Patman Act as it applies to
State and local governmental purchasing, because our
holding is limited to finding that there is no per se
exemption for such purchasing.
8 see, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,
434 u.s. 308, 312-313 (1978): Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 u.s. 219, 236
(1948) (stating that antitrust laws are "comprehensive in
[their] terms and coverage, protecting all who are made
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
Footnote continued on next page.
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-

AA<~~~-~~

'-<.a eA.~~~~~~

M-~-k{,
~t.. ..~~~
~~- ~~-c..~..,.-py ~ ~·....,••t:..4~•4 ~

....

the Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 u.s. .,.773
(1975),

~

~•

"our cases have repeatedly established that there

is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from

.

~~

r,--1
~ll

the antitrust laws,

id., at 787

(citing United States v.

I

Philadelphia National Bank, 374 u.s. 321, 350-351 (1963)
California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)) .9
Lafayette v.

Louisiana Power

~

In City of

~gi
Light Co., 435 u.s. ~

&

~~~=~=:~a~-8~~
~

'\the purposes and scope

of

the

public

anti trust

laws:

"[T} he

economic

corporations ... designed

maximum benefits for
inherently

more

as

choices made

they

are

to

by

assure

the community constituency, are not

likely

to

comport

with

the

broader

interests of national economic well-being than are those
of

private

interests

corporations
of ... its

acting

in

shareholders."

furtherance
Id.,

at

of

the

403,

408

.(

perpetrated")

(emphasis added).

9 see,
e.
g.,
National
Gerimedical
Hospital
&
Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 u.s. 378, 388
(1981)~ City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 u.s. 389, 398, 399 (1978) ~ Abbott Laboratories v.
Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 12
(1976) ~
United States v.
National Assn.
Securities
Dealers, 422 u.s. 694, 719 (1975).

7.

~

(footnotes ~ed) .10
The

~he Lfle!!'

Robinson-Patman
it

exempt/

Act

sales · to

local governmental agencies. 11

does
or

purchases

by State

and

The only express exemption

10 rn
one
important
sense,
competition
from
government can be more invidious than that from chainstores, at which the Robinson-Patman Act particularly was
aimed. See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69,
75-76 (1979); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 u.s. 536,
543-544 (1960)~~9 ~aubi lEe volume of purchases permits
any large, relatively efficient retail organization to
pass on cost savings to consumers, and to that extent,
consumers benefit merely from economy of scale.
But to
the extent that Lower prices result from less overhead, in
the form of no taxes, government subsidies, and free
services, governmental agencies me:r;-ely redistribute the
burden of the costs from the ~H\iit!e consumers to the
citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman
Act simply would give governmental agencies
further
advantages in the commercial market, perhaps enough to
eliminate private competitors.
Because consumers, as
citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs of the
drugs sold by government distributors, and because there
is no reason to assume that governmental retailers will
provide retail distribution any more efficiently than
private retail pharmacists, consumers ultimately will
suffer to the extent that governmental retail activities
eliminate more efficient, private retail distribution
systems.
Exemptions from the antitrust laws inherently distort
the market, and it hardly need be noted that governments
are significant purchasers in the markets for almost all
goods
produced.
See
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers
Association,
Annual
Survey Report
1979-1980,
at
11
(purchases
by State
and
local
government
hospitals
constitute 4% of the market; federal hospitals 2.3%).
11 Respondents argue that application of the Act to
the State of Alabama would present a significant risk of
conflict with the Tenth Amendment and that therefore this
construction of the Act should be avoided.
See NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 u.s. 490, 501 (1979).
There is no risk, however, of a constitutional issue
arising from the application of the Act in this case: The
retail sale of pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably
'[an] attribute[] of state sovereignty.'"
See EEOC v.
Wyoming, No. 81-554, at 9 (January
1982) (quoting
Hodel
v.
Virginia
Surface
Mining
&
Reclamation
Association, Inc., 452 u.s. 264, 288 (1981)).
It is
simply too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot
regulate States under its commerce clause powers when they
Footnote continued on next page.

8.

from

the

Act's

proscriptions

is

that

for

institutions contained in 15 U.S.C. §13c. 12

~thus

whether

"purchaser"

l

State

a
for

or

purposes

local

of

Th

may

hospital

§ 2 (a)

or

a

issue is
be

"person"

a
for

purposes of §2 (f) .
We need not discuss the word "purchasers" in §2(a) at
any great lengthl3

to cast doubt on the holding of the

courts below that State and local hospitals are
se

from

the

proscriptions

because the word "person"

of

the

exempt~

Robinson-Patman

Act,

in the antitrust laws has been

before us on several occasions. 1 4

In Chattanooga Foundry

are engaged in proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden
v. Terminal Railway,
377 u.s. 184, 188-189, 192-193
(1964).
If
the
Tenth
Amendment
protects
certain
governmental purchasing from the Act's limitations, such
as for government consumption for traditional governmental
functions,
those traditional state functions may be
protected on a case-by-case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette,
435 u.s., at 413 n.42 (plurality opinion).
12 Because the District Court properly assumed, for
purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least
some of the hospital purchases would not be covered by the
§13c exemption, see notes 3, supra, and accompanying text,
we need not decide whether the express exemption would
support summary judgment in cases against governmental
hospitals purchasing for their own use.
13 The word "purchasers" most likely has a meaning as
inclusive as the word "person."
See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430
(1936)
(remarks
of
Senator
Robinson)
("The Clayton
Anti trust Act contains terms general to all purchasers.
The pending bill does not segregate any particular class
of
purchasers,
or
exempt
any
special
class
of
purchasers.").
Footnote(s) 14 will appear on following pages.

1

9.

& Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906),
the Court held that a municipality is a
the

meaning

of

§8

of

the

Sherman

1

"person" within

Act,

the

general

definitional section, and that the city could maintain a
treble-damage action under
the Clayton Act. 1 5

§7,

the predecessor of §4 of

Some 36 years later, Georgia v. Evans,

1

316 u.s. 159, 162 (1942), held that the words "any person"
in §7 of the Sherman Act included States.
Court decided City of Lafayette,
without qualification that
definition of
and States."

'person'

or

By the time the

we were able

to state

"the Court has held that the
'persons'

embraces both cities

435 U.S., at 395.

14 The word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly
in the antitrust statutes. Section 8 of the Sherman Act,
ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210, 15 u.s.c. §7 (1976 ed.), and §1 of
the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 15 u.s.c. §12
(1976 ed.), are general definitional sections which define
"person" or "persons" "wherever used in this [Act] ... to
include corporations and associations existing under or
authorized by the laws of either the United States, the
laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or
the laws of any foreign country."
15 section 7 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat.
210 (1890) was repealed in 1955. Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, ch. 323, 33 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976 ed.),
provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the anti trust laws may sue ther for
in any district court •.. , and shall recover threefold the
damages
by
him
sustained .... "
Section
4
is
made
applicable to all of the antitrust statutes by §1 of the
Clayton Act, 15 u.s.c. §12 (1976 ed.).
See City of
Lafayette, 435 u.s. 396-397 & 13.

1

10.

The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous
to

require

substantive

by

compliance
standards

impose ... sanctions upon

of

municipalities
other

federal

'persons.'"

with
laws

the
which

at 400. 16

Id.,

But

1

one case is of particular relevance to our discussion of
the antidiscrimination provisions of
Act at issue here.
313

u.s.

the Robinson-Patman

In Union Pacific R. v. United States,

450

the

(1941)'

considered

Court

the

applicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708,

1

32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41(1)
(1976

ed.)

essentially
purposes

as

(repealed
is
the

an

anti trust

provision

"a

statute

serving

anti-price-discrimination

the Robinson-Patman Act."
402 n.l9. 1 8

1978) , 17

in

the

which
same

provisions

of

City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at

The Court there had no trouble finding that a

1 6see California v.
585-586 (1944); Ohio v.
(1934).

United States,
Helvering, 292

320 u.s. 577,
u.s. 360, 370

1 7That statute, in language similar to that used in
§2 of the Clayton Act, as amended, made it unlawful for
"any person, persons, or corporation to offer, grant, or
give, or to solicit, accept, or receive any rebate,
concession,
or
discrimination
in
respect
to
the
transportation of any property in interstate or foreign
commerce by any [covered] common carrier."
l8Accord, Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A
Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. Rev.
Footnote continued on next page.

1

11.

municipality
statute.

was

See

Lafayette, 435

a

'person'

313

U.S.,

u.s.,

at

within

the

467-468.

meaning

See

of

the

also City of

at 401-402 n.l9.

We believe that it is not enough to distinguish City

1

of Lafayettel9 from the case before us on the basis that
City of Lafayette
rather

than

distinction

involved claims under

under
gives

no

the

the Sherman Act

Robinson-Patman

weight

to

the

Act.

Court's

Such
specific

reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in its discussion of
the all-inclusive nature of the term "persons."
at 397 n.l4.

1

435 U.S.,

The issue presented in Abbott Laboratories

did not concern sales to governmental hospitals,

but the

principles set forth there, and that underly its analysis,
are equally pertinent to the issue presented here.20

Nor

71, 89 n. 100 (1974).
19 The only apparent difference between the scope of
the two laws is the extent to which the activities
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the commerce clause,
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is
otherwise subject to the Act.
20
It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws,
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be
construed liberally, and that the exceptions
from their application are to be construed
Footnote continued on next page.

1

12.

do we perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in
the Robinson-Patman Act any differently than we have that
word in the Clayton Act, which it amends. 21

Unless there

is some clear expression in the legislative history22 to

strictly.
United States v. McKesson & Robbins,
351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956) ~ FMC v. Seatrain Lines,
Inc., 411 u.s. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v.
Standard Oil Co., 395 u.s. 642, 646-647 (1969).
The Court has recognized, also, that RobinsonPatman "was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit
all
devices
by which
large
buyers
gained
discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by
virtue of their greater purchasing power." FTC
v. Brach & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960); FTC~
Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 u.s. 341, 349 (1968).
Because the Act is remedial,
it is to be
construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.
See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968).
425

u.s.,

at 11-12.

21 Indeed, the House committee report specifically
states that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the
Clayton Act will apply without repetition to the terms
concerned where they appear in this bill, since it is
designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H.R.
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1936); s.
Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
See 80 Cong.
Rec.
3116
(1936)
("Many have complained because the
provisions of the bill apply to 1 any person engaged in
commerce. 1
The original Clayton Act contains that
exact language, and it is carried into the bill under
consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used
because it has been construed by the courts."). That the
common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts
should be, when possible, construed consistently with each
other
should
not
be
surprising given
their
common
purposes.
See 80 Cong. Rec. 8137 (1936) (remarks of Rep.
Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a
The Clayton Act was enacted
new policy or a new theory.
in 1914, and it was the purpose of that act to do just
what this law sets out to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151
(remarks of Senator Logan).
2 2Al though the face of the Act contains no express
exemption in favor of sales to or purchases by State and
local governmental agencies, the Court has often held that
legislative history should be considered even though the
language appears to be clear. See, e. g., Watt v. Alaska,
451 U.S. 259,
266
(1981); Train v. Colorado Publ1c
Footnote continued on next page.

13.

I

indicate
the

that our

other

prior

antitrust

analyses and

laws

are

not

interpretations of
applicable

Robinson-Patman Act, 2 3 the Court of Appeals
·considered the

to

1

the

should have

issue whether State and local governments

were exempt per se from the limitations of the Act long
ago settled.

1

III
A

The
Patman

legislative
Act

was

history

intended

on
to

whether
apply

to

the

governmental

purchasing is meager and largely unenlightening.
nothing

Robinson-

There is

in the Senate or House committee reports,

or

in

Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 u.s. 1, 9-10 (1976).
It is thus not surprising that the Court has also
considered "how far Congress intended to extend its
mandate under" the Robinson-Patman Act and found the
answer in its "purpose and legislative history." Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 (1974).
See
FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 u.s 55, 69-70 (1959):
Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 72,
78 (1953).
23 It is clear that the burden is not on petitioner
at this late date to show Congress's specific intent to
include state and local governments within the RobinsonPatman Act.
In Lafayette and Union Pacific, the Court
found that cities were plainly "persons" within the
meaning of the Sherman and Elkins Acts without any direct
evidence of congressional intent on the subject. See also
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 u.s. 308, 317
(1978) (holding that a foreign nation is a "person" within
§4 of the Clayton Act).

1

14.

the

floor

however,
least

debates,

the

issue.

There

is,

evidence that some members of Congress were at

aware

governmental
were

discussing

of

possibility

purchases.

concerned,

purchasing,

the

not

about

but whether

Government's

Not

of

the Act

surprisingly,

state

and

applying
most

to

members

1

local governmental

the Act would limit the federal

purchasing.

The

most

i.mpEH't!mt -piece

of i!f'

relevant legislative history is the testimony of the Act's
principal

draftsman,

committee. 24

H.B.

Although

it

Teegarden,
is

before

difficult

to

the

House

determine

24
Rep. Lloyd: Would this bill,
in your judgment,
prevent the granting of discounts to the United
States Government?
Mr.
Teegarden:
Not
Clayton Act does so .•..

unless

the

present

Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government
gets
huge
discounts. . . . .
Now,
would
that
discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should
unless a discount contrary to the present bill
would be barred--that is, the present law--would
be barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this:
The Federal Government is not in competition
with other buyers from these concerns.
The Federal Government is saved by the same
distinction....
They are not in competition
with anyone else who would buy.
Rep.
Hancock:
It
would
eliminate
competitive bidding all along the line, would it
not, in classes of goods that would be covered
by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding
Footnote continued on next page.
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exactly what Mr.

Teegarden thought about the application

of the Act to State and local governmental purchasing, one
conclusion is certain: Mr. Teegarden expressly stated that
the

Act

hospitals

would

apply

to

in

least

some

at

the

purchases

of

circumstances. 25

on Government orders?
Rep.
Hancock:
Government,
municipality.

State,

municipal
Thus,

Mr.

city,

Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
Rep. Michener: If it did do it, you would
not want it, would you?
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it.
It
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would
with the Government.
Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the
city, county exactly the same as anybody else,
same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden:

No.

Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell
to a city hospital any cheaper than they would
to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in
this way.
In the final analysis, it would
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a
particular case.
If the two hospitals are in
competition with each other, I should say that '
the fact that one is operated by the city does
not save it from the bill.
Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209
(1935)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings].
25other conclusions also may be possible: (i) that
purchases by any governmental agency are not affected when
the government is not in .competition with other buyers;
and (ii) that the Act would not prevent governmental
purchasing by competitive bidding.
Neither of these
readings, however, is necessarily inconsistent with our
holding today.

1

16.

Teegarden's
exemption

comments

found

by

are

no

the courts

support

for

below for

the

per

se

State and city

governmental purchasing.26

f

/k

26 Mr. Teegarden subsequently submitted a
itten
brief to the House committee.
Mr
TQega~cen
first
rejected outright the desirability of ~ exemptions:
"Since the bill as drawn has been pared down so carefully
to those transations which in their very nature smack of
unjust discrimination, no reason appears why it should be
restricted: and no other antitrust law is so restricted."
1935 Hearings, supra note 24, at 249.
He then posed the
question whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive
bidding on Governmental purchases below trade price
levels." Mr. Teegarden stated that "[t)he answer is found
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute
will not be construed to limit or restrict in any way the
rights, prerogatives, or privileges of the sovereign
unless it so expressly provides--a principle inherited by
American jurisprudence from the common law ..... "
He also
noted
that
"requiring
a
showing
of
effect
upon
competition, will further preclude any possibility of the
bill affecting the Government.
1935 Hearings, supra, at
250 (footnotes omitted).
It is arguable that Mr. Teegarden intended to include
both State and federal governments in his use of the word
"Governmental," but his comments do not compel that
conclusion. All the cases cited by Mr. Teegarden suggest
that the sovereign exception, as used in the United
States, means that a government, in passing a law, does
not give up what it does not expressly surrender.
See
United States v. Herron, 87 u.s. (20 Wall.) 227, 257
(1874): Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19
Wall.) 227, 239 (1874).
In the same year that Congress
passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court in United States
v. California, 297 u.s. 175, 186 (1936), stated that 1t
could "perceive no reason for extending [the presumption
against including the sovereign in a statute] so as to
exempt a business carried on by a state from the otherwise
applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-embracing
in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable
of being obstructed by state as by individual action."
See California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 562-563 (1957).
At most, the rule of statutory construction, as used by
Mr. Teegarden and applied to the Robinson-Patman Act,
supports
an
exemption
for
the
federal
government's
purchases, the existence of which is not before us.
Cf.
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-605
(1941) (holding that the United States was not a "person"
under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble
damages).
Moreover, he clearly assumed that governmental
purchasing would not compete with private purchasing, thus
eliminating for his purposes even the possibility of the
Act applying to State and local governments.

17.

1

B

This

Court

has

said

that

a

contemporaneous

construction of a new law by an official charged with its
enforcement is highly persuasive of the statute's proper
meaning.
(1965).

See

e.

g.,

Udall

v.

Tallman,

380

u.s.

1,

16

Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney

General of the United States responded to an

1

inquiry by

the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to
government contracts for supplies."
(1936).

In

ruling

that

such

38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539

contracts

are

outside

the

Act, the Attorney General explained:

[S)tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc.,
in matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily
applyA the Government unless it is expressly so
provided; and it does not seem to have been the
policy of the Congress to make such statutes
applicable to the Government ....
The Act of June 19, 1936, merely amended
the Act of October 15, 1914 ... and, in so far as
I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded
heretofore
as
applicable
to
Government
contracts. 27

27 Id., at 540 (later in the letter using phrase
"Federal Government"
and stating other reasons "for
avoiding a construction that would make the statute
applicable to the Government in violation of the apparent
policy of the Congress in such matters").
The Attorney
General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 u.s. 415, 425 (1928), in
which
this
Court
upheld
the granting of
favorable
telegraph rates to a federal corporation that competed
with private enterprise.

1

1

2
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1he

Attorney

General's

2

~~

opinion a.e sayic.g- a.Ryefii.J:I.g about the Act's applicability
to State and local governmental agencies. 2 8

Hv-~
v~
year,

the

Attorney

General

W...;

Indeed,

of

the

California

i\

expressly concluded that State and municipal governmental
purchasing was within the proscriptions of the Act.

See

Opinion of the Attorney General of California, 1932-1939
Trade

Cas.

(CCH)

,[55,156,

415-416

(1937) . 2 9

It

thus

28 Representative Patman, however, did interpret the
opinion
as
exempting
State
and
local
governmental
purchases. See W. Patman, Complete Guide to the RobinsonPatman
Act
30
(1963).
Representative
Patman's
interpretation of the Act is certainly entitled to weight
where it indicates his intent in 1936, but here he seems
to
be
interpreting
the Attorney General's
opinion.
Representative Patman's intentions are probably better
reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to
amend the Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United
States, any State or any political subdivision thereof."
H.R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 3377, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
There is no legislative history
on these bills, but it is arguable that Representative
Patman believed that the original intent needed to be
stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney
General's construction of the Act to the contrary. In any
case, Congress's failure to pass these bills probably
stems from a reluctance to subject federal purchases to
the Act.
Respondents
argue
that,
when
Congress
passed
legislation amending the Robinson-Patman Act in 1938, its
failure to overrule Rep. Patman's views, as expressed in
his book, is persuasive evidence of its intent to leave
the prior interpretation intact.
See United States v.
American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271,
280-281 (1975).
A rule, however, that Congress must
"overrule" one Congressman's interpretation of an Act of
Congress, else that interpretation becomes law, is not
only novel,
but would make any legislative history
impossible to do and Congress's clarification of the law
very difficult.
2 9Two other early state attorney general opinions do
not decide whether the Act applies to state purchasing for
Footnote continued on next page.
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cannot
the

be

said

Act's

intent

that

passage

necessary

the

legislative history surrounding

manifests

to

take

that

State

clear

and

congressional

local

governmental

2

purchasing from within its confines.

c
Respondents'

principal

argument

is

that

subsequent

ry~~~~
legislative events, and

een~istenk

j~s~al

~

construction,

J1

have confirmed that governmental purchases are outside the
Act.

2

We have found, on occasion, such evidence persuasive

of the construction of the Act that we too should adopt.
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419
201

(1974),

we

noted

that

"the

courts

u.s.
in

186, 200-

nearly

four

decades of litigation" had given the Robinson-Patman Act a
certain construction and held that, "[i]n the face of this
longstanding

interpretation

congressional silence,

and

the

the legislative history

warrant our extending §2 (a)

continued
[did]

not

beyond its clear language to

retail sales.
See Opinion of Attorney Gerneral of
Minnesota, 1932-1939 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~55,157, at 416
(1937) (concluding Act "not applicable to the purchasing
departments of the state when purchasing materials and
supplies for the state"): Opinion of Attorney Gerneral of
Wisconsin, 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937) (purchase of
commercial
fertilizers
for
agricultural
experiment
stations: no indication of any purchase for resale).

2
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reach a multitude of local activities that hitherto have

2,

been left to state and local regulation."30
Respondents

rely

Robinson-Patman Act
hearings,

the

discrimination

in

House
in

heavily
the

on

of

held

late 1960's. 3l

committee

favor

hearings

was

told

governmental

on

the

During

those

that

price

hospitals

was

outside the Act,32 and Chairman Paul Dixon of the Federal

30 see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 u.s. 258, 273-274 (1972)
(treating professional baseball as an anomaly under the
anti trust laws because of "[c) ongressional awareness for
three decades of the Court's ruling ..• , coupled with
congressional inaction").
See also Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 723, 733 (1975) (affirming
rule adopted by "virtually all lower federal courts facing
the issue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting
this question over the past quarter century").
31 The most important relevant event in the RobinsonPatman Act's post-enactment history is the amendment in
1938 excluding eleemosynary institutions.
Whether the
existence of an exemption in §l3c supports an exemption
from the Act of all governmental purchasing depends
whether §13c is interpreted to apply to any governmental
agencies.
That is a substantial issue, however, in its
own right.
Compare 81 Cong. Rec. 8 706 ( 19 3 7) (remarks of
Rep.
Pettengill)
(reading
similar
amendment
as
not
including "a charitable institution that was not supported
in any part by public funds"): H.R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968), with 81 Cong. Rec., at
8706 (statement of Rep. Walter) (agreeing that §l3c would
apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and
States).
See also City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397
n.l4 (including within the Nonprofit Institutions Act
"public libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by
local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 1819 n.lO; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (exemption codifies the
intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We
need not address it.
32 see, e. g., Small Business Problems in the Drug
Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Activities
of Regula tory Agencies of the Select Commit tee on Small
Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15-16 (1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings]:
Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings
Footnote continued on next page.
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Commission

Trade

transactions

disclaimed

involving

state

any
health

authority
care

over

programs.33

Although the statement of the FTC's chairman is entitled
to

weight,

it

administrative

"can

hardly

be

construction

said

the

to

have

'notoriety'

given
that

Court found persuasive in Udall v. Tallman, 380
18."

Zuber v. Allen, 396

u.s.

168, 194 (1949).

statements express 1 it tle more than

informed,

the

2

this

u.s.,

at

The other
interested

opinions on the issue, and certainly are not entitled to

2

the consideration given those of Mr. Teegarden.
What should be important is the conclusion that the
committee drew from this testimony, and that conclusion is
far

from clear.

basis
Act

The committee stated that "[t]here is no

apparent ... why

should

not

be

the mandate

applied

to

of

the

Robinson-Patman

discriminatory

drug

sales

Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the
Robinson-Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small
Business of the House of Representatives, 9lst Cong., 1st
Sess. 73-77, 623 (1969-1970). The committee also was told
that institutional purchasers frequently purchase drugs at
lower prices than that paid by retai 1 pharmacies, see
1967-1968 Hearings, supra, at 15, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and
many
witnesses
complained
that
this
discrimination
adversely affected competition. See id., at A-140-141, p.
253-262, 273, 291.
33 See H.R. Rep. No. 1983, at 74.

2
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favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit
or

nonprofit,

competition

to

at

druggists."

the

the

extent

retail

there

level

is

prescription drug

with

disfavored

(emphasis added) .34

Id., at 79

retail

But to read

2

that statement as approving a per se exemption from the
Robinson-Patman
require

us

Act

to

for

draw

an

governmental
inference

purchasing
that

is

would

far

from

compelled.
Respondents

also

courts considering

argue

that,

without

exception,

2

the matter of coverage have concluded

that the Act does not apply to governmental purchasers and
that not one has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer,
under

either

§2(a)

or

§2(f)

of

the

Act,

where

the

discriminatory price involved a sale to a State, city, or
county.

There

assertion:
considering

The
the

are

several

number
Act's

of

difficulties
judicial

application

to

with

this

decisions

even

purchases

by

34 The
commit tee
also
concluded
that
the
19 38
Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private
nonprofit institutions ..• to the extent the sales are for
the nonprofit institution's 'own use,"'
H.R. Rep. No.
1983, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction
of §l3c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress.

2
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government

are

few

in

apparently

had

ever

expressly

here,

respondents'

number;35

no

Court

adopted,

interpretation

of

of

before

§2;36

most

Appeals
the

one

of

the

35 The parties bring to our attention less than a
dozen cases that even involve the application of the
Robinson-Patman Act to governmental purchasing. See notes
36 & 37, infra.
36 Five District Courts have suggested in dicta or in
alternative holdings that there is a per se exemption for
governmental
purchasing.
See
Pacific
Engineering
&
Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) ~75,054, at 96,721, 96,742 (D Utah 1974)
(but
finding "no support for the proposition that sales to
private parties are exempt merely because the ultimate
consumer
is
the
government";
federal
government
purchaser), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F.2d 790,
798
(CAlO)
(finding
legitimate
competition
despite
different prices), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 879 (1977);
Portland
Retail
Druggists
Association
v.
Abbott
Laboratories,
No.
71-543
(D
Or.
Sept.
11,
1972)
(unpublished, oral opinion), vacated and remanded, 510
F. 2d 486 (CA9 197 4) (finding § 13c applied to the purchases
and sales), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 1 (1976); Logan
Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., No. 4-66-5, op. at 4 (D
Idaho May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 F.2d
212, 215-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University
within the scope of Nonprofit Institutions Act; expressly
not addressing whether there is a "so-called governmental
exemption"), cert denied, 389 u.s. 898 (1967); Sachs v.
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY
19 55) (dicta) , a f f ' d per cur i am, 2 3 4 F . 2 d 9 59 ( CA 2) , c e r t .
denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956); General Shale Products Corp.
v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-604 (WD Ky.)
(but
alternat1vely
holding
the
Robinson-Patman
Act
inapplicable on the ground that "[n]either the government
nor a city in its purchase of property considered
necessary
for
the
purposes
of
carrying
out
its
governmental functions is in competition with another
buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling that
article") (emphasis supplied), aff'd, 132 F.2d 425, 428
(CA6
Cir.
1942)
(expressly
reserving
issue
whether
Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales to governmental
agency), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943).
Only one
court seems to have relied solely on the per se exemption
to dismiss a Robinson-Patman claim.
See Mountain View
Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D Utah,
Aug.
15,
1977)
(unpublished
opinion)
(consent
by
plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act
claims based on sales to governmental agencies) , aff' d,
630 F.2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (finding complaint insufficient
because it failed to identify products that were subject
to discriminatory treatment or the favored and disfavored
Footnote continued on next page.
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cases are simply inapposite; and there are more cases that
suggest

the

governmental

Robinson-Patman
purchasing.37

Act

is

applicable

to

This judicial track record is

purchasers of any product) .
37 see City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 397 n.l4
(stating that §l3c exempted governmental libraries from
Robinson-Patman Act); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at
18-19 n.lO (Court not at all troubled by application of
§l3c to governmental agency in Logan Lanes, Inc. v.
Brunswick Corp., 378 F. 2d 212, 215-216
(CA9), cert.
denied, 389 u.s. 898 (1969)); Municipality of Anchorage v.
Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 641 (D Alaska 1982)
(expressly holding that municipality has standing to bring
Robinson-Patman Act claims for sales to it) ; Burge v.
Bryant Public School District, 5 20 F. Supp. 328, 3 30-3 3 3
(ED Ark. 1980) (holding school's purchases not violations
under §§2(c), 13c), aff'd, 658 F.2d 611, 612 (CAB 1981)
(holding purch~ses exempt under §13(c)); Champaign-Urbana
News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp.
281, 287, 291 (CD Ill. 1979) (finding the Robinson-Patman
Act inapplicable to purchases by the Army and Air Force
Exchange Service because of sovereign immunity,
but
strongly suggesting that State governments would face an
opposite result), aff'd, 632 F.2d 680, 687-692 (CA7 1980)
(finding "strong evidence in the legislative history that
the Robinson-Patman Act was not intended to include
purchases by the federal government") (emphasis added);
Sterling Nelson & Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393,
399
(D. Idaho 19 6 5)
(" [N] o reason occurs to us why
J~ [Robinson-Patman Act violations] should not be actionable
~ with respect to sales to a sovereign as well as sales to a
private citizen or corporation."), aff'd, 351 F.2d 851,
858-859 (CA9 1965) (holding that §13 (c) applies to State
governmental procurement officers acting within the scope
of their job), cert. denied, 383 u.s. 936 (1966) (cited
with approval in California Motor Transportation Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)); Sperry Rand
Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Association, 152 F.
Supp. 91, 95, 96 (EDNY 1957)
(refusing to dismiss a
counterclain alleging that sales to the u.s. Army Signal
Corps violated §l3a; finding "no cases in which it has
been held that sales to the Government fall outside"
§l3a); A.J. Goodman & Sons v. United Lacquer Manufacturing
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D Mass. 1949) (dismissing
action alleging price discrimination in sale to State
because plaintiff had not shown injury; applicability of
Act to State assumed).
Cf.
Reid v.
University of
Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly
~~
reserv1ng question whether state agency is exempt from §§2
/ / and l3a).

25.

thus

simply not

the unbroken chain of

judical decisions

2

upon which this Court has generally relied in the past for
ascertaining
Congress

a

over

preserve.

construction
a

long

of

period

the
of

anti trust
time

has

laws
chosen

that
to

Without a more formidable list of precedents,

this Court should not deviate from its duty to discern the
intent

of

the

enacting

Congress

and

from

our

2

own

consistent construction of the terms in the antitrust law,
and instead rely on the recent interpretations of only a
handful of lower courts.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations
of

various

commentators

and

executive

officials.

The

difficulty is that most of these sources indicate that the
question presented

is unsettled, 38

do not

foreclose

our

38 see
SA
z.
Cavitch,
Business
Organizations
§1050. 01 [8] [c],
at
1050-45
to
-46
(1978)
(opinions
"divided" whether Act is applicable): 4 J. Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70
(1982)
(recognizing "there is some conflict among the
authorities
as
to
whether
sales
to
states
and
municipalities
are
excluded
from
Robinson-Patman
liability"): id. §24.06 [2], at 24-75 to 24-76 (finding
courts and state attorney generals "divided as to whether
states and municipalities are to be accorded the same
status as the Federal Government under the Robinson-Patman
Act"): E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 202-203 (1970)
("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to
have settled the matter where the federal government is
concerned,
some
controversy
has
arisen
over
the
applicability of the act to purchases by state and local
governments.").
Cf. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the
Footnote continued on next page.
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holding,39 and in some cases support it. 4 0

Thus, Congress

cannot be said to have left untouched a universally held
interpretation of the Act.
IV
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized,
both for its effects4 1 and for the policies that it seeks

Robinson-Patman Act 84 n.l66 (1962) (noting that purchases
for resale must be analyzed separately from purchases for
consumption) .
39 some
deal
only
with
sales
to
the
federal
government.
See
Letter from Comptroller General to
Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration (July 17, 1973),
reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,174,642, at 94,819
(1973).
Almost all fail to mention, much less decide,
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applies to State and local
purchasing for retail sales.
See Report of the Attorney
General Under Executive Order 10,936, Identical Bidding in
Public Procurement 11 (1962):
40 The Attorney General of Georgia has found that the
Robinson-Patman Act applies at least to some governmental
purchasing.
See Opinion of the Attorney General of
Georgia, 1948-1949 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,162,455, at 63,338
(1949). Although the opinion specifically addresses sales
EY a State rather than sales to a State, our immediate,
broader concern--the applicability of the Robinson-Patman
Act to activity by a governmental entity in direct
competition with private enterprises--does not depend on
whether the State happens to be a buyer or seller.
See
Opinion of Attorney General of North Carolina, 47 N.C.A.G.
No. 1, 112, 113, 115 (1977) (indicating that whether State
and local governments enjoy the same exemption as the
federal government
"has rarely been litigated," and
relying, not on any exemption, but on the fact that State
purchases at lower prices "would be permitted within the
Act itself."
41 Respondents criticize our holding because (i) the
Act
would
prevent
States
from
securing
favorable
discounts,
and
higher
prices
for
government
would
unquestionably translate into a combination of fewer
governmental
services
and
higher
taxes:
and
(ii)
application of the Act would displace the State's freedom
to structure integral operations in certain areas.
The
underlying assumption of much of these fears is that
application of the Robinson-Patman Act to State and local
Footnote continued on next page.
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to promote.
not for

This Court has warned, however, that "it is

the courts to indulge in

~~ bus.iR&eB

2

of policy-

making in the field of antitrust legislation" and advised
that "[o]ur function ends with the endeavor to ascertain
from

the

words

relevant

used,

material,

Congress."

construed

what

was

in

in

United States v. Cooper,

the

fact

light
the

of

intent

312 U.S.,

the
of

3

600, 604-

605 (1941).
"A general application of the

[Robinson-Patman]

Act

to all combinations of business and capital organized to
suppress
spirit

commercial

and

impulses

competition
of

the

is

in

harmony

times which gave

with

the

it birth."

governmental purchasing will preclude purchasing by sealed
competitive bidding.
Respondents argue that bidding by
its nature demands price discrimination and that a
successful low bid below list price cannot be justified on
the basis of meeting competition, because the object of
bidding is to "beat" the competition.
It is not at all clear, however, whether competitive
bidding is a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act in any
case, see National Institute on Prices and Pricing,
Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 Antitrust L.J.
147, 161-162 (1971): Note, Competitive Bidding Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, 49 St. John's L. Rev. 512, 519
(1975): cf. note 25, supra, much less where the State or
city has specifically authorized or mandated such means of
purchasing.
Moreover, governmental agencies may be able
to purchase at discount prices because of a host of
legitimate reasons: i. e., volume, low distributional
cost, promotional benefits to manufacturers, low credit
risk.
In any case, it is not necessary to decide here
whether petitioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims have any
merit or whether the State action doctrine would exempt
these sales and purchases.

3

"

28.

South-Eastern

Underwriters,

322

at

u.s.'

553.

The

legislative history, while barren of any indication that
Congress

intended

coverage,

~~
is full of references to the ~r rO"rs of large

organizations

to

purchasing

exempt

states

from other

from

the

Act's
3'

large organizations

for resale in competition with the small, local retailers
There is no

in the congressmen's states and districts.

reason, in the absence of any explicit exemption, to think

~k~~' ~u.t.

that congressmen who feared these evils ~nt

3

A

to deny the small pharmacies of Jefferson County, Alabama
protection from the competition of the
of

them

a11. 42

To

create

an

..a..~4At
b~

exemption

here

competitor
would

be

clearly contrary to the intent of Congress.

v

3

We hold that sales and purchases by state and local
governmental

hospitals

are

not

exempt per

proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act.

se

from

the

The judgment of

42 under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would
accrue, precisely as intended, to the benefit of small,
private retailers.
See Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al.
before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 261 (1935) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings] (Mr.
Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of
private rights").

29.

the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed and remanded
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

3

,..

.
~

'

job 12/21/82
SECOND DRAFT: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association,
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether sales to and purchases
by
for

state and
resale

local hospitals of pharmaceutical products

in competition with private retail pharmacies

are exempt per se from the proscriptions of

the Clayton

Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,

u.s.c.

49 Stat. 1526, 15

§13 (the Act).
I

Petitioner
pharmacists

and

is

Court

the

defendants

the

association

doing

business

of
in

retail

Jefferson

Petitioner, as assignee of its members'

commenced
for

trade

pharmacies

County, Alabama.
claims,

a

this

action

Northern

in

District

respondent

1978
of

in

the

Alabama,

pharmaceutical

District
naming

as

manufacturers;

the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama

(the

University); and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy.

The

University operates a medical center, including hospitals,
in

conjunction

with

the

State

university

and

medical

school.

Located in the university medical center are two

pharmacies.

Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital,

existing as a public corporation incorporated pursuant to
Alabama law.
The
relief
§§15,

complaint

under
26,

for

Clayton Act,
U.S.C.

§ §4

seeks
and

16

alleged

as

treble
of

by

the

and

Clayton Act,

violations

amended

§§13 (a), (f).

the

damages

of

injunctive
15

§2(a), (f)

U.S. C.
of

Robinson-Patman Act,

Petitioner contends

the
15

that respondent

7
manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their products to
the

University's

two

pharmacies

and

to

Cooper

Green

-'

Hospital Pharmacy (the "state purchasers") at prices lower
than

those

at

which

1 In relevant part, 15

they

sold

u.s.c.

like

products

to

~
§l3(a) provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality, where either or any of
the purchases involved in such discrimination
are in commerce, where such commodities are sold
for use, consumption, or resale within the
United States ... , and where the effect of such
discr iminati.on may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of
them ....

in

3.

petitioner's

assignors.

- .....
prices

the state

drugs so

in violation of

procured to the general public in direct competition with
privately owned
that

the

price

There

pharmacies.
discrimination

is

also
not

are

allegations

exempted

from

the

proscriptions of the Act by 15 U.S.C. §13c. 3
Respondents
failure

to

state

dismissal

that

instrumentali tv
sanctions

moved

of

a

claim,

sales
are

§ 2.

to

of

dismiss
setting

the
forth

complaint

for

as grounds

for

~
~
made to

exempt

as a matter

In granting

a

government

of

law from

the

respondents'

motions,

the

District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations
that

local

retail

pharmacies

had

been

injured

by

the

2 section 2 (f), 15 u.s.c. §13 (f), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
commerce,
in the course of such commerce,
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination
in price which is prohibited by this section.

in

3 section 13c provides:
Nothing in sections 13 to 13b and 2la of this title,
shall apply to purchases of their supplies for
their
own
use
by
schools,
colleges,
universities,
public
libraries,
churches,
hospitals,
and
charitable
institutions
not
operated for profit.

4.

challenged
the

pric~rimi~n

and that at least some of

purchases were not exempt

govg£-mRQReai

under

§ 13c. 4

A

The District Court held that "governmental purchases are,
without

regard

to

15

U.S.C.

§13c,

beyond

the

intended

reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at
least with
traditional

respect

to purchases for

governmental

The Court of Appeals for
curiam,

purposes."

hospitals and other
656

F.2d

92,

102. 5

the Fifth Circuit affirmed,

~

"on the bas is of the district court's Memorandum

of Opinion."

656 F.2d, at 93. 6

We granted certiorari because the issue presented is
an

important

question

of

federal

law

that

should

be

settled by this Court, and now reverse.

4 656

F.2d 92, 98 (CAS
Court's opinion in Appendix).

1981)

(reprinting

District

5 Petitioner's
antitrust
claims
were
dismissed
solely on the basis that State and municipal hospital
. purchases are exempt per se from the Robinson-Patman Act.
See 656 F.2d, at 103 ("The court does not here base its
decision upon the 'state action' doctrine as explicated in
Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 [ (] 1943) .... "). We thus have
no occasion to determine whether some other rule of law
might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman
Act claims.
6 The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals,
agreed that "[t]he claims against the Board must ... be
treated as equivalent to claims against the State itself."
656 F.2d, at 99.
Accordingly, both courts held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision.
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JEFFS SALLY-POW
The issue presented by this case is a narrow
one.

We are not concerned with sales to or purchases by

the federal government.

Nor are we concerned with state

--. ·--..._
purchases for consumption or use in traditional
governmental functions.

Rather, the issue before us

involves only state purchases for the purpose of competing
- with the advantage of discriminatory prices - in the
retail pharmacy
The courts below held, and respondents contend,

-

that the Act exempts all state purchases regardless of the
purpose of the purchase.

We may assume, without deciding >

that Congress did not intend the Act to apply where state
purchases are for traditional governmental functions, and

v

2.

that therefore such purchases are exempt per se.

If there

is such an implied exemption, we do not think it applies
where a state has chosen to compete in the private market ,

III
In construing a statute, we

~+

look1-~ f~)l

to

the language of the statute itself.

Jim:

Do you not think the "call" for what is now note 7

should be relocated?

;

5.

,
~~~~ ~

It is

jmpor.:..taR-t

±.9-.ma-kQ. eJ:.ea-r

the- ncrr-toWliess

of- the

We are not concerned with sales to or
purchases

by

the

federal

government.

~kJ;::i:;::L ~

'

Our

concern

is

~t.h~

limited to the tf ctivities of t State ar:1g lee«l ~orverl"':ment

entt~s. lnd~~d~ ~~~with
~

1\

l

their

1\

CIY-~

purchases

f~-6~onsumption

in

traditional

governmental

~

Rather, the specific issue before us involves)

functions.

C'ctNt~ft

p~I:H'o£-echA-aa-:::te~!-B~~~:t~-""~"a"Mft~Wa~s;war:~lt-Ee~s:--.~~oJ S ta te;:;;~
~:~!~r~

--~~~~~A"-the purpose of competing Ain the retail pharmacy market

-.,

~

with private enterprise.
The courts below held, and the respondents contend,
that the Act
aA~

exernpt;~~a:-=~: ::;~

~n~iee,

purchase.

regardless

of

the

purpose

of

the

~ t he complaint here alleges injury as a
~f:c~...,.~~~~

result of State and local) r-e-t.ail act b.Li ti'i'i, --we need l"'""t

~d.-8~

1\~hether

respondent hospitals for
there

~-~--~4
sales

~
consumption ~ exempt

"

toA the

------

If

·.

~1-s

uu_

~ ~ y's~

6

i-tZ-~~,~~

0

III
dud

3..ocal

resale

in

competition with private retail pharma c ies are exempt

~

~
I\

se from the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act is a
question of congressional

intent.

language of the Act itsel :::_j
~47

We look first

to the

~~ ~

The Robinson-Patman Act does not by its terms exempt

~ ~pr~~. ~>y o;~ate....arn>
ag9 "QGias.

The

only

express

local

exemption

a::::~

from

the

Act's

proscriptions is that for nonprofit institutions contained
in

15

u.s.c.

§13c. 8

Moreover,

as

the

courts

below

7 Respondents argue that application of the Act to
the State of Alabama would present a significant risk of
conflict w~th the Tenth Amendment and that therefore this
construction of the Act should be avoided.
See NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).
There is no risk, however, of a constitutional issue
arising from the application of the Act in this case: The
retail sale of pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably
' [an] attribute [] of state sovereignty. '"
See EEOC v.
Wyoming, No. 81-554, at 9 (January --, 1982) (quoting
Hodel
v.
Virginia
Surface
Mining
&
Reclamation
Association, Inc., 452 u.s. 264, 288 (1981)).
It is
simply too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot
regulate States under its commerce clause powers when they
are engaged in proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden
v. Terminal Railway,
377 u.s. 184, 188-189, 192-193
(1964).
If
the
Tenth
Amendment
protects
certain
governmental purchasing from the Act's 1 imitations, such
as for government consumption for traditional governmental
functions,
those
traditional state functions may be
protected on a case-by-case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette,
435 U.S., at 413 n.42 (plurality opinion).
Footnote(s) 8 will appear on following pages.

...
7.

"[t]he

conceded,
'purchasers'
bodies.

15

concession
decisions. 10

%

,. q

statutory

language--'persons'

and

is sufficiently broad to cover governmental

u.s.c.
was

§§13(a,f) ."

compelled

by

656 F.2d,
several

In City of Lafayette v.

8 1}e-es-ue~ lhe

of

at 99. 9
the

This

Court's

Louisiana Power &

~

D ·strict Court properly assumed, for
~ /~ purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least
~ ~ }0
~some of the hospital purchases would not be covered by the
~~~
§13c exemption, see note 3, supra, and accompanying text,
~ _
we need not 4eeMe whether this express exemption would
,
support summary judgment in cases against government
~
hospitals purchasing for their own use.

1'1./
V_Jr

9The word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly
in the antitrust statutes. Section 8 of the Sherman Act,
ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210, 15 u.s.c. §7 (1976 ed.), and §l of
the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 15 u.s.c. §12
(1976 ed.), are general definitional sections that define
"person" or "persons" "wherever used in this [Act] ... to
include corporations and associations existing under or
authorized by the laws of either the United States, the
laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or
the laws of any foreign country."
Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, ch. 123, 33 Stat. 731, 15 u.s.c. §15 (1976
ed.), provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court ..• , and shall recover threefold the
damages
by
him
sustained ••.. "
Section
4
is
made
applicable to all of the antitrust statutes by §1 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §12 (1976 ed.).
See City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 u.s. jag,
396-397 & 13 (1978).

lOs ee, e. g., Georg1a
.
v. Evans, 316 U.S. 15q, 162
(1942) (holding that the words "any person" in §7 of the
Sherman Act include States); Chattanooga Foundr~ & Pi~e
Works v. City of Atlanta, :?.03 u.s. 390, 39
(190 )
(holding that a municipality is a "person" within the
meaning of §8 of the Sherman Act and that the city could
maintain a treble-damage action under §7, the predecessor
of § 4 of the Clayton Act) .
See also Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, 434 u.s. 308, 317 (1978) (holding
that a fore1gn nation is a "person" within §4 of the
Clayton Act) .
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to
require compliance by municipalities with the substantive
standards of other federal laws which impose ••. sanctions
upon 'persons.'"
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Footnote continued on next page.

9

8.

Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 395 (1978), we were able to state
without qualification that
definition of

'person'

or

"the Court has held
'persons'

1

that the

embraces both cities

and
City
of Lafayette 12 from the case before us on the

i)City o £= bafaygtte Ainvolved clii:i-m.s ..~.n~.Q.Qr

rather

than

the

.
......

~

the

Robinson-Patman

~at

~ Sherman

Act

~,,

'

Act.

Such

Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
(1978).
See California v.
United States, 320 u.s.
585-586 (1944); Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360,
(1934).
One case 1s of
particular relevance.
In
nion Pacific R. v. United
States, 313 u.s. 450 (1941 , the Court considered the
appl1cability to a citv of § of the Elkins Act, ch. 708,
32 Stat. 847, as amended, 3 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41(1)
(1976
ed.)
(repealed
in
1978),
"a
statute
which
essentially is an anti trust prov1s1on serving the same
purposes as the anti-price discrimination provisions of
the Robinson-Patman Act." C t of Lafa ette, 435 U.S., at
402 n.l9.
The Court there
·
· g that a
municipality was a 'person' within the meaning of the
statute.
See 313 u.s., at 467-468.
See also City of
Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 401-402 n.lq.
,

"purchasers"..t~a~eaning

11 The word
as
inclusive as the word "person."
See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430
( 19 36)
(remarks
of
Senator
Robinson)
("The
Clayton
Anti trust Act contains terms general to all purchasers.
The pending bill does not segregate any particular class
of
purchasers,
or
exempt
any
special
class
of
purchasers.") .
12

The only apparent difference between the scope of
the two laws is the extent to which the activities
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the commerce clause,
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 u.s. 186, 199201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is
otherwise subject to the Act.

1

specific

nature of the term "persons."

435 U.S.,

1

perceive any reason to construe
Act
have ~ din
Unless

which
urp ses,

or

there

is

the

Act

any

the Clayton Act,

has

some

in

~-----

egi ~-t-o-~14 to indicate that our prior

13 Indeed, the House committee report specifically
states that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the
Clayton Act will apply without repetition to the terms
concerned where they appear in this bill, since it is
designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H.R.
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1936); S.
Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
See 80 Cong.
Rec.
3116
(1936)
("Many have complained because the
provisions of the bill apply to 1 any person engaged in
commerce. 1
The original Clayton Act contains that
exact language, and it is carried into the bill under
consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used
because it has been construed by the courts."). That the
common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts
should be, when possible, construed consistently with each
other
should
not
be
surprising given their common
purposes.
See 80 Cong. Rec. 8137 (1936) (remarks of Rep.
Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a
The Clayton Act was enacted
new policy or a new theory.
in 1914, and it was the purpose of that act to do just
what this law sets out to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151
(remarks of Senator Logan) .
1 4Although the face of the Act contains no express
exemption in favor of sa~es to or purchases b State and
local governmental agencies, the Court as often held that
legislative history should be considere even E ough the
language appears to be clear. See, e. g., Watt v. Alaska,
451 U.S.
259, 266
(1981); Train v. Colorado Public
Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976).
It is thus not surprising that the Court has also
considered "how far Congress intended to extend its
Footnote continued on next page.

1

10.

and

interpretations of

the other anti trust

applicable to the Robinson-Patman Act,

15

the courts

should have cons ide red the issue whether State and loca
governments were exempt per se from the limitations of the

1

Act long ago settled.
A

On

numerous

comprehensive

occasions,
coverage

of

this

Court

has

the

antitrust

affirmed
laws

and

the
has

recognized that those laws represent "a carefully studied

1

attempt to bring within the [antitrust laws] every person
engaged

in

monopolize
United

u.s.

business

whose

commercial

States

533, 553

v.

activities

intercourse

South-Eastern

might

among

restrain
the

Underwriters

or

states."

Ass'n,

322

(1944) . 1 6

1

mandate under" the Robinson-Patman Act and found the
answer in its "purpose and legislative history." Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 u.s. 186, 197 (1974).
See
FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S 55, 69-70 (1959);
Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 72,
78 (1953).
--

/

15rt is clear that the burden is not on petitioner
at this late date to show Congress's specific intent to
include State and local governments within the RobinsonPatman Act.
In City of Lafayette and Union Pacific R. v.
United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941) (see note 10, supra),
the Court found that cities were plainly "persons" within
the meaning of the Sherman and Elk ins Acts without any
direct evidence of congressional intent on the subject.
Footnote(s) 16 will appear on following pages.

7
~

11.

~ t i n Goldfarb v. Virginia State
~~~ tlc."J:
, ~ "our

(1975)

Bar, 421 U.S. 773

cases have repeatedly established that there

is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from
the antitrust laws,

id., at 787

(citing United States v.

Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S.
California v. FPC,
of

Lafayette,

competition

in

with

369 u.s.
applying
a

482,

321, 350-351 (1963);

485

anti trust

private

(1962)) • 17

In City

laws

city

in

that

no

utility,

we

to

a

held

exemption for local governments would be implied.
BRENNAN,

writing

for

the Court,

and scope of the anti trust laws:
made

by

assure

public

maximum

emphasized

benefits

for

the

JUSTICE

the purposes

"[T) he economic choices

corporations .•. designed

as

they

1

are

to

community constituency,

are not inherently more likely to comport with the broader

16 see, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,
434 U.S. 308, 312-313 (1978); Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948) (stating that antitrust laws are "comprehensive in
[their] terms and coverage, protecting all who are made
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
perpetrated") (emphasis added).
17see,
e.
g.,
National
Gerimedical
Hospital
&
Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388
(1981); Cit~ of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 u.s. 3 9, 398, 399 (1978); Abbott Laboratories v.
Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 12
(1976);
United
States
v.
National
Assn.
Securities
Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975 •

1

12.

interests of national economic well-being than are those
of

private

corporations

acting

in

interests of. .. its shareholders."

furtherance

435 U.S.,

of

1

the

at 403, 408

(footnotes omitted) • 1 8

~d ~ese ~methe

purposes

interpreting
JUSTICE

they

further,

~he

BLACKMON

and

~~..,._

;t:
the

actit.rust principles,

stated

for

-to

beA

helpful

Robinson-Patman

the

Court

in

Act.

in

1

As

Abbott

Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425

u.s.

1, 11-12 (1976):

~

It has been said, of course, that the
antitrust
laws,
and
Robinson- atrnan
in
particular, are to be construed lib rally, and
that the exceptions from their appl'cation are
to be construed strictly.
United States v.
18 In

~

one important sense, retail
from
government can be more invidious than that from chainstores, at which the Robinson-Patrnan Act pa ticularly was
aimed. See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 u.s. 69,
75-76 (1979): FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
63 U.S. 536,
543-544
(1960)-.-- The volume of purchases permits any
large, relatively efficient retail organizati
to pass on
cost savings to consumers, and to that exten , consumers
b
rely from economy of scale. But to the extent
hat lower rices result from less overhead, · n the form
of no taxes, ~everflm~~t subsidies, and free services,
CJQli-QUUDeRtal agencies merely redistribute the burden of
he costs from the actual consumers to the ci izens at
large.
An exemption from the Robinson-Patrnan A t simply
would give '3'9"~ nuseftta~ agencies hit the!!' advantag { in the
~~-rnrnercial
market, per_llaps enou h to eliminate private
corn
itors.
Beee:1:1se t.onsurners,
citizens, ultimately
will p
for the full costs
the d
sold by
~8@~~uw~~~~~~·~~~
reason to
retail
retail
u
y
suffer to the
extent that go~ ernrnental retail ctivities eliminate more
efficient,
1 distri ution systems.

~~~~
~~

y~
~

,..~

---

1

13.

McKesson & Robbins, 351 u.s. 305, 316 (1956);
FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733
(1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S.
642, 646-647 (1969).
The Court has recognized,
also, that Robinson-Patman "was enacted in 1936
to curb and prohibit all devices by which large
buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller
ones
by
virtue
of
their
greater
purchasing power." FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U.S.
166, 168 (1960); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390
U.S.
341, 349
(1968).
Because the Act is
remedial, it is to be construed broadly to
effectuate its purposes.
See Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 132, 336 (1967); Peyton v.
Rowe , 3 91 U. S . 54 , 6 5 ( 19 6 8) .

16

16

17

17

Thus,

in

view

of

the

Act's

remedial purposes,

and

the

broad scope of its language as interpreted by this Court,
the burden of showing that the legislative history compels

aus to create SGme special per se exemption is on those who
)\

18

would argue that Congress intended--but did not choose to
say

so--that

State

and

local

entities

could

compete

business 19
B
IR vieu... ~ ....t ae PrG.t

/~

~

f1

Hf

~ .~

,. . . , . t"

~

~~vt

o~

19 It may be that, despite the absence of an express
exemption, Congress did not intend for the Act to apply to
purchases for government consumption as contrasted with
retail sales.
Because the courts below found a per se
exemption, under the facts of this case, for respondent
hospitals' retail activities, we have no occasion to
decide whether the Act
imposes any restrictions on
purchases by State and local governments for consumption
in more traditional government activities.
Our task,
however, would not differ from the one here: looking to
the legislative history to see whether Congress intended

to create such an exemption.

~·~Y':~ ft.~?"~

~:t~;;;~

~~1.

'--s ptirposeo ,_- M!:a e£ the ab!'Jeiice

18

14.

falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that
there

is

a

per

purchasing.

'bfA local

"

se

exemption

for

all

State

and

local

Before Congress considered leaving State and

entities free to compete unfairly with the private

19

sector, surely it would have held hearings on an issue of
such

importance.

House

committee

Yet there

is

reports,

or

nothin:f;;~ or
in

the

floor

debates,

discussing the issue.
There

is,

however,

evidence

that

some

members

of

19

Congress were ab t ee&t aware of the possibil~ty of the Act
applying

to

most members

governmental
were

purchases.

concerned,

not

Not

surprisingly,

about State

and

local

government purchasing, but whether the Act would limit the
federal

Government's

legislative
principal

draftsman,

committee. 20

(

history

purchasing.
is

the

H.B.

Although

it

testimony

Teegarden,
is

The

most
of

before

difficult

to

relevant
the

Act's

the

House

determine

20
Rep. Lloyd: Would this bill,
in your judgment,
prevent the granting of discounts to the United
States Government?
Footnote continued on next page.

20
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exactly what

thought about the application

Mr.
Teegarden:
Not
Clayton Act does so ....

unless

the

present

Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government
gets
huge
discounts. . . . .
Now,
would
that
discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should
unless a discount contrary to the present bill
would be barred--that is, the present law--would
be barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this:
The Federal Government is not in competition
with other buyers from t n ese concerns.
The Federal Government is saved by the same
distinction....
~hey
are not in competition
with anyone else who would buy.
Rep.
Hancock:
It
would
eliminate
competitive bidding all along the line, would it
not, in classes of goods that would be covered
by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding
on Government orders?
Rep.
Hancock:
municipality.

Government,

State,

city,

Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
Rep. Michener: If it did do it,
not want it, would you?

you would

Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it.
It
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would
with the Government.
Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the
city, county exactly the same as anybody else,
same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden:

No.

Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell
to a city hospital any cheater than they would
to a privately-owned hospita , under this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in
this way.
In the final analysis, it would
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a
particular case.
If the two hospitals are in
competition with each other, I should say that
the fact that one is operated by the city does
not save it from the bill.
Footnote cont1nued on next page.

16.

~

to '\State

2

conclusion 's certain:
the

Act

~Teegarden

apply

hospitals

in

exempt ion

found

to
some

by

purchases

of

circumstances.21

municipal

~

Thus, -MFy-

th

~~
purchas ~ . 22
1\

the

expressly stated that

2

:N;..

caz:l.Ret

be

s-aid

~hat::

-the

Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on
the Judie iary, 74th Cong. , 1st Sess. 208-209
( 19 35)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings].
2lother conclusions also may be possible: (i) that
purchases by any governmental agency are not affected when
the government is not in competition with other buyers:
and (ii) that the Act would not prevent governmental
purchasing by competitive bidding.
Neither of these
readings, however, is necessarily inconsistent with our
holding today.
22 ~

Teegarden subsequently submitted a written
brief to the House committee. He first rejected outright
the desirability of i!.!!Y_ exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings,
supra note 21, at 249. He then posed the question whether
"tlie
bill
[would]
prevent
competitive
bidding
on
Governmental purchases below trade price levels." -M F .
~ ~e riH!iR~ stated
that "[t) he answer is found in the
principle of statutory construction that a statute will
not be constru
strict in any way the
ri
rerogatives, or privileges
the sovereign
L-----~ulrn~ess it so expressly provides--a principle · heri ed b
American jurisprudence from the common law .•.•• "
e also
noted
that
"requiring
a
showing
of
effec
upon
competition, will further preclude any possibility of the
bill affecting the Govern!ll ~ l!t."
Id., at 250 (footnotes

14

omitted)
~*
~~ ~
All~ the cases cited ~)r.(.

Teegarden suggest that the
sovereign exceptio
as us~ in the United States means
that a government, ~ pass ~ a law, does not give up what
it does not expressly surrender.
In the same year that
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court in
United States v. California, 297 u.s. 175, 186 (1936),
stated that 1 t could "perceive no reason for extending
[the presumption against including the sovereign in a
statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a state
Footnote continued on next a e.
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to '\State

2

conclusion 's certain:
the

Act

~Teegarden

apply

hospitals

in

to

the

some

expressly stated that

purchases

of

circumstances.2 1

~~support

municipal
Thus,
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for
2
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lfp/ss 12/27/82
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be

said

""l= ha~

the
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JEFF15 SALLY-POW

~
In the absence of any relevant evidence, it simply cannot
1\
be said that the legislative history supports an intention
to enable, by an unexpressed exemption, a state to enter
the private competitive markets with congressionally
approved price advantages.
J
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WOal:

it does not expressly surrender.
In the same year that
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court in
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 186 (1936),
stated that 1t could "perceive no reason for extending
[the presumption against including the sovereign in a
statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a state
Footnote continued on next a e.

17.

history
~ manifests

that

clear

surrounding
congressional

the

Act's

intent

necessary

take State and local government purchasing from within
2

from the otherwise
provisions of an act of
Congress, all-embrac ng in scope and national in its
purpose, which is as capable of being obstructed by state
as by individual acti n."
See California v. Taylor, 353
U.S. 553, 562-563 (19 7). At most, the rule of statutory
construction, a& ~~Qd
. Teegarden and applied to the
Robinson-Patman Act, supports an exemption for the federal
government's purchases, the existence of which 1s not
before us.
Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S.
600, 604-605 (1941) (holding that the United States was
not a "person" under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing
for treble damages).
Moreover, he clearly assumed that
governmental purchasing would not compete with private
purchasing, thus eliminating for his purposes even the
possibility of the Act applying to State and local
governments.
23six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney
General of the United States responded to an inquiry by
the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to
government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539
(1936).
In ruling that such contracts are outside the
Act, the Attorney General explained:
[S) tatutes
regulating
rates,
charges,
etc.,
matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily
apply to the Government unless it is expressly
so provided; and it does not seem to have been
the policy of the Congress to make such statutes
applicable to the Government •••.
The Act of June 19, 1936, merely amended
the Act of October 15, 1914 ... and, in so far as
I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded
heretofore
as
applicable
to
Government
contracts.

in

Id., at 540 (later in the letter using phrase "Federal
Government" and stating other reasons "for avoiding a
construction that would make the statute applicable to the
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the
Congress
in
such
matters").
The
Attorney
General
expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 275 U.S. 415, 425 (1928), in which
this Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph
rates to a federal corporation that competed with private
enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the
Footnote continued on next page.

l .

.
.
d ~d
. . 1-.
1 egislative events, an
s~ at~ ~~ Qa Q~l ~tkQD ~Y several

a-bL
~e

District Courts,

confirm~

that~ government

purchases

are outside the proscriptions of the Act.

2

a.-,_.,4
on occasion, such evidence persuasive

of the Act . tb• t

w~...l:GO~dopt

Copp Paving Co.,

419 U.S.

186,

~

.r:n

200-201

the construction

7
1

Gulf Oil Corp. v.
(1974),

we note

7

that "the courts in nearly four decades of litigation" ha

Act's
applicability
State
and ·local . government
agencies.
Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney
General of California
xpressly con luded that State and
municipal governmental purchasing
as within the Act's
proscriptions. See 193 -1939 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1155,156, at
415-416 (1937).
Two o her early state attorney general
opinions simply do not
· e wh ther the Act applies to
state purchasing for
retail
ales.
See Opinion of
ttorney Gerneral of Minnesota, 932-1939 Trade Cas. (CCH)
11
157, at 416 (1937); Opinio of Attorney Gerneral of
Wise sin, 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wi . 142 (1937).
~~~~
~~--~--~ R resentative Patman
did interpret fh~-\
~1
opinion as exempting Stat~nd local government purch ses.
A1 r~ ·~~
See W. Patman, Complete Guide to
Robinson-Patman Act
41 ~;~4/'{'
30 (1963).
R
s
·
'
Interpretation
T~
J~ is ~~~i~ y entitled to :=_i:~t4 }m;~ .' · · .
~~, but ~ he ~... rcr -Oe Interpreting
""
Attorney
General's
op!_nion.
Representative
Patm
intentions ~ probabfY A better
reflected
in
his
introduction ~ 951 and 19~3 of bills to amend the Act to
define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any
State or any political subdivision thereof."
H.R. 4452,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1953).
There is no legislative history on these
bills, but it is arguable that R.Qp i::Q ii.eR-t a ~e- Pa tm~... k
believed that the original intent needed to be stated
expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney General's
construct ion of the Act to the contrary.
In any case,
Congress's failure to pass these bills probably stems from
a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act.

.

efl Jl- .be-a~~~~~~
~ ~ ~ -- P.~~A~~~.P'~-6!} __
A

~~ Plu.._~~~~

19.

given the Robinson-Patman Act a certain construction and
held

that,

interpretation
the

~--_p,;~;
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~·

and

the

beyond its clear

of

face

continued

legislative history

§2 (a)

. ~~

the

" [ i] n

[did]

this

2

longstanding

congressional

not warrant our

silence,
extending

language to reach a multi tude of

~~/r/-J
local activities that hifherto have been left to state and

2

~ ~~~~~~

1\

local

regulati~) ~- ~ ~ '-fo.M
Respondents

r-eloy ........,.,.;,ry

Robinson-Patman Act
hea-r i R9 -.,

-rh e

discrimination

in

House
in

the

~n<?.P h1l"-::~e

late 1960 1 s. 24

committee

favor

of

was

told

government

Bnr iAg

~hose

that

price

hospitals

was

outside the Act, 25 and Chairman Paul Dixon of the Federal

~

24 The most important relevant event in the obinsonPatman Act 1 s post-enactment history is the amen ment in
1938 excluding eleemosynary institutions.
Whe her the
existence of an exemption in §13c supports an e emption
from the Act of all government purchasing depends whether
§13c is interpreted to apply to any government agencies.
That is a substantial issue, however, in its own right.
Compare 81 Cong. Rec. 8706
(1937)
(remarks of Rep.
Pettengill) (reading similar amendment as not including "a
charitable institution that was not supported in any part
by public funds"); H.R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7-8, 78
(1968), with 81 Cong. Rec., at 8706
(statement of Rep. Walter) (agreeing that §13c would apply
to institutions financed by cities, counties, and States).
See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 397 n.l4
(including within the Nonprofit Institutions Act "public
libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by local
government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 18-19
n.lO; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (exemption codifies the
intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We
need not address it.
Footnote(s) 25 will appear on following pages.
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Commission

Trade

transactions

~ough
to

disclaimed

involving

state

any
health

authority
care

over

programs. 26

the statement of the FTC's chairman is entitled

weight,

it

administrative

"can

hardly

construction

be

said

the

to

have

'notoriety'

given
that

the

c:

'ffie-

[ (1965)]."

Zuber v. Allen,

396 U.S. 168, 194

?

this

Court found persuasive in Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. [ 1,]
18

2

J

(~949) •__

~her statements express little more than ~

interested opinions on
entitled

to

the

c~~Jf
the

issue,

consideration

and certainly are not

2

g~n~~

U>fA-~~~~~t:U>f~~.

'lleesardew. 4"""~ 5~ ~-Q.. -ta....-f
1\

What should be important is the conclusion that the
committee drew from this testimony, and that conclusion is

25 see, e. g., Small Business Problems in the Drug
Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Activities
of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on Small
Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15-16 (1967-1968} [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearin~s];
Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hear1ngs
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the
Robinson-Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small
Business of the House of Representatives, 9lst Cong., 1st
Sess. 73-77, 623 (1969-1970}. The committee also was told
that institutional purchasers frequently purchase drugs at
lower prices than ,.. t..b..a.t paid by retai 1 pharmacies, see
1967-1968 Hearings, supra, at 15, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and
many
witnesses
complained
that
this
discrimination
adversely affected competition, see id., at A-140-141,
253-262, 273, 291.
---26see H.R. Rep. No. 1983, at 74.
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the mandate of
· ed

Act

to

the

di scr imina tory drug

nonprofit,

competition

to

at

druggists."

the

the

extent

retail

Id., at 79

sales

purchasers, profit

favoring nongovernmental instit
or

Robinson-Patman

prescription drug

there

level

with

2

(emphasis

that statement as approving a per se exemption from the
Robinson-Patman

Act

require

draw

us

to

for
an

government
inference

purchasing
that

is

would

far

fro

compelle0

2

Respondents

also

argue

that,

without

exception,

courts considering the matter of coverage have concluded
that the Act does not apply to government purchasers and
that not one has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer,
under

either

§§2(a}

or

2(f}

of

the

Act,

where

the

discriminatory price involved a sale to a State, city, or

. J

~~:,~v\.1
~
I~-,

,~.~ ~L~
r~-~-

/

27 The

committee
also
concluded
that
the
1938
Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private
nonprofit institutions ..• to the extent the sales are for
the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'"
H.R. Rep. No.
1983, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction
of §13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress.
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assertion:
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number
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of
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application

relatively
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to

small: 29
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Appeal~
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(iv)

most of the District Court cases upon which

respondents rely are simply

inapposite; 30

(v)

2

it is not

~d-\

28 rndeed, i f anything, our opinions have
. . . ~t the opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at
6 397 n.l4: Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at 18-19 · n.lO:
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
u.s. 508, 513 (1972).

29 The parties bring to our attention less than a
dozen cases, many with unpublished opinions, that even
involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to
government purchasing.
See notes 31-33, infra. Cf. Blue ~
Chit Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975) ~
(af irming rule adopted by "virtually all lower federal
courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases
presenting this question over the past quarter century.")
(emphasis added).
30 see Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. KerrMcGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,[75,054, at 96,721,
96,742 (D Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving federal government
as ultimate purchaser:
relying on Attorney General's
opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
551 F.2d 790, 798 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition
despite different prices), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 879
(1977): General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co.,
37 F. Supp. 598, 602-604 (WD Ky.) (finding no "sale" under
the Act and alternatively holding the Act inapplicable on
the ground that "[n] either the government nor a city in
its purchase of property considered necessary for the
purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in
Footnote continued on next page.

23.

clear that

~published

District Court opinion has relied

a...
solely on .,t:.Re per
government

se

purchasing

claim alleging

exemption
to

injury as

for

dismiss
a

result

a

all State or

local

Robinson-Patman

~

Act

'.s-

ofA. government l"et.;.iJ.

~~~~~~~31

~ and (vi) there are several cases that suggest the

Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to government purchasing
for

purposes

of

retail

sales. 32

This

judicial

track

competition with another buyer who may be engaged in
bu!ing and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied) ,
af 1 d, 132 F.2d 425, 428 (CA6 Cir. 1942)
(expressly
reserving issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to
sales to government agency) , cer t. denied, 318 U.S. 780
(1943).
31 cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories,
No.
C-77-0094
(D Utah, Aug.
15, 1977)
(unpublished
opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice
Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to governmental
agencies), aff'd, 630 F.2d 1383 (CAlO 1980)
(finding
complaint insufficient because it failed to identify
products that were subject to discriminatory treatment or
the favored and disfavored purchasers of any product) ;
Portland
Retail
Druggists
Association
v.
Abbott
Laboratories,
No.
71-543
(D
Or.
Sept.
11,
1972)
(unpublished, oral opinion), vacated and remanded, 510
F.2d 486 (CA9 1974) (finding §13c applied to the purchases
and sales), vacated and remanded, 425 u.s. 1 (1976). Two
District Courts have suggested in alternative holdings
that there
is a per se exemption for governmental
purchasing for nonconsumption use.
Logan Lanes, Inc. v.
Brunswick Corp., No. 4-66-5, op. at 4 (D Idaho May 26,
1966) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 F.2d 212, 215-216
(CA9) (purchases by Utah State University within the scope
of Nonprofit Institutions Act; expressly not addressing
whether there is a "so-called governmental exemption"),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967). One case's discussion
of the issue presented here is dicta. See Sachs v. BrownForman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955)
(dicta), aff'd per curiam, 234 F.2d 959 (CA2), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956).
It also should be noted that
all of these cases predate our discussion in City of
Lafayette.
32 see Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F.
S u pp. 3 2 8 , 3 3 0-3 3 3 (ED Ark . 19 8 0) , a f f ' d , 6 58 F . 2 d 611 ,
Footnote continued on next page.
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record

is ~t~s s i m,pl q ..cot

the unbroken chain of

jud ical

decisions upon which this Court has gen% alJ.y relied in

2

the past for ascertaining a construction of the antitrust
laws that Congress over a long period of time has chosen
to preserve.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations
of

various

commentators

and

executive

officials.

~

~~-~~~~s~t.J

di££ietl~

~

meat of these sources indicate that the

~

1\
question presented

is unsettled, 33

r;o

not

foreclose our

612 (CAS 1981): Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L.
Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 287, 291 (CD Ill.
1979) (finding the Act inapplicable to purchases by the
Army and Air Force Exchange Service because of sovereign
immunity, but strongly suggesting that State governments
would face an opposite result), aff'd, 632 F.2d 680, 687692 (CA7 1980): A.J. Goodman & Sons v. United Lacquer
Manufacturing Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D Mass. 1949).
Other cases cut against any per se exemption for
government purchases.
See Municipality of Anchorage v.
Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 641 (D Alaska
19 8 2 ) : S t e r 1 in g Ne 1 son & Sons v . Range n , Inc • , 2 3 5 F .
Supp. 393, 399 (D. Idaho 1965), aff'd, 351 F.2d 851, 858859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966): Sperry
Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Association,
152 F. Supp. 91, 95, 96 (EDNY 1957).
Cf. Reid v.
University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 443 (ND Ohio
1952).

1

33see
5A
z. Cav~~ ' Business Organizations
§105D.Ol[8) [c),
at
105D-45
to -46
(1978)
(opinions
"divided" whether Act is applicable): 4 J. Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70
(1982)
(recognizing "there is some conflict among the
authorities
as
to
whether
sales
to
states
and
municipalities
are
excluded
from
Robinson-Patman
liability"): id. §24.06[2), at 24-75 to 24-76: E. Kintner,
A Robinson-Patman Primer 202-203 (1970) ("Although [the
Attorney General's] opinion appears to have settled the
matter where the federal government is concerned, some
controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act
to purchases by state and local governments."): F. Rowe,
Footnote continued on next page.
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34

and ~

cases support

2

IV
The Robinson-Patman Act has been
both for its

effect~for

Price Discrimination
n.l66 (1962).

Under

the po

that it seeks

Robinson-Patman

Act

84

34 some
deal
only
sales
to
the
federal
government.
See
Lette
Comptroller General to
Robert F. Sarlo, Veter s Administration (July 17, 1973),
reprinted in 1973-2
rade Cas. (CCH) ,174,642, at 94,819
(1973).
Almost a
fail to mention, much less decide,
whether the Act
plies to State and local purchasing for
retail sales.
See Report of the Attorney General Under
Executive
der 10,936,
Identical Bidding
in Public
Procureme
11 (1962);
See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G.
. 1 , 112 , 113 , 115 ( 19 7 7 ) ; Ga . Op . At t y . Ge n . 7 2 3 , 7 2 7
(1948-1949).
36Respondents criticize our holding because ( i) the
Act
would
prevent
States
from
securing
favorable
discounts,
and
higher
prices
for
government
would
unquestionably translate into a combination of fewer
government services and higher taxes; and (ii) application
of the Act would displace the State's freedom to structure
integral operations in certain areas.
The underlying
assumption of much of these fears is that application of
the Act to State and local government purchasing will
preclude
purchasing
by
sealed
competitive
bidding.
Respondents argue that bidding by its nature demands price
discrimination and that a successful low bid below list
price cannot be
justified on the basis of meeting
competition, because the object of bidding is to "beat"
the competition.
It is not at all clear, however, whether competitive
bidding is a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act in any
case, see National Institute on Prices and Pricing,
Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 Antitrust L.J.
147, 161-162 (1971); Note, Competitive Bidding Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, 49 St. John's L. Rev. 512, 519
(1975); cf. note 21, supra, much less where the State or
city has specifically authorized or mandated such means of
purchasing.
Cf. 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741
(1979)
Footnote continued on next page.
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fact

to

ascertain

light

the

-tha-t

of

intent

n

[o]ur

from

the

the

relevant

of

Congress."

United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S., 600, 604-605 (1941).
"A general application of the

3

[Robinson-Patman]

3

Act

to all combinations of business and capital organized to
suppress
spirit

commercial

and

competition

impulses

South-Eastern

of

the

Underwriters,

legislative history

is

in

harmony

times which gave
322

u.s.'

at

with

the

it birth."
553.

The

t.
economic evil of

large

organizations

purchasing

from

other

large

(concluding that City of Lafayette and §2(a) do not
preclude a county from granting an exclusive franchise for
garbage collection).
Moreover, governmental agencies may
be able to purchase at discount prices because of a host
of legitimate reasons: i. e., volume, low distributional
cost, promotional benef1ts to manufacturers, low credit
risk, lack of competition with private enterprise.
In any
case,
it
is
not necessary
to decide here whether
petitioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims have any merit or
whether the State action doctrine would exempt these sales
and purchases.

3
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organizations

for

resale

in competition with
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is

no
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in

think

that
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feared
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strongest
exemption
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them
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competition
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To

of

the

create
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32

clearlyAcontrary to the intent of

Congress.

v
We

hold

that

sales

to

and

purchases

by State

and

32

,Jill""

local government hospitals for resale in competition with

private ~

not

exempt

per

proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act.

se

from

the

The judgment of

the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed and remanded
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

37under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would
accrue, precisely as intended, to the benefit of small,
private retailers.
See Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al.
before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 261 (1935)
[hereinafter 1935 Hearings]
(~
Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of
private rights").
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In 1976, in Beer v. u.s., ; 'e held that §5 applies
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-827
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1983]
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting.

/
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The issue that confronts the Court is one of statutory construction: whether the Robinson-Patman Act covers purchases of commodities by state and local governments for resale in competition with private retailers. 1 The Court's
task, therefore, is to discern the intent of the 1936 Congress
which enacted the Robinson-Patman Act. I do not agree
with the majority that this issue can be resolved by reference
to cases under the Sherman Act or other statutes, or by reliance on the broad r~dial purposes of the antitrust laws
--generally. The 193~ongress simply did not focus on this
' 1 ·~.PL.
, - .• - -1-s-s u- e-.. The business~ l~ai cogu:mfm"bes hav~d for
J.~ast four decades thatSuch purc"hases are not coveredj
1
For these reasons, as exp ame more fri ly below-;-1 respect'

me
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fully dissent.
'This case does not require us to consider, as the majority suggests,
ante, at 7, whether compliance with other federal statutes necessitates an

implied exemption from the provisions of the Act. The question is simply
one of congressional intent-i. e., what Congress intended when it enacted
the Robinson-Patman Act with respect to coverage of governmental purchases for resale.
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I
A
The majority relies extensively on the interpretation this
Court has given to the term "person" under the Sherman Act
and other statutes as a guide to whether the terms "person"
and "purchasers," as used in § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.
730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (the Act), 49
Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13, include state and local governmental entities. See ante, at 4-6. In my view, such reliance is misplaced. The question of the Robinson-Patman
Act's treatment of governmental purchases requires an independent examination of the legislative history of that Act to
ascertain congressional intent. 2 Indeed, the cases cited by
the majority emphasize that the key question regarding coverage or noncoverage of governmental entities is the intent of
Congress in enacting the statute in question. 3 ResolutioiiOf
The majority cites Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308
(1978), as a case in which the Court applied Sherman Act cases to construe
the Clayton Act, which the Robinson-Patman Act amends. Ante, at 7, n.
14. In Pfizer the Court held that a foreign nation is a "person" entitled to
bring a treble damages action under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 15. As the Court acknowledged, id., at 311, § 4 is a reenactment of the
virtually identical language of § 7 of the Sherman Act. In fact, § 7 was
eventually repealed as redundant. § 3, 69 Stat. 283; seeS. Rep. No. 619,
84th Gong., 1st Sess., 2 (1955). Reliance on prior interpretation of § 7 of
the Sherman Act was therefore uniquely appropriate.
3
See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, supra, at 315 (1978) (§ 4 of
the Clayton Act) ("The word 'person' ... is not a term of art with a fixed
meaning wherever it is used, nor was it in 1890 when the Sherman Act was
passed."); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161 (1942) (§ 7 of the Sherman
Act) ("Whether the word 'person' ... includes a State or the United States
depends upon its legislative environment."); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
360, 370 (1934) (Rev. Stat. §§ 3140, 3244) (''Whether the word 'person' or
'corporation' includes a state ... depends upon the connection in which it is
found."). See also United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604-605
(1941) ("[T]here is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the
subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the
2
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the statutory construction question cannot be made to depend u on the abstract assertion that the term "person..,' is
broa enou to em race tates an mumc1palitles. 4 For
these reasons, the mere fact that in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 n. 14 (1978), a
Sherman Act case, the Court referred to the RobinsonPatman Act in its discussion of the breadth of the term "per?
son" cannot resolve the question now before us
~
. p
Further, the majority opinion propounds a~syl~
logism when it (1) suggests that the term "person" in the
/2A1 ~
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should be construed similarly, (2) cites Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251
(1972), for the proposition that the Clayton Act applies to
States, and (3) then opines that the terms "person" and "purchasers" under § 2 therefore should be construed to include
state purchases. Ante, at 6. Because, as the majority observes, ante, at 6, n. 13, the definitional section of the Clay-

/

law.").
It is also worth noting that many of the cases upon which the majority
relies involved construction of the term "person" for the purpose of determining whether a particular governmental entity is a "person" entitle to
sue. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, supra; nite States v. Cooper
corp., supra (United States is not "person" entitled to sue under§ 7 of the
Sherman Act); Georgia v. Evans, supra (State is "person" entitled to sue
under § 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906) (municipality is "person" entitled to
sue under § 7 of the Sherman Act).
'I would also note the misleading character of the majority's citation of
Senator Robinson's remarks in connection with its observation that "[t]he
word 'purchasers' has a meaning as inclusive as the word 'person."' Ante,
at 5, n. 11. The remarks of Senator Robinson should not be read to suggest that the word "purchasers," as used in the Robinson-Patman Act,
embraces States or municipalities. The senator's observation reflects an
affirmative response to Senator Vandenberg's concern that, although the
bill was drafted with a view toward the problems of large chain-store buying power in the retail merchandising field, the Act would apply to private
enterprise in the field of industrial production as well. See 80 Cong. Rec.
6429--&430 (1936).

• I
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ton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 12, was intended to apply to the Robinson-Patman Act, I do not dispute the first proposition.
However, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. stated only that a
State is a "person" for purposes of bringing a treble damages
action under §4 of the Clayton Act. 405 U. S., at 261. 5
Conspicuously absent from the majorit 's discussion is any
a
a es or loca governments ar~ peraut orit ho din
sons for purposes of ex osure to lia i ity as urc aser:Unaer
the provisions of t e Clayton Act. 6 Although ongress
might now decide that the purchasing activities of States and
local governments should be subject to the limitations imposed by § 2, that is a policy judgment appropriately left to
legislative determination.
B

Nor do I find persuasive the majority's invocation of presumptions regarding the liberal construction and broad remedial purposes of the antitrust laws generally. Without dero• Cf Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943) ("In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save
only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is
not lightly to be attributed to Congress.").
6
Indeed, one basis for the United States Attorney General's conclusion
in 1938 that the Robinson-Patman Act is inapplicable to purchases of supplies by the Federal Government was the absence of any judicial decision
construing the Clayton Act, prior to its amendment by the RobinsonPatman Act, to apply to governmental contracts. 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539,
540 (1938).
Prior to 1929, courts interpreted the original§ 2 as addressed only to the
problem of primary line competition-i. e., injury to competition among
sellers. See, e. g., National Biscuit Co. v. FTV, 299 F'. 733 (CA2), cert.
aenied, 266 U. S. 613 (1924). Not until1929 did this Court hold that § 2
also protected against the type of injury alleged in the present case-i. e.,
secondary line injury, or injury to competition among buyers. See George
Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245, 253 (1929).
The Robinson-Patman amendment to § 2 clarified that the Act was designed to redress the latter type of injury.

J
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gating the usefulness of those principles or suggesting that
they should never play a role in the Robinson-Patman context, one may nevertheless candidly acknowledge that the
Court also has identified a certain tension between the Robinson-Patman Act, on the one hand, and the Sherman Act
and other antitrust statutes, on the other. The Court frequently has recognized that strict enforcement of the antiprice-discrimination provisions of the former may lead to
price rigidity and uniformity in direct conflict with the goals
ofthe latter. See, e. g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
FTC, 440 U. S. 69, 80, 83 n. 16 (1979); Automatic Canteen
Co. v. FTC, 346 U. S. 61, 63, 74 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 249 & n. 15 (1951). 7
At the very least, this recognition raises doubts that the
Court should liberall cons rue the Robinson-Patman Act in
favor of broader coverage. Those doubts are en an
y
th~ncipal aim in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act was to protect small retailers from the competitive injury suffered at the hands of large chain stores. 8
It is consistent with that intent for Congress also to have displayed special solicitude for the well-established, belowtrade price buying practices of governmental institutions.
II
As the majority documents, ante, at 9, n. 17, the legislative
history of the Robinson-Patman Act clearly indicates that
Congress envisioned some sort of immunity for governmental
7
Indeed, the tension between the Robinson-Patman policy of protection
of competitors and the Sherman Act goal of protection of the competitive
process has prompted the Court to achieve a partial reconciliation of the
two by liberal interpretation of the "meeting competition" defense under
§ 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U. S. C. § 13(b). See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 251 (1951).
8
H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1936); S. Rep. No.
1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936); see FTC, Final Report on the Chain
Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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bodies. 9 The question before the Court is the extent of that
immunity-in particular, whether the purchase of goods by
state and local governments for resale in competition with
private retailers is within the intended scope of the Robinson-Patman Act. As the majority acknowledges, ante, at 9, ~
the 1936 Congress that enacfeathe Roi>inson-Patman Act did
not focus on e preci issue efore the Court. Notwiths an mg th1s mission,· t e maJori y announces the surprising conclusion that "[t]o create an exemption here clearly
would be contrary to the intent of Congress." Ante, at 19
(emphasis added).
The majority is correct in stating that it is not the business
9

Members of the House expressed concern with the effect of the bill on
the established below-market buying practices of federal, state, county,
and municipal governments. Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1935). In
response H. B. Teegarden, a principal draftsman of the Act, assured members of the House Judiciary Committee that he "would not want" the Act if
it prohibited, all along the line, the competitive bidding practices of those
governments. !d.
Moreover, with respect to subsequent legislative history, I find at least
somewhat significant the fact that later attempts in Congress to expressly
include governmental entities within the coverage of the Act failed. See
H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1 2); H. R. 5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H. R. 722, 85th Cong., 1st
ess. (1957); H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 430, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). In particular, I would not dismiss as readily as
does the majority, ante, at 11, n. 19, the bills introduced by Representative
Patman in 1951 and 1953 to amend the Act to define "purchasers" to include "the United States, any State or any political subdivision thereof."
The majority speculates that Representative Patman introduced these bills
to reaffirm his original intent that these entities would be covered. It is
equally plausible-or perhaps even more plausible in light of Representative Patman's failure in his book, W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act
168 (1938), to disagree with or criticize the United States Attorney General's construction of the Act to exclude purchases by the Federal government and his extension of the Attorney General's rationale to "municipal
and public institutions," id.-to infer that he viewed the bills as extending
the Act's coverage.
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of this Court to engage in "'policy-making in the field of antitrust legislation'" in order to fill gaps where Congress has
not clearly expressed its intent. Ante, at 19 (quoting United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 606 (1941)). It is precisely because I concur in that admonition that I would refrain from attributing to Congress an intent to cover the
state and local governmental purchases in question here. 10
A

In attempting to supply the unexpressed intent of Congress, the majority fails to offer satisfactory guidelines for
determining the scope of the Act's coverage of governmental
agencies. 11 The majority assumes, "without deciding, that
Congress did not intend the Act to apply to purchases for
consumption in traditional government functions" and suggests that state purchases of pharmaceuticals for the purpose
0

My resolution of the statutory issue here should not be construed to
reflect a policy judgment that the Robinson-Patman Act should protect "a
State's entrepreneurial capacity." City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 422 (CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring).
We are not concerned here with whether the kind of activity in which these
governmental entities are enaged appropriately exposes them to antitrust
liability under the Act. Cf. id., at 418. That question raises policy concerns lying peculiarly within the institutional province of Congress. "A
court, without the benefit of legislative hearings that would illuminate the
policy considerations if the question were left to Congress, is not competent in my opinion to resolve this question . . . . It is regrettable that the
Court today finds it necessary to rush to this essentially legislative judgment." Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S., at 331 (POWELL,
J., dissenting). Because the question before us is one of congressional intent and it is far from clear that Congress has supplied an answer to that
question, I would refrain from substituting the policy judgments of the judiciary for those Congress might embrace. Cf. id., at 320 (CHIEF JUSTICE
BURGER, dissenting); id., at 330-331 (POWELL, J., dissenting).
11
To the extent the majority purports to "divine" the will of Congress, it
comes as no surprise, given Congress' inattention to this precise question,
that no "bright lines" for coverage and noncoverage emerge from its
opinion.
'
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of resale to indigent citizens may not expose the State to antitrust liability. Ante, at 4 & n. 7.
The majority's assumption, however, is inconsistent with
the principles of statutory construction upon which it purports to rely. If, absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary, the plain language of the statute controls, then by the majority's own assertions one would have
to conclude that even purchases for the State's own use or for
resale to indigents would fall within the Act's proscriptions.
For, as the majority remarks, ante, at 4, the terms "person"
and "purchasers" are broad enough to include governmental
entities, and the legislative history is "ambiguous on the
application of the Act to state purchases for consumption .... " Ante, at 9-10. 12
Moreover, to the extent the majority implies that a State's
coverage or noncoverage under the Act turns on the distinction between purchases for resale and purchases for consumption, 13 that distinction is inconsistent with the competition rationale elsewhere suggested, ante, at 19, to underlie
the prohibitions of § 2(a). For example, a state university
hospital might limit the use of its pharmacy to its own faculty
and staff, thereby falling within the "for their own use" ex12

I would add, however, that-regardless of Congress' intent-exclusion
from coverage of state purchases for consumption in traditional governmental functions is supportable on Tenth Amendment grounds. I therefore agree with the majority's recognition, ante, at 3, n. 6, that coverage of
these purchases would raise significant Tenth Amendment problems.
18
The majority thus suggests, though it refrains from holding, that the
scope of coverage under § 2(a) is coextensive with the "for their own use"
line drawn by the Nonprofit Institutions Act of 1938, 15 U. S. C. § 13c, and
interpreted by the Court in Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail DrugThis proposed
gists Association, Inc., 425 U. S. 1 (1976).
resale/consumption distinction has no foundation in the language of § 2(a),
which prohibits discrimination "in price between different purchasers of
commodities ... , where such commodities are sold for use, consumption,
or resale .... " 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) (emphasis added).
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ception. 14 Nevertheless, the university pharmacy may be inflicting competitive injury on private pharmacies that the
university's faculty and staff might otherwise patronize. 16
Thus, the majority's conflicting suggestions leave in doubt
what principle-the presence of functional competition or the
consumption/resale dichotomy-guides the determination
whether a state or local government's purchases fall within
the Act's proscriptions.
B
Against the backdrop of a legislative history that even the
majority concedes does not focus on the issue before us
stands the general consensus in the legal and business communities that sales to governmental entities are not covered
by the Robinson-Patman Act. The majority devotes considerable effort to distinguishing or undercutting the authorities
cited by the respondents. In so doing, and in observing that
these authorities cannot reveal Congress' intent in 1936,
ante, at 14 & n. 24, the majority misunderstands the significance of this evidence. These authorities simply illustrate
the v!:tually~ni~ous ass~mpti,on over the past fort~en
years o"f noncoverage"OrgOvernmental entities-an assumption at as serve as e asis of well-established governmental purchasing practices and marketing relationships.
In the past the Court has relied upon the widespread understanding of the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act in limiting the scope of the Act's prohibitions. 16 To do so here is no
14
See Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Association,
Inc., supra, at 16--17.
15
Or, to take another example, a cafeteria operated by a governmental
agency for the benefit of its employees also might inflict some competitive
injury on restaurants in the same area that otherwise might enjoy the employees' patronage.
16
See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 246--247 (1951) (reliance
on widespread understanding that the meeting competition proviso of
§ 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, provides a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination).

81-827-DISSENT
10

JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS.

less appropriate.
Despite its attempt to discount the significance of the judicial authorities cited by the respondents, the majority cannot
dispute that no court has imposed liability upon a seller
buyer, under eit er
a or § 2(f),
. S. . §§ 13(a) and
(f), in a case involving an alleged price discrimination in favor
of a federal, state, or municipal governmental purchaser. 17
17
See Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J .L . Cummins News
Co., 632 F. 2d 680, 688-689 (CA7 1980) (Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable
to purchases by instrumentality of Federal Government for resale); Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories Pharmaceutical Products Division, No. C-77-0094 (Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (order
of consent dismissing with prejudice Robinson-Patman claims based on
sales to any governmental entity), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980); Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., No. 4--Q6-5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion) (sale of
bowling equipment to State not within provisions of Act; alternative holding that sales exempt under 15 U. S. C. § 13c), affd, 378 F . 2d 212, 217
(CA9) (sales to state university within § 13c exemption), cert. denied, 389
U. S. 898 (1967); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development
Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 96 (EDNY 1957) (disclaiming, on motion for
reargument, any intention that original opinion could be "construed to suggest that sales to the Government can be thought to be subject to the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act"); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) ("It is doubtful at best whether the
Robinson-Patman Act applies at all to sales to Government agencies, state
or federal.") (holding Act inapplicable to sales by liquor distiller to state
liquor commissions; alternative holding that no competitive injury suffered
by plaintiff liquor wholesaler), affd on opinion below, 234 F. 2d 959 (CA2),
cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD Ky. 1941) (alternatively holding that
Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable to sales to municipal housing commission and suggesting that "the Act does not apply to sales to the government, states, or municipalities"), affd, 132 F . 2d 425 (CA6 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780 (1943).
While one may concede that most of these cases do not focus on the precise situation of purchases by state or local governments for resale, they
nonetheless reflect the consensus of judicial opinion that governmental
bodies are not subject to liability under § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act. The majority would dismiss many of these
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Commentators confirm the general judicial consensus that
sales to States and municipalities are not covered by the
Act. 18
cases with the simple observation that they predate the Court's decision in
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978).
Ante, at 16, n. 29. For reasons already noted, however, in my view City
of Lafayette does not resolve the issue before us in this case.
Moreover, cases that the majority suggests are supportive of its position, ante, at 17, n. 30, are similarly distinguishable. For example, both
Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633
(Alaska 1982), and Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F.
Supp. 393 (Idaho 1964), afrd, 351 F. 2d, 851, 858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966), indicate only that the Robinson-Patman Act
may apply where the State, as in Sterling, or the municipality, as in
Hitachi, is the victim of commercial bribery under § 2(c), 15 U. S. C.
§ 13(c), rather than the favored customer.
18
E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 224 (1979) (2d ed. 1979) ("In
spite of [any] contrary indications [among state attorneys general], it is
generally believed that 'the exemption applies to governmental purchases
at any level."); W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson Patman Act
30 (1963) (indicating the Act is inapplicable to sales to government, municipal, or public institutions); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 84 (1962) ("The preponderance of reasoned opinion
treats State or municipal bodies on a par with the Federal Government's
exemption."); 4 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation
§ 24.06 at 24-70 (1982) ("[T]he prevailing view is that such sales [to states
and municipalities] are excluded from Robinson-Patman liability."). See
also 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973) (indicating that lower federal courts have generally held the Act inapplicable to
sales to states and municipalities, that one lower federal court has held the
Act may be applicable if the State is the disfavored customer, and that
opinions among state attorneys general are divided).
Although not specifically addressing any consumption/resale distinction,
a past Attorney General of the United States also has opined that purchases by state and local governments are not within the Act's prohibition
against price discrimination. Report of the Attorney General Under Executive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962)
(identical bidders on contracts with state and local governments cannot
contend that the Act prohibits bidding below the schedule price because
the Act is not applicable to government contracts).

·.
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This same understanding has been expressed in testimony
before Congress. In 1967 and 1968 a congressional subcommittee conducted public hearings on the problems of
small businesses in the pharmaceutical industry. The subcommittee heard testimony from both representatives of
pharmaceutical manufacturers and retail pharmacists regarding the industry-wide practice of price discrimination in sales
of pharmaceuticals to governmental purchasers-federal,
state, county, and municipal. 19 Several witnesses also directly expressed their assumption that the Robinson-Patman
Act does not apply to such sales. 20
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 48 (1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Merritt Skinner,
community pharmacist); id., at 258 (William Apple, executive director of
the American Pharmaceutical Association); id., at 296, 318-319 (Hyman
Moore, H.L. Moore Drug Exchange, Inc.); id., at 500 (Henry DeBoest,
vice president of Eli Lilly & Co.); id., at 705 (Donald van Roden, vice president and general manager of pharmaceutical operations for Smith Kline &
French Laboratories); i d., at 792 (Joseph Ingolia, vice president and general manager of Schering Laboratories); id., at 817 (Lyman Duncan, vice
president of American Cyanamid Co.).
Based upon this overwhelming evidence, the Select Committee on Small
Business concluded in its report to the House: "The difference between
drug prices charged retailers and wholesalers as compared to those
charged ... governmental customers is extremely substantial, often being
over 50 percent." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968).
20
See 1967-1968 Hearings, at 15-16 (Earl Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, counsel for the National Assocation of Retail Druggists) ("When
a drug supplier sells drugs to Federal, State, or municipal governmental
institutions, the price charged by the supplier may be without regard to
the Robinson-Patman Act, because such sales are probably exempt from
the Robinson-Patman Act."); id., at 731 (W. Abrahamson, president of Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.) ("[T]he only special pricing we have ever engaged in are [sic] in bidding situations to [federal, state, or local government] agencies excluded from the Robinson-Patman Act."); id., at 1069 (C.
Stetler, president of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association)
("There is nothing immoral or unlawful about incremental cost pricing in
'

9
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In 1969 and 1970, the same House subcommittee investigated the problems of small businessmen under the Robinson-Patman Act. In these hearings witnesses again expressed the view that governmental purchases at any level
are not covered, highlighting the problem of favorable prices
on governmental purchases for resale and making a plea for a
change in the law. 21
cases-such as sales to the Government ... -where the Robinson-Patman
Act does not apply.").
Even one congressman on the subcommittee expressed his understanding that the Act does not apply to governmental purchasers. See id., at
1092 (Rep. Corman) ("[l]f there were no exemption under RobinsonPatman for the Government, what would be the situation as to their purchases?"). The colloquy that followed Representative Corman's question
further evidences the assumption that governmental purchases are outside
the scope of the Act, even in the case of resales.
Mr. Stetler. If there was no exemption under Robinson-Patman, I presume some of these practices would be illegal under Robinson-Patman.
Mr. Cutler. If I could try to answer that, [Representative] Corman ... . [A]bsent the one case of these resales . . . , I suppose the lack of
exemption would make no difference, because the Robinson-Patman Act
would not apply for other reasons, because you are not discriminating between two people engaged in commerce and competing with one another.
Further, there is a real question as to whether the Robinson-Patman Act
applies under any circumstances where you are bidding under a competitive bid. So for both of these reasons, the answer to your question would
be that the same pricing practices might still lawfully prevail under Robinson-Patman without the exemption for the government . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
21
William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs for the National Association of Wholesalers, testified:
Over the years, the Robinson-Patman Act has not been extended to
cover sales to the Government. In the days when Government purchases
constituted a relatively small volume in the marketplace, this exemption
posed few problems. But today, with the vast growth in Government purchases, Federal, State, and local, ... the continued exemption creates
many unfair competitive situations.
We believe that Congress must turn its attention to this problem.

'.
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III
The 1 gislative histo of the Robinson-Patman Act ~ly
reveals t at ongress mtended to exclude governmental entitles om tll.e c s proscnpt10ns to some extent.
owever, ongress 1 no cu on e issue Be ore us and therefore did not provide one clear rationale governing coverage
and noncoverage. In an area in which bright lines are
needed to guide state and local governments in their purchasing practices, the majority fails to identify any principle triggering inclusion or exclusion.
_1 ~ -f\
Moreover, oEe cannot 5!?ubt that state, count;y, and munici- J ()0 fUL
pal governments and manlilacturers of commoditTeShave \~ / ~
struCtured their marketing relationships with each other on
the longstanding assumption that the Robinson-Patman Act
~
Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act, Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of
the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73-74 (1969-1970). See id., at 76-77 (Everette
Macintyre, acting chairman of the Federal Trade Commission) (affirming
that sales to the Federal Government, even in the resale context, are not
subject to the Robinson-Patman Act).
Harold Halfpenny, legal counsel for the Automotive Service Industry
Association, focused most precisely on the problem of which petitioners
complain-i. e., competitive injury to private industry when governmental
entities receive more favorable prices on purchases of commodities for
resale.
[W]hile the Act is silent on the subject, its legislative history and subsequent interpretation support the proposition that sales made to Federal or
State governmental bodies are not subject to the provisions of the Act.
This may be injurious to competition in several ways . ...
[T]here are "second line" situations where competition exists between the
Government and private indsutry in the resale of commodities.
The Federal Trade Commission has not recommended legislation to
make the Robinson-Patman Act applicable to sales to governmental purchases. However, in our opinion, Congress should consider acting on its
own volition.
Id., at 623 (emphasis added).
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does not apply to those transactions. That understanding
finds substantial support among the courts and commentators. State and local governments have developed programs for providing services to the public, including medical
care to the indigent and the medically needy, 22 based on the
same assumption. The majority's holding that sales of commodities to state and local governments for resale in competition with private enterprise are covered by the Act will engender significant disruption-not only through government
and industry reexamination and restructuring of marketing
relationships, but also, unfortunately, through possible termination of services and supplies to needy citizens 23 and
through litigation associated with the process of reexamination. 24 The Court rests its decision primarily on one statement in the legislative history, 25 taken in isolation from other
remarks designed to assure concerned House members that
the Act would not force the abandonment of governmental
below-market buying practices which the majority's holding
now calls into question. Given Congress' failure to delineate
the extent of the Robinson-Patman Act's coverage or
22
See, e. g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. §§ 14100-14126 (1980 & Supp.
1982); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, ~~5-1 to 5-14 (Supp. 1982--83); Mont. Code
Ann. §§53-6-103 to 53-6-144 (1981); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§365, 365-a
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982); Tex. Human Res. Code Ann.
§§ 32.001-32.037 (1980); Va. Code§§ 63.1-134 to 63.1-144 (1980).
23
The administrative burden of developing internal accounting and
recordkeeping procedures to segregate commodities purchased for resale,
plus the additional financial strain of paying higher prices for these purchases, may induce state and local governments to terminate programs and
services already in place. More significantly, however, the uncertainty
generated by the majority's failure to establish clear lines of demarcation
for coverage and noncoverage and the fear of exposure to treble damages
liability might well cause cautious legislators facing budgetary dilemmas to
eliminate these programs.
24
I note that the Court has not indicated that today's holding will have
only prospective effect.
z.o> See ante, at 10.
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noncoverage of state and local governments, I would allow
Congress to speak on this issue rather than disrupt longstanding practices and programs and judicially arm private
litigants with a powerful treble damages action against these
governments. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment
below.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[January - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue rresented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical
·
products to hos itals eperatea h/ state and local govern~ for resale in competition with private retail pharmacies is exempt from the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman
Act.
I
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama,
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members'
claims. Respondent~ are fifteen pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama,
and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University
operates a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical
school. Located in the University's medical center are two
pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, existing as a public corporation under Alabama law.
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15
U. S. C. §§ 15 & 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-
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Patman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. §(i3(a) &
(f). Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation
of § 2(f) 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 3
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the
sanctions of§ 2. In granting respondents' motions, the District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged
Section 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .... "
2
Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section."
' Section 13c provides:
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit."
'"State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and
its agencies.
1
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price discrimination and that at least some of the state purchases were not exempt under § 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, without regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). 5 The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 6
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of
federal law.-- U.S.-- (1982). We now reverse.
II

·tJoJ_

~

The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for
~Q"ASl:lffifltie~ in
traditional governmental functions. 7
6
Petitioner's claims were dismissed solely on the basis that state purchases are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F. 2d, at 103
n. 10. We thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule of
law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims.
6
The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from
the District Court's decision.
7
Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of
p~armaceutical drugs is not ':indisputably" an attribute of st.at~
e1gnty. See EEOC v. Wyomtng, - - U. S. - - , - - (1983), (Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264,
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regu-
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Rather, the issue before us is limited to state purchases for
the purpose of competing against private enterprise-with
the advantage of discriminatory prices-in the retail market.
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental nmctions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not apply where a State has
chosen to compete in the private retail market.

III
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory language-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of
this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
late States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S.
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain)!{ate purchases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional
governmental functions, those purchases must be protected on a case-bycase basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U. S. 389, 413 & n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion).
8
The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption
would support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchasing for their own use. ~e note 20, infra.
9
The wor~"person"~'persons" ~used repeatedly in the antitrust
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15.
0
' See, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "person" under§ 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works

.D.c
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Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example,
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person'
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than
the Robinson-Patman Act. 12 Such a distinction ignores the
specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive nature of the term "person." 435
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person"
within the meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Ac!.: See also Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1918) (foreign nation is a "person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act).
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.' " City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v.
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R.
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the applicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman
A~t.''
City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435
U. S., at 401 n. 19.
u The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "person.'' See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
12
The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act.

'

.

)
A

81--827-0PINION
JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBO'IT LABS.
t..lO+

6

U. S., at 397 n. 14. ~
we erceive any reason to construe the word "person" in at ct any differently than we
have in the Clayton Act, which it amendsA13 "<.. . In sum, the
plain language of the Act strongly suggests' that there is no
exemption for state purchases to compete with private
enterprise.
IV
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and history of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose
~eveals no such c:trary intention.
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities
Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill,
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R.
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen.
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act contains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by
the courts.''). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy
or a new theo~ The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do.''); id., at 3119
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinso bill is to strengthen Clayton
Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same) . ...........,-.--......
- Pa.-hnAIII
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might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 14 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the
antitrust laws. I d., at 787 (citing United States v. P hiladelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350--351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482,485 (1962)). 15 In City of Lafayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in
competition with a private utility, we held that no exe~
for local governments would be implied. The Cour1:6f'emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as
they are to assure maximum benefits for the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the
broader interests of national economic well-being than are
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S.,
at 403. See also id., at 408. 16
See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 312-313
(1978) ~ atm ~'broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added).
15
See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398,
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975).
16
In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the
14
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have been
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman
Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
1, 11-12 (1976):

u. s.

"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws,
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 646-647 (1969). The Court
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing
power.' FTC v. Brock & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960);
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968).
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54,
65 (1968)."

®---------3> -p.ui

extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from taxation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the RobinsonPatman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient,
private retail distribution systems.

)
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The legislative history falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that there is an exemption for J tate t .c. .
purchases. There is nothing whatever in the Senate or
House Committee reports, or in the floor debates, focusing
on the issue. Some members of Congress were aware of the
possibility that the Act would apply to governmental pur- U1
chases. Most members, however, were lnotfconcernedlwith
state purchases, but with possible limitations on the Lederal Q:l(f .
Government. The most relevant legislative history is the
testimony of the Act's principal draftsman, H. B. Teegarden,
before the House Judiciary Committee. 17 Although the tes7
' [Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting
of discounts to the United States Government?
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so ....
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts ....
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be
barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns ....

The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy.
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders?
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality.
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you?
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the
Government.
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden: No.
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?

.'
~
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timony is ambiguous on the application of the Act to state
purchases for consumption, one conclusion is certain:
Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would apply to the
purchases of municipal hospitals in at least some circumstances. Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all such purchasing. 18 In

/~ .

Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case.
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill.
Hearings on H. R. 1,995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
1935 Hearings].
8
' Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House committee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be construed to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition ... will further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." I d., at 250.
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the RobinsonPatman Act was pending before Congresw he Court stated that it could
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, allembracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553,
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an
exemption for the f.ederal ~overnment's purchases. The existence of such
an exemption is riOt before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312
U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the Sherman
Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden

1'
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the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive markets with congressionally approved price advantages. 19
clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not compete with private purchasing. ~P J:tis flt:li"~eses, this elimisated the Patiesale fer thee
.Aet te Bflplyte state ag&'R~i&~ That assumption, however, is inapplicable
here.
19
Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op.
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act,
the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so provided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make
such statutes applicable to the Government....
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and,
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as
applicable to Government contracts.
e.\~~.r;f,e..A ~ \...:.. t4A.~~
at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General Yil&d th& plu;alii& ~
~~'ederal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541.
The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the
Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicability to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1!55,156, at
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales.
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1!55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions."
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman,
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attor-

!f,

v.,)(k.Q
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v

\

Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legislative events and decisions of district courts confirm that
state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn
therefore to th~subsequent event~R w:kiefi PC~HeleHts cz.

J

Pel~

~

•

A
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman
Act held in the late 1960s. 20 Testimony before the House
ney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpreting-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951);
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney General's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act.
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Representative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: purchases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than
4.u:lic.c. ·~ •nos~ re.c.~,.-l ~ ...
urchases for use in traditiona functions. 'lor. ~ t)~\ ..eM-\
20
The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's mvt\~t k.~Arl>~.•'\ Ml £JCE.tnppost-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary +ieN ov j,...,..u,..,l '.\ foY
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an ~\fto\c.. ~\u- Cf'r ·, r.e ~ 1 5.QI:l.
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases de- ~ 34 ;_ (' ~·1
pends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that per~•
form the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right.
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (suggesting that § 13c does not include government agencies0.._with 81 Cong. A
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institu- I
tions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette,
435 U. S., at 397 n. 14 (§ 13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by deft-

4
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Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price discrimination in favor of state hospitals, 21 and Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority
over transactions involving state health care programs. 22 It
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the state agency competed with private retailers, although he was aware of such practices by institutional purchasers. 23 Other statements expressed little
nition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at
18 n. 10; 81 Gong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We
need not address this issue here.
21
See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the RobinsonPatman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of
Representatives, 91st Gong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant Direc~· 1 cxl_ b2~ (
tor of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); Harold Half)
penny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Associatiol)i Small
1\
Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on Small
Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Gong. 15-16 (1967-1968)
[hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'l Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State purchases ..-..
"probably" exempt). But see id., at 8q(@) (remarkS of Charles Fort,
I.
)
President Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act
may prohibit this practice
.. "~ There also was testimony that institu- ( j ·~. 1 M 8(g \.:SCUfY\1.
tional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than do retail
,....
pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition, see id., at
A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292. ~
22
See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra
20, at 74.
/!\
23
After hearing his testimony, the ubcommittee posed further ques•
tions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail druggists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, jtate, and private group I. c ·
health care programs; (ii) the ~ederal ~overnment's ability to purchase from ~ .
drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii)
instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpatients or even nonpatients." !d., at 73. In his response to the Sub-

:J

81-827-0PINION
14

JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS.

more than informed, interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's
passage. 24 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 21.®----e.
committee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category,
which involved§ 13c issues. /d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most similar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon.
24
Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the 'b1 e •i6y aadL
eenellisor, aal;~ of the Subcommittee repo -"the views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring t e intent of an earlier one."
United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, e. g., Consumer
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102,
117-118~. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 758
(1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 200 n. 7 (1977)
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act are in no sense
part of the le 'slative history.").
26
t is clear from the ouse u comrm ee s conclusions that it did not
focus on the question presented by this case. The Subcommittee found
that the difference between drug prices for retailers and government customers "is extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors
inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manufacturers seem . . . violative of the RobinsonPatman Act .... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommittee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory prices-about
which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful. The Subcommitte report
did include the awkwardly worded statement: "There is no basis apparent
... why the mandate of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to
discriminatory drug sales favoring € 010ovemment@ institutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is prescription drug competition
at the retail level with disfavored retail druggists." Id., at 79A.(8HlflR&B~ A
~ This unexceptional opinion, however, simply says that private in'
stitutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said n .
about the unfair competition at issue in this case.
e Subcommittee also 7.$
cone u e that t e 19
es1gne to afford immunity to "

e
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B
Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief fo~ Respondent .
University 31-32. There are serious infirmlloties in these L
1\
!:'broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held,.Qr suggested ,A
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 26 (ii) the number of judicial decisions even considering the Act's application to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 'l:1 (iii)
respondents cite no jtourt of f ppeals decision that has exI. t.. .
pressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision
below; (iv) some of the J!Istrict Jl'ourt cases upon which reI .c...
spondents rely are simply inapposite; 28 (v) it is not clear that

\

~·

private nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'" H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 20, at 78,
but that would indicate more the construction of § 13c than it would the
intent of the 1936 Congress.
26
Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19 n.
10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508,
513 (1972).
Z7 The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to ,$tate
purchases. See ~1\28-30, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases
presenting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after
"nearly four decades of litigation").
28
See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving .federal i overnment as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney General's o pinion as sole support), affd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790,
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices),

I.e..
nl\.
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any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in
the private market; 29 and (vi) there are several cases that
suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state
purchases for resale purposes. 30 This judicial track record is

!9r7~

cert. denied, 434 U. S. 87l
Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16
(Act
was
no proof that sales affected'praiiitiff adversely)" ,«ff'd on opinion below,
234 F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956)~ General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-Q03
(WD Ky.1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding
the Act inapplicabl~~ "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its
governmental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be
engaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), affd,
132 F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S.
780 (1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F.
Supp., at 16.
29
Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77....{)094
(Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state
agencies), affd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers subject to discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association
- ~ept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral
A
v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore.~
,~
opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. ;::d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied),
vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has suggested in1alternative holdingL that there is an exemption for state pur-~
chases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
No. 4-66-5, slip op. at 4 (ldahoAMay 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), affd,
378 F. 2d 212, 215-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University within
scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called governmental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases predate
our decision in City of Lafayette.
30
See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); ChampaignUrbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281,

~p1955)

be..c.AIJk

A

l CU\.lA
J

inapplicable~_Ahere
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in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases
r,.. citRed ~d27, supra.
espon ents also seek support in the interpretations of
various commentators and executive officials. But the most
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question presented is unsettled; 31 others do not foreclose our holding; 32
and in some cases they support it. 33 Thus, Congress cannot
28~287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchase~~
")

~1>5

.

f!88iii'9~ State agencies might face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 680 I).
(CA7 1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi
Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637-641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson &
Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d
851, 858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand
Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439,
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency exempt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other
business corporations).
"See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 &
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962).
32
Some deal only with sales to the federal government. See Letter
from Comptroller General to Robert F: Sarlo,=-veterans Administration
(July 17, 1973), reprinted inJ973-2Zrade Cas. (CCH) ~ 74,642. Almost all
fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962).
33
See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977);

[
,...

]
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be said to have left untouched a universally held interpretation of the Act. ~1
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developmentswhether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt purchases by a State for the ur ose of competin with a price
advantag
n the rivate retail mar

IS.

VI
The Robin~n-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote.
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it certainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of policy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper
Corp. 312 U. S., 600, 606 (1941).
[194&-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with private enterprise, it is subject to Act).
" In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25, the
Department of Justice stated:
AThe mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to engage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activities of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the federal government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned
enterprise to the same standards recjuir[ed] of all who engage in commercial transactions in the market.
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890
(1977).
Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F. 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the
charter of a ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign
activity that would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine).

A
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"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is replete with references to the economic evil of large
organizations purchasing from other large organizations for
resale in competition with the small, local retailers. There is
no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think
that congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny
small businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson
County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the
strongest competitor of them all ..a..ls- To create an exemption
here clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress.
VII
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

3~

1\

A
.

·'

;!(Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings,
supra ~~ 17, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of private rights").

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ __ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-827

JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical
products to state and local government hospitals for resale in
competition with private retail pharmacies is exempt from
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
I
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama,
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members'
claims. Respondents are fifteen pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama,
and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University
operates a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical
school. Located in the University's medical center are two
pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, existing as a public corporation under Alabama law.
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15
U. S. C. §§ 15 & 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the RobinsonPatman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) and
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(f). Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation
of § 2(f) 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 3
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged
price discrimination and that at least some of the state pur'Section 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities oflike grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .... "
2
Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section."
3
Section 13c provides:
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit."
• "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and
its agencies.
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chases were not exempt under§ 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, without regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). 5 The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 6
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of
federal law. - - U. S. - - (1982). We now reverse.
II

The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for
use in traditional governmental functions. 7 Rather, the
Petitioner's claims were dismissed solely on the basis that state purchases are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F. 2d, at 103
n. 10. We thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule of
law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims.
6
The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from
the District Court's decision.
7
Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably'' an attribute of state sovereignty. See EEOC v. Wyoming,- U . S . - , - (1983); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc. , 452 U. S. 264,
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in
5
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issue before us is limited to state purchases for the purpose of
competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of
discriminatory prices-in the retail market.
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental functions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not apply where a State has
chosen to compete in the private retail market.

III
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory language-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of
this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S.
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain state purchas~s from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional
governmental functions, those purchases must be protected on a case-bycase basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U. S. 389, 413, and n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion).
8
The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption
would support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchasing for their own use. See note 20, infra.
9
The words "person" and "persons" are used repeatedly in the antitrust
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15.
0
' See, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "person" under§ 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person"
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Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example,
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person'
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than
the Robinson-Patman Act. 12 Such a distinction ignores the
specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive nature of the term "person." 435
U. S., at 397, n. 14. We do not perceive any reason to conwithin the meaning of § 8 of the Shennan Act). See also Pfizer, Inc . v.
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a "person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act).
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.' " City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v.
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R.
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the applicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act." City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435
U. S., at 401 n. 19.
11
The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The
Clayton Antitrust Act contains tenns general to all purchasers. The
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
12
The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act.
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strue the word "person" in that Act any differently than we
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends, 13 and it is undisputed that the Clayton Act applies to states. See Hawaii v.
Standard Oil 6, 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972). In sum, the plain
language of the Act strongly suggests that there is no exemption for state purchases to compete with private enterprise.
IV
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and history of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose
and history here reveals no such contrary intention.
A
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities
Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill,
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R.
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen.
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act contains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by
the courts."). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do."); id., at 3119
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson-Patman bill is to strengthen
Clayton Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same).
13
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might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 14 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the
antitrust laws. Id., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 15 In City of Lafayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in
competition with a private utility, we held that no exemption
for local governments would be implied. The Court emphasized the purpos-es and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as
they are to assure maximum benefits for the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the
broader interests of national economic well-being than are
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S.,
at 403. See also id., at 408. 16
See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312-313
(1978) (noting "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added).
15
See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398,
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719-720 (1975).
16
In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the
'

4
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have been
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman
Act. As JusTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425

u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976):

"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws,
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 646-647 (1969). The Court
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing
power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960);
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968).
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54,
65 (1968)."

B
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from taxation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the RobinsonPatman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient,
·
private retail distribution systems.

..

,,
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The legislative history falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that there is an exemption for state
purchases. There is nothing whatever in the Senate or
House Committee reports, or in the floor debates, focusing
on the issue. Some members of Congress were aware of the
possibility that the Act would apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however, were concerned not with
state purchases, but with possible limitations on the Federal
Government. The most relevant legislative history is the
testimony of the Act's principal draftsman, H. B. Teegarden,
before the House Judiciary Committee. 17 Although the tes17
[Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting
of discounts to the United States Government?
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so....
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts ....
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be
barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns ....

The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy.
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders?
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality.
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you?
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the
Government.
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden: No.
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
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timony is ambiguous on the application of the Act to state
purchases for consumption, one conclusion is certain:
Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would apply to the
purchases of municipal hospitals in at least some circumstances. Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all such purchasing.'8 In
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case.
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill.
Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
1935 Hearings].
18
Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House committee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be construed to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition ... will further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." I d., at 250.
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the RobinsonPatman Act was pending before Congress, the Court stated that it could
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, allembracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553,
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an
exemption for the Federal Government's purchases. The existence of
such an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp.,
312 U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the
Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover,
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the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive markets with congressionally approved price advantages. 19
Teegarden clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not compete with private purchasing. For his purposes, this eliminated the rationale for the Act to apply to state agencies. That assumption, however,
is inapplicable here.
19
Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op.
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act,
the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so provided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make
such statutes applicable to the Government....
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and,
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as
applicable to Government contracts.
I d., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General clarified that his
reference was to "the Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons
"for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425
(1928), in which the Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates
to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicability to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales.
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas.
(CCH) ~ 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions."
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman,
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attar-
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Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legislative events and decisions of district courts confirm that
state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn
therefore to these subsequent events.
A
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman
Act held in the late 1960s. 20 Testimony before the House
ney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpreting~r erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951);
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney General's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act.
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Representative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: purchases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional governmantal functions. For the Department of Justice's most recent statements regarding an exemption or immunity for state enterprises, see note 34, infra.
20
The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases depends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that perform the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right.
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (suggesting that § 13c does not include government agencies), with 81 Cong.
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette,
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Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price discrimination in favor of state hospitals, 21 and Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority
over transactions involving state health care programs. 22 It
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the state agency competed with private retailers, although he was aware of such practices by institutional purchasers. 23 Other statements expressed little
435 U. S., at 397, n. 14 (§ 13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by
definition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S.,
at 18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We
need not address this issue here.
21
See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the RobinsonPatman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); id., at 623 (Harold Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association);
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on
Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 15-16
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC
Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'l Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State purchases "probably'' exempt). But see id., at 80 (remarks of Charles Fort,
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act
may prohibit this practice"); id., at 86 (same). There also was testimony
that institutional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than
do retail pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition,
see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292.
22
See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra, n. 20, at 74.
23
After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail druggists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, state, and private group
health care programs; (ii) the Federal Government's ability to purchase
from drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and
(iii) instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to out-

I

•
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more than informed, interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's
passage. 24 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 21.
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices
for retailers and government customers "is extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manufacturers seem ... violative of the Robinson-Patman Act
.... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommittee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory
prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful.
The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly worded
statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the mandate
of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institupatients or even nonpatients." !d., at 73. In his response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category,
which involved § 13c issues. I d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most similar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon.
24
Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the failure of
the Subcommittee report to rely on it for its conclusions-"the views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See,
e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U. S. 102, 117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U. S. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc : v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192,
200, n. 7 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act
are in no sense part of the legislative history.").
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tional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfavored retail druggists." I d., at 79. This unexceptional
opinion, however, simply says that private institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this
case. 25
B

Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent
University 31-32. There are serious infirmities in these
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held nor suggested
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 26 (ii) the number of judicial decisions even considering the Act's application to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 27 (iii)
The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'" H. R. Rep.
No. 1983, supra note 20, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction of § 13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress.
26
Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 397, n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19,
n. 10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S.
508, 513 (1972).
27
The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to state
purchases. See nn. 28-30, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually all
lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting
25
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respondents cite no court of appeals decision that has expressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision
below; (iv) some of the district court cases upon which respondents rely are simply inapposite; 28 (v) it is not clear that
any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in
the private market; 29 and (vi) there are several cases that
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after
"nearly four decades of litigation").
28
See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving Federal Government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney General's opinion as sole support), affd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790,
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices),
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) (Act inapplicable because there was
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely), affd on opinion below, 234
F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD
Ky.1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding the Act
inapplicable because "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of
property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), affd, 132
F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether RobinsonPatman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780
(1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F.
Supp., at 16.
29
Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77--D094
(Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state
agencies), affd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers subject to discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association
v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore., Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished,
oral opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied), vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has
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suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state
purchases for resale purposes. 30 This judicial track record is
in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases
cited, n. 27, supra.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of
various commentators and executive officials. But the most
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question presented is unsettled; 31 others do not foreclose our holding; 32
suggested in an alternative holding that there is an exemption for state
purchases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., No. 4--{)6-5, slip op. at 4 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), affd, 378 F. 2d 212, 215-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University within scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called governmental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases
predate our decision in City of Lafayette.
80
See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); ChampaignUrbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281,
28~287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases,
State agencies might face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 680 (CA7
1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81
F . Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption
for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable,
Ltd., 547 F . Supp. 633, 637-641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v.
Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d 851,
858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp .
v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439,
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency exempt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other
business corporations).
81
See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 &
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Rob-
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and in some cases they support it. 33 Thus, Congress cannot
be said to have left untouched a universally held interpretation of the Act. 34
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developmentswhether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing with a price
advantage.
inson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962).
32
Some deal only with sales to the Federal Government. See Letter
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in [1973-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 74,642. Almost
all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962).
33
See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977);
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with private enterprise, it is subject to Act).
34
In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25, the
Department of Justice stated:
"The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to engage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activities of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the federal government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned
enterprise to the same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commercial transactions in the market."
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890
(1977). Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F. 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the charter of a
ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign activity that
would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine).
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VI
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote.
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it certainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of policy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper
Corp. 312 U. 8., 600, 606 (1941).
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U. 8., at 553. The legislative history is replete with references to the economic evil of large
organizations purchasing from other large organizations for
resale in competition with the small, local retailers. There is
no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think
that congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny
small businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson
County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the
strongest competitor of them all. 35 To create an exemption
here clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress.

VII
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of
Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings ,
supra, n. 17, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection
of private rights").
86

.,,
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Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Supreme Court Bars
Some Cut-Rate Sales
By Makers of Drugs
By a

WALL STREET JOURNAL

Staff Reporter

WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court said
drug manufacturers must stop selling at cut·
rate prices to commercial pharmacies run
by government-owned hospitals.
The Justices ruled 5·4 that federal anti·
trust law doesn't permit drug companies to
discriminate against private retail pharmacists by offering lower prices to state, city
and county hospital pharmacies with which
they compete.
The ruling, written by Justice Lewis
Powell, didn't say whether manufacturers
may still offer discounts to state and local
governments for purchases of drugs or other
items that aren't going to be sold over the
counter. The decision was limited to com·
mercia! pharmacies run by public hospitals
for their patients, often indigents.
The opinion said the Robinson·Patman
Act, which prohibits price discrimination,
applies equally to drug-company sales to
public hospital pharmacies and those of pri·
vate pharmacies.
The case involved a lawsuit by a group of
Alabama retail druggists, who claimed that
15 major drug makers were unfairly selling
at .low prices to a pharmacy run by the Uni·
versity of Alabama Hospital in Birmingham.
A federal district court dismissed the suit,
gui de lo laphroaig, wrilc Julius Wile Sons & Co., 1 Hollow Lane, lake Success, NY. 11 042 _
Saying State and local governments were ex·
~;,;;;,;;;,;;;,;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;,;;;,;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;,;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;w---1 empt from the price-discrimintion Iaw. A
'"
federal appeals court in Atlanta agreed, but ·
the high court reversed the ruling.
Dissenting Justices-Sandra Day O'Con·
nor, William Brennan, William Rehnquist
and John Stevens-said purchases by state
and local governments should be exempt because Congress didn't address the issue
when it passed the law.

Pentagon Official Says
Reagan Should Delay
Tax-Rate Cut for 1983

.

1um.

•

By a

lll ffi.

Call Toll-Free
(800) 854-8063 National
(714) 640-1813 local
(800) 432-7071 California

WALL STREET JouRNAL

Staff Reporter

WASHINGTON- The second-ranking offi·
cia! at the Pentagon suggested the president
should delay this year's 10% personal tax·
rate cut, but acknowledged he might be sent
to the "woodshed" for the comment.
Paul Thayer, who recently became dep·
uty Defense secretary, made th~ suggestion
in questioning by the House Budget Commit·
tee. It sparked a testy exch<.nge between
Mr. Thayer and Rep. Jack Kemp (R., N.Y.),
a champion of tax cuts, accordng to a tran.
script of the hearing.
Mr. Thayer, who had been chairman and
chief executive officer of LTV Corp., has
been in his job for only a few weeks.
"Thon
>'~~ked at yesterday's hearing
· '

· -- ,..re,r-ol.

tr

_By now, you've probably dec
You may have also dec
capital involved in choosing
ware, and the right people.
free seminar will tell you w
· We'll demonstrate how
your order entry, billing, inv
payables, and payroll-in s
pany's accounting. We'll do
small step at a time, or in o
All with no contract to s
investment. And, most impor
of your business. ADP, alon
ing services by on-line and
by pick-up and delivery met
your individual needs. You c
help you need now, then gr
Before you risk your b
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· point to attend our free sem
nothing to lose, because thl
ends with a handshake, noJ
Call today to make yo
seminar now being held in
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Atlanta
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March 8th, 9tl
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23rd, 24th
Boston Area
Dates
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March 4th, 1'
V.brcester
March 8th
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March 9th
Nashua, NH
March 15th
Danvers
March 16th
Boston
March22nd,
Braintree
March 24th
Long Island Area Dates
Melville
March 8th,
lOth, 15th,
22m!, 23rd
Miami Area
Dates
West Palm Beach March 8th
lOth
Miami
March 151
17th
Ft. Lauderdale
March 22
24th
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THIRD DRAFT: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association,
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
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Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat.
1526, 15
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§13 (the Act).
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the University's medical center
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Robinson-Patman Act,
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Petitioner contends
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that j :espondent

manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their products to
the

University's

two

pharmacies

and

to

Cooper

Green

charjeJ petdlaYJer'.5. fl'lttr~J.f'r>
Hospit al Pharmacy at prices lower than those
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like
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Petitioner

1 section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act,
15
U.S.C.
§13 (a),
provides
in
relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in
price
between
different
purchasers
of
commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are
in commerce,
where such
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States ... , and where
the
effect
of
such
discrimination may
be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them •...

3.

i*d:lle-r

alleges

that

the

respondent

hospital pharmacies

knowingly induced such lower prices in violation of §2(f) 2

sold
drugs

and

so

procured

to

the

general pub lic in direct competition with privately owned
pharmacies.

lil

/+f; f;Mer
'
~
Ef\ also -.... allegi'iit,.ts

the

tha t

pri ce

'------

discriminati on is not exempted from the proscriptions of
the Act by 15 u.s.c. §13c. 3
Respondents
failure

to

state

moved
a

to

claim,

dismiss
se:tting

the
forth

complaint
as:-

ground~

for
00£

-Dismissal that state purc hases 4 are exem~as a matter of
law CE: om the

sanctions of §2}

In granting respondents'

motions, the District Court expressly accepted as true the
allegations that local retail pharmacies had been injured

2 section 2(f), 15 u.s.c. §13(f), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination
in price which is prohibited by this section.
3 section 13c provides:
Nothing in sections 13 to 13b and 2la of
this title, shall apply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges,
universities,
public
libraries,
churches,
hospitals,
and
charitable
institutions
not
operated for prof' .
a~

4 656 F.2d 92
8 (CAS
Court's opinion~ Appendix).

1981)

(reprinting

District

4.

by the challenged price discrimination and that at least
some of the state purchases were not exempt under §13c. 5
The District Court held that "governmental purchases are,
without

regard

to

15

u.s.c.

§13c,

beyond

the

intended

reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at
least with

respect

traditional
(1981). 6

to purchases for

governmental

The

Court

of

purposes."
Appeals

affirmed~$l"~..r~y

"on

for

the

court's Memorandum of Opinion."

__::;-

question

of

656

F.2d

the

Fifth

basis

of

the

92,

102

district

656 F.2d, at 93. 7

We granted certiorari because
1'> ('("~ '· ( 11 $

Aimportant

hospitals and other

:he
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· S1!Ue-:pJ;~sente.d is
~ ~
g2

law6

We
set1<1ed-by this Court. arul[ now reverse.

()./lR

~-•{sales

5"state purchases"
a State and its agencies.

~

4(}

to and purchases by

"· 10 .

6Petitioner's
antitrust
claims
were
solely on the basis that State purchases are
the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F.2d, at 103
oe s not here base i.ts d1:Ci "S ion -upo-n--..-t'lb---a.-e+-'5
doctrine as explicated
Parker
341
1943 .... " .
e
ave- no-o-ccasion
w ether some ot er rule of law might justify dismissal of
petititioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims.
7 The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals,
agreed that "[t)he claims against the Board must ... be
treated as equivalent to claims against the State itself."
656 F.2d, at 99.
Accordingly, both courts held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision.
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State purchases for the purpose of competing
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private

e nt e rprise--with the advantage of discriminatory prices-market.
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that
the Act exempts such State purchases.
deciding,

Assuming, without

that Congress did not intend the Act to apply

_______6i)
_we -~
/~
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(_~--

----
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ondents argue that application of the Act to
purcha s
by bhe State of Alabama would present a
signi icant ri~ of conflict with the Tenth Amendment and
that therefore i any construction of the Act to include such
purchases ~
See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, 440 u.s. 490, 501 (1979).
There is no risk,
however, of a constitutional issue ~ising from the
application of the Act in this case~:!\e retail sale of
pharmac e ic al
drugs
is
not
'Indisputably
' [an]
attribu e[] o f state sovereignty.'" See EEOC v. Wyoming,
(
1982) (quoting Hodel v.
inia Surface Minin
& Reclamation Association Inc.,
,
(
It 1s s1mp y too ate 1n t e
day to suggest that Congress cannot regulate States under
its €ommerce ~lause powers when they are engaged in
propfletary ac"ti vi ties.
See, e. g. , Parden v. Terminal
Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 188-189, 192-193 (1964).
If the
Tenth Amendment protects certain State purchases from the
Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional
governmental functions, those purchases
be protected
on a case-by-case basis.
Cf. Cit
of Lafa ette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 u.s. 3 9, 41 n.42 ( 978)
(plurality opinion).
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This concession was compelled by several
11
d ec1s1ons.
. .

In

City

of

Lafayette

v.

9 The District Court properly assumed, for purposes
of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the
hospital purchases would not be covered by the §13c
exemption.
See note 3, supra, and accompanying text.
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express
exemption would support summary judgment in cases against
State hospitals purchasing for their own use.
10 The word

"person" or "persons" is used repeatedly
in the antitrust statutes. See 15 u.s.c. §§7, 12, 15.
11 see, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 u.s. 159, 162
(1942) (holding that the words "any person" in §7 of the
Sherman Act include States); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Footnote continued on next page.

8

7.

Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435

u.s.

389, 395 (1978), we

r.

stateJ without qualification that -t!!:E::I!:I!ai~.--""'

v

~

~t:e:~-=!t!ll!!b:lt:;=IWIM"Ulhe definition of 'person' or

'persons'

embraces both cities and States." 12
Respondents

would

distinguish

City

of

Lafayette 13

~~CJ
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 u.s. 390, 396 (1906)
(
ing-:;
t
a municipality is a "person" within the
meaning of §8 of the Sherman Act and
the city could
maintain a treble-damages action under §7, the predecessor
of §4 of the Clayton Act).
See also Pfize
Inc. v.
Government of India, 4 34 U.S. 308, 317 ( 197 ) (hold· n'J
hat a foreign nation is a "person"
· ·' '1• §4 of the
Clayton Act) .
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to
require compliance by municipalities with the substantive
standards of other federal laws which impose ... sanctions
u~on 'persons.'"
Cit~ of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
L1ght Co., 435 U.S.
89, 400 (1978).
See California v.
United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 (1934).
One case is of
particular relevance.
In Union Pacific R. v. United
States, 313 u.s. 450 (1941), the Court considered the
applicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708,
32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41(1)
(1976
ed.)
(repealed
in
1978),
"a
statute
which
essentially is an anti trust provision serving the same
purposes as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of
the Robinson-Patman Act." City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at
402
n.l9.
The Court
here expressly found that a
municipality was a "person" within the meaning of the
statute.
See 313 u.s., at 467-468.
See also City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 401-402 n.l9.
12 The word "purchasers" necessarily has a meaning as
inclusive as the word "person."
See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430
( 19 36)
(remarks of Senator
Robinson)
("The Clayton
Anti trust Act contains terms general to all purchasers.
The pending bill does not segregate any particular class
of
purchasers,
or
exempt
any
special
class
of
purchasers.").
l3The only apparent difference between the scope of
the
Q
laws is the extent to which the activities
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the ~ommerce Cl ause,
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 4 - u.s. 1 ~ 199201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is
Footnote continued on next page.
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from the case before us on the ground that it involved the
Sherman Act

rather

than

the

Robinson-Patman Act.

Such

()tAf

distinction ignores

specific reference to the
,p('

Robinson-Patman Act in

*-- discussion

nature of the term "person."

435

of the all-inclusive

u.s.,

at 397 n.l4.

Nor

do we perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in
that-Ac~~fferently

which

it

amends.

14

than we have in the Clayton Act,

'he

plain

language

of

the

Act

is
-f-o
(

enterpris~

g

IZIJt&lil

'h!l

u_n_l_e_s_ s ---a---d- i _f _f _e _r_e_n_t

compete

with

legislative

privy

intent

is

otherwise subject to the Act.
14 Indeed, the House committee report specifically
states that "[t)he special definitions of section 1 of the
Clayton Act will apply without repeti tio
to the terms
concerned where they appear in this bil , si nce it is
r)o~t. 6-~~f'j,
designed to become by amendment a part of h at act." H.R.
~11 t+1t ~ Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d S
. 17 (1936): S.
11
? Y rrc6-l
Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1 76 .
See 80 Cong.
tl\ ;J,et1
7
Rec.
3116
( 19 36)
("Many have comp
n ed because the
/u"1utJ1C '
provisions of the bill apply to 1 any person engaged in
commerce. 1
The original Clayton Act contains that
exact language, and it " is carried into the bill under
consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act w
used
because it has been construed b the courts."
;zhat t e
the Clayton and Rob1nson-Patman Acts
construed consistent! with eac
iven their
common
) (remarks of Rep.
("The.._ Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a
new policy or a new theory.
The Clayton Act was enacted
in 1914, and it was the purpose of that act to do just
what this law sets out to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151
( 19 36) (remarks of Senator Logan) •

1

9.

apparent from the purpose and history
1

A

Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes
of the antitrust laws,
On

numerous

including the Robinson-Patman Act.

occasions,

comprehensive

coverage

this
of

the

Court

has

antitrust

affirmed

the

laws

has

and

recognized that those laws represent "a carefully studied

1

[-them]

attempt to bring
engaged

in

monopolize

within~~._.-aama........~

business

whose

commercial

United States v.

activities

intercourse

might

among

restrain or
the

states."

South-Eastern Underwriters Association,

322 u.s. 533, 553 (1944) . 16

In Goldfarb v. Virginia State

~ -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.__.. .~

L

See,
v. Alaska, 451 u.s. 259, 266 (1981): Train v.
Public Interest Research GrouJ?, Inc., J26 u.s.
(1976)
z
'
'I a 1 •
'iP'iiitiM3 iii i b e Court has_......,
considered "how far Congress intendea to extend its
mandate under" the Robinson-Patman Act and found the
answer in its "purpose and legislative history." Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 u.s. 186, 197 (1974).
See
FTC v. Sim_2licity Pattern Co., 360 u.s 55, 69-70 (1959):
AUtomatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 72,
78 (1953).
l6see, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,
434 U.S. 308, 312-313 (1978): Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 u.s. 219, 236
(1948) (atating that antitrust laws are "comprehensive in
[their] terms and coverage, protecting all who are made
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
perpetrated") (emphasis added).

1

10.

Bar,

421

U.S.

cases have

773

(1975),

the Court observed

repeatedly established that there

presumption

against

antitrust

~'

implicit
at

787

that

is a heavy

exemptions"
(citing

"our

from

United

States

the
v.

Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-351 (1963);
California v. FPC,
of

Lafayette,

competition

in

with

369 U.S.
applying
a

482, 485
anti trust

private

(1962)) • 17

In City

laws

city

in

that

no

utility,

we

to

a

held

exemption for local governments would be implied.
BRENNAN,

writing

for

the Court,

and scope of the antitrust laws:
~

made

by

public

assure maximum

emphasized

for

JUSTICE

the purposes

1

"[T]he economic choices
=tf

corporation~•.•f esigned
benefits

1

the

as

they

are

to

community constituency,

are not inherently more likely to comport with the broader
interests of national economic well-being than are those
of

private

corporations

acting

interests of ..• its shareholders."

in

furtherance

435 u.s.' at

of

the

403~

1 7see,
e.
g.,
National
Gerimedical Hospital
&
Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388
(1981); Cit~ of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 u.s. 3 9, 398, 399 (1978); Abbott Laboratories v.
Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 u.s. 1, 12
(1976);
United States
v.
National Assn.
Securities
Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975).

1

11.

(footnotes
These principles, and the purposes they further, have
been helpful in interpreting the language of the RobinsonPatman Act.

1

As JUSTICE BLACKMON stated for the Court in

Abbott Laboratories

v.

Portland Retail Druggists Assn.,

Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976):
It has been said, of course, that the
antitrust
laws,
and
Robinson-Patman
in
particular, are to be construed liberally, and
that the exceptions from their application are
to be construed strictly.
United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956);
FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 u.s. 726, 733
(1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 u.s.
642, 646-647 (1969). The Court has recognized,
also, that Robinson-Patman "was enacted in 1936
to curb and prohibit all devices by which large
buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller
ones
by
virtue
of
their
greater
purchasing power." FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U.S.
166, 168 (1960); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390
U.S. 341, 349
(1968).
Because ~
the Act (

1

1

~

18I n one Important
.
. .
f rom
sense, reta1'1
ompet1t1on
State agencies can be more invidious than that from chainstores, i1 'r
i h the Robinson-Patman Act .-r'r i l&Ill •:r
·
See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 u.s. 69,
75-76 (1979); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.q,.,363 U.S. 536,
543-544 (1960)-.Y:Oiume ...., purchas~ permits any
larqe, ~la · 1 efficient~retail organization to pass on
cost savings to c sumers, ) and to that extent, consumers
benefit merely from economy of scale.
But to the extent
that lower prices result from l~s overhead, in the form
of no taxes, federal grants, State subsidies, afltd free
public services, agencies merely redistribute the burden
of ~ costs from the actual consumers to the citizens at
large.
An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act
would
give State agencies
a
significant
additional
advantage in the commercial market, perhaps enough to ~
eliminate
marginal
or
small
priva~
competitors.
Co
rs, as citiz en s, ult~'matel r l
pay for the full
costs of t
s~l~ by th
ate agencies involved in
1
this case.
~ - (is.~
eason to assume that such
agencies
will
pro vid e
retail
distribution
more
efficiently than private retail pharmacistsA
onsumers
. _ .. .111:1~""" will suffer to the extent that ~t te retail
activities
eliminate more
efficient,
private
retail
distribution systems.
I

<';I r

1

1f

12.

remedial, it is to be construed broadly
effectuate its purposes.
See Tchere12nin
Knight, 389 u.s. 332, 336 (1967): Peyton
Rowe, 391 u.s. 54, 65 (1968).

1

to
v.
v.

1
Thus,

in

view

of

the

remedial purposes,

Act's

and

the

broad scope of its language as interpreted by this Court,
the burden of showing that the legislative history compels
us to create an exemption is on those who would argue that
Congress

intended -but

did

'..

not

choose

to

so~-that

say

State agencies could compete with private business

1

free

from the Act's constraints.
B

The legislative history falls far short of supporting
respondents'

contention

that

there
ae

State purchases.
to

compete

is

33£&.

an

exemption

for

1

iiM& i leaving

unfairly

with

the
an issue of

Yet
Senate

or

House

foe ust'Aj
debates,

there

committee

is

nothing

reports,

whatever

or

in

in

the

the

floor

o..,
the issue.
I

There

is,

however,

evidence

that

some

members

of

appl7 )

waul~
th"'r
Congress were aware of the possibility . . the Act
11

to governmental purchases.

Not surprisingly, Host members

1

13.

)

/

were concerned, not about State purchases,
/:fiOVI,
111

on

the federal Government-,.IIIIJ!•M••-'1~

limi t

The

most relevant legislative history is the testimony of the
Act's

principal

draftsman,

H.B.

Teegarden,

before

6ommittee. 19

19
Rep.
Lloyd: Would this bill,
in your
judgment, prevent the granting of discounts to
the United States Government?
Mr.
Teegarden:
Not
Clayton Act does so ••..

unless

the

present

Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government
gets
huge
discounts.....
Now,
would
that
discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should
unless a discount contrary to the present bill
would be barred--that is, the present law--would
be barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this:
The Federal Government is not in competition
with other buyers from these concerns.
The Federal Government is saved by the same
distinction....
They are not in competition
with anyone else who would buy.
Rep.
Hancock:
It
would
eliminate
competitive bidding all along the line, would it
not, in classes of goods that would be covered
by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding
on Government orders?
Rep.
Hancock:
municipality.

Government,

State,

city,

Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
Rep. Michener: If it did do it, you would
not want it, would you?
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would
with the Government.
Footnote continued on next page.

the
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~

~

~ atta•'ll] 1Fh&~

~

i(}

'i'&8'!1lE&tua

lf"h

'aa&l:i!JB'I !lftiseat

the

application of

1

the Act to State purchases for consumption, one conclusion
is certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would
apply to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at least
some circumstances.

Thus, his comments arferd ne SYppo~ ~

the exemption found by the courts below for all such
purchasing. 20

In

the

absence

of

any

other

relevant

Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the
city, county exactly the same as anybody else,
same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden:

No.

Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell
to a city hospital any cheaper than they would
to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in
this way.
In the final analysis, it would
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a
particular case.
If the two hospitals are in
competition with each other, I should say that
the fact that one is operated by the city does
not save it from the bill.
Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209
(1935)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 19 35 Hearings] .
20 Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief
to the House committee.
He first rejected outright the
desirability of ~ exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra
note 19, at 249. He then posed the question whether "the
bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels."
He stated that
"[t]he answer is found in the principle of statutory
construction that a statute will not be construed to limit
or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives, or
privileges of the sovereign unless
it so expressly
provides--a principle inherited by American jurisprudence
from the common law ..... "
But he also noted that
"requiring a showing of effect upon competition, will
further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the
Government." Id., at 250 (footnotes omitted).
The "statutory construction" referred to by Teegarden
Footnote continued on next page.
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we
evidence,

it

2 tli

see a

cannot~•a. .a~i~s~•.eeea••~•,t~e

legislative

an unexpressed
exemption,

enter

~

private

competitive

markets with

1

Act,
[S] tatutes
regulating
rates,
charges,
etc.,
matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily
apply to the Government unless it is expressly
so provided: and it does not seem to have been
e policy of the Congress to make such statutes
app
ble to the Government .... ~ 4
~----..... The Acfl ~: :~
,
9
merely amended
the ActJ -,r' Q hJP Liz; tf J!L ••,t::tnd, in so far as
I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded
heretofore
as
applicable
to
Go
t
contractsj. ~
~
!'rffVr~'~Rtf&elu'.rb>'
ave
e

!

54 ~ f~ter

Id., at
Governmenij.\'
J

7

in

$,.

u[~~hrase

in t e letter1
"Federal
and 3d ' 'ng other reasons "for avoiding a
Footnote continued on next page.
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F

{~ ~ ~ ~
ondents

legislative
Courts

nevertheless

events

confirm

that

and

'(___If(,
argue

decisions

of

State

purchases

'

~')

.1!

;;:;;;<.~ ~

M
that
LZ

are

subsequent ·

azul

District

outside

the

a.l !;'11 ·

construction that would make theftatute applicable to the
Government in violation of th
apparent policy of the
Congress
in
such
matters".
The
Attorney
General
o r - _..... pressly
relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western
Un1
Tele ra h Co., 275 U.S. 415, 425 (1928), in which
~
Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph
rates to a federal corporation that competed with private
enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the
Act's applicability to State agencies.
Indeed, in the
following
year,
the Attorney General of California
expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Act's proscriptions.
See 19 32-19 39 Trade Cas.
(CCH)
,[55, 156, at 415-416
( 19 37) .
Two other early State
attorney general opinions simply do not consider whether
the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See
Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, 1932-1939 Trade
Cas. (CCH) ,[55,157, at 416 (1937): 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis.
142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United
States] Attorney General's reasons may be also applied to
municipal and public institutions."
W.
Patman, The
Robinson-Patman Act 38
(1938).
See also W. Patman,
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30
(1963)
(interpreting Attorney General's op1n1on as exempting
State purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some
weight,
but he appears only to be interpreting--or
erroneously extending--the Attorney General's opinion and
reasoning.
Representative Patman's personal intentions
probably are better reflected in his introduction in 1951
and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "purchaser"
to include "the United States, any State or any political
subdivision thereof."
H.R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951): H.R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is
no legislative history on these bills, but it is arguable
that he believed that the original intent needed to be
stated exp~ neg~ee-- -his ~ea~i "; of the Attorney
General' s ,(const!uct_ion of the Ac t(!)'
·;X:~tra"W In any
case, Congress's failure to pass these bills probably
stems from a reluctance to subject federal purchases to
the Act.
It bears repeating, however, that none of these
views--including Representative Patman' s--focuses on the
State
purchases
alleged
here:
purchases
to
gain
competitive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional functions.

17.

"5,COPf"

fL

~,

'

as

of

the

the

2

01'\

subsequent events

J ~ee - fo..,te!?-

L__{ol

J

investigating practices in th e pharmaceutical industry
ir'IJJca.ted
{he A-ct d.rd ;,or ~owr

---2-'~a~~ination

in favor of State

~

hospital~

2

and t_ Chairman Paul Dixon
-

Fetfera.( TJ-a.~ CdM,... f$Siiiu)
£2 st~t, 4Lf~,
1., u .~.t

~ 13c

22 The most important r elevant event n the RobinsonPatman Act's post-enactment history is t e amendment in
foi
1938 excluding eleemosynar y institutions.
Whether the(
existence of an exemption in §13c suppor s an exemption
all State purchases depends upon whether
§13c is interpreted to apply to ~State agencies. That
is a substantial issue
in its own right.
Compare 81 Cong. Rec. 8706
( 193 7)
(remarks of Rep.
Pettengill) (readi.mj similar amendment .as- not includ
"a
charitable institution th at was not supported in any part
by public funds"))._ Hf::!t
R.
ep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d A, If}
Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968)
with 81 Cong. Rec. 8706 (1937) ,..
(statement of Rep. Wal er) (
e.Einq- ha.t §13c woulcl apply
to institutions financed by cities, counties, and States).
See also Cit~ of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 397 n.l4
(i
~ing widiin the Nonprofit Institutions Act "public
libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by local
government"): Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 18-19
n .10: 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 ( 19 37) (exemption codifies the
intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We
need not address :!iCE 1'ht~ l~$tA.t' lurR6)
I

23
See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman
Act: Hearings Before the Spec1al Subcommittee on Small
Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the Select
Committee
on
Small
Business
of
the
House
of
Representatives, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 73-77, 623 (19691970)
(William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs,
National Association of Wholesalers: Harold Halfpenny,
counsel for the Automative Association of Wholesalers):
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory
Agencies of the Select Committee on Small Business of the
House OI,. Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16
(1967-1968)
[hereinafter
1967-1968
Hearings]
(Ear~
Kintner, former FT Commissioner, on behalf of NARD). There
----------~~~~~~~ also was
that institutional purchasers
1
frequently
drugs at lower prices than 'fll~
Foot te continued on next page. ~
I
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~----....,

~ede~al _

_:rrade

disclaimed

Commissio

any

authority

transactions involving State health care programs.
wlr.e1her
is

not

at

all

clear,

a
,..illlillli:2:11w:::::O:v cases

however,

;n IVvct,
the

~[chairman

over

24

It

Dixon

rState agency

with private retailers, although he was

~

competmg

2

aware of such

practice by institutional purchasers. 25

Other statements

express little more than informed, interested opinions on
the issue presented, and
consideration

~not

appropriate

for

the

entitled to the

constructions

contemporaneously with the Act's passage. 26

given

See supra, at

~retail

pharmacies, see id., at 15, 258, 318, 1093-1094,
and many witnesses complained that this discrimination
adversely affected competition, see id., at A-140-141,
253-262, 273, 291.
24 see H.R. Rep.

at 74.

his tes
,
further
ues tions
on the market
expanding
care programs~
( i i)
ent~ to
purchase from
_
drug
facturers at su stantially below wholesale cost~ and
hospitals, 'both nonprofit and proprietary, selling
atients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73.
In his
s to the Subcommittee, Chairman--nixon declined to
discuss further the last categor , which involved §l3c
1ssues.
Id., at 74.
H1s disclaimer
envisioned
State purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in
competition with private enterprise.
Thus, ~he issue Jl
presente'OA i1
1 i:11 •••8 is most similar to thl. issuer' not discussed
by Chairman Dixon.

poseJ.

];

I

I

I

I

I

•

•

26 Assuming
that
this
post-enactment
commentary
before the Subcommittee can be imputed to iillr Congress .-,.
-i-tlill•ii!i•--qui te a leap given the brevity and conclusory
Footnote continued on next page.
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n. 21.
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's
it

~·d

~

this

not

focusi:';a~lit;1!1~

case.

The

that

on the question presented by

Subcommittee

found

that

the

difference

22

For
between drug prices

government~omers
always

fully

§

t•

is

7 retailers

~xtremely

explainable

by

and

substantial" and "not

either

cost

justifiable

quantity discounts,

economies of scale, or other factors

inherent

distribution."

in

bulk

~lr:i)
conclusion ,~it

of

individual

appear

is

manufacturers
of

the

seem

and

Robinson-Patman

1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77

quite possible

that

in

some

instances

Act ••.• "

(1968) )

Thus,

it

the Subcommittee considered some

State purchasing at discriminatory prices--about which it
had

heard

22

stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies

violative

0 ep. No.

~ ~ext

testimony--to

be

unlawful.

The

Subcommitte

nature of the Subcommittee report--"the views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring
the intent of an earlier one."
United States v. Price,
361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).
See, e. g., Consumer Product
Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. , 44 7 U.S. 102,
117-118 & n.l3 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
u.s. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann,
434 U.S. 192, 200 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10
years after passage of the Act are in no sense part of the
legislative history.").

23

20.

{

report did include th

awkwardly worded statement: "There

is no basis apparent ..• why the mandate of the RobinsonPatman Act should not
sales

favoring

be applied to discriminatory drug

nongovernmental

2

institutional purchasers,

profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is prescription
drug

competition

at

retail druggists."

the

retail

level

with

disfavored

(emphasis added}. 27

Id., at 79

This

unexceptional statement, however, simply says that private

2

MtJ.Y
institutional

purchases

not

~,. .=-••••;~

~-~

discriminatory

prices.

expressly about

tJtrll(.(j~

~

unfair l competition
The

facilitate
sales

Subcommittee

said

at

nothing

the unfair competition at issue in this

case.

2

Respondents

also

argue

that,

courts considering the
that !}

without

exception,

coverage have concluded

)+-,

does not apply to government purchasersja.D

(()W'"'t

~

nola e

has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer,

if:;

~

27 The Subcommitte~
so concluded that the 1938
Amendment was "design~ to afford immunity to private
nonprofit insti tutionsr... o the extent the sales are for
the nonprofit institu1:ion' s 'own use,'"
H.R. Rep. No.
1983, supra note 22, at 78, but that would indicate more
the construction of §13c than it would the intent of the
1936 Congress.

21.

under

either

~(a)

rn

whe-.:-

the

2

discriminatory price involved a sale to a State, city, or
county.

There

assertion:
an

of

serious

infirmaties

in

this

broad

(i) this Court has never held or suggested that

exemption

number

are

for

State

purchases

existed; 28

(ii)

judicial decisions even considering

the

the Act's

2

application to purchases by State agencies is relatively
small;

29

f
(iii)

we

I

are

-

cite

Q

no

Court

of

Appeals

decision that has expressly adopted 1 before the decision
I

/-

District
simply

Court

interpretation of §2;

cases

inapposite; 30

upon
(v)

which
it

is

(iv) some of the

respondents

rely

are

not

that

2.!!Y.

clear

28rndeed,
our opinions
suggest--_...._
precisely the opposite.
See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S.,
at 397 n.l4; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at 18-19 n.lO;
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
u.s. 508, 513 (1972).

Fewer

2 9The parties
than a
dozen cases, many with unpublished opinions, that
involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to
State purchases.
See notes 30-32, infra.
Cf. Blue Chip
Starnes v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 723, 733 (1975)
(aff1rming rule adopted by "virtually all lower federal
courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases
presenting this question over the past quarter century")
(emphasis added); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419
U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (adopting consistent, "longstanding"
construction of Robinson-Patman Act after "nearly four
decades of litigation").

~ Pacific Enginee r ing & Production Co. v. KerrMcGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1175,054, at 96,721,
96,742 (D Utah 1974) (di c ta) (involving federal government
as ultimate purchaser;
relying on Attorney General's
Footnote continued on next page.
30

2

22.

published District Court opinion has relied solely on a

(:xempti~~
Act

claim

State

alleging

purch~
injury

to dismiss a Robinson-Patman
as

a

result

competition in the private market; 31 and
several

cases

that

suggest

the

of

government

(vi)

there are

Robinson-Patman

Act

is

op1n1on as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
551 F.2d 790, 798 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition
despite different prices), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879
(1977); General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co.,
37 F. Supp. 598, 602-604 (WD Ky.) (finding no "sale" under
the Act and alternatively holding the Act inapplicable on
the ground that "[n] either the government nor a city in
its purchase of property considered necessary for the
purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in
buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied),
aff'd, 132 F.2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving
issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales to
State agency), cert. denied, 318 u.s. 780 (1943).
3 1 cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories,
No.
C-77-0094
(D Utah, Aug.
15, 1977)
(unpublished
opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice
Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to State
}gencies), aff'd, 630 F.2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) lCI liM!
(COmplaint insufficient because it failed to ~~¥
products or purchasers
subject toSU~inatory
treatment);
Portland Retail Dru ists~ssociation v.
Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (b Or. Sept. 11, 1972)
(unpublished, oral opinion), vacated
nd remanded, 510
F.2d 486 (CA9 1974)
~13c applied to the purchases
and sales), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 1 (1976). One
District Court has suggested in alternative hol~gs that
there
is
an
exemption
for
State
purchas._
for
nonconsumption use.
Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., No. 4-66-5, op. at 4 (D Idaho May 26, 1966)
(unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 F.2d 212, 215-216 (CA9)
(purchases by Utah State University within the scope of
Nonprofit Institutions Act;
expressly not addressing
whether there is a "so-called governmental exempt ion") ,
cert. denied, 389 u.s. 898 (1967).
:a f the ill&&e l'rae•a•wtd hare i111 it ·
See Sachs v. BrownForman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp.
1 6 (SONY 1955)
(dicta), aff'd per curiam, 234 F.2d
(CA2 ), cert.
R~nied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956).
A ll of these cases predate
in City of
% fayette.

26

23.

applicable to State purchases for resale purposes. 32
judicial

track

record

is

This

in no sense comparable to the

unbroken chain of judical decisions upon which this Court

~

r~ "'''tl~5-'r

the

~~·~or

relied ..........
anti trust

laws

ascertaining a construction of

that Congress over a
~Ao~lJ

2

long period of

'/'htff' be
'lvl'e ?

time has chosen to preserve.

<et ~~s

t111

Respondents also seek support in the interpretations
of various commentators and executive officials.
most

authoritative

of

these

sources

indicate

But the
that

the

question presented is unsettled, 33 others do not foreclose

J

32 see Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F.
Supp. 328, 330-333 (ED Ark. 1980), aff'd, 658 F.2d 611,
612 (CAB 1981); Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L.
Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 287, 291 (CD Ill.
1979) (
Act inapplicable to purchases by the
Army and Air Force Exchange Service because of sovereign
immunity, but possibly
·
State agencies
would face an opposite result), aff'd, 632 F.2d 680, 687692 (CA7 1980); A.J. Goodman & Sons v. United Lacquer
Manufacturing Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D Mass. 1949).
Other cases cut against~ exemption for State purchases.
See Munici,ali~ of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cablef Ltd., 547
F. Supp. 6 3, 6 1 (fi Alaska 1982); Sterling Ne son & Sons
v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (D. Idaho 1965),
aff'd, 351 F.2d 851, 858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383
u.s. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research &
Development Association, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95, 96 (EDNY
1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp.
439, 443 (ND Ohio 1952).
3 3 see
SA
z. Cavitch, Business Organizations
§105D.Ol[8) [c),
at
lOSD-45
to -46
(1978)
(opinions
"divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and ~Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70
(1982) ~I
g
• !J \"there is some conflict among the
authorities
as
to
whether
sales
to
states
and
munici~alities
are
excluded
from
Robinson-Patman
liabil1ty"); id. §24.06[2), at 24-75 to 24-76; E. Kintner,
A Robinson-Patman Primer 202-203 ( 1970) ("Although [the
Footnote continued on next page.
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24.

our

holding,

Congress

34

and

cannot

in

be

some

said

cases
to

support

have

left

it. 35

Thus,

untouched

a

universally held interpretation of the Act.
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-whether

legislative,

have considered

the

judie ial,
specific

or

2:

in commentary--rarely

issue before us.

There

is

simply no unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to
exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing-with a price advantage--in the private retail market.

2

The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized,
both for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to
promote.

Though

Congress

is

well

aware

of

these

Attorney General's] opinion appears to have settled the
matter where the federal government is concerned, some
controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act
to purchases by state and local governments.")~ F. Rowe,
Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 84
n.l66 (1962).
34 some
deal
only
with
sales
to
the
federal
government.
See
Letter from Comptroller General to
Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration (July 17, 1973),
reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,174,642, at 94,819
(1973).
Almost all fail to mention, much less decide,
whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail
sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive
Order 10,9 36, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11
(1962).
35see 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979)~ 47 N.C.A.G.
No. 1, 112, 113, 115 (1977) ~ Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727
(1948-1949).

25.

I
criticisms~

the Act has remained in effect for almost half

2

[x]
"[ t
indulge

in ..• policy-making

legislation ....

Our

is not for

in

the

[this Court]

field

function ends with

of

to

antitrust

the endeavor

to

ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of
the

relevant material,

Congress."
(1941}

what

United States v.

was

in

fact

the

312

u.s.,

Cooper,

intent of
600,

606

[Robinson-Patman]

Act

2

0

"A general application of the

to all combinations of business and capital organized to
suppress
spirit

commercial

and

impulses

South-Eastern
legislative

competition
of

the

is

in

harmony

times which gave

Underwriters,

history

is

u.s.,

322

replete

with

at

with

the

3

it birth."
The

553.

references

to

the

economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other
large

organizations

small,
absence

local

for

retailers.

of

resale
There

in
is

competition with
no

exemption,

reason,
to

in

think

the

3

the
that

congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small
businesses~ such

as

the

pharmacies

of

Jefferson County,

J

Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest

3

26.

pl-.tJ.r ltl ~ ceu 1TttA,f
prod.t.A-tt"5
------~--

competitor

of

them all. 3

create

an

exemption here

clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress.

We

hold

that

sales

to ~ purchases "by) State

and

local government hospitals for resale in competition with

3

private pharmacies are not exempt from the proscriptions
of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Appeals
r

accordingly

is

The judgment of the Court of
reversed

and

remanded

for

It .-

~oceedings

consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

C2

i-_Lc_e n_j:( _ _
I'\O_te
__'_
1'__a_r_

3

2___:!_)

job 12/29/82
THIRD DRAFT: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association,
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The

issue

presented

is

whether

the

sale

of

pharmaceutical products to hospitals operated by State and
local governments

for

resale

in competition with private

retail pharmacies is exempt from the proscriptions of the
Clayton Act,

38

Stat.

730,

as

Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15

amended

u.s.c.

by

the Robinson-

§13 (the Act).

I

Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists
and

pharmacies

Alabama,

doing

commenced

this

business
action

in
in

Jefferson

1978

in

the

County,
District

Court for the Northern District of Alabama as the assignee
of

its

members'

claims.

Respondents,

the

defendants

below, are fifteen pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board
of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the Cooper
Green

Hospital

Pharmacy.

The

University

operates

a

medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school.
Located

in

the

University's

medical

center

are

two

2

pharmacies.

0

Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital,

existing as a public corporation under Alabama law.
The

complaint

seeks

treble

damages

and

injunctive

relief under §§4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 u.s.c. §§15
and 26,

for

Clayton Act,
u.s.c.

alleged
as

§§13 (a)

violations

amended
and

by

(f).

of §2 (a)

the

and

(f)

of the

Robinson-Patman Act,

Petitioner

contends

that

15
the

respondent manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their
products to the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper
Green Hospital Pharmacy at prices lower than those charged
petitioner's

members

for

1 ike

products.

Petitioner

alleges that the respondent hospital pharmacies knowingly
induced such lower prices in violation of §2(f) 2 and sold

1 sect ion 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act,
15
u.s.c.
§13 (a),
provides
in
relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in
price
between
different
purchasers
of
commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are
in commerce,
where such
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States •.• , and where
the
effect
of
such
discrimination may
be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

3•

drugs

so

procured

to

the

general

public

in

competition with privately owned pharmacies.

direct

Petitioner

also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 u.s.c. §13c. 3
Respondents
failure
purchases

to
4

sanctions

moved

state
are

of

a

dismiss

claim,

exempt

§2.

to

as

on
a

In granting

the

the

complaint

ground

matter

of

that

law

respondents'

for
state

from

the

motions,

the

District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations
that

local

retail

pharmacies

had

been

injured

by

the

challenged price discrimination and that at least some of
the

state

purchases

were

not

exempt

under

§13c. 5

The

customers of either of them .•..
2 section 2(f), 15 u.s.c. §l3(f), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination
in price which is prohibited by this section.
3section 13c provides:
Nothing in sections 13 to 13b and 2la of
this title, shall apply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges,
universities,
public
libraries,
churches,
hospitals,
and
charitable
institutions
not
operated for profit.
4 "State purchases" are defined
purchases by a State and its agencies.
5 656 F.2d 92, 98 (CAS
Court's opinion as Appendix).

1981)

as

sales

(reprinting

to

and

District

4.

District
without

Court
regard

held
to

15

that

"governmental

u.s.c.

§13c,

purchases

beyond

the

are,

intended

reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at
least with
traditional
(1981) . 6

respect

to purchases for

governmental

purposes."

hospitals and other
656

F.2d

92,

102

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a

divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the
district

We
question

court's

granted
of

Memorandum

of

Opinion."

certiorari

to

resolve

federal

u.s.

law.

656

this
(1982).

F.2d,

at

important
We

now

reverse.
II

The issue here is very narrow.
with

sales

to

the

federal

We are not concerned

government.

Nor

are

we

6 Petitioner's
antitrust
claims
were
dismissed
solely on the basis that State purchases are exempt from
the Robinson-Patman Act.
See 656 F.2d, at 103 n.lO.
We
thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule
of law might justify dismissal of petititioner's RobinsonPatman Act claims.
7

The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals,
agreed that "[t]he claims against the Board must ... be
treated as equivalent to claims against the State itself."
656 'F.2d, at 99.
Accordingly, both courts held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision.

5.

concerned

with

traditional

State

governmental

purchases

consumption

for

functions. 8

Rather,

the

in

issue

before us is limited to State purchases for the purpose of
competing against private enterprise--with

the advantage

of discriminatory prices--in the retail market.
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that
the Act exempts such State purchases.

Assuming, without

deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to
State

purchases

governmental

for

functions,

consumption
and

that

such

in

traditional
purchases

are

therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not
apply where a State has chosen to compete in the private

8 Respondents argue that application of the Act to
purchases by the State of Alabama would present a
significant risk of conflict with the Tenth Amendment and
that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
. . includ~such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).
There is no risk,
however, of a constitutional issue arising from the
application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of
pharmaceutical
drugs
is
not
"indisputably
'[an]
attribut~ ] of state sovereignty.'"
See EEOC v. Wyoming,
U.S. __ , __ (198/.) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Minin & Reclamation Association Inc., 452 u.s. 264, 288
) . It 1s s1mp y too ate 1n t e day to suggest that
Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause
powers when they are engaged in proprietary activities.
See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 188189, 192-193 (1964).
If the Tenth Amendment protects
certain State purchases from the Act's limitations, such
as for consumption in traditional governmental functions,
those purchases must be protected on a case-by-case basis.
Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 413 n.42 (1978) (plurality opinion).

6.

retail market.
III
In

construing

a

statute,

statutory language itself.

we

look

first

to

the

The Robinson-Patman Act by its

terms does not exempt State purchases.

The only express

exemption is that for nonprofit institutions contained in
15 U.S.C. §13c. 9

Moreover, as the courts below conceded,

"[t]he statutory language--'persons'
sufficiently
u.s.c.

broad

§§12,

concession
. .
11
d ec1s1ons.

to

cover

13(a,f) ."

was

compelled

656
by

and

'purchasers'--is

governmental
F.2d,

at

several

of

In City of Lafayette v.

bodies.
99. 10
this

15
This

Court's

Louisiana Power

&

9 The District Court properly assumed, for purposes
of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the
hospital purchases would not be covered by the §13c
exemption.
See note 3, supra, and accompanying text.
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express
exemption would support summary judgment in cases against
State hospitals purchasing for their own use. $u. roU. 2.2. ~·
10 The word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly
in the antitrust statutes. See 15 u.s.c. §§7, 12, 15.
11 see, e. ~., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162
(1942) (the wor s "any person" in §7 of he Sherman Act
include States); Chattanoo a Foundr & Pie Works v. City
of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906) ( a a municipality
is a "person" within the meaning of §8 o the Sherman Act
and
maintain a treble-damages action under
§7, the predecessor of §4 of the Clayton Act).
See also
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 317
(1978) (a foreign nation is a "person" under §4 of the
Clayton Act) .
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to
require compliance by municipalities with the substantive
Footnote continued on next page.

7.

Light
stated

Co.,

435

without

U.S.

389,

395

qualification

(1978),
that

for

"the

example,

we

definition

of

'person' or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 12

from the case before us on the ground that it
Sherman Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act.
distinction

ignores

our

specific

reference

Such a
to

the

Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive

standards of other federal laws which impose ••. sanctions
upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Li~Jht Co., 435 U.S.
389, 400 (1978).
See California v.
Un1ted States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-586 (1944): Oh1o v.
Helvering, 292 u.s. 360, 370 (1934).
One case is of
particular relevance.
In Union Pacific R. v. United
States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the
applicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708,
32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41(1)
(1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a statute which essentially
is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the
anti-price-discrimination provisions of
the RobinsonPatman Act."
City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 402 n.l9.
The Court expressly found that a municipality was a
"person" within the meaning of the statute.
313 U.S., at
467-468. See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 401-402
n.l9.
12 The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive
as the word "person."
See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936)
(remarks of Senator Robinson) ("The Clayton Anti trust Act
contains terms general to all purchasers.
The pending
bill
does
not
segregate
any
particular
class
of
purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
13 The only apparent difference between the scope of
the relevant laws is the extent to which the activities
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause,
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is
otherwise subject to the Act.

8.

nature of the term "person."

435 U.S., at 397 n.l4.

Nor

do we perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in
that Act any differently than we have in the Clayton Act,
which it amends. 14
strongly

suggests

In sum, the plain language of the Act
that

there

is

no

exemption

for

State

purchases to compete with private enterprise.
IV

1

The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a
different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose

A-..,
and

history

of

the

Act.

examination

of

the

legislative purpose and history reveals no such contrary
intention. 15

1

/

14 Indeed, the House and Senate ~ommittee reports
specifically state that "[t)he speciaT definitions of
section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply without repetition
to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill,
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that
act."
H.R. Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17
(1936); S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See
80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) ("Many have complained because
the provisions of the bill apply to 'any person engaged in
commerce.'
The original Clayton Act contains that
exact language, and it is carried into the bill under
consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used
because it has been construed by the courts.").
Given
their common purposes, it should not be surprising that
the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts
should be construed consistently with each other.
See 80
Cong. Rec. 8137 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Michener) ("The
Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy or a
new theory.
The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it
was the purpose of that act to do just what this law sets
out to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151 (1936) (remarks of
Senator Logan) .
Footnote(s) 15 will appear on following pages.

9.

A

Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes
of the antitrust laws,
On

numerous

including the Robinson-Patman Act.

occasions,

comprehensive

coverage

this
of

Court

the

has

antitrust

affirmed
laws

the

and

has

1

recognized that these laws represent "a carefully studied
attempt
business

to

bring

whose

within

[them]

activities

every person engaged

might

restrain

or

in

monopolize

commercial intercourse among the states."

United States

v.

322 U.S.

South-Eastern Underwriters Association,

553 (1944) • 16
773

(1975) ,

533,

In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
the

Court

observed

that

"our

cases

have

repeatedly established that there is a heavy presumption

15 Although

the face of the Act clearly contains no
express
exemption
in
favor
of State purchases,
we
ertheless consider the legislative history.
See, e.
Watt v. Alaska, 451 u.s. 259, 266 (1981); Train v.
orado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1,
9-10 (1976). The Court previously has considered "how far
Congress
intended to extend
its mandate under"
the
Robinson-Patman Act and found the answer in its "purpose
and legislative history." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Cogp Paving
Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 (1974).
See FTC v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 360 u.s 55, 69-70 (1959); Automatic Canteen
Co. of ~merica v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 72, 78 (1953).

g.~fizer,

:A'See, e.
Inc. v. Government of India,
434 u.s. 308, 312-313 (1978); Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 u.s. 219, 236
(1948) (antitrust laws are "comprehensive in [their] terms
and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated")
(emphasis added) .

1

10.

against

implicit

exemptions"

from

the

antitrust

laws.

Id., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadelphia National

J

Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-351 (1963): California v. FPC, 369

u.s.

(1962)) . 17

482, 485

antitrust

laws

to

a

city

In City of Lafayette,
in competition with

applying
a

private

utility, we held that no exemption for local governments
would be implied.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court,

J

emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws:
"[T] he

economic choices made by public corporations

designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for
community constituency, are not inherently more likely to
comport with

the broader

interests of

national economic

1

well-being than are those of private corporations acting
1fte orjCH'll~at/7JII. anJ

in furtherance of the interests off
435 U.S.,

at 403

.

(footnotes omitted).

its shareholders."
See also id.,

at

408. 18

National Gerimedical Hospital
&
Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388
r.sni•iuu: Fewer & Light Ce. C

18 In one important sense, retail competition from
State agencies can be more invidious than that from chainstores, the particular targets of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Footnote continued on next page.
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have

13

been helpful in interpreting the language of the RobinsonPatman Act.

As JUSTICE BLACKMON stated for the Court in

Abbott Laboratories

v.

Portland Retail

Druggists Assn. ,

• • 1, 11-12 (1976):

been said, of course, that the
laws,
and
Robinson-Patman
in
· cular, are to be construed liberally, and
that the exceptions from their application are
to be construed strictly.
United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, 351 u.s. 305, 316 (1956);
FMC v. Seatrain
inas, Inc., 411 u.s. 726, 733
(1973); Perkins v. St~ ard Oil Co., 395 U.S.
642, 646-647 (1969).
The
urt has recognized,
also, that Robinson-Patman ' as enacted in 1936
to curb and prohibit all devices by which large
buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller
ones
virtue
of
their
greater
purchasing power " FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 u.s.
166, 168 (1960); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390
U.S.
341,
349
(1968).
Because the Act is
remedial, it is to be construed broadly to
effectuate its purposes.
~Tcherepnin
v.
Knight, 389 u.s. 332, 3 6 ~(196'n; Peyton v.
Rowe , 3 91 U. S . 54 , 6 5 ( 19 8 ) •

/

o/'

See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 u.s. 69, 75-76
(1979); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 u.s. 536, 543-544
( 19 60) •
Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to
~s,
and .to that extent, consumers benefit merely
~
tr~m -~ economy of scale.
But to the extent that lower
prices result from lower overhead, in the form of federal
grants, State subsidies, free public services, and freedom
from taxation, State agencies merely redistribute the
burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens
at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act ~uld ,_\
give State agencies a ~~gnificant additional advantag~
~'CJ the
commercial marke qt
perhaps
enough
to eliminate
marginal or small private competitors.
Consumers, as
citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs of the
drugs sold by the State agencies involved in this case.
Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies
will provide retail distribution more efficiently than
private retail pharmacists, consumers will suffer to the
extent
that State
retail
activities
eliminate more
efficient, private retail distribution systems.

14

14

15
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12.

Thus,

in

view

of

the

Act's

remedial

purposes,

and

the

broad scope of its language as interpreted by this Court,
the burden of showing that the legislative history compels

)

~~~

us to create an exemption is on those who
Congress intended,

argue that

but did not choose to say, that State

16

fll4-1_

agencies

compete with private business free from the

Act's constraints.
B

The legislative history falls far short of supporting
respondents'

contention

State purchases.
issue of
free

~there

such

that

there

is

an

exemption

for

17

Surely Congress would have discussed an

importance before leaving State purchasers

to compete

unfairly

with

the

private

sector.

Yet

is nothing whatever in the Senate or House committee

reports, or in the floor debates, focusing on the issue.

~

17

There is evidence that some members of Congress were
aware

of

the

possibility

governmental purchases.

that

the

Act

Most members,

would

apply

however,

to

were not

wi/11
concerned

----

State

purchases,

but

limitations on the federal Government.
legislative

history

is

the

?,

• ::t,

possible

The most relevant

testimony

of

the

Act's

18

13.

principal
Judiciary

draftsman,

H.B.

Committee. 19

Teegarden,
Although

before
the

the

House

testimony

19
Rep.
Lloyd:
Would
this bill,
in your
judgment, prevent the granting of discounts to
the United States Government?
Mr.
Teegarden:
Not
Clayton Act does so i ···

/* ~r.

unless

the

present

~

i ~tance,

Lloyd: For
the Government
gets
huge
discounts. r :~·.
Now,
would
that
discount be barred by this bill?

Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should
unless a discount contrary to the present bill
would be barred--that is, the present law--would
be barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this:
The Federal Government is not in competition
with other buyers from these concerns . ••••
~
The Federal Government is saved by the same
distinction....
They are not in competition
with anyone else who would buy.

... :J

Rep.
Hancock:
It
would
eliminate
competitive bidding all along the line, would it
not, in classes of goods that would be covered
by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding
on Government orders?
Rep.
Hancock:
municipality.

Government,

State,

city,

Mr. Teegarden: No: I think not.
Rep. Michener: If it did do it,
not want it, would you?

you would

Mr. Teegarden: No: I would not want it.
It
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would
with the Government.
Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the
city, county exactly the same as anybody else,
same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden:

No.

Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell
to a city hospital any cheaper than they would
to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
Footnote continued on next page.

is

14.

ambiguous on the application of the Act to State purchases
for

consumption,

one

conclusion

is

certain:

Teegarden

18

expressly stated that the Act would apply to the purchases
of

municipal

hospitals

in

at

least

some

circumstances.

Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found
by

the

courts

below for

all

such purchasing. 20

In

the

Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in
this way.
In the final analysis, it would
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a
particular case.
If the two hospitals are in
competition with each other, I should say that
the fact that one is operated by the city does
not save it from the bill.
Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209
(1935)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings].
20 Teegarden subsequently submit ted a writ ten brief
to the House committee.
He first rejected outright the
desirability of ~ exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra
note 19, at 249. He then posed the question whether "the
bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels."
He stated that
"[t)he answer is found in the principle of statutory
construction that a statute will not be construed to limit
or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives, or
privileges of the sovereign unless
it so expressly
provides--a principle inherited by American jurisprudence
from the common law •.. .. "
But he also noted that
"requiring a showing .of erfec t upon compe.t.-'tion, will
preclude
y possib ility of the bill af
ting the
a-~~~-I
at 25 0 (footnotes omitted).
~e
construe 1
eegarden ~F
,
construc.t.ion- -of
•
1
cited suggest that this sovereign exceptio
a government, when it passes a law, gives up
only what it expressly surrenders.
In the same year that
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court stated
that it could "perceive no reason for extending [the
presumption against including the sovereign in a statute]
so as to exempt a business carried on by a state from the
otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress,
all-embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which
is as capable of being obstructed by state as by
individual action." United States v. California, 297 U.S.
Footnote continued on next page.
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absence of any other

relevant evidence, we cannot see a

legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed
exemption,

to

enter

private

competitive

markets

with

congressionally approved price advantages. 21

#

(l936)~ee

175, 186
California v. Taylor, 353 u.s. 553,
562-563 (1957). • In the context of the Robinson-Patman
Act, the rule of statutory construction on which Teegarden
relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the federal
government's
purchases.
The
existence
of
such
an
exemption is not before us.
Cf. United States v. Cooper
Corp., 312 u.s. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a
"person" under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing for
treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that
governmental purchasing would not compete with private
purchasing.
For
his
purposes,
this
eliminated
the
rationale for the Act to apply to State agencies.
That
assumption, however, is inapplicable here.

21 six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney
General of the United States responded to an inquiry from
the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to
government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539
(1936).
In ruling that such contracts are outside the
Act, the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc.,
in matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily
apply to the Government unless it is expressly
so provided: and it does not seem to have been
the policy of the Congress to make such statutes
applicable to the Government ....
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended
the [Clayton Act]
and, in so far as I am
aware, the latter Act has not been regarded
heretofore
as
applicable
to
Government
contracts.
Id~,
at 540.
Later in the letter, the Attorney General
used the phrase "Federal Government," ibid., and gave
other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make
the statute applicable to the Government in violation of
the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id.,
at 541.
The Attorney General expressly relied upon
Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275
U.S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the Court upheld the
granting of favorable
telegraph rates to a federal
corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the
Act's applicability to State agencies.
Indeed, in the
following
year,
the Attorney General
of
California
expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Footnote continued on next page.
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t
Despite

the

plain

legislative history,
subsequent

language

respondents

legislative

events

of

the

Act

and

its

19

nevertheless argue that

and

decisions of

District

Courts confirm that State purchases are outside the scope
of the Act.

We turn therefore to the subsequent events on
20

which respondents rely.
A

Act's proscriptions.
See 1932-1939 Trade Cas.
(CCH)
1155,156,
at 415-416
(1937).
Two other early State
attorney general opinions simply do not consider whether
the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See
Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, 1932-1939 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1155,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis.
142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the
[United
States] Attorney General's reasons may be also applied to
municipal and public
institutions."
W.
Patman, The
Robinson-Patrnan Act 38
(1938).
See also W. Patman,
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patrnan Act 30
(1963)
(interpreting Attorney General's opinion as exempting
State purchases).
His interpretation is entitled to some
weight,
but he appears only to be interpreting--or
erroneously extending--the Attorney General's opinion and
reasoning.
Representative Patman's personal intentions
probably are better reflected in his introduction in 1951
and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "purchaser"
to include "the United States, any State or any political
subdivision thereof."
H.R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is
no legislative history on these bills, but it is arguable
that he believed that the original intent needed to be
stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney
General's contrary construction of the Act.
In any case,
Congress's failure to pass these bills probably sterns from
a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act.
It bears repeating, however, that none of these
views--including Representative Patman' s--focuses on the
State
purchases
alleged
here:
purchases
to
gain
cornpeti tive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional functions.

17.

Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman
Act held in the late 1960s. 22

Testimony before the House

Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
industry

indicated

that

the

Act

did

not

cover

price

discrimination in favor of State hospitals,23 and Federal
Trade

Commission

Chairman

Paul

Dixon

disclaimed

any

22 The most important relevant event in the RobinsonPatman Act's post-enactment history is the amendment in
1938 excluding eleemosynary institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15
u.s.c. §13c.
Whether the existence of an exemption in
§13c supports an exemption for certain State purchases
depends upon whether §13c is interpreted to apply to State
agencies that perform the functions listed.
That is a
substantial issue in its own right. Compare H.R. Rep. No.
1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 ( 1968) (suggesting that
§13c does not include government agencies) with 81 Cong.
Rec. 8706 (1937) (statement of Rep. Walter) (§13c would
apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and
States).
See also City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397
n.l4
(Nonprofit
Institutions
Act
includes
"public
libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by local
government")~
Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 18-19
n.lO~
81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (exemption codifies the
intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We
need not address this issue here.
23 see, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman
Act: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Small
Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the Select
Committee
on
Small
Business
of
the
House
of
Representatives, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 73-77, 623 (19691970)
(William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs,
National Association of Wholesalers~ Harold Halfpenny,
counsel for the Automative Association of Wholesalers)~
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory
Agencies of the Select Committee on Small Business of the
House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16
(1967-1968)
[hereinafter
1967-1968
Hearings]
(Earl
Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, on behalf of NARD).
There also was testimony that institutional purchasers
frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than do retail
pharmacies, see id., at 15, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many
witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely
affected competition, see id., at A-14 ~ 141, 253-262, 273,
291.
~

20

18.

authority over
programs. 24
Chairman

transactions

It

Dixon

is

not

involving State health

at

all

contemplated

clear,

cases

in

however,
which

agency competed with private

retailers,

aware

institutional

Other

of

such

practices

statements

by

express

interested opinions on the
entitled

to

constructions

passage. 2 6

the

little

See supra,

at ~

the

State

21

purchasers. 25

than

with

informed,

and are not

appropriate

contemporaneously

whether

although he was

issue presented,

consideration

given

more

care

for
the

the
Act's

& n.21.

24 See H.R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 22, at 74.
25 After
hearing his testimony,
the Subcommittee
posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the
eroding
influence
on
the
retail
druggists'
market
presented by: (i) expanding federal, State, and private
group health care programs; (ii) the federal government's
ability to purchase from drug manufacturers at prices
substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii) instances of
hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to
outpatients or even nonpatients."
Id., at 73.
In his
response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to
discuss further the last category, which involved §13c
issues.
Id., at 74.
His disclaimer of F.T.C. authority
envisionea-5tate purchases for welfare programs, not for
resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the
issue presented here is most similar to the issue not
discussed by Chairman Dixon.
26 Assuming
that
this
post-enactment
commentary
before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress--quite
a leap given the brevity and conclusory nature of the
Subcommittee report--"the views of a subsequent Congress
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 u.s. 304, 313
(1960). See, e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 u.s. 102, 117-118 & n.l3 (1980);
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979);
Footnote continued on next page.
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It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions
that it did not focus on the question presented by this
case.
drug

The Subcommittee found that the difference between
prices

for

retailers

and

government

customers

22

"is

extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable
by either cost justifiable quantity discounts,

economies

of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution."
H.R.

Rep.

No.

1983,

the next conclusion,
policies

of

90th Cong.,

2d Sess.

77

(1968}.

In

22

it stated that "[n] umerous acts and

individual

seem ~

manufacturers

in

----..

some

instances app~ violative of the Robinson-Patman Act .••. "
Ibid.

Thus,

it

is quite possible that the Subcommittee

considered some State purchasing at discriminatory prices-about which it had heard testimony--to be unlawful.
Subcommitte

report

did

include

the

awkwardly

23

The

worded

statement: "There is no basis apparent ... why the mandate
of

the

Robinson-Patman

discriminatory

drug

Act
sales

should

not

favoring

be

applied

to

nongovernmental

United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 u.s. 192, 200 (1977}
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the
Act are in no sense part of the legislative history."}.

23

20.

institutional

purchasers,

extent

is

there

profit

prescription

or

drug

nonprofit,

to

the

competition

at

the

retail level with disfavored retail druggists."
79

(emphasis

added) .27

This

unexceptional

Id.,

at

statement,

however, simply says that private institutional purchases

24

may not facilitate unfair retail competition through sales
at discriminatory prices.
expressly about

the

The Subcommittee said nothing

unfair

competition at

issue

in

this

case.

24

B

Respondents

also

argue

that,

without

exception,

courts considering the Act's coverage have concluded that
it does not apply to government purchasers; no court has
imposed

liability

upon

a

seller

or

buyer,

under

either

§2(a)

or §2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a

sale

to

a

infirmaties

State,
in

this

city,
broad

or

county.

assertion:

There
(i)

are

serious

this Court has

27The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938
Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private
nonprofit institutions ..• to the extent the sales are for
the nonprofit institution's 'own use,"'
H.R. Rep. No.
1983, supra note 22, at 78, but that would indicate more
the construction of §13c than it would the intent of the
1936 Congress.

25

21.

never

held

or

suggested

purchases ~. .li~ ,

28

even

the Act's

considering

that~n

application

to

small: 2 9

(iii)

is

relatively

cite

of

Appeals

adopted
below;

Court
their
( iv)

respondents

exemption

for

State

(ii) the number of judicial decisions

State agencies
no

~ALJ

decision

interpretation

of

§2

that
before

purchases

by

25

respondents

has
the

expressly
decision

some of the District Court cases upon which
rely are

simply

inapposite;30

(v)

it is not

2 8Indeed,
our
opinions
suggest
precisely
the
opposite.
See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397 n.l4;
Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 18-19 n.lO; California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 u.s. 508,
513 (1972).
29The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many
with unpublished opinions, that involve the application of
the Robinson-Patman Act to State purchases. See notes 3032, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 733 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds
of reported cases presenting this question over the past
quarter century") (emphasis added); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (adopting consistent,
"longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after
"nearly four decades of litigation").
30see Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. KerrMcGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,[75,054, at 96,721,
96,742 (D Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving federal government
as ultimate purchaser;
relying on Attorney General's
opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
551 F.2d 790, 798 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition
despite different prices), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879
(1977); General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co.,
37 F. Supp. 598, 602-604 (WD Ky.) (finding no "sale" under
the Act and alternatively holding the Act inapplicable on
the ground that "[n] either the government nor a city in
its purchase of property considered necessary for the
purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in
buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied),
aff'd, 132 F.2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving
issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales to
Footnote continued on next page.
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that~

clear
solely

on

a

published District Court opinion has relied
State

purchase

exemption

Robinson-Patman Act claim alleging

to

dismiss

a

injury as a result of

government competition in the private market~

31

and

(vi)

1JW(
there are several cases that suggestf'n e Robinson-Patman
Act

is

applicable

purposes. 32

This

to

judicial

State
track

purchases

for

record

in

is

resale
no

sense

State agency), cert. denied, 318 u.s. 780 (1943).
31 cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories,
No. C-77-0094 (Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpubl1shed op1n1on)
(consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice RobinsonPatman Act claims based on sales to State agencies) ,
aff'd, 630 F.2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint insufficient
because it failed to identify products or purchasers
subject to discriminatory treatment)~ Portland Retail
Druggists Association v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543
(D Ore. Sept. 11, 1972)
(unpublished, oral opinion),
vacated and remanded, 510 F.2d 486 (CA9 1974)
(§13c
applied to the purchases and sales), vacated and remanded,
425 u.s. 1 (1976).
One District Court has suggested in
alternative holdings that there is an exemption for State
purchases for nonconsumption use.
Logan Lanes, Inc. v.
Brunswick Corp., No. 4-66-5, op. at 4 (Idaho May 26, 1966)
(unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 F.2d 212, 215-216 (CA9)
(purchases by Utah State University within the scope of
Nonprofit
Institutions Act~
expressly not addressing
whether there is a 11 so-called governmental exempt ion 11 ) ,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967).
See also Sachs v.
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY
1955) (dicta), aff'd per curiam, 234 F.2d 959 (CA2), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956).
All of these cases predate
our decision in City of Lafayette.
3 2 see Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F.
Supp. 328, 330-333 (ED Ark. 1980), aff'd, 658 F.2d 611,
612 (CAS 1981) ~ Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L.
Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 287, 291 (CD Ill.
1979) (Act 1napplicable to purchases by the Army and Air
Force Exchange Service because of sovereign immunity, but
possibly State agencies would face an opposite result),
aff'd, 632 F.2d 680, 687-692 (CA7 1980)~ A.J. Goodman &
Sons v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81 F. Supp.
890, 893
(Mass. 1949).
Other cases cut against ~
exemption for State purchases.
See Municipality of
Footnote continued on next page.
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comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon
which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a
construction of

the anti trust

laws that Congress over a

2~

tJbtl

long period of time has chosen to preserve.

Cf ~~29,

supra.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations
of various commentators and executive officials.

G)--

most

authoritative

of

these

sources

indicate

But the
that

the

question presented is unsettled 33 others do not foreclose

our

holding, 3 4 and

in

some cases

f.,~rt

1' t •

35

Thus,

Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 641
(Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235
F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1965), aff'd, 351 F.2d 851, 858859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Sperry
Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Association,
152 F. Supp. 91, 95, 96
(EDNY 1957).
Cf. Reid v.
University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 443 (ND Ohio
1952).
33see
SA
z. Cavitch, Business Organizations
§l05D.Ol[8] [c),
at
lOSD-45
to
-46
(1978)
(opinions
"divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70
(1982) ("there is some conflict among the authorities as
to whether sales to states and municipalities are excluded
from Robinson-Patman liability"); id. §24.06 [2], at 24-75
to 24-76; E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 202-203
(1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears
to have settled the matter where the federal government is
concerned,
some
controversy
has
arisen
over
the
applicability of the act to purchases by state and local
governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the
Robinson-Patman Act 84 n.l66 (1962).
3 4 some
deal
only
with
sales
to
the
federal
government.
See
Letter from Comptroller General to
Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration (July 17, 1973),
reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,[74,642, at 94,819
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 35 will appear on following pages.
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Congress

cannot

be

said

to

have

left

untouched

a

universally held interpretation of the Act.
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-whether

legislative,

have considered

the

judicial,
specific

or

28

in commentary--rarely

issue before us.

There

is

simply no unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to
exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing-28

with a price advantage--in the private retail market.

The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized,
both for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to
promote.

Although

Congress

is

well

aware

of

these

criticisms, the Act has remained in effect for almost half
a century.

"[I)t is not for

policy-making
legislation ....

Our

in

[this Court]

the

field

function ends with

to indulge in
of

antitrust

the endeavor

to

(1973).
Almost all fail to mention, much less decide,
whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail
sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive
Order 10,936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11
(1962).
35see 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G.
No. 1, 112, 113, 115 (1977); Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727
(1948-1949).
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ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of
the

relevant

Congress."

material,

what

United States v.

was

in

fact

Cooper,

the

intent of

312 u.s.,

600,

606

[Robinson-Patman]

Act

29

(1941}.
"A general application of the

to all combinations of business and capital organized to
suppress
spirit

commercial

and

impulses

South-Eastern
legislative

competition
of

the

is

in

harmony

times which gave

Underwriters,

history

is

322

replete

u.s.,
with

at

with

the

30

it birth."
The

553.

references

to

the

economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other
large

organizations

small,
absence

local
of

for

resale

retailers.
an

explicit

There

in
is

competition
no

exemption,

with

the

in

the

reason,
to

think

30

that

congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small
businesses,

such as

the pharmacies of Jefferson County,

Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest
competitor of

them all. 36

To create an exemption here

3 6under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would
accrue, precisely as intended, to the benefit of small,
private retailers.
See 19 3 5 Hearings, supra note 19, at
261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of
private rights"}.

31
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clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress.

We
State

hold
and

pharmaceutical

that/\ sale

local

government

hospitals

for

products

to

resale

in

;~

competition with private pharmacies G!F not exempt
the

proscriptions

of

the

Robinson-Patman

Act.

from
The

judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed

tltf

~,it)

and~manded

for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.
It is so ordered.

3:

..)
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Inc. v. Abbott Laqpratories, No. 81-827
.J#

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The

issue

presented

is

whether

the

sale

of

pharmaceutical products to hospitals operated by State and
local governments

for

resale

in competition with private

retail pharmacies is exempt from the proscriptions of the
Clayton Act,

38

Stat.

730,

as

Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15

amended

u.s.c.

by

the Robinson-

§13 (the Act).

I

Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists
and

pharmacies

Alabama,

doing

commenced

this

business
action

in
in

Jefferson

1978

in

the

County,
District

Court for the Northern District of Alabama as the assignee
of

its

members'

claims.

Respondents,

the

1~

defendants

below, are fifteen pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board
of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the Cooper
Green

Hospital

Pharmacy.

The

University

operates

a

medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school.
Located

in

the

University's

medical

center

are

two

21

2.

pharmacies.

Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital,

existing as a public corporation under Alabama law.
The

complaint

seeks

treble

damages

and

injunctive

relief under §§4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§15
and 26,

for

Clayton Act,
u.s.c.

alleged violations of §2(a)
as

§§13 (a)

amended
and

by

(f).

the

and

(f)

of the

Robinson-Patman Act,

Petitioner

contends

2~

that

15
the

respondent manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their
products to the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper
Green Hospital Pharmacy at prices lower than those charged
petitioner's

members

for

like

products.

Petitioner

alleges that the respondent hospital pharmacies knowingly
induced such lower prices in violation of §2(f) 2 and sold

1 section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act,
15
u.s.c.
§13 (a),
provides
in
relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in
price
between
different
purchasers
of
commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are
in commerce,
where such
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States ... , and where
the
effect of
such
discrimination may
be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

3(

3.

drugs

so

procured

to

the

general

public

in

direct

3~

Petitioner

competition with privately owned pharmacies.

also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 u.s.c. §13c. 3
Respondents
failure

to

moved

state

purchases 4

are

sanctions

of §2.

a

to

dismiss

claim,

exempt

as

on
a

In granting

the

the

complaint

ground

matter

of

that

law

respondents'

for
state

from

the

motions,

the

4<

District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations
that

local

retail

pharmacies

had

been

injured

by

the

challenged price discrimination and that at least some of
the

state

purchases

were

not

exempt

under

§13c. 5

The

customers of either of them .•••
2 section 2 (f), 15 u.s.c. §13 (f), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination
in price which is prohibited by this section.
3 section 13c provides:
Nothing in sections 13 to 13b and 2la of
this title, shall apply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges,
universities,
public
libraries,
churches,
hospitals,
and
charitable
institutions
not
operated for profit.
4 "State purchases" are defined
purchases by a State and its agencies.
5 656 F.2d 92, 98 (CAS
Court's opinion as Appendix).

1981)

as

sales

(reprinting

to

and

District

4!

4.

District
without

Court
regard

held
to

15

that

"governmental

u.s.c.

§13c,

purchases

beyond

the

are,

intended

reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at
least with
traditional
(1981) . 6

respect

to purchases for hospitals and other

governmental

purposes."

656

F.2d

92,

5l

102

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a

divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the
district

court's

Memorandum

of

Opinion."

656

F.2d,

at
5~

We
quest ion

granted
of

certiorari

federal

to

resolve

u.s.

law.

this
(1982).

important
We

now

reverse.
II

The issue here is very narrow.
with

*(

sales

to

the

federal

We are not concerned

government.

Nor

are

we

6 Petitioner's
antitrust
claims
were
dismissed
solely on the basis that State purchases are exempt from
the Robinson-Patman Act.
See 656 F.2d, at 103 n.~ O.
We
thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule
of law might justify dismissal of petititioner's RobinsonPatman Act claims.
7 The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals,
agreed that "[t]he claims against the Board must •.. be
treated as equivalent to claims against the State itself."
656 F.2d, at 99.
Accordingly, both courts held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision.
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concerned

with

traditional

State

governmental

purchases

for

functions. 8

consumption
Rather,

the

in

issue

before us is limited to State purchases for the purpose of
competing against private enterprise--with

the advantage

of discriminatory prices--in the retail market.
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that
the

Act

exempts

all State purchases.

Assuming,

without

deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to
State

purchases

governmental

for

functions,

consumption
and

that

such

in

traditional
purchases

are

therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not
apply where a State has chosen to compete in the private

8 Respondents argue that application of the Act to
purchases by the State of Alabama would present a
significant risk of conflict with the Tenth Amendment and
that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).
There is no risk,
however, of a constitutional issue arising from the
application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of
pharmaceutical
drugs
is
not
"indisputably
'[an]
attribut[e] of state sovereignty.'" See EEOC v. Wyoming,
u.s. __ , __ (1983) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981)).
It is too late in the day to suggest that
Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause
powers when they are engaged in proprietary activities.
See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 188189, 192-193 (1964).
If the Tenth Amendment protects
certain State purchases from the Act's 1 imitations, such
as for consumption in traditional governmental functions,
those purchases must be protected on a case-by-case basis.
Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
u.s. 389, 413 n.42 (1978) (plurality opinion).

'\

6.

retail market.
III
In

construing

a

statute,

statutory language itself.

7~

we

look

first

to

the

The Robinson-Patman Act by its

terms does not exempt State purchases.

The only express

exemption is that for nonprofit institutions contained in
15 u.s.c. §13c. 9

Moreover, as the courts below conceded,

"[t]he statutory language--'persons'
sufficiently
u.s.c.

broad

§§12,

concession
decisions. 11

to

cover

13(a,f)."

was

compelled

656
by

and

'purchasers'--is

governmental
F.2d,

at

several

of

In City of Lafayette v.

81

bodies.
99. 10
this

15
This

Court's

Louisiana Power &

9 The District Court properly assumed, for purposes
of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the
hospital purchases would not be covered by the §13c
exemption.
See note 3, supra, and accompanying text.
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express
exemption would support summary judgment in cases against
State hospitals purchasing for their own use. See note 22
infra.
10 The word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly
in the antitrust statutes. See 15 u.s.c. §§7, 12, 15.
11 see, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 u.s. 159, 162
(1942) (the words "any person" in §7 of the Sherman Act
include States); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City
of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906) (a municipality is a
"person" within the meaning of §8 of the Sherman Act and
can maintain a treble-damages action under §7,
the
predecessor of §4 of the Clayton Act).
See also Pfizer,
Inc. v. Government of India, 434 u.s. 308, 317 (1978) (a
foreign nation is a "person" under §4 of the Clayton Act).
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to
require compliance by municipalities with the substantive
Footnote continued on next page.
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Light

Co.,

stated

435

without

U.S.

389,

395

qualification

(1978),
that

for

"the

example,

we

definition

of

'person' or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 12
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from
the

case

before

us

on

the

ground

that

it

involved

Sherman Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. 13
distinction

ignores

the

specific

reference

the

Such a
to

the

Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive

standards of other federal laws which impose ... sanctions
upon 'persons.'"
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 u.s. 389, 400 (1978).
See California v.
United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 (1934).
One case is of
particular relevance.
In Union Pacific R. v. United
States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the
applicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708,
32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41(1)
(1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a statute which essentially
is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the
anti-price-discrimination provisions of
the RobinsonPatman Act."
City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 402 n.~ 9.
The Court expressly found that a municipality was a
"person" within the meaning of the statute.
313 u.s., at
467-468. See also City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 401-402
n.l9.

"

12 The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive
as the word "person."
See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936)
(remarks of Senator Robinson) ("The Clayton Anti trust Act
contains terms general to all purchasers.
The pending
bill
does
not
segregate
any
particular
class
of
purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
13 The only apparent difference between the scope of
the relevant laws is the extent to which the activities
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause,
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 u.s. 186, 199201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is
otherwise subject to the Act.

9

8.

nature of the term "person."

435

u.s.,

at 397 n.l4.
1\..

Nor

do we perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in

9

that Act any differently than we have in the Clayton Act,
which it amends. 14
strongly

suggests

In sum, the plain language of the Act
that

there

is

no

exemption

for

State

purchases to compete with private enterprise.
IV

The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a
different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose
and history of the Act.

An examination of the legislative

purpose and history reveals no such contrary intention. 15

14 Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports
specifically state that "[t)he special definitions of
section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply without repetition
to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill,
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that
act." H.R. Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17
(1936); S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See
80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) ("Many have complained because
the provisions of the bill apply to 'any person engaged in
commerce.'
The original Clayton Act contains that
exact language, and it is carried into the bill under
consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used
because it has been construed by the courts.").
Given
their common purposes, it should not be surprising that
the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts
should be construed consistently with each other. See 80
Cong. Rec. 8137 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Michener) ("The
Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy or a
new theory.
The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it
was the purpose of that act to do just what this law sets
out to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151 (1936) (remarks of
Senator Logan).
l5Although the face of the Act clearly contains no
express
exemption
in
favor
of State purchases,
we
nevertheless consider the legislative history.
See, e.
Footnote continued on next page.
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10!

A

Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes
of the antitrust laws,
On

numerous

including the Robinson-Patman Act.

occasions,

comprehensive

coverage

this
of

Court

the

has

antitrust

affirmed

the

laws

has

and

recognized that these laws represent "a carefully studied
attempt
business

to

bring

whose

within

[them]

activities

every person engaged

might

restrain

or

in

monopolize

commercial intercourse among the states."

United States

v.

322 u.s.

South-Eastern Underwriters Association,

553 (1944) . 16
773

(1975) ,

533,

In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 u.s.
the

Court

observed

that

"our

cases

have

repeatedly established that there is a heavy presumption
against

implicit

exemptions"

from

the

111

antitrust

laws.

_g_!.-' Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981); Train v.
Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1,
9-10 (1976). The Court previously has considered "how far
Congress
intended to extend
its mandate under" the
Robinson-Patman Act and found the answer in its "purpose
and legislative history." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving
Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 (1974).
See FTC v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 360 u.s 55, 69-70 (1959); Automatic Canteen
Co. of America v. FTC, 346 u.s. 61, 72, 78 (1953).
l6see, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,
434 U.S. 308, 312-313 (1978); Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948) (antitrust laws are "comprehensive in [their] terms
and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated")
(emphasis added).

11!

10.

Id., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369

u.s.

(1962)) . 17

482, 485

antitrust

laws

to a

12

In City of Lafayette, applying

city

in competition with a private

utility, we held that no exemption for local governments
would be implied.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court,

emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws:
11

12

[T) he economic choices made by public corporations ... ,

designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for

the

community constituency, are not inherently more likely to
comport with

the broader

interests of national economic

well-being than are those of private corporations acting
in furtherance of
its shareholders.

11

the
435

interests of the organization and

u.s.,

at 403

(footnotes omitted).

See also id., at 408.18

17 See,
e.
g.,
National Ger imedical Hospital
&
Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 u.s. 378, 388
(1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 398, 399; Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
U.S. 1, 12
(1976); United States v. National Assn.
Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975).
18 In one important sense, retail competition from
State agencies can be more invidious than that from chainstores, the particular targets of the Robinson-Patman Act.
See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 75-76
(1979); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543-544
(1960).
Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to
Footnote continued on next page.
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11.

These principles, and the purposes they further, have
been helpful in interpreting the language of the RobinsonPatman Act.

13~

As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in

Abbott Laboratories

v.

Portland Retail Druggists Assn.,

Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976):
"It has been said, of course, that the
antitrust
laws,
and
Robinson-Patman
in
particular, are to be construed liberally, and
that the exceptions from their application are
to be construed strictly.
United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956);
FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 u.s. 726, 733
(1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 u.s.
642, 646-647 (1969).
The Court has recognized,
also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936
to curb and prohibit all devices by which large
buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller
ones
by
virtue
of
their
greater
purchasing power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 u.s.
166, 168 (1960); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390
U.S. 341, 349
(1968).
Because the Act is
remedial, it is to be construed broadly to
effectuate its purposes.
See Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v.
Rowe, 3 91 U.S . 54 , 6 5 ( 19 6 8) . "

14(

14!

15(

15!

16(
Thus,

in

view

of

the

Act's

remedial purposes,

and

the

consumers, and to that extent, consumers benefit merely
from economy of scale.
But to the extent that lower
prices result from lower overhead, in the form of federal
grants, State subsidies, free public services, and freedom
from taxation, State agencies merely redistribute the
burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens
at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act could
give State agencies a significant additional advantage in
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate
marginal or small private competitors.
Consumers, as
citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs of the
drugs sold by the State agencies involved in this case.
Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies
will provide retail distribution more efficiently than
private retail pharmacists, consumers will suffer to the
extent
that State
retail
activities
eliminate more
efficient, private retail distribution systems.

12.

broad scope of its language as interpreted by this Court,
the burden of showing that the legislative history compels
us

to

create

an

exemption

Congress intended,

is

on

those

who

argue

but did not choose to say,

that

that State

agencies may compete with private business free

16~

from the

Act's constraints.
B

The legislative history falls far short of supporting
respondents'

contention

State purchases.
issue of
free

to

such

that

there

is

an

exemption

for

17(

Surely Congress would have discussed an

importance before leaving State purchasers

compete

unfairly

with

the

private

sector.

Yet

there is nothing whatever in the Senate or House Committee
17~

reports, or in the floor debates, focusing on the issue.
There is evidence that some members of Congress were
aware

of

the

possibility

that

the

Act

governmental purchases.

Most members,

concerned

purchases,

with

State

principal

history

draftsman,

is
H.B.

the

with

to

were not
possible

The most relevant

testimony

Teegarden,

apply

however,

but

limitations on the federal Government.
legislative

would

of

before

the

Act's

the

House

18(

13.

Judiciary

Committee. 1 9

Although

the

testimony

19
Rep.
Lloyd:
Would
this
bill,
in your
judgment, prevent the granting of discounts to
the United States Government?
Mr.
Teegarden:
Clayton Act does so.

Not

unless

the

present

Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government
gets
huge
discounts.
Now,
would
that
discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should
unless a discount contrary to the present bill
would be barred--that is, the present law--would
be barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this:
The Federal Government is not in competition
with other buyers from these concerns . • . .
The Federal Government is saved by the same
distinction....
They are not in competition
with anyone else who would buy.
Rep.
Hancock:
It
would
eliminate
competitive bidding all along the line, would it
not, in classes of goods that would be covered
by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding
on Government orders?
Rep.
Hancock:
municipality.

Government,

State,

city,

Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
Rep. Michener: If it did do it,
not want it, would you?

you would

Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it.
It
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would
with the Government.
Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the
city, county exactly the same as anybody else,
same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden:

No.

Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell
to a city hospital any cheaper than they would
to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in
Footnote continued on next page.

is
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ambiguous on the application of the Act to State purchases
for

consumption,

one

conclusion

is

certain:

Teegarden

expressly stated that the Act would apply to the purchases
of

municipal

hospitals

in

at

least

some

circumstances.

Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found
by

the

courts

below for

all such purchasing. 20

In the

this way.
In the final analysis, it would
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a
particular case.
If the two hospitals are in
competition with each other, I should say that
the fact that one is operated by the city does
not save it from the bill.
Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209
(1935)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings].
20 Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief
to the House committee.
He first rejected outright the
desirability of ~ exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra
note 19, at 249.
He then posed the question whether "the
bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels."
He stated that
"[t]he answer is found in the principle of statutory
construction that a statute will not be construed to limit
or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives, or
privileges of the sovereign unless
it so expressly
provides--a principle inherited by American jurisprudence
from the common law ..... "
But he also noted that
"requiring a showing of effect upon competition, will
further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the
Government." Id., at 250 (footnotes omitted).
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this
sovereign-exception rule of statutory construction simply
means that a government, when it passes a law, gives up
only what it expressly surrenders.
In the same year that
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court stated
that it could "perceive no reason for extending [the
presumption against including the sovereign in a statute]
so as to exempt a business carried on by a state from the
otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress,
all-embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which
is as capable of being obstructed by state as by
individual action." United States v. California, 297 U.S.
175, 186 (1936).
See California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553,
562-563 (1957).
In the context of the Robinson-Patman
Act, the rule of statutory construction on which Teegarden
Footnote continued on next page.
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absence

of

any

other

relevant

evidence,

we

find

no

legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed
exemption,

to

enter

private

competitive

markets

with

congressionally approved price advantages. 21

relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the federal
government's
purchases.
The
existence
of
such
an
exemption is not before us.
Cf. United States v. Cooper
Corp., 312 u.s. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a
"person" under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing for
treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that
governmental purchasing would not compete with private
purchasing.
For
his
purposes,
this
eliminated
the
rationale for the Act to apply to State agencies.
That
assumption, however, is inapplicable here.
2lsix months after the Act was passed, the Attorney
General of the United States responded to an inquiry from
the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to
government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539
(1936).
In ruling that such contracts are outside the
Act, the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc.,
in matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily
apply to the Government unless it is expressly
so provided; and it does not seem to have been
the policy of the Congress to make such statutes
applicable to the Government ....
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended
the [Clayton Act]
and, in so far as I am
aware, the latter Act has not been regarded
heretofore
as
applicable
to
Government
contracts.
Id., at 540.
Later in the letter, the Attorney General
used the phrase "Federal Government," ibid., and gave
other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make
the statute applicable to the Government in violation of
the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id.,
at 541.
The Attorney General expressly relied upon
Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275
U.S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the Court upheld the
granting of favorable
telegraph rates to a federal
corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the
Act's applicability to State agencies.
Indeed, in the
following
year,
the Attorney General
of California
expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Act's proscriptions.
See 19 3 2-19 39 Trade Cas.
(CCH)
,!55, 156,
at 415-416
(1937).
Two other early State
attorney general opinions simply do not consider whether
Footnote continued on next page.

19

16.

v
Despite

the

plain

legislative history,
subsequent

language

of

the

Act

and

its

19

respondents nevertheless argue that

legislative

events

and

decisions of

District

Courts confirm that State purchases are outside the scope
of the Act.

We turn therefore to the subsequent events on

which respondents rely.

20
A

Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman

the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See
Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, 1932-1939 Trade
Cas. (CCH) ,155,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis.
142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the
[United
States] Attorney General's reasons may be also applied to
municipal and public institutions."
W.
Patman, The
Robinson-Patman Act 38
(1938).
See also W. Patman,
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30
(1963)
(interpreting Attorney General's op1n1on as exempting
State purchases).
His interpretation is entitled to some
weight,
but he appears only to be interpreting--or
erroneously extending--the Attorney General's opinion and
reasoning.
Representative Patman's personal intentions
probably are better reflected in his introduction in 1951
and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "purchaser"
to include "the United States, any State or any political
subdivision thereof."
H.R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is
no legislative history on these bills, but it is arguable
that he believed that the original intent needed to be
stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney
General's contrary construction of the Act.
In any case,
Congress's failure to pass these bills probably stems from
a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act.
It bears repeating, however, that none of these
views--including Representative Patman' s--focuses on the
State
purchases
alleged
here:
purchases
to
gain
competitive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional functions.

17.

Act held in the late 1960s. 22

Testimony before the House

Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
industry

indicated

that

the

Act

did

not

cover

price

discrimination in favor of State hospitals, 23 and Federal
Trade

Commission

authority over

Chairman

transactions

Paul

Dixon

disclaimed

any

involving State health

care

22 The most important relevant event in the RobinsonPatman Act's post-enactment history is the amendment in
1938 excluding eleemosynary institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15
u.s.c. §13c.
Whether the existence of an exemption in
§13c supports an exemption for certain State purchases
depends upon whether §13c is interpreted to apply to State
agencies that perform the functions listed.
That is a
substantial issue in its own right. Compare H.R. Rep. No.
1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968} (suggesting that
§13c does not include government agencies} with 81 Cong.
Rec. 8706 (1937} (statement of Rep. Walter} (§13c would
apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and
States}.
See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 397
n.J.4
(Nonprofit
Institutions
Act
includes
"public
l:lbrar ies," which "are, by definition, operated by local
government"}~
Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at 18-19
n.lO~
81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937} (exemption codifies the
i~ention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act} . We
need not address this issue here.
23 see, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman
Act: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Small
Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the Select
Committee
on
Small
Business
of
the
House
of
Representatives, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 73-77, 623 (19691970}
(William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs,
National Association of Wholesalers~ Harold Halfpenny,
counsel for the Automative Association of Wholesalers};
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory
Agencies of the Select Committee on Small Business of the
House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16
(1967-1968}
[hereinafter
1967-1968
Hearings]
(Earl
Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, on behalf of NARD}.
There also was testimony that institutional purchasers
frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than do retail
pharmacies, see id., at 15, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many
witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely
affected competition, see id., at A-140 to -141, 253-262,
2 7 3 , 2 91.

--

·'\
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programs. 24
Chairman

It

Dixon

is

not

at

all

contemplated

clear,

cases

in

agency competed with private retailers,
aware
Other

of

such

practices

statements

express

interested opinions on
entitled

to

constructions
passage. 26

by

the

the

which

little

more

the

State

purchasers. 25

than

issue presented,

with

informed,

and are not

appropriate

contemporaneously

whether

although he was

institutional

consideration

given

however,

for
the

the
Act's

See supra,

24 See H.R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 22, at 74.
25 After
hearing his testimony,
the Subcommittee
posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the
eroding
influence
on
the
retail
druggists'
market
presented by: (i} expanding federal, State, and private
group health care programs: (ii} the federal government's
ability to purchase from drug manufacturers at pr1ces
substantially below wholesale cost: and (iii} instances of
hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to
outpatients or even nonpatients."
Id., at 73.
In his
response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to
discuss further the last category, which involved §13c
issues.
Id., at 74.
His disclaimer of F.T.C. authority
envisionea-5tate purchases for welfare programs, not for
resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the
issue presented here is most similar to the issue not
discussed by Chairman Dixon.
26 Assuming
that
this
post-enactment
commentary
before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress--quite
a leap given the brevity and conclusory nature of the
Subcommittee report-- "the views of a subsequent Congress
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one."
United States v. Price, 361 u.s. 304, 313
(1960}. See, e. g., Consumer Product Safet Commission v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-118 & n.).3 (1980}:
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 u.s. 750, 7~8 (1979}:
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 (1977}
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the
Act are in no sense part of the legislative history."}.
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It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions
that it did not focus on the question presented by this
case.
drug

The Subcommittee found that the difference between
prices

for

retailers

and

government

extremely substantial" and "not always

customers

22

"is

fully explainable

by either cost justifiable quantity discounts,

economies

of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution."
H.R.

Rep.

No.

1983, 90th Cong.,

the next conclusion,

2d Sess. 77

(1968).

In

22

it stated that "[n]umerous acts and

policies of individual manufacturers seem .•• violative of
the

Robinson-Fa tman Act ...• "

possible

that

purchasing

the

Ibid.

Subcommittee

at discriminatory

Thus,

considered

prices--about

heard testimony--to be unlawful.

Act

should

is

some
which

quite
State
it had

"There is no

why the mandate of the Robinson-Patman

not

be

applied

to discriminatory drug

sales

favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit
or

nonprofit,

competition
druggists."

at

23

The Subcommitte report

did include the awkwardly worded statement:
basis apparent

it

to

the extent

the
Id. ,

retail
at

79

there

level

is prescription drug

with

disfavored

retail

(emphasis

added) .27

This

Footnote(s) 27 will appear on following pages.

23
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unexceptional opinion,

however,

simply says

institutional purchases may not

facilitate

that private
unfair

retail

competition through sales at d i scr imina tory prices.
Subcommittee

said

nothing

expressly

about

the

24

The

unfair

competition at issue in this case.
B

Respondents

also

argue

that,

without

exception,

24

courts considering the Act's coverage have concluded that
it does not apply to government purchasers.
that

no

court

buyer,

under

has

imposed

either

liability

§ 2 (a)

or

upon

They insist
a

§2(f),

seller
when

or
the

discriminatory price involved a sale to a State, city, or
county.
are

See Brief for Respondent University 31-32.

serious

infirmaties

in

these

this Court has never held or
exemption

for

State

broad

25

There

assertions:

(i)

suggested that there is an

purchases; 28

(ii)

the

number

of

2 7The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938
Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private
nonprofit institutions •.• to the extent the sales are for
the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'"
H.R. Rep. No.
1983, supra note 22, at 78, but that would indicate more
the construction of §l3c than it would the intent of the
1936 Congress.
2 8Indeed,
our
opinions
suggest
precisely
the
opposite.
See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397 n.)- 4;
Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at 18-19 n. ~ O; California
Footnote continued on next page.
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judicial decisions even considering the Act's application
to

purchases

(iii)
has

by

State

agencies

is

relatively

25

small: 29

respondents cite no Court of Appeals decision that
expressly adopted

the decision below:

interpretation of

§2

before

(iv) some of the District Court cases

upon which respondents
it is not clear

their

rely are simply inapposite: 30

that~

(v)

published District Court opinion

has relied solely on a State purchase exemption to dismiss
a Robinson-Patman Act claim alleging injury as a result of

Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 u.s. 508,
513 q~72).
The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many
with unpublished opinions, that involve the application of
the Robinson-Patman Act to State purchases. See notes 3032, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 733 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds
of reported cases presenting this question over the past
quarter century") (emphasis added): Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (adopting consistent,
"longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after
"nearly four decades of litigation").
3°see Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. KerrMcGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,175,054, at 96,721,
96,742 (D Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving federal government
as ultimate purchaser:
relying on Attorney General's
opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
551 F.2d 790, 798 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition
despite different prices), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 879
(1977): General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co.,
37 F. Supp. 598, 602-604 (WD Ky.) (finding no "sale" under
the Act and alternatively holding the Act inapplicable on
the ground that "[n] either the government nor a city in
its purchase of property considered necessary for the
purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in
buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied),
aff'd, 132 F.2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving
issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales to
State agency), cert. denied, 318 u.s. 780 (1943).

26
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government competition in the private market; 31 and
there

are

several cases

Patman Act
purposes. 32

is

that

applicable

This

judicial

(vi)

suggest that the Robinson-

to State purchases
track

record

is

for
in

no

resale
sense

comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon

31 cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories,
No. C-77-0094 (Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion)
(consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice RobinsonPatman Act claims based on sales to State agencies) ,
aff'd, 630 F.2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint insufficient
because it failed to identify products or purchasers
subject to discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail
Druggists Association v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543
(D Ore. Sept. 11, 1972)
(unpublished, oral opinion),
vacated and remanded, 510 F.2d 486 (CA9 1974)
(§13c
applied to the purchases and sales), vacated and remanded,
425 U.S. 1 (1976).
One District Court has suggested in
alternative holdings that there is an exemption for State
purchases for nonconsumption use.
Logan Lanes, Inc. v.
Brunswick Corp., No. 4-66-5, op. at 4 (Idaho May 26, 1966)
(unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 F.2d 212, 215-216 (CA9)
(purchases by Utah State University within the scope of
Nonprofit
Institutions Act;
expressly not addressing
whether there is a 11 so-called governmental exempt ion 11 ) ,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967).
See also Sachs v.
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY
1955) (dicta), aff'd per curiam, 234 F.2d 959 (CA2), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 925 ( 1956) • All of these cases predate
our decision in City of Lafayette.
32 see Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F.
Supp. 328, 330-333 (ED Ark. 1980), aff'd, 658 F.2d 611,
612 (CAS 1981); Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L.
Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 287, 291 (CD Ill.
1979) (Act inapplicable to purchases by the Army and Air
Force Exchange Service because of sovereign immunity, but
possibly State agencies would face an opposite result),
a f f ' d , 6 3 2 F • 2 d 6 8 0 , 6 8 7-6 9 2 ( CA 7 19 8 0 ) ; A • J . Goodman &
Sons v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81 F. Supp.
890, 893
(Mass. 1949).
Other cases cut against A..!!.Y.
exemption for State purchases.
See Municipality of
Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 641
(Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235
F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1965), aff'd, 351 F.2d 851, 858859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 u.s. 936 (1966); Sperry
Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Association,
152 F. Supp. 91, 95, 96
(EDNY 1957).
Cf. Reid v.
University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 443 (ND Ohio
1952).

26
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which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a
construction of

the anti trust laws that Congress over a

long

time has chosen to preserve.

period

of

27

See cases

cited note 29, supra.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations
of various commentators and executive officials.
most

authoritative

of

these

sources

indicate

But the
that

the

question presented is unsettled: 33 others do not foreclose
our holding: 34 and in some cases they support it. 35
Congress

cannot

be

said

to

have

left

Thus,

untouched

a

33 see
SA
z. Cavitch, Business Organizations
§105D.Ol [8] [c],
at
lOSD-45
to A -46
(1978)
{opinions
"divided" whether Act is applicable): 4 J. Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70
(1982) ("there is some conflict among the authorities as
to whether sales to states and municipalities are excluded
from Robinson-Patman liability"): id. §24.06[2], at 24-75
to 24-76: E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 202-203
(1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears
to have settled the matter where the federal government is
concerned,
some
controversy
has
arisen
over
the
applicability of the act to purchases by state and local
governments."): F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the
Robinson-Patman Act 84 n.K66 (1962).
34 some
deal
only
with
sales
to
the
federal
government.
See
Letter from Comptroller General to
Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration (July 17, 1973),
reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,174,642, at 94,819
(1973).
Almost all fail to mention, much less decide,
whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail
sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive
Order 10,9 36, !dent ical Bidding in Public Procurement 11
(1962)
0

35 see 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979): 47 N.C.A.G.
No. 1, 112, 113, 115 (1977): Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727
(1948-1949)
0

27
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universally held interpretation of the Act.
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-whether

legislative,

have considered

judicial,

the specific

or

28

in commentary--rarely

issue before us.

There is

simply no unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to
exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing-with a price advantage--in the private retail market.

28

VI
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized,
both for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to
promote.

Although

Congress

is

well

aware

of

these

criticisms, the Act has remained in effect for almost half
a century.
indulge

And it certainly is "not for

in

policy-making

legislation ....

Our

in

the

[this Court]

field

function ends with

of

29

to

antitrust

the endeavor

to

ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of
the

relevant

Congress."

material,

what

United States v.

was

in

Cooper,

fact

the

312

u.s.,

intent of
600,

606

[Robinson-Patman]

Act

(1941}.
"A general application of the

to all combinations of business and capital organized to

29

'

25.

.

suppress
spirit

commercial

and

impulses of

South-Eastern
legislative

competition
the

is

in

harmony

times which gave

Underwriters,

history

is

u.s.,

322

replete

with

at

with

the

it birth."

30

The

553.

references

to

the

economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other
large

organizations

small,
absence

local
of

for

resale

retailers.
an

explicit

in

There

is

competition with
no

exemption,

reason,
to

in

think

the
the

30

that

congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small
businesses,

such as

the pharmacies of Jefferson County,

Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest
competitor

of

them all. 36

To create

an

exemption here

31

clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress.
VII

We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to
State

and

local

government

hospitals

for

resale

in

competition with private pharmacies is not exempt from the
proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act.

The judgment of

36 under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would
accrue, precisely as intended, to the benefit of small,
private retailers.
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at
261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of
private rights").

31

26.

the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case
is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.
It is so ordered.

32
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Light

Co.,

stated

435

without

u.s.

389,

395

qualification

(1978),
that

for

"the

example,

we

definition

of

'person' or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 12
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from
the

case

before

us

on

the

ground

that

it

involved

Sherman Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. 13
distinction

ignores

~

;p;;?

specific

reference

the

Such a
to

the

Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive

standards of other federal laws which impose .•. sanctions
upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978).
See California v.
United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 u.s. 360, 370 (1934).
One case is of
particular relevance.
In Union Pacific R. v. United
States, 313 u.s. 450 (1941), the Court considered the
applicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708,
32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41 (1)
(1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a statute which essentially
is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the
anti-price-discrimination provisions of
the RobinsonPatman Act.'~, City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 402 n.l9.
The Court expressly found that a municipality was a
"person" within the meaning of the statute.
313 U.S., at
467-468. See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 401-402
n.l9.
12 The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive
as the word "person."
See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936)
(remarks of Senator Robinson) ("The Clayton Anti trust Act
contains terms general to all purchasers.
The pending
bill
does
not
segregate
any
particular
class
of
purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
13 The only apparent difference between the scope of
the relevant laws is the extent to which the activities
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause,
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 u.s. 186, 199201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is
otherwise subject to the Act.

9

50

concerned

with

traditional

State

governmental

purchases

for

functions. 8

consumption
Rather,

the

in

issue

before us is limited to State purchases for the purpose of
competing against private enterprise--with

the advantage

6

of discriminatory prices--in the retail market.
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that

1

~

the Act exempts such State purchases.

Assuming, without

deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to
State

purchases

governmental

for

functions,

consumption
and

that

such

in

traditional
purchases

are

therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not
apply where a State has chosen to compete in the private

8 Respondents argue that application of the Act to
purchases by the State of Alabama would present a
significant risk of conflict with the Tenth Amendment and
that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, 440 u.s. 490, 501 (1979).
There is no risk,
however, of a constitutional issue ar1s1ng from the
application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of
pharmaceutical
drugs
is
not
"indisputably
' [an]
attribut[e) of state sovereignty.'" See EEOC v. Wyoming,
U.S. __ , __ (1983) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 u.s. 264, 288
(1981)).
It is si•p~ too late in the day to suggest that
Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause
powers when they are engaged in proprietary activities.
See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 188189, 192-193 (1964).
If the Tenth Amendment protects
certain State purchases from the Act's limitations, such
as for consumption in traditional governmental functions,
those purchases must be protected on a case-by-case basis.
Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
u.s. 389, 413 n.42 (1978) (plurality opinion).

7

15.

absence of any other relevant evidence, we 1\

~t ~ a zJ'

legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed
exemption,

to

enter

private

competitive

markets

with

congressionally approved price advantages. 2 1

relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the federal
government's
purchases.
The
existence
of
such
an
exemption is not before us.
Cf. United States v. Cooper
Corp., 312 u.s. 600, 604-605 (1941} (United States not a
"person" under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing for
treble damages}. Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that
governmental purchasing would not compete with private
purchasing.
For
his
purposes,
this
eliminated
the
rationale for the Act to apply to State agencies.
That
assumption, however, is inapplicable here.
2lsix months after the Act was passed, the Attorney
General of the United States responded to an inquiry from
the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to
government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539
(1936}.
In ruling that such contracts are outside the
Act, the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc.,
in matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily
apply to the Government unless it is expressly
so provided; and it does not seem to have been
the policy of the Congress to make such statutes
applicable to the Government ....
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended
the [Clayton Act] . . . and, in so far as I am
aware, the latter Act has not been regarded
heretofore
as
applicable
to
Government
contracts.
Id. , at 540.
Later in the letter, the Attorney General
used the phrase "Federal Government," ibid., and gave
other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make
the statute applicable to the Government in violation of
the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id.,
at 541.
The Attorney General expressly relied upon
Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275
U.S. 415, 425 (1928}, in which the Court upheld the
granting of favorable
telegraph rates to a federal
corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the
Act's applicability to State agencies.
Indeed, in the
following
year,
the Attorney General
of
California
expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Act's proscriptions.
See 1932-1939 Trade Cas.
(CCH}
,155,156,
at 415-416
(1937}.
Two other early State
attorney general opinions simply do not consider whether
Footnote continued on next page.
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programs. 24
Chairman

It

Dixon

is

not

at

all

contemplated

clear,

cases

in

agency competed with private retailers,
aware
Other

of

such

practices

statements

by

express

interested opinions on the
entitled

to

constructions
passage. 2 6

the
given

which

little

more

the

State

21

purchasers. 2 5

than

issue presented,

with

informed,

and are not

appropriate

contemporaneously

whether

although he was

institutional

consideration

See supra, at

however,

for
the

the

21

Act's

& n.21.

24 see H.R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 22, at 74.

25 After
hearing his testimony,
the Subcommittee
posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the
eroding
influence
on
the
retail
druggists'
market
presented by: (i} expanding federal, State, and private
group health care programs; (ii} the federal government's
ability to purchase from drug manufacturers at prices
substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii} instances of
hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to
outpatients or even nonpatients."
Id., at 73.
In his
response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to
discuss further the last category, which involved §13c
issues.
Id., at 74.
His disclaimer of F.T.C. authority
envisionea-5tate purchases for welfare programs, not~
or
resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the
issue presented here is most similar to the issue
otdiscussed by Chairman Dixon.
26 Assuming
that
this
post-enactment
commentary
before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress--quite
a leap given the brevity and conclusory nature of the
Subcommittee report--"the views of a subsequent Congress
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 u.s. 304, 313
(1960}. See, e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 u.s. 102, 117-118 & n.l3 (1980};
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979};
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 (1977}
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the
Act are in no sense part of the legislative history."}.

20.

unexceptional

~ however,

simply says that private

institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair

retail

competition through sales at discriminatory prices.
Subcommittee

said

nothing

expressly

about

the

24

The

unfair

competition at issue in this case.
B

Respondents

also

argue

that,

without

exception,

24

courts considering the Act's coverage have concluded that

4~~

1\no

it does not apply to government purch &
imposed

liability upon

a

seller

or

buyer,

court has

under

either

§2(a)

or §2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a

sale

to

a

State,

city,

or

county.

There

are

serious

1\

inf irma ties

in

~
. 5
tj).i-6 broad assert1on:

(i)

this Court has

1\

never

held or

suggested

State purchases; 28

(ii)

that

there

is an exemption for

the number of judicial decisions

2 7The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938
Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private
nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for
the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'"
H.R. Rep. No.
1983, supra note 22, at 78, but that would indicate more
the construction of §13c than it would the intent of the
1936 Congress.
2 8rndeed,
our
opinions
suggest
precisely
the
opposite.
See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397 n.l4;
Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at 18-19 n.lO; California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 u.s. 508,
513 (1972).

25
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universally held interpretation of the Act.
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-whether

legislative,

have considered

the

judicial,
specific

or

in commentary--rarely

issue before us.

There

28

is

simply no unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to
exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing-with a price advantage--in the private retail market.
VI

28

The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized,
both for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to
promote.

Although

Congress

is

well

aware

of

these

criticisms, the Act has remained in effect for almost half

~t.--1--~w
1

a century. ~''ii]-t -i-s ~ not for
policy-making
legislation ....

Our

in

[this Court]

the

field

function ends with

to indulge in
of

29

antitrust

the endeavor

to

ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of
the

relevant

Congress."

material,

what

United States v.

was

in

fact

the

intent

of

312

u.s.,

600,

606

[Robinson-Patman]

Act

Cooper,

{1941}.

"A general application of the

to all combinations of business and capital organized to

29

job 12/30/82
THIRD DRAFT: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association,
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The

issue

presented

is

whether

the

sale

of

pharmaceutical products to hospitals operated by State and
local governments for

resale

in competition with private

retail pharmacies is exempt from the proscriptions of the

Patman
I

Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists
and

pharmacies

Alabama,

doing

commenced

this

business
action

in
in

Jefferson

1978

in

the

County,
District

Court for the Northern District of Alabama as the assignee
of

its

members'

claims.

Respondents,

the

defendants

below, are fifteen pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board
of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the Cooper
Green

Hospital

Pharmacy.

The

University

operates

a

medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school.
Located

in

the

University's

medical

center

are

two

I

I

2.

pharmacies.

Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital,

existing as a public corporation under Alabama law.
The

complaint
J

seeks

treble

damages

,/

relief under §§4 ana 16 of the Clayton
ana

1
26'

for

alleged violations
'38 s. ra,t. 1-30)

Clayton Act, [as
u.s.c.

.J

§§13 (a)

amended
ana

by

(f).

/

Act~ fs

of §2(a)

the

ana injunctive
( 3~ 5tt.tt. 1-31) +31-'>
u.s.c. §§l5

ana

(f)

of the
'11 Stut. 15"26

Robinson-Patman

Petitioner

contends

that

the

respondent manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their
products to the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper
Green Hospital Pharmacy at prices lower than those charged
petitioner's

members

for

1 ike

products.

Petitioner

alleges that the respondent hospital pharmacies knowingly
induced such lower prices in violation of §2(f) 2 ana sola

1

sect ion , 2

(a)~ !:Wai!b.i~~~:1t:1JR~i,~,~,. .•~•liiDMN~~
§13 (a),

provides

relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
either directly or inai rectly, to a i scr imina te
in
price
between
different
purchasers
of
commodities of like grade ana quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination
are
in commerce,
where such
commoa it ies are sola for use, consumption, or
resale with in the Un i tea States ... , ana where
the
effect
of
such
discrimination
may
be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

in

3.

drugs

so

procured

competition with

to

the

general

public

in

privately owned pharmacies.

direc t

Petitioner

also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted

j

from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U.S.C. §13c. 3
Respondents
failure

to

purchases 4
sanctions

moved

state
are

of

a

dismiss

claim,

exempt

§ 2.

to

as

on
a

In granting

the

the

complaint

ground

matter

of

that

law

respondents'

for
state

from

the

motions,

the

District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations
that

local

retail

pharmacies

had

been

injured

by

the

challenged price discrimination and that at least some of
the

state

purchases

were

not

exempt

under

§13c. 5

The

customers of either of them .•.•
2 section 2 (f), 15 u.s.c. §13 (f), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination
in price which is prohibited by this section.
3 section 13c providesr_.,..h.f'

w;J J

R_6 hl'11 ~n-

fa1'm4.-a

l'k.t]

Nothing in C , .
,
·
sha'i~pply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges,
universities,
public
libraries,
churches,
hospitals,
and
charitable
institutions
not
operated for profit.
4 "state purchases" are defined
purchases by a State and its agencies.
5{56 F.2d J92, J98 ttA5 / 1981)
Court's opinion as Appendix).

as

sales

(reprinting

to

and

District

I

I

4•

District
without

Court
regard

that v(.governmental

held
to

15

u.s.c.

§13c,

purchases

beyond

the

are,

intended

reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at
least with
traditional

~981)

.6

respect

to purchases

governmental

for

purposes."

We
question

1 656

F.2d ,/92,

~02

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a

divided per curiam decision, affirmed
district

hospitals and other

court's

granted
of

~on

the basis of the

Memorandum

of

Opinion."

certiorari

to

resolve

federal

v'656

this

u.s.

law.

F.2d,

at

important
We

now

reverse.
II

The issue here is very narrow.
with

sales

to

the

federal

We are not concerned

government.

Nor

are

we

6 Petitioner's
antitrust
claims
were
dismissed
solely on the basis that Stat7. purchases ar~ exe~pt from
the Robinson-Patman Act.
See 656 F.2d, at ~03 n.~O.
We
thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule
of law might justify dismissal of petititioner's RobinsonPatman Act claims.
~
~
7 The District Court, and thus the Court of Apdbali
agreed that~" [t]he claims against the Board mus~ .• be
_,treated as equivalent to claims against the State itsel ."
V656 F.2d, atV99.
Accordingly, both courts held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision.

5.

concerned

with

traditional

State

purchases

governmental

for

functions.8

consumption
Rather,

the

in

issue

before us is limited to State purchases for the purpose of
competing

against private

enterprise--with

the advantage

of discriminatory prices--in the retail market.
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that
the Act exempts

such State purchases.

Assuming, without

deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to
State

purchases

governmental

for

functions,

consumption
and

that

such

in

tracE tional
purchases

are

therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not
apply where a State has chosen to compete in the

8 Respondents argue
applicatio
of the
to
purchases by
the St te of Alabama would
significant risk of co flict with the
that we therefore shou d avoid any J con truction of
_) that include~ such pu~ bases.
S~e NL
v. ~Catholi
~ica o, 440 U.S.
90,V50l {1979).
The_r_e--~i-s~~o--~-1~.s-k~,
howeve
of a const"tutional
e arising f om the
licatr n of the A t in this ca e: The retail sal
:~ j)
phar
ut"cal
drug
is
not
"indisputably
a, ~
attribut
of state sovereignty.~ See EEOC v. Wyomrng,
U.S. _ _ , _ _ {1983)
Hodel v. ' Virginia Surface
Minin
& Reclamation Association Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981
.
It is simply too late in the day to suggest tha~
ongress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause
7
powers when/ they are engaged in propr jetary activities .
See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S.Jl84, 18..;.iMPiiiiii~l93 fi:964).
If the Tenth Amendment protects
~
certain State purchases from the Act's limitations, such
as for consumption in traditional governmental functions,
tho~ purchases must be PJ.Otected on a case-by-case basis.
Cf. City of Lafayette v. Lfiuisiana Power & Light Co., J435
U.S. 7 389, 413 n.42 (1978) ~lurality opinion).

I

I

6.

retail market.
III
In

construing

a

statute,

statutory language itself.

we

look

first

to

the

The Robinson-Patman Act by its

terms does not exempt State purchases.

The only express

exemption is that for nonprofit institutions contained in
15

u.s.c.

J. [t] he

§13c. 9

Moreover, as the courts below conceded,

statutory language--'persons'

sufficiently

u.s.c.

decisions. 11

to

cover

was

compelled

by

'purchasers'--is

governmental
F.2d,

13(a,f}."

§§12,

concession

9

broad

and

several

In City of Lafayette v.

at
of

bodies.

/

99.10

this

15
This

Court's

Louisiana Power &

The District Court properly assumed, for purposes
of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the
hospital purchases woyld not be covered by the §13c
exemption.
See note 3, supra, and accompanying text.
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express
exemption would support summary judgment in cases agai~t
State hospitals purchasing for their own use. See note 22
infra.
in

require

7.

. J

. ::::L:_;:i:.. ;gt.;;.h.::..t=---=C::..:o=-.=--'

435

u.s.

('{978),

I
stated

without

qualification

for

~the

example,

we

definition

of

.

'person' or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 12
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from
the case

before

us on

the

ground

that

it

involved

Sherman Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. 13
distinction

ignores

our

specific

the

Such a

reference

to

the

Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the
ft

ff

js

standards of othey federal laws which j,mposej. . . nctions
upon 'persoys. '" City of ,Lafa~tte v. Louis1an Power &
)Jight co., 435 y.s."389,".foo t'J-978).
SeEJ Cal'fornia v.
Junited States, 320 u.s. ~ 577, ~~85-586 r.l944) ~ Ohio v.
J Helvering, ~292 u.s. ~360, v3,70 ~L934).
One
ase is of
particulJ r relevance.
_}n Junion Pacific R. v. ~ United
States, 313 u.s . ./450 (1941), the Court considered the
~ppl icabiJs i ty to a city of § 1 of the1 Elk ins Act, c~;;. I, 08,
32 Stat. 847, as amended, "34 Stat. 587, ./49 U.S.C. §41(1)
(1976 ed.) (repealed v'l978), V"a statute which essentially
is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the
anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robins2n--.___ .... tman Act."
City of Lafayette, "435 u.s., at "402 n.l9.
The Court expressly found that a municipality was a
"person" within the meaning of the s 1j, tute. J313 u.s., at
467-468. See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 401~
n.l9.
\..
12 The word "purchasers" )las a meaning ~ inclgsive
as the word "person."
See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (~936)
(remarks of Senator Robinson) ~The Clayton Antitrust Act
contains terms general to all purchasers.
The pending
bill
does
not
segregate
any
particular
class
of
purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
13 The only apparent differ e nce betwe en the scope of
the relevant laws is the extent to which the activities
complained of must affect interstate comme rce. Congress's
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
tra~actions within iJs reach under the Commer~ Clv;se,
see gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., J419 U.S. 186, 199201 ~1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is
otherwise subject to the Act.

9

8.

u.s.,

nature of the term "person." J435

at

~97 n~4.

Nor

do we perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in
that Act any differently than we have in the Clayton Act,
which it amends. 14
strongly

suggests

In sum, the plain language of the Act
that

there

is

no

exemption

for

State

purchases to compete with private enterprise.
IV

1

The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a
different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose
and history of the Act.

An examination of the legislative

purpose and history reveals no such contrary intention. 15
(

fY'r-tt.r~$ oF

$eV!.

LoJ411)

14 Indeed, the House a d Senate Committee reports
specifically state that
t]he special definitions of
section 1 of the Clayton Ac will apply without repetition
to the terms concerned wh re they appear in this b i l v ,
since ~t is designedJo bee me by amendment a 2art of tha
~ apt:."- - H.R.~.tLNo. 2287, Pt. -.~ 1, .,. . 74th Cong., .72d Sess.
7
~
("1936); ..rs • .1Rep?>._l502, v74th c;p,ng., . . .2d
.
Sess. \..S (i936). See
lao Cong. Rec. '-'3116 (1936) (''~pny have complained because
the provisions of the bill apply to 'any person engaged in
commerce.'
The original Clayton Act contains that
exact language, and it is carried into the bill under
consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used
because it has been construed by the courts.").
Given
their common purposes, it should not be surprising that
the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts
should be c.9nstrue<;1 consistently with eac~ other.
Se_~ "'So
Cong. Rec. 8137 ('1936) (remarks of Rep. Michener) r'The
Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy or a
The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it
new theory.
- ~J as the purpose of that act to do just what this law sets
~-.. o t to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151 (1936)
(remarks of
~
~ Sen a tor Logan) r.-" ( purpos.P oF R. l:.rll rs h:> s~"'ff1tr.11 Cltty'llM /t-(.t)

V"

(/')\

~
~
/

"

l5Although the face of the Act clearly contains no
express
exemption
in
favor
of State purchases,
we
nevertheless consider the legislative history.
See, e.
Footnote continued on next page.
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1

A

Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes
of the antitrust laws,
On

numerous

including the Robinson-Patrnan Act.

occasions,

comprehensive

this

coverage

of

Court

the

has

affirmed

antitrust

laws

the

and

has

recognized that these laws representv(.a carefully studied
attempt
business

to

whose

commercial
V.

bring

within

[them]

activities

every

might

intercourse among

the

person

restrain

or

engaged

J 77 3

M.-944) • 16

~97 5)

,

states." JUnited States

"

533,

InJGoldfarb v. JVirginia State Bar, -'421 U.S.
the

Court

repeatedly established
against

in

monopolize

1south-Eastern Unuerwr1ters
..:J
•
•
•
, ;322
Assoc1at1on,
U.S.

~53

implicit

observed
that

there

exemptions"

from

that V.'our

cases

is a heavy presumption
the

antitrust

laws.

JWa t t

®'

see~.., J'Pf' er Inc. v. JGovernrnent of India,
U.S.~
2-31 ;
~andeviJ,le Island Far!lls,
~ v. }.me · n Cry al Sugar Co., \0:134 U.S. \1219, 11236
~948)
(antitrust laws are "comprehensive in [their] terms
and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated")
(emphasis added) .
·

J

434

1

have

1
J
./
./.
J
J
.
v . A1 ask a , 4 51 U • S • 2 59 , 2 6 6 (19 81 ) ~ T r a 1 n .1 .
JCOlora o Public Interest Research Grou , Inc., ~26 u.s. 1,
J 9-10 976). The Court previously has considered "how far
Congress
intended
to extend
its mandate under"
the
Robinson-Pa trnan Act and foJ,nd the answer in its "purpose
and legislative history." Gulf Oil Co~v. "cj;PP Paving
Co., "'419 U.S.A
t'£l>!97t){
'b:.
See FT
v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., ./3'60 U.S 1~, ~69-70 lfl9j-_9);
ut0:rnatic Canteen
Co. of Arne ric a v.
3 4 6 U.S . .161, 7 2 , v7 8
9 53) •
fq • ,

1

16

'7

10.

Id., atv;87

(citingJUnited States v.

1

Bank, 374 u.s. /321,
u.s.

~82,

utility,

(\962)) • 17

/ 485

antitrust

~50-351

laws

to

a

city

~hiladelphia

(I963); "'california

would be implied.

v.~~69

In City of Lafayette,
in competition with

we held that no exemption for

National

applying
a

private

local governments

JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court,

emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws:
11

[T] he economic choices made by public corporations ... ,

designed as

they are

to assure maximum benefits for

the

community constituency, are not inherently more likely to
comport

with

well-being
in

the

broader

than are

furtherance

of

its shareholders.

I

11

interests of

national

economic

those of private corporations acting

the

interests of

435 u.s., at

See also id., at 408.

18

the organization and

'{o tJ ~feetRete~ omit:ted-~
~,~

,__,,!>

a'l'f

~

"f2lJ
17 see,
e.
g., /National
Gerim d'cal
Ho ital
&
ntolo
Center v. Blue Cross, 4 2 U.S. 378
388
98
· City of Lafayette, 435 U.S.,
t ~98, \3'99; \Abbott
Labor to ies v:l~ortla d Retail Dru i t s Assn., Inc.,V425
U.S.
1, 12
fJ.976~
United Stajles y.
National Assn
Securities Dealer1f. 422 u.s. \lt94, "'719 n_975).
18 In one important sense, retail competition from
---------State agencies can be more invidious than that from chainstores, thel particular targets of the R~binson-P,tma~Act.
Sie e.
.
Great A&P Tea Co. v. 1FTC
440 U.S. 69, 75-76
\)-979);
T v.JAnheuser-Busch, Inc~63 U.S. "536, ~43-544
(119 60) .
olume purchasing permits any large, relatively
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to
Footnote continued on next page.
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have
been helpful in interpreting the language of the RobinsonPatman Act.
JAbbott

As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in

Laboratories

"

Inc., 425

1

v. \/Portland

u.s. "1, J.11-12

Retai 1

Druggists Assn.,

('{976):

11

"

I

It has been said, of course, that the
antitrust
laws,
and
Robinson-Patman
in
particular, are to be construed liberally, and
that the except ions from the }r application are
to be construed
ictly.
United Sta?fs v.
McKesson & Robbin , 351 u.s. "' 305, 316956);
M v. Seatrain Li es, Inc., "411 U.S. J 726, 733
73); JPerkins v. "Standard Oil Co., J395 u.s.
1642, 646-647 P-1:969).
The Court has recognized,
also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936
to curb and prohibit all devices by which large
buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller
ones
b~· tue
of
their
greater
J,>Urchas ing power. '
TC v. ~Broch & Co., ~63 ~S.
166, lj)8 ~960);
T
v. "E"red Meyer, Inc., 390
U.S. ~41,
349
68).
Because the Act is
remedial,
it is to be construs.e broadly to
~ffectuate
its p~poses.
See Tcherepnin v.
,Knighth '-'3 89 T.!JS. 332!1 336 (1967); V'Peyton v.
"Rowe' "3 91 u.s. 54 ' 6 5 r19 6 8) . II

1

1

1

1

1

Thus,

in

view

of

the

Act's

remedial

purposes,

and

the

consumers, and to that extent, consumers benefit merely
from economy of scale.
But to the extent that lower
prices result from lower overhead, in the form of federal
grants, State subsidies, free public services, and freedom
from taxation, State agencies merely redistribute the
burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens
at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act could
give State agencies a significant additional advantage in
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate
marginal or small private competitors.
Consumers, as
citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs of the
drugs sold by the State agencies involved in this case.
Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies
will provide retail distribution more efficiently than
private retail pharmacists, consumers will suffer to the
extent
that
State
retail
activities
eliminate more
efficient, private retail distribution systems.

12.

broad scope of its language as interpreted by this Court,
the burden of showing that the legislative history compels
us

to

create

an

Congress intended,

exemption

is

on

those

who

argue

but did not choose to say,

that

that State

agencies may compete with private business free

1

from the

Act's constraints.
B

The legislative history falls far short of supporting
respondents 1

contention

State purchases.
issue of
free

to

such

that

there - is

an

exemption

for

1

Surely Congress would have discussed an

importance before leaving State purchasers

compete

unfairly

with

the

private

sector.

Yet

there is nothing whatever in the Senate or House Committee
reports, or in the floor debates, focusing on the issue.

1

There is evidence that some members of Congress were
aware

of

the

possibility

that

the

Act

governmental purchases.

Most members,

concerned

purchases,

with

State

principal

history
draftsman,

is
H.B.

the

however,

but

limitations on the federal Government.
legislative

would

to

were not
possible

The most relevant

testimony

Teegarden,

with

apply

of

before

the

Act's

the

House

1

I

I

13.

Judiciary

Committee. 1 9

Although

the

testimony

19

Rep.
Lloyd:
Would this bill,
in your
judgment, prevent the granting of discounts to
the United States Government?
Mr.
Teegarden:
Clayton Act does so.

Not

unless

the

present

Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government
gets huge discounts.
Now,
would that
discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should
unless a discount contrary to the present bill
would be barred--that is, the present law--would
be barred by that bill.
As ide from that, my answer would be this:
The Federal Government is not in competition
with other buyers from these concerns . . . .
The Federal Government is saved by the same
distinction....
They are not in competition
with anyone else who would buy.
Rep.
Hancock:
It
would
eliminate
competitive bidding all along the line, would it
not, in classes of goods that would be covered
by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding
on Government orders?
Rep.
Hancock:
municipality.

Government,

State,

city,

Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
Rep. Michener: If it did do it,
not want it, would you?

you would

Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would
with the Government.
Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the
city, county exactly the same as anybody else,
same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden:

No.

Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell
to a city hospital any cheaper than they would
to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in
Footnote continued on next page.
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ambiguous on the application of the Act to State purchases
for

consumption,

one

conclusion

is

certain:

Teegarden

J

expressly stated that the Act would apply to the purchases
of

municipal

hospitals

in

at

least

some

circumstances.

Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found
by

the

courts

below

for

all

such purchasing. 20

In

the

this way.
In the final analysis, it would
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a
particular case.
If the two hospitals are in
competition with each other, I should say that
the fact that one is operated by the city does
not save it from the bill.
,
Heari s on H.R . ..!4995 et al. be ore the Ilouse Committ
on
the Judiciary,
74th Cong., 1st Sess.
08-209
935)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings].
20 Teegarden subsequently submit ted a written brief
to the House committee.
He first rejected outright the
desirabilitytof ~ exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra
note 19, at 249.
He then posed the question whether "the
bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmen__tal
purchases below trade price levels."
He stated that
"[t)he answer is found in the principle of statutory
construction that a statute will not be construed to limit
or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives, or
privileges of
the sovereign unless
it so expressly
provides--a principle inherited by American jurisprudence
from
the common law ..... "
But he also noted that
"requiring a showing of effect upon competition, will
further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the
Government." Id., at 250 (footnotes omitted).
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this
sovereign-exception rule of statutory construction simply
means that a government, when it passes a law, gives up
only what it expressly surrenders.
In the same year that
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court stated
that it could "perceive no reason for extending [the
presumption against including the sovereign in a statute]
so a s to exempt a business carried on by a state from the
otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress,
all-embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which
is as capable of being obstructed by state as by
jndi~idual action." Juyited States v. "califor;nia,
"297 Ju.s./'" o.T
0
-175, 186 1936).
See California v. 7Taylor, 353 U.S.J;\~A '-J~..t.l-V562-56?;.)
In the context of the Robinson-Patman
Act, th~ rule of statutory construction on which Teegarden
Footnote continued on next page .
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absence of any other

relevant evidence,

we cannot see a

legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed
exemptio~,

to

enter

private

competitive

markets

with

congressionally approved price advantages. 21

relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the federal
government's
purchases.
The
existence
of
su~h
an
exempti~n is not before us.
Ct. J united States v. Cooper
Corp., "312 u.s . ../600, v'604-605 '(1941) (Un1ted States not a
"person" under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing for
treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that
governmental purchasing would not compete with private
purchasing.
For
his
purposes,
this
eliminated
the
rationale for the Act to apply to State agencies.
That
assumption, however, is inapplicable here.
2lsix months after the Act was passed, the Attorney
General of the United States responded to an inquiry from
the Secretary of War regarding the {\pt' s application "to
~9vernment contracts for supplies." "'38 Op. Atty. Gen.vS39
V-t-936).
In ruling that such contracts are outside the
Act, the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc.,
in matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily
apply to the Government unless it is expressly
so provided; and it does not seem to have been
the policy of the Congress to make such statutes
applicable to the Government ....
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended
the [Clayton Act]
and, in so far as I am
aware, the latter Act has not been regarded
heretofore
as
applicable
to
Government
contracts.
Id. , at J5 40.
Later in the letter, the 1}k torney General
used the phrase "Federal Government," Vi bid., and gave
other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make
the statute applicable to the Government in violation of
the~pparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id.,
at 541.
The Attorney General expressly relied upon
jEmergepcy F~eet Corp. v.lwestern Union Telegraph Co.,~75
U.S. \/415, "425 t'l928), in which the Court upheld the
granting of
favorable
telegraph
rates
to a federal
corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the
Act's applicability to State agencies.
Indeed, in the
following
year,
the
Attorney General
of
California
expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Act's proscriltions.
SFe "1932-1939 Trade Cas.
(CCH)
1 ,[55, 156,
at 415-416
('d937).
Two other early State
attorney general opinions simply do not consider whether
Footnote continued on next page.

1~

16.

v
Despite
legislative
subsequent

the

plain

history,

language

respondents

legislative

events

of

the

Act

nevertheless

and

decisions

and

its

argue

that

of

l

District

Courts confirm that State purchases are outside the scope
of the Act.

We turn therefore to the subsequent events on

which respondents rely.

2
A

Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman

the Act applies to State purchases for re~il sales. See
Opinion of Attorney Ge~ral .9f Min~sota,932-1939 Trade
Cas. )CCH) ~[55,157, at ~16 ('1.937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis.
v-142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the
[United
States] Attorney General's reasons may be also applied to
municipal and public
institutions."
W.
Pve;tm~If,
The
Robinson-Patman Act 38
(1938).
See also W VFa.tftan,
vcomplete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act ~0
(~963)
(interpreting Attorney General's opinion as exempting
State purchases).
His interpretation is entitled to some
weight,
but he appears only to be interpreting--or
erroneously extending--the Attorney General's opinion and
reasoning.
Representative Patman's personal intentions
probably are better reflected in his introduction in 1951
and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "purchaser"
to include "the United State~ any ~tate or any political
~ybdivision thereo~"
H.R. 1-452, 82d Cong., Vlst Sess.
("1951); H.R . ./3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. K953). There is
no legislative history on these bills, but it is arguable
that he believed that the original intent needed to be
stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney
General's contrary construction of the Act.
In any case,
Congress's failure to pass these bills probably stems from
a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act.
It bears repeating, however, that none of these
views--including Representative Patman' s--focuses on the
State
purchases
alleged
here:
purchases
to
gain
competitive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional functions.

I

i
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Act held in the late 1960s. 22

Testimony before the House

Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
industry

indicated

that

the

Act

did

not

cover

price

discrimination in favor of State hospitals, 23 and Federal
Trade

Commission

authority

over

Chairman

transactions

Paul

Dixon

involving

disclaimed

State

health

any
care

22 The most important relevant event in the RobinsonJ?atman Act's post-enactment history is the amendm~nt J,n
Vl938 ex~luding eleemosynary institutions,V52 Stat.\446, 15
u.s.c. §13c.
Whether the existence of an exemption in
§13c supports an exemption for certain State purchases
depends upon whether §l3c is interpreted to apply to State
agencies that perform the functions listed.
That is a
substantial issue in its o~ right. -~Compare H.R. Rep. No.
1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8,~8 r.t968) (suggesting that
§13c does n~t include government agencies) with ~1 Cong.
Rec . ./8706 ~.L937) (statement of Rep. /walter) (§13c would
apply to institutions financed by cit i;zs, counties, ~nd
States) . 91lC.See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., .~at 397
Jn.l4
~flF~ ·
, 'i!!~ ·
includes v"public
libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by lo:!l .A
government"); ~bbott Laboratories, " 425 u.s., at 18..,._--,
n.lO; " 81 Cong. Rec. '18705 (\;{937) (exemption codifies the
intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act) . We
need not address this issue here.
23 see, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman
Act: Hearings Before the Spec1al Subcomm1 ttee on Small
Business and
the Robinson-Patman Act of the Select
Commit tee
on
Small
Business
of / the
j!ouse
of
Representatives, 9lst Cong.
'43-77, l/623 (19691970)
(William McCamant, Director of Publi:% Affairs,
National Association of Wholesalers; Harold Halfpenny,
counsel for the Automative Association · of Wholesalers);
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory
A encies of the Select Committee on Small Business o
the
House of Representatives, 90th Cong
15-16
(1967-1968)
[hereinafter
1967-1968
Hearings]
(Earl
Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, on behalf of NARD).
There also was testimony that institutional purchasers
frequently obtain drugs at )_ower pr i~es than do retail
pharmacies, see id., at 111 ~58,1318,Vl093-1094, and many
witnesses complained that this dj,scriminat.ipn a~versely
pffe~ competition, see id., atVA-140 to ~4l,V253-262,
Y273,0

I
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programs. 24
Chairman
agency
aware
Other

It

Dixon

is

not

such

entitled

constructions
passage. 2 6

express

opinions on
to

by

the
given

the

clear,

cases

private

practices

statements

interested

all

contemplated

competed with
of

at

in

retailers,

which

little

more

the

than

he was

with

informed,

and are not

appropriate

&

State

purchasers. 2 5

issue presented,

contemporaneously

whether

although

institutional

consideration

See supra, at

however,

for
the

the
Act's

n. 21.

24 see H.R. Rep. No. v(983, supra notev;2 ,

at~4.

25 After
hearing
his
testimony,
the Subcommittee
posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the
eroding
influence
on
the
retail
druggists'
market
presented by: (i) expanding federal, State, and private
group health care programs; (ii) the federal government's
ability to purchase from drug manufacturers at prices
substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii) instances of
hospitals, ""both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to
outpatients or even nonpatients."
Id., at ~3.
In his
response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to
discuss further the last category, which involved §13c
issues.
Id., atV74.
His disclaimer of F.T.C. authority
envisione~tate purchases for welfare programs, not for
resale in competition with private enterprise.
Thus, the
issue presented here is most similar to the issue not
discussed by Chairman Dixon.
2 6Assuming
that
this
post-enactment
commentary
before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress--quite
a leap given the brE;vity and conclusory nature of the
Subcommittee report-.V'the views of a subsequent Congress
form a hazardoJ?.s basis for in~ ring . t;.he in te\).1; of. pm
e1rlier one."
United States v. Price, '161 U.S. '-104, "313 _ _....,
/t0960).
S~e, e. g.,~onsumer Product Safet Cornmiss'on v.
GTE Sylvan1a, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
17-118 &
.13
9
;
o/Oscar Mayer & Co. v. -IEvq.ns, ./441 u.s. -/750, ..f759
79);
../United Air Lines, Inc. v.VMcMann, "434 U.S. Vj_92, 200
977)
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the
Act are in no sense part of the legislative history.").
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It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions
that

it did not

case.

focus

on the question presented by this

The Subcommittee found that the difference between

drug

prices

for

retailers

extremely substantial"
by either cost

and

government

and /.'not always

customers v(, is

fully explainable

justifiable quantity discounts,

economies

of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution."

JH.R.

No. ./.1 9 8 3,

Rep.

.L90t h Cong., ./2 d Sess. 77

In

,.
'-

/

the next conclusion,

it stated that " [ n] umerous acts and

policies of individual manufacturers seem ... violative of

1f
the

Robinson-Patman Act[- ..• "

possible

that

purchasing
heard
did

at

the

Subcommittee

di scr imina tory

Thus,

v'Ibid.

considered

prices--about

testimony--to be unlawful.

it

is

quite

some
which

State
it

had

2

The Subcommitte report

include the awkwardly worded statement: v{There is no

basis apparent .•• why the mandate of the Robinson-Patman
Act

should

not

be

applied

favoring nongovernmental
or

nonprofit,

competition
druggists."

to

at

the

the

J Id. ,

to

discriminatory

drug

institutional purchasers,

extent

retail

there

level

is

sales
profit

prescription

drug

with

disfavored

retail

ctmphasis

added) . 2 7

This

Footnote(s) 27 will appear on following pages.
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unexceptional statement, however, simply says that private
institutional purchases may not

facilitate

unfair

retail

competition through sales at d i scr imina tory prices.
Subcommittee

said

nothing

expressly

about

the

The

unfair

competition at issue in this case.
B

Respondents

also

argue

that,

without

exception,

courts considering the Act's coverage have concluded that
it does not apply to government purchasers;

no court has

imposed

under

liability

§2 (a)

or §2 (f),

sale

to

a

infirmaties
never

held

or

a

seller

or

buyer,

either

when the discriminatory price involved a

State,
in

upon

city,

this

broad

suggested

State purchases; 28

or

( i i)

county.

There

assertion:

that

there

(i)
is

the number of

an

are

serious

this Court has
exemption

for

judicial decisions

27 The Sub9ommittee also concluded that the 1938
Amendment was V"designed to afford immunity to private
nonprofit institutions •.. to the extent the sales are for
_Jhe nonprofit institution's 'own use,"'
H.R. Rep. No.
1983, supra note ~2, at V78, but that would indicate more
the construction of §13c than it would the intent of the
1936 Congress.
28 rndeed,
our
opinions
suggest
precisely
the
o p po s i t e .
S e e C i t y of La faye t t e , 4 3 5 U . S . , at 3 9 7 n . 14 ;
Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 18-19 n.lO; California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
513 (1972).

~
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even

considering

State
cite

agencies
no

adopted
below;

Court
their
(iv)

respondents
clear
solely

application

to

small; 29

(iii)

relatively

of

Appeals

decision

interpretation

rely

a

Act's

is

some of

that~

on

the

are

of

§2

that
before

purchases

by

respondents

has

expressly

the

decision

the District Court cases upon which
simply

inapposite; 3 0

(v)

it

is not

published District Court opinion has relied
State

2

purchase

exemption

Robinson-Patman Act claim alleging

to

dismiss

a

injury as a result of

29 The par ies cite fewer
han a dozen cases, many
with unpublis ed opinions, that involve the application of
the Robinson- atman Act to Stat purchases. See notes 3032, ipfra.
f.VBlue Chi Starn s v. VManor Drug Stores, f421
U.S. '1723, 73
((975) (affirmin rule adopted byl"virtually
all lower federal courts faci g the issue in the hundreds
of reported cases presenting this question over the past
quarter centpry") (e~hasis a d~d) ;VGulf Oil Corp. v.\ICopp
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 ('t1.974) (adopting consistent,
"longstanding" construction of Robinson-Pa~-~;fct after
"nearly four decades of litigation").
~
30see vf>acific En ineerin
& Produ
ion Co. v. ~.{err
McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,054, at
96,742 (I'Uta 197
(dictt (involvi g federal government
as ultimate purchaser\
elying on Attorney General's
9pinion as sole su~?.,ctf, 'fj'd i y a r t and '-tev'd in part,
\t1.551 F.2d09o, 798-7fCCA10) (fipdin
legitima~E}--competition
despite _.different prices), 't:ert. deni~d, ~34 u.s. "'879
~7) ;'tenera
rod cts C r . v.Vstruck Const. Co.,
-./37-'f. Supp. 98, 602-6
D Ky.
(finding no "sale" under
the Act and alte5ratively holdi g the Act inapplicable on
the ground that '[n] either the government nor a city in
its purchase of property considered necessary for the
purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in
buying vlnd resel~ing that 9rticle") (emphasis supplied),
aff'd,
32 F.2d "425, V428 ("CA6 vi942) (expressly reserving
issue whether Robinson-Patmap Act appli~~ to sales to
~State agency), cert. denied, ~18 u.S.~80 (~943).
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in the private market; 31 and

government competition
there are

several cases

Patman Act

is

purposes. 3 2

that

applicable

This

suggest that

to State

judicial

track

the Robinson-

purchases

record

(vi)

is

for
in

no

resale
sense

comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon

(f

xpf'ft;.$1~

a1e"'cy
j 1'\

e;

.a

(h,,

no t

acfclre>5111J

eKfVV!fi

FrtJwt

hus{neo$~ ftl

bu{./t~.,~$

fht

wht'f/ur

~tl

l,.)hel1

sa111t

st-ate
elllrJt'd

tnannfT

{dlf•r-~ t NM~ J.

as

2
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which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a
construction of

the anti trust

long

time has

period

of

laws that Congress over a

chosen

to preserve.

See cases

cited note 29, supra.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations
of various commentators and executive officials.
most

authoritative

of

these

sources

indicate

But the
that

the

question presented is unsettled; 33 others do not foreclose
our holding;34 and in some cases they support it.35
Congress

cannot

be

said

to

have

left

Thus,

untouched

£.

3

a

~ ~"'PP' 1 ~sz
-.jOVl

33see v5A vz.
JCavitch, vBusiness v r
nizations
§l05D.Ol[8) [c)
(1~)
(opinions
/'divided" whether Act is applicable); J.J4 J. Kalinxski,
~rust
Laws and Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70
~
.(~~·)
("there is some conflict among the authorities as
to whether sales to states and municipJ:li ties are
t ttJea
1
{_ouere&
H ' '
OF iii 'J I IE Di:iidl Piil!J iJ.F id. § 24.06 [ 2); • .
'') '
·
"E . ./Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer ~203
f1..e .ft.f )
970) ('Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears
to have settled the matter where the federal government is
concerned,
some
controversy
has
arisen
over
the
applicability of thz act ,10 purchases by state and local
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universally held interpretation of the Act.
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-whether

legislative,

have considered

the

judicial,
specific

or

in commentary--rarely

issue before us.

There

is

simply no unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to
exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing-with a price advantage--in the private retail market.
VI
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized,
both for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to
promote.

Although

Congress

is

well

aware

of

these

criticisms, the Act has remained in effect for almost half
a century. v([I]t

/0

tN~
[

is not for
in

Our

relevant

Congress."

/

field

the

function ends with

ascertain from the words used,
the

to indulge in

1;

policy-making

legislation ...•

[this Court]

material,

what

of

antitrust

the endeavor

to

construed in the light of

was

in

fact

the

~. . . {; £.orf ·

United States v. ~, - 312

general application of

the

u.s.,

intent

of

t/600, ...1606

[Robinson-Patman]

Act

to all combinations of business and capital organized to

25.

suppress
spirit

t

commercial

and

impulses

of

the

history

is

is

in

harmony

times which gave

Underwriters,

South-Eastern
legislative

competition

./322

replete

u.s. ,
with

at

with

the

it birth."

J553.

references

The
to

the

economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other
large

organizations

small,
absence

local

for

resale
There

retailers.

of

an

in

explicit

is

competition
no

exemption,

reason,
to

with

the

in

the

think

that

congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small
businesses,

such as

the

pharmacies of Jefferson County,

Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest
compe titor

of

them

all. 36

To

c r eate

an

ex e mption

here

clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress.
VI I
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to
State

and

local

government

hospitals

for

resale

in

competition with private pharmacies is not ex e mpt from the
proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act.

The judgment of

36 under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would
accrue, precisely as iD;tflnded, to the benefit of _9mall,
J;>rivate retailers.
See "1.935 Hearings, supra note'--'l9, at
261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of
private rights").
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the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case
is

remanded

for

further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.
It is so ordered.
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No. 81-827--Jefferson County Pharmaceutical
Assn, Inc., v. Abbott Laboratories, et al

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

The

question

Robinson-Patman Act,
local

governments

15

in

this

u.s.c.

that

have

case

§13,

is

whether

the

applies to state and

entered

the

commercial

marketplace as retailers of goods to the general public in
competition

with

private

firms.

Because

this

is

a

substantial question, and because I think the decision of
the Court of Appeals

for

the Fifth Circuit answered

the

2.

question

incorrectly,

I

dissent

from

the

denial

of

certiorari.

I

Petitioner
pharmacists doing

[~

is

business

an

association

of

in Jefferson County,

retail
Alabama.

Respondents are f J n drug companies and certain state
and county pharmacies operated
and

county

alleged

hospitals.l

that

the

state

In

in conjunction with state
its

and

complaint,

county

petitioner

pharmacies

were

receiving preferential prices from the drug manufacturers
and

were

using

their

favored

position

to

compete

with

private pharmacies in retail sales to the general public.
Petitioner
prices,
the

alleged

followed

by

Robinson-Patman

that
retail
Act,

these
sales
15

preferential
to

U.S.C.

wholesale

consumers,
§13. 2

violated

Petitioner

1 The respondent pharmacies include those operated
by the county hospital and by the hospitals and clinics of
the Medical College of the University of Alabama.
2 under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce ••. to discriminate in
price between differ e nt purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality •.. where such commodities are sold for
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

sought injunctive relief and treble damages. 3
The

United

for

the

Northern District of Alabama dismissed the complaint.

The

court

are

found

"beyond

the

that

States

sales

intended

District

to

reach

Court

governmental

of

the

agencies

Robinson-Patman

Price

Discrimination Act, at least with respect to purchases for
hospitals

and

other

traditional

governmental

purposes."

Pet. at 20a.

In reaching this conclusion the court relied

primarily

on

statements

draftsmen

of

commentators
sales

to

the
and

H.

B.

Robinson-Patman
government

governmental

scope of the Act. 4

by

Teegarden,
Act,

officials

agencies

are

and

the

chief

by

other

indicating

beyond

the

that

intended

The court cited several district and

use, consumption or resale with in the United States ,..... •• :~
and where the effect of such discrimination may oe
substantially to lessen competition or
injure
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination."
15 U.S.C.
§13.
3The
District
Court
found
that
one
of
the
defendants--the Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama--was immune from any claim to damages by virtue of
the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed from
suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief.
4 see w. Patman, Complete Guide to the RobinsonPatman Act 30-32 (1963).
But Congressman Patman did not
address
the
question
whether
the
Act
applies
to
governmental purchases for retail resale.
The district
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General
indicating that the Act did not apply to sales to the
federal government.
Again, however, the question was
Footnote continued on next page.

4.

appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to
governmental purchases, 5 and indicated that such a holding
was

supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light

of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426

u.s.

833 (1976).

The Court of Appeals affirmed

on the basis of the District Court's opinion.

Judge Clark

dissented.

assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies."
3 8 Op • At t ' Y1' Gen . 5 3 9 ( 19 3 6 ) •
~ L------The Lrrstrict Court also relied on the fact that
Congress
has
on
two
occasions
considered,
without
enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable to sales
to governmental agencies.
See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1951); H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
However, neither of these bills was specifically directed
to the question of sales to governmental agencies for
resale to the general public.
But see Champaign-Urbana
News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. CummTnS News Co., 632 F. 2d
680, 688 (CA7 1980).
Moreover, "several equally tenable
inferences [can] be drawn from the failure of the Congress
to adopt an amendment in the light of the interpretation
placed upon the existing law by some of its members,
including the inference that the existing legislation
already incorporated the offered change."
United States
v. Wise, 370 u.s. 405, 411 (1962).
5 In only two of the cited cases, however, did the
district court hold that sales to governmental agencies in
competition with private firms were not covered by the
Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not
reach the question. A See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., 378 F.2d 212 (CA9 1967); Portland Retail Druggists
Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 F.2d 486 (CA9 1974),
remanded on other
1ssues,
425 u.s.
1
(1976).
Cf.
Champaign-urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummns News
Co., 632 F.2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military
exchange store for resale to military personnel are not
subject
to
the
Robinson-Patman
Act);
General
Shale
Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp.
598, 603 (W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd on othergrounds, 132 F.
2d 425 (CA6 1942) ("Neither the government nor a city in
its purchase of property
is in competition with
another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling
the article.") (emphasis added).
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II

As
opinion,

Judge

the

Clark

'

Court

distinction

between

consumption

and

of

It may

the

bodies

subject

not

the

their own consumption.
implied

because,

use

advantage

the

competition.
before

the

purchases

be agreed

as

Thus,
House

a

of

Act,
to

that
Act,

Act

dissenting

the

its

resale

to

own
the

the

legislative

and

subsequent

that

when

fundamental
for

for

indicate
the

his

purchases

Robinson-Patman
of

in

blurred

government

interpretations
are

Appeals

government

general public. 6
history

of

explained

governmental

purchasing

for

Such an exemption properly may be
consumer,

the government does not

cheaper wholesale prices

Teegarden explained
Judiciary

Committee

to

injure

in his testimony
that

the

federal

government would continue to be able to purchase goods at
discounts not available to other purchasers:
is
not
in
"The
Federal
Government
competition
with
other
buyers
from
these
6 Petitioner only argues that purchases by the
government pharmacies for the purpose of resale to members
of the general public are covered by the Robinson-Patman
Act.
Petitioner does not contend that purchases for the
purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered
by the Act.

6.

[wholesalers] •
[T] o have a d i scr imina t ion,
there must be a relative position between the
parties to the discrimination which constitutes
an injury to one as against the other.
I think
the answer is to be found in that.
"In other words, if seller A makes a price
to a retailer in New York and a different price
to a retailer in San Francisco, all other things
aside,
no case of discrimination could be
predicated there, because the two are not in the
same sphere at all.
"The Federal Government is saved by the
location
but
of
same
distinction,
not
of
function.
They are not ~ competition with
anyone else who wotiiO buy."

In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase
for

~ ~

retail resale is a completely different animal from a

purchase for consumption."

~et •1 at

government

for

purchases

considerations
inapplicable

of

to

public generally.
a

distinction

in

policy

government

and

29a.

An exemption for

consumption
legislative

purchases

for

rests

on

intent

wholly

resale

to

the

Indeed, this Court recognized just such
its

decision

in Abbott Laboratories v.

7 Hearings
Before
the
House
Committee
on
the
Judiciary on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added). The quotation in text is
included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting opinion.
Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of
this case is Teegarden's response to the question put to
him by Congressman Hancock as to whether a wholesaler
could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper price
than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would
have to answer it in this way. . .. fi If the two hospitals
are in competition with each other, ~should say then that
the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it
from the bi 11.
If they are not in competition with each
other, then they are in a different sphere." Id., at 209.

~~

~
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Portland Retail Druggists Assn.,
issue

in that case was

pharmacies

in

whether ~

nonprofit

425 U.S.

1

(1976).

The ~

the purchase of drugs by

hospitals

was

exempt

from

the

Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption provided in
the Nonprofit Institutions Act.

The exemption is limited,

extending only to "purchases of •.• supplies for their own
use by schools ..• hospitals, and charitable institutions
not operated for profit."

15 U.S .C. § l3c

.~The

Court held

that to the extent the drugs had been purchased for resale
to

former

patients,

for

dispensation

to

employees

and

students (other than for the personal use of themselves or
of

their

general

dependents),
public,

the

and

for

resale

exemption

was

to members of

not

available. ·

the
The

Court noted that to extend the exemption to cover retail
resales to walk-in customers "would make the commercially
advantaged hospital pharmacy
store

open

to

devastatingly

all

comers

positioned

commercial pharmacies."

just another

for

community drug

prescription

with

respect

services
to

and

competing

425 U.S., at 17-18.

This case is indistinguishable in principle from
Portland

Retail

Druggists.

When

a

hospital

acts

as

a

8.

competitor

rather

exemption.

When

claim

exemption

protection
whether

of

or

directly

it

consumer

acts

because

the

it

solely
the

as

basic

competition--is

not

to

than a

no

Nonprofit

a

its claim to

consumer,

purpose
longer

of

at

Institutions

hospitals, 8

government

loses

the

it may

the

Act--

issue.

Thus,

Act

applies

distinction

it

draws between purchases for consumption and purchases for
.I
. 'I

resale

to

the

general

public

is

equally

applicable

to

government hospitals as to private nonprofit hospitals.
Nor

do

I

think

that

the Tenth Amendment

is

a

barrier to the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to
the state and county hospitals.

The retail sale of drugs

to members of the general public is hardly an attribute of
state
.

sovereignty.

See Hodel

v.

Virginia Surface Mining

(

~ and Regulation Assnh' _ _ u.s. _ _ (1981).

III

We

u.s.

have

stated

repeatedly

that

"the

anti trust

8 see Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
389, 397 n.~4 (1978).

435

9.

laws

and

Robinson-Patman

construed

liberally,

application

are

and

to

in

that

be

particular,
the

are

exceptions

construed

to

from

strictly."

be

their
Abbott

Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn, supra, 425

u.s. '

at

A 11.

immunity

is not

institution
political

seeking

Power

despite

&

these

legislative

have

said

favored.

of

a

the

is

state.

despite

anti trust

true whether
private
See

435 U.S.

principles,
of

implied

is

exemption

Light Co.,

history

that

This

the

subdivision

Louisiana
Yet

And we

the

or

the

Lafayette

389,
the

397

(1978).

purposes

Robinson-Patman

v.

and

Act,

and

despite the Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists,
the

Court

of

government
with

e._\

v:/

pharmacies

private

~atrnan
large

Appeals

implied
that

pharmacies.

an

exemption

compete
The

in

the

purpose

of

for

sales

to

retail market
the

Robinson-

Act was "to curb and prohibit all devices by which
buYers

gained

discriminatory

by~~

preferences

over

s maller

ones

power."

FTC

(1960).

It is not easy to a s sume that Congress intended

v.

Henry

of

Broch

their
&

Co.,

greater
363

U.S.

purchasing
166,

168

to protect s mall business from what was seen as the unfair

1)?/J,
::::.::--"

10.

competition of large corporations only to leave these very
same

businesses

competitor

of

vulnerable

all--the

to

the

government.

greatest

potential

The dec is ion of

the

Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important, and
I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari.
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

The

question

in

this

Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
local

governments

that

have

case

is

whether

the

§13, applies to state and
entered

the

commercial

marketplace as retailers of goods to the general public in
competition

with

private

firms.

Because

this

is

a

substantial question, and because I think the decision of
the Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit answered the

2.

question

incorrectly,

I

dissent

from

the

denial

of

certiorari.

I

Petitioner

is

an

pharmacists doing business

association

of

in Jefferson County,

retail
Alabama.

Respondents are fifteen drug companies and certain state
and county pharmacies operated in conjunction with state
and

county

alleged

hospitals. 1

that

the

In

state

its

and

complaint,

county

petitioner

pharmacies

were

receiving preferential prices from the drug manufacturers
and

were

using

their

favored

position

to

compete

with

private pharmacies in retail sales to the general public.
Petitioner
prices,
the

alleged

followed

by

Robinson-Patman

that
retai 1
Act,

these
sales
15

preferential

wholesale

to consumers,

u.s.c.

§13. 2

viola ted

Petitioner

1 The respondent pharmacies include those operated
by the county hospital and by the hospitals and clinics of
the Medical College of the University of Alabama.
2under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce •.. to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality ... where such commodities are sold for
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

sought injunctive relief and treble damages. 3
The

United

for

the

Northern District of Alabama dismissed the complaint.

The

court

are

found

"beyond

the

that

States

sales

intended

District

to

reach

Court

governmental

of

agencies

the Robinson-Patman Price

Discrimination Act, at least with respect to purchases for
hospitals

and

other

traditional

governmental

purposes."

Pet. at 20a.

In reaching this conclusion the court relied

primarily

on

statements

draftsmen

of

commentators
sales

to

the
and

H.

B.

Robinson-Patman
government

governmental

scope of the Act. 4

by

Teegarden,
Act,

officials

agencies

are

and

the

chief

by

other

indicating

beyond

the

that

intended

The court cited several district and

use, consumption or resale within the United States ..• ,
and where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or
injure
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination."
15 U.S.C.
§13.
3The
District
Court
found
that
one
of
the
defendants--the Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama--was immune from any claim to damages by virtue of
the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed from
suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief.
4 see W. Patman, Complete Guide to the RobinsonPatman Act 30-32 (1963).
But Congressman Patman did not
address
the
question
whether
the
Act
applies
to
governmental purchases for retail resale.
The district
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General
indicating that the Act did not apply to sales to the
federal government.
Again, however, the question was
Footnote continued on next page.

4.

appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to
governmental purchases, 5 and indicated that such a holding
was supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light
of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426

u.s.

833 (1976).

The Court of Appeals affirmed

on the basis of the District Court's opinion.

Judge Clark

dissented.

assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies."
38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936).
The District Court also relied on the fact that
Congress
has
on
two
occasions
considered,
without
enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable to sales
to governmental agencies.
See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., lst
Sess. (1951): H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong., lst Sess. (1953).
However, neither of these bills was specifically directed
to the question of sales to governmental agencies for
resale to the general public.
But see Champaign-Urbana
News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummln5 NeWs Co., 632 F. 2d
680, 688 (CA7 1980).
Moreover, "several equally tenable
inferences [can] be drawn from the failure of the Congress
to adopt an amendment in the light of the interpretation
placed upon the existing law by some of its members,
including the inference that the existing legislation
already incorporated the offered change."
United States
v. Wise, 370 u.s. 405, 411 (1962).
5 In only two of the cited cases, however, did the
district court hold that sales to governmental agencies in
competition with private firms were not covered by the
Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not
reach the question. See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., 378 F.2d 212 (CA9 1967): Portland Retail Drugg1sts
Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 F.2d 486 (CA9 1974),
remanded on other
1ssues,
425 U.S.
1
(1976).
Cf.
Champaign-urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummns News
Co., 632 F.2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military
exchange store for resale to military personnel are not
subject
to
the
Robinson-Patman Act):
General
Shale
Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp.
598, 603 (W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd on othergrounds, 132 F.
2d 425 (CA6 1942) ("Neither the government nor a city in
its purchase of property
is in competition with
another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling
the article.") (emphasis added).
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Such an exemption properly may be
consumer,
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advantage of cheaper wholesale prices to injure

competition.
before

as a

Act,

Act,

the

Thus, Teegarden explained
House

Judiciary

Committee

in his testimony
that

the

federal

government would continue to be able to purchase goods at
discounts not available to other purchasers:
is
not
in
"The
Federal
Government
competition
with
other
buyers
from
these
6 Petitioner only argues that purchases by the
government pharmacies for the purpose of resale to members
of the general public are covered by the Robinson-Patman
Act.
Petitioner does not contend that purchases for the
purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered
by the Act.

6.

[wholesalers].
fT]o have a discrimination,
there must be a relative position between the
parties to the discrimination which constitutes
an injury to one as against the other.
I think
the answer is to be found in that.
"In other words, if seller A makes a price
to a retailer in New York and a different price
to a retailer in San Francisco, all other things
aside,
no case of discrimination could be
predicated there, because the two are not in the
same sphere at all.
"The Federal Government is saved by the
same distinction,
not
of
location
but
of
function.
They are not ~ competition with
anyone else who wotiiCl buy."

In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase
for retail resale is a completely different animal from a
purchase for consumption." Pet. at 29a.
government

purchases

considerations
inapplicable

of

to

public generally.
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distinction

in

for
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government

and

An exemption for

consumption
legislative

purchases

for

rests

on

intent

wholly

resale

to

the

Indeed, this Court recognized just such
its decision

in Abbott Laboratories v.

7 Hear ings Before
the House
Committee
on
the
Judiciary on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added). The quotation in text is
included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting opinion.
Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of
this case is Teegarden's response to the question put to
him by Congressman Hancock as to whether a wholesaler
could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper price
than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would
have to answer it in this way. . . . If the two hospitals
are in competition with each other, I should say then that
the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it
from the bill.
If they are not in competition with each
other, then they are in a different sphere." Id., at 209.
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nonprofit
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hospitals
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exempt
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the

Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption provided in
the Nonprofit Institutions Act.

The exemption is limited,

extending only to "purchases of •.. supplies for their own
use by schools ... hospitals, and charitable institutions
not operated for profit."

u.s.c.
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§13c. The Court held
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to

the

general

public

is

equally

applicable

to

government hospitals as to private nonprofit hospitals.
Nor

do

I

think

that

the Tenth Amendment

is

a

barrier to the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to
the state and county hospitals.

The retail sale of drugs

to members of the general public is hardly an attribute of
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sovereignty.

See Hodel v.

and Regulation Assn,

u.s.

Virginia Surface Mining
(1981).
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Abbott

strictly."
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at
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Id.
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seeking
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purposes

Robinson-Patman

and

Act,

and

despite the Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists,
the Court

of Appeals

government

pharmacies

with

private

implied

an exemption

that compete

pharmacies.

The

in the

purpose

of

for

sales

to

retail market
the

Robinson-

Patman Act was "to curb and prohibit all devices by which
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buyers

gained
by
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power."

FTC

{1960).

It is not easy to assume that Congress intended

Henry

of

Broch

their
&

Co.,

greater

over

smaller

v.

virture

preferences

363

u.s.

purchasing
166,

168

to protect small business from what was seen as the unfair

10.

competition of large corporations only to leave these very
same

businesses

competitor

of

vulnerable

to

the

all--the government.

greatest

potential

The decision of

the

Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important, and
I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81--827

JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[January - , 1983]

JusTiCE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical
products to hospitals operated by State and local governments for resale in competition with private retail pharma.
cies is exempt from the proscriptions of the . ..
.
'

-

.

~----~"'~--ua••R•obinson-Patman Ac~--11. .
I
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama,
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members'
claims. Respondents, the defendants below, are fifteen
pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama, and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University operates a medical center, including
hospitals, and a medical school. Located in the University's
medical center are two pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital
is a county hospital, existing as a public corporation under
Alabama law.
The complaint seeks treble damage and injunctive relief
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 15 and
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26, for alleged violations of § 2(a) and (f) of the layton Act,~
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 13(a) and (f). Petitioner contends that the respondent
manufacturers violated § 2(a) ' by selling their products to
the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at prices lower than those charged petitioner's
members for like products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital pharmacies knowingly induced such lower
prices in violation of § 2(f) 2 and sold drugs so procured to the
general public in direct competition with privately owned
pharmacies. Petitioner also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted from the proscriptions of the Act
by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 3
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim, on the ground that state purchases 4 are ex-

2(a)~-.i•••••-..._.~,_.,.llliilllt--llillt•.__. .,.~. . . ,. . _

' Section
U.S. C.§ 13(a), provides in relevant part:
. / ( ---~~shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States .. . , and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .. . .
2
Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
uch commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section.
3
Section 13c provides:
Nothing in • • • • •• • - • •• •• ... shall apply to purtiiJt"t
bases of their supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities,
ublic libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not opered for profit.
'"State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and
its agencies .
~ 15

G

..

ftctJ
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empt as a matter of law from the sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that local retail pharmacies had
been injured by the challenged price discrimination and that
at least some of the state purchases were not exempt under
§ 13c. 5 The District Court held that "governmental purchases are, without regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the
intended reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination
Act, at least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other
traditional governmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102
(1981). 6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the disJ"ict- C<lll(t's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 7
antetl--ee~orari to resolve this important question of
federal law. U. ~).(1982). We now reverse.
II

The issue here is very narrow. We are not concerned with
sales to the federal government. Nor are we concerned with
State purchases for consumption in traditional governmental
functions. 8 Rather, the issue before us is limited to State
656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5 1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as
Appendix).
• Petitioner's antitrust claims were dismissed solely on the basis that
State purchases are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F.
2d, at 103 n. 10. We thus have no occasion to determine whether some
other rule of law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman
Act claims.
7
The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from
the District Court's decision.
8
Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
6
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purchases for the purpose of competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of discriminatory prices-in the
retail market.
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the
Act exempts all State purchases. Assuming, without deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to State
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental nmctions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not apply where a State has
chosen to compete in the private retail market.

III
In construing a statute, we look first to the statutory language itself. The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does
not exempt State purchases. The only express exemption is
that for nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 9
Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory Ianthat includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitution
issue arising from the application of the A:_~jE this case: '!:,.¥_retail s
of
Ph:il'IIla~eutical drugs is not "indisputablyv/f(""nfattribut.tf"yor stat saver~ See EEOC v. Wyoming, U. S. - , (1983)){·---...tt.
Hodel v. Virginia S1a~e Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452
U. S. 264, 288 (1981 . t is too late in the day to suggest that Congress
cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are
engaged in proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parde!.LY. . ..T.ermJ:n.aL.Rail:: ~
way, 377 U. S. 184, 18A--idlff93 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment
protects certain State purchases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional governmental functions, those purchases must ~
e
protected on a case-by-case basis. Cf. City of La a ette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 413 n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion).
9
The District Court properly assumei:l, for purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption
would support summary judgment in cases against State hospitals purchasing for their own use. See note 22 infra.

&
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guage-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656
F. 2d, at 99. 10 This concession was compelled by several of
this Court's decisions. 11 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example,
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person'
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 12
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the
case before us on the ground that it involved the Sherman
Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. 13 Such a distinc-

See also Pfi'"'• Inc. v.
of /Mia, 434 U.S. 308, 31~8). - '
foreign nation is a "person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act).
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v.
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 58&-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R.
v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the applicability to a city of§ 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34
Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a statute which
·
essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same pur oses
price-discrimination provisions of the
· son- atman Act." City of La'S
ayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Court expressly found that a munici~-: was a "person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U.S., at
\...:::::./
'lOJ-"'1 • See also City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 40tMJf$ n. 19.
12
The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Senator Robinson) ("The
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
13
The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is

~

\

~.

G"""'";..,.'

-(

J

8
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tion ignores the specific reference to the Robinson-Patman
Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive nature of the term
"person." 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14. Nor do we perceive any
reason to construe the word "person" in that Act any differently than we have in the Clayton Act, which it amends. 14 In
sum, the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that
there is no exemption for State purchases to compete with
private enterprise.
IV
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a different legislative intent is apparent .from the purpose and history of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose
and history reveals no such contrary intention. 15
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil
Corp . v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act.
14
Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifi_yally state
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton A ( will apply
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appe in this bill,
since it is desi e9 to become by amendment a part of th t ac~ ~
ep. No. 87, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d ess. 7 (1936); S. ep.k~502, 74th-~
Cong. , 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936)~(~'~::!:
ny
!.!!:
ha
~v~e:...!c~o.!-7
m!:.----,-------plained because the provisions of the bill apply to 'any person engaged in
(
1
F
commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act contains that exact language,
re mt~ r~~~. ~ 0
and it is carried into the bill under consideration. The language of the
11 • L o j A~
Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by the courts.'').
Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising that the common
terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should be construed consistently with each other. See~
8137 .-,(remarks of Rep.
Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy or a
new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the purtJ!QO§lS!-----1
of that act to do just what this Jaw sets out to do.");
311 ~
".SS:l'IIIM; (remarks of Senator Logan) r--------~--:---.,..__
15
Although the face of the Act clearly contains no express exemption in
( p 14 rpo!»~ oF Aobi~Hdt\
favor of State purchases, we nevertheless consider the legislative history.
See, e. g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 266 (1981); Train v. Colorado
b ill is to <; rrr ... 1th t'tj
J

J

se

l
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A

Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 16 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the
antitrust laws. Id., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U. S. 482, 485 (1962)). 17 In City of Lafayette, applying antitrust laws to a city in competition with
a private utility, we held that no exemption for local governments would be implied. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the
Court, emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust
laws: "[T]he economic choices made by public corporations

\

( o.pply illj 5her""", A-cr
C()Set.
tz:> coll!.t"rue
C(aytvVI

11-c;t) ;

--

t

•

Publiclnterest Research Group, Inc ., 426 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1976). The Court
previously has considered "how far Congress intended to extend its mandate under" the Robinson-Patman Act and found the answer in its "purpos~Aand legislative history." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S.
186; 197 (1974). See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S 55
0
(1959); Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U. . 1, 72, 78
(1953).
16
See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,
U.S. 308, ~
32-313
(197~~ Mandeville Island Farms, Inc . v. Ameri an Crystal Sugar
its
334 U. S. 219, 236 (1948) ( ·
omprehensive in . terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the for idden
If».
practices by whomever they may be perpetrate<\(') (emphasis added).
17
See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital'& Gerontology Center v.
~
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398,
399· Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc ., 425
f U. S. 1, 12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers,
Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719 (1975).

ftct

iS
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, designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for
the community constituency, are not inherently more likely
to comport with the broader interests of national economic
well-being than are those of private corporations acting in
furtherance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S., at 403
See also
id., at 408. 18
These principles, and the purposes they further, have been
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman
Act. As JusTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425

u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976):

"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws,
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Stand8

In one important sense, retail competition from State agencies can be
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the
Robinson-Patman Act. See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U. S.
69, 75-76 (1979); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc ., 363 U. S. 536, 54~4
(1960). Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively efficient, retail
organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the extent that
lower prices result from lower overhead, in the form of federal grants,
State subsidies, free public services, and freedom from taxation, State
agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the actual consumers
to the citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act
could give State agencies a significant additional advantage in certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small private
competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs
of the drugs sold by the State agencies involved in this case. Because
there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers will suffer
to the extent that State retail activities eliminate more efficient, private
retail distribution systems.
'
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ard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 64&-647 (1969). The Court
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing
power.' FTC v. Brock & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960);
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968).
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54,
65 (1968)."
Thus, in view of the Act's remedial purposes, and the broad
scope of its language as interpreted by this Court, the burden
of showing that the legislative history compels us to create an
exemption is on those who argue that Congress intended, but
did not choose to say, that State agencies may compete with
private business free from the Act's constraints.
B

The legislative history falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that there is an exemption for State
purchases. Surely Congress would have discussed an issue
of such importance before leaving State purchasers free to
compete unfairly with the private sector. Yet there is nothing whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or
in the floor debates, focusing on the issue.
There is evidence that some members of Congress were
aware of the possibility that the Act would apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however, were not concerned with State purchases, but with possible limitations on
the federal Government. The most relevant legislative history is the testimony of the Act's principal draftsman, H.B.
Teegarden, before the House Judiciary Committee. 19 Al19~ep] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting of
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though the testimony is ambiguous on the application of the
Act to State purchases for consumption, one conclusion is
certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would apply
to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at least some circumstances. Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all such purchasing. 20
discounts to the United States Government?
Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so ....
•
Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts ....
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it shouldRnless a discount contrary to
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be
barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns ....

----=::M~r.

f.\__

l1J

The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction. . . . They
A
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy.
{!iep] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders?
rRepJ Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality.
~.Teegarden: No; I think not.
~ei?] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you?
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate
_c_~titive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the
Govet;ijmellt
~eEJ Hancock: Yo would have to bid to the city, countyo\exactly the
same as anybody else same quantity, same price, same quality?
.
Mr. Teegarden: No.
@.ep] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular c?,e.
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should sayJ!:.hat
the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill.
Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
1935 Hearings].
20
Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House com-

--

#'"

4
~
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In the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive markets with congressionally approved price advantages. 21
mittee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be construed to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogative r prlVl eges
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a rinci le inherited b
American jurisprudence from the common law. . . ... " But he also noted
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition~ll fUrther preclude
any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." !d., at 25~ H • •
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes
a law, gives up only what it expressly surren~d~e:rrs~.~~~~~~~~~:::~--=---:-:---:-:---~ 1[
t
I ' 2 b'
2
the Court stated that 1t coul
t~R
Rob;., so"'---"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption agains
ra the
P at~~)1
b t/1 IV~!.
sovereign
statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a state from
the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-embracing in
pE11d tllj ~Fore Cof'\J rt'~1>,
scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being obstructed
by state as by individual action." United States v. California, 297 U. S.
175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 562--563 (1957).
In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the
federal government's purchases. The existence of such an exemption is
not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604-Q05
(1941) (United States not a "person" under the Sherman Act for purposes
of suing for treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that
governmental purchasing would not compete with private purchasing.
For his purposes, this eliminated the rationale for the Act to apply to State
agencies. That assumption, however, is inapplicable here.
2
' Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies. " 38 Op.
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act,
the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce
1

. . ,

1

'
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v
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legislative events and decisions of District Courts confirm that
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so provided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make
such statutes applicable to the Government ....
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and,
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as
applicable to Government contracts.
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General used the phrase
"Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541.
The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp . v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the
Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicability to State agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Act's proscriptions. Seefi932-1939f\Trade Cas. (CCH) 1[ 55,156, at 415-416
(1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply do not
consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See
Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, N-932-1939~Trade Cas. (CCH)
1r 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions."
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman,
--~
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (inter r in Attor<..:-----1~1! ~overt\ Me.,ta.l
ney General's opinion as exempting~ urc ases). His interpretation
L~
is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpreting-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are better reflected in
his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any political subdivision
thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H. R. 3377, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney Ge~eral's contrary construe-
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State purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn
therefore to the subsequent events on which respondents
rely.
A
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman
Act held in the late 1960s. 22 Testimony before the House
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price discrimination in favor of State hospitals, 23 and Federal Trade
tion of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to pass these bills probably
stems from a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act.
It bears repeating, however, that none of these views-including Representative Patman's-focuses on the State purchases alleged here: purchases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional functions.
22
The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain State purchases depends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to State agencies that
perform the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right.
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (sugestin that § 13c does not include government agencies) with 81 Cong.
of Rep. Walter)(§ 13c would apply to instituRec. 8706 (1937) (
tions financed by ci ies, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette
435 U. S., at 397 n. 14
· ·
nclu es pu 1c 1 rar~b;:bo:::t~
t --..--:---------~
ies " which "are b definition, operated by loca government":,;);7;A
Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 1
n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937 (exemp1.
tion codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act).
\r< l'lll.,. l< s
We need not address this issue here.
c._:?
.,.,.____
R.er· Wtdrer
23
See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings
~ 1 at
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinsonb ~ (
Patman Act of the Select Committee oy Small Business o the Hous_e o!~
2 _::_L------~RMe~pC:resentatives, 91st Cong.J
___
73-77
(1969-1970) (William
r-;;erv,.ce
amant, Director of Public Affairs, National Association of WholP!utlL
I"'Justry
er; Harold Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative~ssociation~!Sli! R.. 0)~
jfj•aSmall Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before
)
the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong.~

of)
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Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority
over transactions involving State health care programs. 24 It
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the State agency competed with
private retailers, although he was aware of such practices by
institutional purchasers. 25 Other statements express little
more than informed, interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's
passage. 26 See supra, at - - - - - and n. 21
COIU\$,
For
e NAt'
~

~

1•

15-16 (1967-1968) [he inafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner,
former FTC Commissioner,
1· ,
6 I
There also was testimony that institutional purchasers freque~tain drugs at lower prices
than do retail pharmacies, see id., at Jf; 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many
witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition, see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 29r,
24
See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 22, at 74.
25
After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail druggists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, State, and private group
health care programs; (ii) the federal government's ability to purchase from
drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii)
instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpatients or even nonpatients." I d., at 73. In his response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category,
which involved§ 13c issues. I d., at 74. His disclaimer of F.T.C. authority envisioned State purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most
similar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon.
26
Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the brevity and
conclusory nature of the Subcommittee report-"the views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."
United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, e. g., Consumer
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102,
117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 Ur-·.;S~. ..,!;75=--......,.___,
(1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 200 (1977) ("Leg----islative observations 10 years after passage of the Act are in no sense part
of the legislative history.").
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It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices
for retailers and government customers "is extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983,
90th Gong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manu~urers seem . . . violative of the Robinson-Patman
\.Y
Ac~ ... " Ibid.
Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommittee considered some State purchasing at discriminatory prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful. The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly
worded statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the
mandate of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied
to discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernme,n tal institutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfavored retail druggists." Id., at 79 (emphasis added). 27
This unexceptional opinion, however, simply says that private institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail
competition through sales at discriminatory prices. The
Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this case.
B

Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no
27
The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,' " H. R. Rep.
No. 1983, supra note 22, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction of § 13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress.
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court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent
University 31-32. There are serious infirmaties in these
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held or suggested
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 28 (ii) the number of judicial decisions even considering the Act's application to purchases by State agencies is relatively small; 29 (iii)
respondents cite no Court of Appeals decision that has expressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision
below; (iv) some of the District Court cases upon which respondents rely are simply inapposite; 30 (v) it is not clear that
28
Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19 n.
10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508,
513 (1972).
29
The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished
/i)
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to State
purchases. See notes 30-32, irifra. Cf. Blue Chi Stam s y, Manor
-&
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 73 (1975) (affirming rule adopteq by "virtually
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases
presenting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added i_
_ 2 01
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200..(U974) (adopting
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after
"nearly four decades of litigation").
~
ao s~Pacijic Engineering & Production Co. v. K
-McGee CorpH
,
W
fi.974-yr'rade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at
96,742 ( Utah 1974) (dicta)
) (
"nnvolving federal government as ultimate purchase~elymg on Attorney
~l's opinion as sole support), affd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F . 2d
~O~(CA10) (finding legitimate
petitwn espite different prices),
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); eneral Shale Products Cor . v. Struck
~nst . C ~ 37 F. Supe. 598, 602-6
(WD Ky (finding no "sale" under the
~
Act and alternatively holding the Act inapplicable.(i !IIi' a
("~inc e ---..
"[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of property considered
:..__...--"
necessary for the purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), affd, 132 F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942)
(expressly reserving issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales
to State agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780 (1943).
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any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a

State purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in
the private market; 31 and (vi) there are several cases that
suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to State
purchases for resale purposes. 32 This judicial track record is

not tJtldr t'~~,, j whe11tt'r
a.1tVt.cy exefltpt FrotH. fhf

(ex prts>ly
~to.+e
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in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases
cited note 29, supra.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of
various commentators and executive officials. But the most
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question presented is unsettled; 33 others do not foreclose our holding; 34
and in some cases they support it. 36 Thus, Congress cannot
be said to have left untouched a universally held interpretation of the Act.
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developmentswhether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing-with a price
advantage-in the priva~teu:e.uu.'UI:~ar,KQ:I~
3 &>
See 5A Z. Ca itch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c]*
8
c_overe& b'1
• • • • (197 ) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable);y
4.
Kalinowski, Ant1 st Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982)
(he ltd '' ) ·)
"there is some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to sta s _
and municipalities are
I I · 2
3 !' · 1 Q • 11 li
id.
L - -- - - - § 24.06[2]
, E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer
-203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to
have settled the matter where the federal government is concerned, some
controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to purchases by
state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the
Robinson-Patman Act 84 n. 166 (1962).
34
Some deal only with sales to the federal government. See Le
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Admin' ation
D
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~74,642 41(
- . , . Almost all fail to mention, much less decide, whether tlie Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive Order 1(}.,{136, Identical Bidding in Public Procure____.....,
ment 11 (1962).
85
See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. No. 1, 112, 113,
115 (1977); Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727~. .· - ·
taM f!h.S
IN/ /1J
33
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VI
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote.
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it certainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in ... policy-making
in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our function ends
with the endeavor to ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what was in fact
the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper, 312 U. S.,
600, 606 (1941).
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is replete with references to the economic evil of large
organizations purchasing from other large organizations for
resale in competition with the small, local retailers. There is
no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think
that congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny
small businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson
County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the
strongest competitor of them all. 36 To create an exemption
here clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress.
VII
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to State
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of
116
Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings,
supra note 19, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of private rights").
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Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical
products to state and local government hospitals for resale in
competition with private retail pharmacies is exempt from
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
I
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama,
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members'
claims. Respondents are 15 pharmaceutical manufacturers,
the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the
Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University operates
a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school.
Located in the University's medical center are two pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, existing as
a public corporation under Alabama law.
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15
U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the RobinsonPatman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) and

I
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Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation
of § 2(f) 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 3
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the
sanctions of§ 2. In granting respondents' motions, the District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged
price discrimination and that at least some of the state pur-

(f).

'Section 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States .. . , and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .... "
2
Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section."
3
Section 13c provides:
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit."
• "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and
its agencies.
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chases were not exempt under § 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, without regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 5
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of
federal law. --U.S.-- (1982). We now reverse.
II

The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for
use in traditional governmental functions. 6 Rather, the

I

l o~

The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he t
claims against the Board must .. . be treated as equivalent to claims
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from
the District Court's decision.
6
Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably'' an attribute of state sovereignty. See EEOC v. Wyoming, - - U. S. - - , - - (1983); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264,
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S.
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain state purchases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional
governmental functions, those purchases must be protected on a case-by6
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issue before us is limited to state purchases for the purpose of
competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of
discriminatory prices-in the retail market. 7
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental functions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not apply where a State has
chosen to compete in the private retail market.

III
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory language-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of
case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U. S. 389, 413, and n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion).
7
1t may be that sales only to indigent citizens, not otherwise able to
purchase pharmaceutical products in the retail market, are not "in competition" with sales by private retailers. We here need not define, however,
precisely when a state agency is "in competition" with private enterprises:
The District Court correctly assumed that the private and state pharmacies in this case are "competing pharmacies." 656 F. 2d, at 98. See also
note 8, infra.
8
The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption
would support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchasing for their own use. See note 20, infra.
9
The words "person" and "persons" are used repeatedly in the antitrust
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15.

81--827-0PINION
JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS.

5

this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example,
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person'
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than
the Robinson-Patman Act.' 2 Such a distinction ignores the
See, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "person" under§ 7 of the Shennan Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person"
within the meaning of § 8 of the Shennan Act). See also Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a "person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act).
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.' " City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v.
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585--586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R.
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the applicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act." City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435
U. S., at 401 n. 19.
11
The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The
Clayton Antitrust Act contains tenns general to all purchasers. The
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
12
The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 19S-201 (1974), does not mean
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose con10

.

.
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specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive nature of the term "person." 435
U. S., at 397, n. 14. We do not perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in that Act any differently than we
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends, 13 and it is undisputed that the Clayton Act applies to states. See Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-261 (1972). In sum,
the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that there is
no exemption for state purchases to compete with private
enterprise.
IV
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and history of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose
and history here reveals no such contrary intention.
A
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On nuduct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act.
3
' Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill,
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R.
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen.
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act contains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by
the courts."). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do."); id., at 3119
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson-Patman bill is to strengthen
Clayton Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same).
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merous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 14 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the
antitrust laws. Id., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350--351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 15 In City of
Lafayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in competition with a private utility, we held that no exemption for
local governments would be implied. The Court emphasized
the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic
choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as they
are to assure maximum benefits for the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the
broader interests of national economic well-being than are
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S.,
at 403. See also id., at 408. 16
14
See, e. g. , Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 312-313
(1978) (noting "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added).
15
See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398,
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975).
16
In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have been
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman
Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425

u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976):

"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws,
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 64(H)47 (1969). The Court
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing
power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960);
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968).
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54,
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from taxation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the RobinsonPatman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient,
private retail distribution systems.
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65 (1968)."

B

The legislative history falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that there is an exemption for state
purchases of "commodities" for "resale." There is nothing
whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or in
the floor debates, focusing on the issue. Some members of
Congress were aware of the possibility that the Act would
apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however,
were concerned not with state purchases, but with possible
limitations on the Federal Government. The most relevant
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's principal
draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House Judiciary
Committee. 17 Although the testimony is ambiguous on the
[Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting
of discounts to the United States Government?
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so . . ..
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts ....
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be
barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns ....
17

The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy.
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders?
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality.
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you?
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the
Government.
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality?
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application of the Act to state purchases for consumption, one
conclusion is certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the
Act would apply to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at
least some circumstances. Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all such
purchasing.'8 In the absence of any other relevant evidence,
Mr. Teegarden: No.
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case.
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill.
Hearings on H . R . 4995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
1935 Hearings].
8
' Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House committee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be construed to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition ... will further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." !d., at 250.
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the RobinsonPatman Act was pending before Congress, the Court stated that it could
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, allembracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553,
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an
exemption for the Federal Government's purchases. The existence of
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we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive markets
with congressionally approved price advantages. 19
such an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp.,
312 U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the
Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover,
Teegarden clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not compete with private purchasing. That assumption, however, is inapplicable
here.
19
Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op.
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act,
the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so provided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make
such statutes applicable to the Government....
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and,
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as
applicable to Government contracts.
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General clarified that his
reference was to "the Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons
"for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425
(1928), in which the Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates
to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicability to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1155,156, at
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales.
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1!55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions."
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 168 (1938). See also W. Patman,

I ~~
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v
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legislative events and decisions of district courts confirm that
state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn
therefore to these subsequent events.
A
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman
Act held in the late 1960s. 20 Testimony before the House
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attorney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpreting-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951);
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney General's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act. For example, in 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961, Representative Keogh also unsuccessfully introduced bills to extend the Act to federal purchases only for resale. See H. R. 430, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 722, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1957); H. R. 5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Representative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: purchases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional governmantal functions. For the Department of Justice's most recent statements regarding an exemption or immunity for state enterprises, see note 34, infra.
20
The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases depends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that per-
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Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price discrimination in favor of state hospitals, 21 and Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority
over transactions involving state health care programs. 22 It
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the state agency competed with private retailers, although he was aware of such practices by institutional purchasers. 23 Other statements expressed little
form the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right.
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (suggesting that § 13c does not include government agencies), with 81 Cong.
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette,
435 U. S., at 397, n. 14 (§ 13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by
definition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S.,
at 18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We
need not address this issue here.
21
See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the RobinsonPatman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); id., at 623 (Harold Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association);
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on
Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 15-16
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC
Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'l Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State purchases "probably" exempt). But see id., at 80 (remarks of Charles Fort,
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act
may prohibit this practice"); id., at 86 (same). There also was testimony
that institutional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than
do retail pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition,
see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292.
22
See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra, n. 20, at 74.
22
After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further ques-
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more than informed, interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's
passage. 24 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 19.
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices
for retailers and government customers "is extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manufacturers seem . . . violative of the Robinson-Patman Act
.... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommittee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory
prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful.
tions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail druggists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, state, and private group
health care programs; (ii) the Federal Government's ability to purchase
from drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and
(iii) instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpatients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category,
which involved § 13c issues. /d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most similar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon.
24
Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress--quite a leap given the failure of
the Subcommittee report to rely on it for its conclusions-"the views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See,
e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U. S. 102, 117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U. S. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192,
200, n. 7 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act
are in no sense part of the legislative history.").
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The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly worded
statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the mandate
of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfavored retail druggists." Id., at 79. This unexceptional
opinion, however, simply says that private institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this
case. 25
B
Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent
:University 31-32. There are serious infirmities in these
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held nor suggested
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 26 (ii) the number of judicial decisions even considering the Act's application to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 27 (iii)
25
The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,"' H. R. Rep.
No. 1983, supra n. 20, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction
of § 13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress.
211
Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 397, n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19,
n. 10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S.
508, 513 (1972).
27
The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to state
purchases. See nn. 28-30, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
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respondents cite no court of appeals decision that has expressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision
below; (iv) some of the district court cases upon which respondents rely are simply inapposite; 28 (v) it is not clear that
any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in
the private market; 29 and (vi) there are several cases that
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually all
lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. CoppPaving Co., 419 U.S. 186,200-201 (1974) (adopting
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after
"nearly four decades of litigation").
28
See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving Federal Government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney General's opinion as sole support), affd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790,
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices),
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) (Act inapplicable because there was
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely), affd on opinion below, 234
F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Canst. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD
Ky.1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding the Act
inapplicable because "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of
property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), affd, 132
F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether RobinsonPatman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780
(1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F.
Supp., at 16.
28
Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77--0094
(Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state
agencies), affd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers sub-
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suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state
purchases for resale purposes. 30 This judicial track record is
in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases
cited, n. 27, supra.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of
various commentators and executive officials. But the most
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question presented is unsettled; 31 others are not necessarily inconsistent
ject to discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association
v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore., Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished,
oral opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied), vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has
suggested in an alternative holding that there is an exemption for state
purchases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., No. 4-66-5, slip op. at 4-5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 F. 2d 212, 21~216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University within scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called governmental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases
predate our decision in City of Lafayette.
00
See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); ChampaignUrbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281,
286-287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases,
state agencies might face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 680 (CA7
1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81
F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption
for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable,
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637--&11 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v.
Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d 851,
858--859 (CA91965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp.
v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439,
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency exempt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other
business corporations).
31
See- 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 &
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with our holding; 32 and in some cases they support it. 33
Thus, Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a universally held interpretation of the Act. 34
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developmentswhether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4J. Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962).
82
Some deal only with sales to the Federal Government. See Letter
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in [1973-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1[74,642. Almost
all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962).
33
See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977);
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with private enterprise, it is subject to Act).
34
In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25,
the Department of Justice stated:
"The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to engage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activities of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the federal government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned
enterprise to the same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commercial transactions in the market."
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890
(1977). Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F. 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the charter of a
ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign activity that
would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine).
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considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing in the private
retail market with a price advantage.
VI
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote.
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it certainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of policy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper
corp. 312 u. s., 6oo, 606 (1941).
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and
impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern
Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is
replete with references to the economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other large organizations for resale in
competition with the small, local retailers. There is no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think that
congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small
businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest competitor of them all. 35 To create an exemption here clearly
would be contrary to the intent of Congress.
36
Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings,
supra, n. 17, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection
of private rights").

I'
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VII
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama,
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members'
claims. Respondents,.- tlie 8ekB82mt:! ae~ are fifteen
pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama, and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University operates a medical center, including
hospitals, and a medical school. Located in the University's
medical center are two pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital
is a county hospital, existing as a public corporation under
Alabama law.
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief ,
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 15 M& -a,

~-t a.+. ~ 3 I
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.<J O
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

JusTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical
products to hospitals operated by State and local governments for resale in competition witb private retail pharmacies is exempt from the proscriptions of the Cla;;tea }..,et, 3~
St~:· ~~' as aMeBae:~~ tl~: Robinson-Patman Ac~ 49 Stat.
16B6, 18 U. ~. Cu § 18 (the Aett.--Q_
f.\

'
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-:::::===-----1 i<i S\-A \. 15 2" 1
26, for alleged violations of § 2(a) and (f) of th Clayton Act,'( ,
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Ac . 15 U. S. C. j
3B .2)\-t\-t-. 1 30, l
§§ 13(a) ~(f). Petitioner contends that
e respondent
man acturers violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to
the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at prices lower than those charged petitioner's
members for like products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital pharmacies knowingly induced such lower
~
prices in violation of § 2(f) 2 and sold'@.rugs so p!'oeure~ to the
general public in direct competition with privately owned
pharmacies. Petitioner also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted from the proscriptions of the Act
by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 3
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint fe:F ~llPe tr?state a elaim, on the ground that state purchases 4 are ex-

l

1.\

j..

'

~

-

"
1\

..
".

\

Section 2(a),lll.&f t!.e Clsyteft Ae~, as ~WReAiilaa 8;' the &eeiBeen Patman_915 U.S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part:
A.lt shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.... ;,
2
Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides:
~It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section.
0
3 Section 13c provides:
-------- [~ ~~~~t.:sottANothing in iiatieRe 13 tie 18e att8 81a of ~his li~fshall apply to purbases of their supplies for their own use by schools, cji~-ges, universities,
public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operted for profit. f..
• "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and
its agencies.
1
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3

empt as a matter of law from the sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that local retail pharmacies had
been injured by the challenged price discrimination and that
at least some of the state purchases were not exempt under
~ The District Court held that "governmental purare, without regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the
.
mtended reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination
Act, at least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other
traditional governmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102
(1981)! 5 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F . 2d, at 93/ ~
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question o£9
U.S.- ~· U.S. (1982). We now reverse.

-::
,,

1\

\

"

II

~arrow.

\

WI,. . . ; ·t~h;_

The issue here is
We are not concerned
___
sales to the federal governmen~ ~
, r • congo~o'!("with 1\
${ate purchases for consumption in traditional governmental J
functions.J'1 Rather, the issue before us is limited to 1tate Q.c
656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5 1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as
Ap~ndix) .

1c..

~

J'Petitioner's MiliwBt' claims were dismissed solely on the basis that
,State purchases are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F.
2d, at 103 n. 10. We thus have no occasion to determine whether some
other rule of law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman
Act claims.
~ /The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from
the District Court's decision.
'1 /Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
5

--1~
rot.
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purchases for the purpose of competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of discriminatory prices-in the
retail market.
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the
Act exempts all %tate purchases. Assuming, without deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to ,State O..C.
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental functions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not apply where a State has
chosen to compete in the private retail market.

III
l:A QQBstwiHg 8 statl.lt9, WQ 199k &st te the statutory lan• 0
~Ia8'9 its91P. The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does
not exempt ,itate purchases. The only express exemption is
that for nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c/ l?
Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory Ianthat includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
There is no risk, however, of a constitutional
issue arising from the application of the ActJ!l this casej...The retail sale of v 0 iJ (V c,....
pharmaceutical drugs is not ''indisputabl~~rattributterof state sover- J / f / 1
A
Yeignty~ See EEOC v. Wyoming, U. S. - - , - - (1983)_4q~eting$1o j.._
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452
"")._ U. S. 264, 288 (198!)). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress
cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are
engaged in proprietan:'activities. Se~, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S. 184, 18$ lBQ, 19Q lg31(1964). If the Tenth Amendment
protects certain $tate p~chases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional governmental functions, those purchases must be
protected on a case-by-case basis. Cf. City o La a ette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 413 . 42 (1978) (plurality opinion).
S /The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption
would support summary judgment in cases against ttate hospitals purchas- ~c..
~
ing for their own use. See note '4J:..nfra.
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979).

_;_ x.c.d. •. I

- :1~

i

~
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guage-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656
F. 2d, at 99. )6q This concession was compelled by several of
this Court's decisions ..l!•t> In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example,
we stated without qualification that ''the definition of 'person'
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States."Ji••
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the
case before l:Uii QR tae g;F9\iRQ u~a~it involved the Sherman
Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. d, 'l. Such a distinc-

~

/\

----,

t ~_ud :

..

, ~

I
.

~

2

'\ Jd'Tbe word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly in the antitrust
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15.
.
Jtf ee e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (tlte weftls-l!aey9' ~.} .. .t~ , s n
;person" . .§ 7 of the Sherman Act iBelaEie Stat-g); Chattanooga Foundry &
a
Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (~municipality is a
"person" within the meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Act aRd caD maint~
~~~tma~~~·:OB-WM'ief'+T:-1
, ~predeeessor of§ 4 ef the Cl~). 8
See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 31IA._1978) (~ 1\
foreign nation is a ''person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act).
p
\.__
-€..
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws
which impose . .. sanctions upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v.
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. Cc. v""
v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the applicability to a city of§ 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34
Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a statute which
essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the antiprice-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act." Cit o Lafayette , 435 U. S. , at 402 n. 19. The Court expressly found that a munici)
...._----"'P;:;;;ality
was a ''person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U. S., at
3
4~ss:-<- See also City of Lafayette, 435 U. S. , at 4019.@n. 19.
11 .li'Th;-word ''purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word ''person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Senat.&t Robinson) ("The
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to ~ purchasers. The
~.
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
12. PThe only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is

" "
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tion ignores the specific reference to the Robinson-Patman
Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive nature of the term
"person." 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14. Nor do we perceive any
reason to construe the word ''person" in that Act any differently than we have in the Clayton Act, which it amends. J,( 'l In
sum, the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that
there is no exemption for $tate purchases to compete with
private enterprise.
IV
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a different legislative intent is apparent .from the purpose and history of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose
and history reveals no such contrary intention.~

the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of ''persons" whose conduct ''in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act.
' 3 J( Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill,
,
since it is design~d to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R.
d---i:tep. No. 2287, Pt~th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936); S. Rep~502, 74th c. ~~ • Cl ·
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936~(';_MfOY have com-"'"' (~
plained because the provisions of the bill apply to 'any person engaged in
k
~
commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act contains that exact language,
and it is carried into the bill under consideration. The language of the
Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by the courts.'').
Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising that the common
terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should be construed con·~. ,ctt sistently with each other. See 80 Ceftg. Rwi'\8137 +l~(remarks of Rep.
11
1\
Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy or a
,.' :/
new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the purpos; /
1
of that act to do just what this law sets out to do.''); 89 Gong. Ree,~ll%{
_-,...-_:!.~~~~~(~re~m~ar~ks~of~S~e~n
Logan)9')t,
~
15
Although the face o e-'Act clearly contains no express exemption iii\ 1
favor ofJtate purchases, we nevertheless consider the legislative history. ; I
See, e. g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 266 (1981); Train v. Colorado \
t' \\ .
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~ uu-A ,

"

Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944).11' 4 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the
antitrust laws. !d., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U. S. 482, 485 (1962)).~ 15 In City of Lafayette,A.applying antitrust laws to a city in competition with
a private utility, we held that no exemption for local governments would be implied. JUS'fiG'S BRENNAN, ·.witing ~~he /
Court, emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust
laws: "[T]he economic choices made by public corporations

Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1976). The Court'
previously has considered ''how far Congress intended to extend its mandate under" the Robinson-Patman Act and found the .answer in its ''pur- ·
pos~and legislative history." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. \
186, 197 (1974). See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S 55, 69-70 '
(1959); Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U. S. 61 72, 78 1
(1953.
!14 ..!"See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312-313
· J:,
.. 1
.......__
(19781
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar C~
--.-~ .. u x.tl !'..'-d'f' ~
rJ
-~
,::. ,w::-;-_; .
~
.
.
'~
334 . S. 219, 236 (1948) (aRtitru&t law:& aFe<'o?~prehensive ~ ., ..., 1
til
...."Y'_~J_,t'::. 1' r o•i• d.~' )' - - \
terms and coverage, protecting all who are made vic~rl5iUilen
L -= "L"'"'"' 'J
• : ' ,. u.s.~1 ~ "' u> ~
•
practices by whomever they may be perpetrat~~ (emphasis added).
r,~. ~.'T
l.
as/See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. /\
~-.,_w:q d:A_t!.r TI'\~N
c.. ,
Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378,388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 398,
.. ~ • .\.c C_ O'C\~iroc:.. (,\,.4~ 399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
·· - '
I ~ S~I ;j12 (1976); UniW States v. N ati<=l Assn. of S.curitie• D•alero,
:422 u. s. 694, 7191(1975).

r

'-T'

A

--~
~

1.- \
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. . . , designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for
the community constituency, are not inherently more likely
to comport with the broader interests of national economic
well-being than are those of private corporations acting in
furtherance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S., at 403rfiuotnotes ottriLLed7. See also
id., at 408.18. '"'
}c:::o
These principles, and the purposes they further, have been
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman
Act. As JusTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976):
"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws,
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Stand-

~

18
In one important sense, retail competition from sftate agencies can be
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the p~i~ular targets of the
Robinson-Patman Act. See e. g. , emr:~ A:&P Tet! Ga. v. FTC , 440 U. Sr
69, 76-76 (19'79), PTC v. A16h9i1Bfl:l' B11sG~, !~. , 863 U. S. -586, 543 844
)- (196Q).. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively efficient, retail
organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the extent that
1
r ·, \, u-\ ~ 'a\ c.~ lower rices Feslo\lt fr~ lower overhead, iH tbe fui'H!o ;/ federal grants,
!k. tate subsidies, free public services, and freedom from
ation, State
agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the actual consumers
to the citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act
.k, could give $'tate agencies a significant additional advantage in certain commercia! markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small private
competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs
Q..c. of the drugs sold by the ~ate agencies involved in this case. Because
there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers will suffer
1-c. to the extent that .State retail activities eliminate more efficient, private
retail distribution systems.

~

.e.

e.

r-'
1\.e.su \,\:,tJ

O.c..
~" I.
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ard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 64&-&i7 (1969). The Court
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing
power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960);
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968).
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54,
65 (1968)."

'W ) 'Fhu~, in view of !he Act's remedial purposes, and the broad
. _ ofCOpe of its la;zylige as interpreted by this Court, t:Re bw-den ..1.-

~ ~ng ~h~jthe legislative history compels us to create an

ax.t.. .~ •

L------- exemptiOn 1s 8R i:k88e \viu~ arga~ that Congress intended, but
.Q.c_

did not choose to say, 1i:Rat ,81iate a8'eBeies may eefftfJeie \wt:R ~ .
pl'iua1ie l:n:~si:ftes~ fieee fr em t'ke f ..:et's eonitraints
B

The legislative history falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that there is an exemption for State
purchases. Sl:H'el;y CaRg:l'iBB weald :ksve ei~Ctl~Beti an iBS\ie

.Q~....,~~w.c.;:;~
~b;~:;:;.....t:Pi~:ee-~~t~&&-~~~
9i:Bf*l~~=~~Ree:-ae-::~:e~p:~:~~~~~:

ing whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or "'
in the floor debates focusing on the issue."::!
C: There is ev=idene~ t~~ome members of Congress were
aware of the possibility that the Act would apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however, were not concerned with State purchases, but with possible limitations on
the federal Government. The most relevant legislative history is the testimony of the Act's principal draftsman, H. B.
Teegarden, before the House Judiciary Committee.Jo(•'T AI•1

~ep]Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting of

0 \lk

1<12..-

-----
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though the testimony is ambiguous on the application of the
Q..c, Act to .%tate purchases for consumption, one conclusion is
certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would apply
to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at least some circumstances. Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all such purchasing. ae"as
'

unts to the United States Governm:ent?
Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so....
[~.]
Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts ... .
1\
o , ~ould that discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it shoul4-.,unless a discount contrary to
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be
barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns. . . .
.. . .
~~
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinctiol)f . . . They
~not in competition with anyone else who would buy.
@ep] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the
" "
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders?
fRep] Hancock: Governm~nt, State, city, municipality.
~.i'eegarden: No; I think not.
~ep]Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you?
[ ]
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate
(\
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the
Government.
~ep:] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, countyf.\.exactly the
If'·
1\ f\ same as anybody els~ame quantity, same price, same quality?
0'
']
Mr. Teegarden: No. ------~
=-------------------l1 (.
@ep] Hancock: W auld they or could they sell to a city hospital any
L..:1\ 1\ cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case.
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say~hat
~-\_~K\the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill.
Hearings on H. R . 4995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20~209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
1935 Hearings].
:~ rTeegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House com-

l J

[)
""

"

l ]

l

)

,...-
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In the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive markets with congressionally approved price advantages.* ,q
mittee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question
whether ~'the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be construed to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogative or privi eges
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by
..:z •
American jurisprudence from the common lavtJ . . .. " But he also noted
that ''requiring a showing of effect upon competitiont will further preclude
I..
any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." [ I d., at 259\'YOOt~
omitte~

~~'by,. .;ln 0 uJ'1';)

.,_;

A

r

.

)

u

All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes
0
B ·
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. In tlte eame ,eM tlta+J
·-r:J--~!tgi!&liio~iiia.MtMM~M'·188!~.-te~to..wt.,:\the Court stated that it could ( \.0~ ~ RO~- hk ' erceive no reason for extending [the presumption agamst 4Aeladin__j(the \ ~ o.c\ wc:w ~
sovereign·i~tatute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a state ~. ·~~ C~
0
the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-embracing in
\3
scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being obstructed 1 ~
by state as by individual action." United States v. California, 297 U. S.
175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 562-563 (1957).
In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the
federal government's purchases. The existence of such an exemption is
not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604-Q05
(1941) (United States not a ''person" under the Sherman Act for purposes
of suing for treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that
governmental purchasing would not compete with private purchasing.
For his purposes, this eliminated the rationale for the Act to apply tojtate 1c
agencies. That assumption, however, is inapplicable here.
1'1 ,t" Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application ''to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op.
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act,
the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce

L'• . . '
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v
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legislative events and decisions offistrict fourts confirm that

t

J1\

[

J

1\

"

"

do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so provided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make
such statutes applicable to the Government. . ..
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and,
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as
applicable to Government contracts.
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General used the phrase
"Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541.
The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the
Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicability to $'tate·agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Act's proscriptions. See~932-1939"Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at 415-416
(1937). Two other early ,State attorney general opinions simply do not
consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See
Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota,)932-1939..,.Trade Cas. (CCH)
~ 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney -General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions."
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman,
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attorney General's opinion as exempting~A'urchases). His interpretation
is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpreting-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are better reflected in
his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any political subdivision
thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H. R. 3377, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney General's contrary construe-

9-.c:..

81--827-0PINION
JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS.

13

~ate purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn
therefore to the subsequent events on which respondents
rely.
A
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman
Act held in the late 1960s..-.zoTestimony before the House
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price discrimination in favor of ¢.ate hospitals,2il"zand Federal Trade
~"'\
l m&~ be. n4\,.;'oll1Abie ~
tion of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to pass these bills}Pesael~
~

a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act.
It bears repeating, hewev~ that none of these views-including RepreI\
sentative Patman's-foc~es on the ,itate purchases alleged here: pur- O..C.
chases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional functions.
20 .z-rrhe most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain ~ate purchases de- ~c.
pends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to $tate agencies that O..c..
perform the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right.
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7--8, 78 (1968) (suggesting that § 13c does not include government agencies) with 81 Cong.
Rec. 8706 (1937) (stateiRiiR~of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette,
435 U. S., at 397 n. 14 (Neft~Pefit IastitYtieas A~ncludes "public librar,)._-ies," which "are, gy defini~operated by local government"); Abbott
Laboratories, 425 U. S., at l~n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (193~exemp
tion codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act).
We need not address this issue here .
.:z.l _...See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-,
Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the ]iouse of
.JL
1
Representatives, 91st Cong.(Ist Sess) 73-77c§23)(196~197~) (_William
-<;-::3. ,
o.l ~Ca,rnant, Director of Public Affairs, National Association o Wholesai- =
-:;-~~~ ( j
~ el}i)t_Iarold Halfpe~y, counsel for. the Automativ1Associatio~ ef Vlflele e
__j
~;Small Busmess Problems m the Drug Industry: Heartngs Before
the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Com- -e.
mittee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong~
1'1\o,~ovc:.r
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Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority
over transactions involvingfttate health care programs.ac-z. ...It
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the ,.s'tate agency competed with ~
private retailers, although he was aware of such practices by
institutional purchasers.•.u Other statements expres~little _e:l
more than informed, interested opinions on the issue pre- 1\
sented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate
for the constructions given contt_mporaneously with the Act's
passage.~-<~ See supra, at~-~and n. 21.l.5
CT~ 9 \l
1\
1\
I(~a-l-e. yu r c.~Q~tt,S 1 .,
, ) 1\ A

~

" ,.oo,,..b '1

fJ'£11\PT

~1~16 (1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 eari s] (E;_ar
ntner, a
fonner FTC Commissioner~ on e a o NAR . There also was es l·
mony that institutional purchasers frequently ob ain dru at lower rices
than do retail pharmacies, see id., at , 58, 318, 109~1094, and many~
.I~~ , \ ~ 1'\
·~
witnesses complained that this discri
ation adversely affected compe2.
~ J Pot I H s.s ~.
\. ~ tition, see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 2~
1\
~ 'D r~q,~ ~>~..S..
u .a. see H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note z:£, at 74!'
0
- ------''=-'--___; l5 »After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further ques- A
tions for Chainnan Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail druggists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, State, and private group
health care programs; (ii) the federal government's ability to purchase from
drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii)
instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpatients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his response to the Subcommittee, Chainnan Dixon declined to discuss further the last category,
which involved§ 13c issues. I d., at 74. His disclaimer of w~ authorCL ity envisioned ,State purchases for welfare programs, not for r~ale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most
similar to the issue not discussed by Chainnan Dixon.
~4 _..Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the brevity and
conclusory nature of the Subcommittee report-''the views of a subsequent
Congress fonn a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."
United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, e. g., Consumer
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750 758
(1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 2 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act are in no sense part
of the legislative history.").

'f

• ·
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It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices
for retailers and government customers "is extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manufacturers seem . . . violative of the Robinson-Patman
Aci . . ." Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommittee considered some _State purchasing at discrimina- k
tory prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful. The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly
worded statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the
mandate of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied
to discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfa:___...e...
vored retail druggists." I d., at 79 (emphasis added).@.J ·
This unexceptional opinion, however, simply says that private institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail
competition through sales at discriminatory prices. The
Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair comat issue in this case. B

rn
l

j

Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts
considering the Act's coverage have conclude~ t~at it does
not apply to government purchasers. They ms1st that no

1
1

I
~

i?
I

\

--e rNC! C-)
_____.-/

I

;

.

25

~e Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "de-

\ _ _ - -stgned to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for ths nonprofit institution's 'own use,"' H. R. Rep.
0 No. 1983, supra note 22'; at 78, but that would indicate more the construe/\ tion of § 13c than it wo"tild the intent of the 1936 Congress.
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court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent
University 31-32. There are serious infirmaties in these
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held;?.r suggested
that there is an exemption for State purchases; (ii) the number of judicial decisions
even considering the Act's applicaq,
tion to purchases by ptate agencies is relatively small;,.. (iii)
respondents cite no Court of Appeals decision that has expressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision
below; (iv) some of the District Court,..cases upon which respondents rely are simply inapposite;~ (v) it is not clear that
a.7

Z.v

4 Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite.

See City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19 n.
10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508,
513 (1972).
t. 7
--The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to State
purchases. See notesA~infra. Cf. Blue Chi Stam s v. Manor
1
( :;(8- 30)
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 73 (1975) (affinning rule adopted by "virtually
J«.
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases
presenting this question over the past quarter century'') (em basis added ·
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200 (1974) (adopting
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after
:z._ ''nearly four decades of litigation").
•see Pacific Engineering & Producti Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
,..1974-1ATrade Cas. (CCH) ~75,054, at 96,721, 96,742 @Utan ffi74) (dicta)
~{
" " (involving federal government as ultimate purchase~Telying on Attorney
General's opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d ~
l - j 790, 798"(CA10) (finding legitimate com etition despite different rices),
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); eneral ~PrQdu_c:t.LG!rP. v. Struck .:z
3 Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 60~Ky~finding no "sale" under the ~.
1\ Act and alternatively holding theAAct inapp cable .QR the grotmd=that...: l'l~ I}
~·urc.A- "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of property considered..,...
necessary for the purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), aff'd, 132 F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942)
(expressly reserving issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales
to ,State agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780 (1943).
fLc...

[ J

!qq

__

t:"' """
\ \'o .
~-·-~ ~_.~_,._,_~---------~

..
'
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any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a
Q..c. _state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in
the private market;~ and (vi) there are several cases that
suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to $'tate .2..c..

purchases for resale purposes ...~ This judicial track record is
4

.x"Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094
(Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with re 'udice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to $tate Q.c.
\ .m.. f Mt t\ tVD
agencies), aff 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint insufficient because
' rei' d.. ·,o,) J "d)
it failed to identify products or purchasers subject to discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association v. Abbott Laboratories, No.
d- 71-543 <@Ore. Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral opinion), vacated andre- )
manded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applie~te-the pW'(lhases aHEf" I\
(}- I!J!Wee), vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). ' dne District Court has
Slc
suggested in alternative holdings that there is an exemption for ,State purchases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
1 _1· . \
No. 4-Q6-5:iop. at 4 (Idaho May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378
~15-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University within ~
~ \ 3c. scope of"~eR~I'eRt IostitutieBs Ae(; expressly" oet adlk~ l, du:..~ ~~)
~"so-called overnmental exemm_i.on" cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898
c-< (196'Tl. !See also Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. , 134 F. upp. , i
16 (SDNY 1955) (dicta), affd per curiam, 234 F. 2d 959 (CA2), cert. denied 352
1956 . All oft ese cases pr ate our dec1s1on m ,tty
of Lafayette.
cv
pe.r c.- ur 1 ~"" ) 930 ... See Burge v. Bryant Public School \ istrict, 520 . Supp. 328, 330-33ID' Z.
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 61 , 612 1 CA8 1981; Champaign-Urbana' "'
.
1
i
NewsAgency,
Inc.v . J.L.CumminsNewsCo.,479 . Supp.281 ,~76,9D! 28fo -J
1
1
·. c.H- \o.o •.LON
(CD Ill. 1979) ~ct inapplicable to1purchasest2y the A:r:my :;md ~etr \ 1\ 1\.
1
G
li:xchaRge 8emee eeeause ef se¥ereigft-immw:Ut.1,. but possibly Stat~ agen- \ ·'---e_ ~~
C~'Q'J:) ciesA~ face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 68<Y;)87-692 ~A7 '-----;f' cle.rl\ \
I'1980); A.J. Goodman & SonJ v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., sr---e...
' e.
'
0 F ~ SutaP,· .§.90,:J893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption
Qc a# 3 f{)r,ate purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable,
.e
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633,' 641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v.
Rangen, Inc., 23
. upp. 393, 399 (Idaho 19~, affd, 351 F. 2d 851, 41\
:d~~:
858-859 (CA91965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp.
-:;. - ~4!
v. Nassau Research & Development Associa~ 152 F. Supp. 91, 95'"'-96~ e. ~
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F . Supp. 439, '(' 1\.
443 (ND Ohio 1952[_( E:J.yre.ss ~ ' \ nG -\- "'PO~ £.. .!>.S 1
.:.

r(
t.t\

W~.e.-\-'r.'C.r ~\ A\~ A0,4L'NC
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in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases
7 cited note 2!t,'supra.
1\
Responde'tits also seek support in the interpretations of
various commentators and executive officials. But the most
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question presented is unsettled; ar ~thers do not foreclose our holding; 1M"?."'
and in some cases they support it. 311 33Thus, Congress cannot
be said to have left untouched a universally held interpretation of the Act.
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developmentswhether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing-with a price
advantage-in the private retail market.
3

~~

~ ,-t(3. ~ ~VI'f>· lq82.) )
..arsee 5A Z. CaW.tch, Business Organizations § 105D.01(8][c], at 1Q9D -45 JL
)-- to 196D-46 (1972:) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J.
Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation§ 24.06, at 24-70 (1982)
(''there is some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states
""-- and municipalities are e:*lllwaee fpgm Rgi:JmseH Patman liabi~~); id.
o
§ 24.06[2j at 24-75 to 24-fij; E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patmani>rimer
~203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to
~ settled the matter where the federal government is concerned, some
controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to purchases by
state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the
14 .12. ) Robinson-Patman Ac~~4 a. 16i'(1962).
-~
32. MSome deal only with sales to the federal government. See £ Letter
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~74,642~at 94,~19 Q
{1Si'S~ Almost all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive Order 1~36, Identical Bidding in Public Procure- -'<.
ment 11 (1962).
~
..JLu .. See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. ~ 112,(!ill
~
n
A 115 (1977); Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 ~
~Y~ .c_(
1"\.~ ~
9
f c..k .s wdl-. 'f.r' " ~tc:.
E. N~ c:.rpr'I.S <:. 1 \t I S

l

o

(l
v
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VI

The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote.
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it certainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in ~x>olicy-making
in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our function ends
with the endeavor to ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what.... as in fact
the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper 312 U. S.,
600, 606 (1941).
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is replete with references to the economic evil of large
organizations purchasing from other large organizations for
resale in competition with the small, local retailers. There is
no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think
that congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny
small businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson
County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the
strongest competitor of them all.~ To create an exemption
here clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress.

3

""

VII
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to ~ate ..Q.c
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of
3'1
1
A

.iii'Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings,
supra note 1~ at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of private rights").
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Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

RIDER A

In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities,
at 25, the Department of Justice stated:
The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned
enterprise to engage in commercial activity should not be
sufficient to immunize all activities of the enterprise
from the antitrust laws. That test removes the clearly
sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust
scrutiny of the federal government while holding the
commercial activities of a state-owned enterprise to the
same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commercial
transactions in the market.
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1890 (1977}.

Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General

de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964}
(the charter of a ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not
a sovereign activity that would justify applying the sovereign
immunity doctrine}.
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JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES ET AL.
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APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[January -

, 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical
products to hospitals operated by state and local governments for resale in competition with private retail pharmacies is exempt from the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman
Act.
I
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama,
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members'
claims. Respondents, are fifteen pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama,
and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University
operates a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical
school. Located in the University's medical center are two
pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, existing as a public corporation under Alabama law.
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15
U. S. C. §§ 15 & 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-
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Patman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. §§ 13(a) &
(f). Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation
of § 2(f) 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 3
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged
Section 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .... "
2
Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section."
3
Section 13c provides:
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit."
'"State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and
its agencies.
1
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price discrimination and that at least some of the state purchases were not exempt under§ 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, without regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981)." The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 6
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of
federal law.-- U.S.-- (1982). We now reverse.
II

The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for
consumption m traditional governmental functions. 7
• Petitioner's claims were dismissed solely on the basis that state purchases are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F. 2d, at 103
n. 10. We thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule of
law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims.
6
The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims
against the State itself. " 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from
the District Court's decision.
7
Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably" an attribute of state sovereignty. See EEOC v. Wyoming, - - U. S. - -, - - (1983); (Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264,
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regu-

• 1
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Rather, the issue before us is limited to state purchases for
the purpose of competin~ against private enterprise-with
the advantage of discriminatory prices-in the retail market.
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental functions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not apply where a State has
chosen to compete in the private retail market.

III
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory language-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of
this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
late States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S.
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain State purchases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional
governmental functions, those purchases must be protected on a case-bycase basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U. S. 389, 413 & n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion).
8
The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption
would support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchasing for their own use. See note 20, infra.
9
The word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly in the antitrust
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15.
10
See, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "person" under§ 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
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Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example,
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person'
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than
the Robinson-Patman Act. 12 Such a distinction ignores the
specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive nature of the term "person." 435
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person"
within the meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Act. See also Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a "person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act).
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v.
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 58&-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R.
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the applicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act.'' City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435
U. S., at 401 n. 19.
11
The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "person.'' See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
12
The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act.
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U. S., at 397 n. 14. Nor do we perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in that Act any differently than we
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends. 13 In sum, the
plain language of the Act strongly suggests that there is no
exemption for state purchases to compete with private
enterprise.
IV
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and history of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose
and history reveals no such contrary intention.
A
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities
3
' Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill,
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R.
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen.
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act contains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by
the courts."). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should
be construed consistently with each other. See 80 id., at 8137 (remarks of
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do.''); id., at 3119
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson bill is to strengthen Clayton
Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same).
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might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 14 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the
antitrust laws. !d., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 15 In City of Lafayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in
competition with a private utility, we held that no exemption
for local governments would be implied. The Court, emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as
they are to assure maximum benefits for the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the
broader interests of national economic well-being than are
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S.,
at 403. See also id., at 408. 16
"See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 312-313
(1978) (rating "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added).
15
See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398,
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975).
16
In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have been
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman
Act. As JuSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425

u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976):

"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws,
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 646-647 (1969). The Court
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing
power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960);
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968).
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54,
65 (1968)."

B
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from taxation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the RobinsonPatman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient,
private retail distribution systems.
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The legislative history falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that there is an exemption for State
purchases. There is nothing whatever in the Senate or
House Committee reports, or in the floor debates, focusing
on the issue. Some members of Congress were aware of the
possibility that the Act would apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however, were not concerned with
state purchases, but with possible limitations on the federal
Government. The most relevant legislative history is the
testimony of the Act's principal draftsman, H. B. Teegarden,
before the House Judiciary Committee. 17 Although the tes17
[Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting
of discounts to the United States Government?
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so ....
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts ....
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be
barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns ....

The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy.
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders?
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality.
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you?
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the
Government.
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden: No.
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
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timony is ambiguous on the application of the Act to state
purchases for consumption, one conclusion is certain:
Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would apply to the
purchases of municipal hospitals in at least some circumstances. Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all such purchasing. 18 In
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case.
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill.
Hearings on H. R. 1,.995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
1935 Hearings].
18
Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House committee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be construed to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition . . . will further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." Id., at 250.
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the RobinsonPatman Act was pending before Congress the Court stated that it could
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, allembracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553,
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an
exemption for the federal government's purchases. The existence of such
an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312
U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the Sherman
Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden
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the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive markets with congressionally approved price advantages. 19
clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not compete with private purchasing. For his purposes, this eliminated the rationale for the
Act to apply to state agencies. That assumption, however, is inapplicable
here.
19
Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op.
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act,
the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so provided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make
such statutes applicable to the Government....
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and,
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as
applicable to Government contracts.
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General used the phrase
"Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541.
The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the
Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicability to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at
415--416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales.
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas.
(CCH) ~ 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions."
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman,
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attor-
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v
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legislative events and decisions of district courts confirm that
state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn
therefore to the subsequent events on which respondents
rely.
A
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman
Act held in the late 1960s. 20 Testimony before the House
ney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpreting-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951);
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney General's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act.
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Representative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: purchases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional functions.
:>)The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases depends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that perform the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right.
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (suggesting that § 13c does not include government agencies) with 81 Cong.
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette,
435 U. S., at 397 n. 14 (§ 13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by defi-
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Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price discrimination in favor of state hospitals, 21 and Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority
over transactions involving state health care programs. 22 It
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the state agency competed with private retailers, although he was aware of such practices by institutional purchasers. 23 Other statements expressed little
nition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at
18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We
need not address this issue here.
21
See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the RobinsonPatman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesaler&); Harold Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association; Small
Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on Small
Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 15-16 (1967-1968)
[hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'l Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State purchases
"probably" exempt). But see id., at 80, 86 (remarks of Charles Fort,
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act
may prohibit this practice .... "). There also was testimony that institutional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than do retail
pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition, see id., at
A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292.
22
See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 20, at 74.
23
After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail druggists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, State, and private group
health care programs; (ii) the federal government's ability to purchase from
drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii)
instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpatients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his response to the Sub-
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more than informed, interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's
passage. 24 See supra, at ~11, and n. 21. 25
committee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category,
which involved § 13c issues. /d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most similar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon.
20
Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the brevity and
conclusory nature of the Subcommittee report-"the views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."
United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, e. g., Consumer
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102,
117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 758
(1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 200 n. 7 (1977)
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act are in no sense
part of the legislative history.").
'" It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that it did not
focus on the question presented by this case. The Subcommittee found
that the difference between drug prices for retailers and government customers "is extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors
inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manufacturers seem . . . violative of the RobinsonPatman Act .... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommittee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory prices-about
which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful. The Subcommitte report
did include the awkwardly worded statement: "There is no basis apparent
... why the mandate of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to
discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is prescription drug competition
at the retail level with disfavored retail druggists." /d., at 79 (emphasis
added). This unexceptional opinion, however, simply says that private institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said nothing expressly
about the unfair competition at issue in this case. The Subcommittee also
concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to
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B

Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent
University 31-32. There are serious infirmaties in these
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held or suggested
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 26 (ii) the number of judicial decisions even considering the Act's application to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 2:1 (iii)
respondents cite no Court of Appeals decision that has expressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision
below; (iv) some of the District Court cases upon which respondents rely are simply inapposite; 28 (v) it is not clear that
private nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'" H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 20, at 78,
but that would indicate more the construction of § 13c than it would the
intent of the 1936 Congress.
26
Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19 n.
10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508,
513 (1972).
27
The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to State
purchases. See notes 28-30, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases
presenting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after
"nearly four decades of litigation").
28
See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving federal government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney General's opinion as sole support), affd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790,
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices),
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any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a

state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in
the private market; 29 and (vi) there are several cases that
suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state
purchases for resale purposes. 30 This judicial track record is
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (Act inapplicable since there was
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely). Affd on opinion below,
234 F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956). General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Canst. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603
(WD Ky.1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding
the Act inapplicable since "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its
governmental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be
engaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), affd,
132 F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S.
780 (1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F.
Supp., at 16.
29
Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094
(Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state
agencies), affd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers subject to discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association
v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore. Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral
opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied),
vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has suggested in alternative holdings that there is an exemption for state purchases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
No. 4-66-5, slip op. at 4 (Idaho May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), affd,
378 F. 2d 212, 215-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University within
scope of§ 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called governmental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases predate
our decision in City of Lafayette.
30
See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA81981) (per curiam); ChampaignUrbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281,
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in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases
cited note 27, supra.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of
various commentators and executive officials. But the most
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question presented is unsettled; 31 others do not foreclose our holding; 32
and in some cases they support it. 33 Thus, Congress cannot
286-287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases but
possibly State agencies might face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 680
(CA7 1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi
Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637--M1 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson &
Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d
851, 858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand
Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439,
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency exempt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other
business corporations).
31
See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 &
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962).
82
Some deal only with sales to the federal government. See Letter
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 74,642. Almost all
fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962).
33
See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977);
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be said to have left untouched a universally held interpretation of the Act.
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developmentswhether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing-with a price
advantage-in the private retail market.
VI
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote.
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it certainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of policy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper
Corp. 312 U. S., 600, 606 (1941).
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with private enterprise, it is subject to Act).
In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25, the
Department of Justice stated:
The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to engage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activities of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the federal government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned
enterprise to the same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commercial transactions in the market.
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890
(1977).
Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F . 2d 354, 360--362 (CA2 1964) (the
charter of a ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign
activity that would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine).
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"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is replete with references to the economic evil of large
organizations purchasing from other large organizations for
resale in competition with the small, local retailers. There is
no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think
that congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny
small businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson
County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the
strongest competitor of them all. 34 To create an exemption
here clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress.

VII
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

34
Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings,
supra note 17, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of private rights").
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JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[February - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical
products to state and local government hospitals for resale in
competition with private retail pharmacies is exempt from
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
I
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama,
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members'
claims. Respondents are 15 pharmaceutical manufacturers,
the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the
Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University operates
a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school.
Located in the University's medical center are two pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, existing as
a public corporation under Alabama law.
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15
U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the RobinsonPatman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) and
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(0. Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers
violated § 2(a)' by selling their products to the University's
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation
of § 2(0 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 3
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged
price discrimination and that at least some of the state purSection 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to Jessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .... "
1
Section 2(0, 15 U. S. C. § 13(0, provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section."
•·Section 13c provides:
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit."
• "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and
its agencies.
1
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chases were not exempt under§ 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, without regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam decision, affinned "on the basis of the district court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 5
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of
federal law. --U.S.-- (1982). We now reverse.
II

The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for
use in traditional governmental functions. 6 Rather, the
'The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from
the District Court's decision.
' Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably'' an attribute of state sovereignty. See EEOC v. Wyoming,- U . S . - , - (1983); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264,
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S.
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain state purchases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional
governmental functions, those purchases must be protected on a case-by-
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issue before us is limited to state purchases for the purpose of
competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of
discriminatory prices-in the retail market. 7
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental functions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not apply where a State has
chosen to compete in the private retail market.

III
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory language-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of
case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U. S. 389, 413, and n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion).
1
Special solicitude for the plight of indigents is a traditional concern of
state and local governments, and a State's aid to indigents is an exercise of
its sovereign powers. If, in special circumstances, sales were made by a
State to a class of indigents, the question presented, that we need not decide, is whether such sales would be ''in competition" with private enterprise. The District Court correctly assumed that the private and state
pharmacies in this case are "competing pharmacies." 656 F. 2d, at 98.
See also note 8, infra.
8
The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be
covered by the § 13c exemption. See n. 3, supra, and accompanying text.
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption would
support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchasing for
their own use. See n. 20, infra.
• The words "person" and ''persons" are used repeatedly in the antitrust
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15.

--·-- --- --·- - ------ ------
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this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example,
we stated without qualification that ''the definition of 'person'
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than
the Robinson-Patman Act. 12 Such a distinction ignores the
10
See, e. g., Geargia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "person" under§ 7 of the Shennan Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person"
within the meaning of § 8 of the Shennan Act). See also Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a "person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act).
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.' " City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v.
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585--586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R.
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the applicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U.S. C. §41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act.'' City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific
Court expressly found that a municipality was a ''person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462--463. See also City of Lafayette, 435
U. S., at 401 n. 19.
11
The word ''purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word ''person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
12
The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 1~201 (1974), does not mean
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of ''persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act.
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specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive nature of the term "person." 435
U. S., at 397, n. 14. We do not perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in that Act any differently than we
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends, 13 and it is undisputed that the Clayton Act applies to states. See Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-261 (1972). 14 In sum,
the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that there is
u Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state
that "[t)he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply
without repetition to the tenns concerned where they appear in this bill,
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R.
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 31.16 (1936) (remarks of Sen.
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act contains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by
the courts."). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do.''); id., at 3119
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson-Patman bill is to strengthen
Clayton Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same).
14
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, questions our use of
antitrust cases to define a word common to the antitrust laws. She would
distinguish all of these cases, that uniformly hold States to be included in
the word "persons," because none has held "that States or local governments are persons for purposes of exposure to liability as purchasers
under the provisions of the Clayton Act.'' Post, at 4 (emphasis in original). The dissent takes no notice, however, of our decision last term in
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 835, 843
(1982), in which the Court stated that the antitrust laws, "like other federal
laws imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course apply to
municipalities as well as to other corporate entities." No authority is cited
for the dissent's distinction between "persons" entitled to sue under the
antitrust laws and "persons" subject to suit under those laws.

I
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no exemption for state purchases to compete with private
enterprise.
IV
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and history of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose
and history here reveals no such contrary intention.
A
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among
the states." United· States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 15 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the
antitrust laws. I d., at 787 (citing United States v. P hiladelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 16 In City of
See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 312-313
(1978) (noting "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added).
••see, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398,
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975).
11
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Lafayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in competition with a private utility, we held that no exemption for
local governments would be implied. The Court emphasized
the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic
choices made by public corporations ... , designed as they
are to assure maximum benefits for the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the
broader interests of national economic well-being than are
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S.,
at 403. See also id., at 408. 17
These principles, and the purposes they further, have been
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman
Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976):
"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws,
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson
17

In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from taxation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the RobinsonPatman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient,
private retail distribution systems.
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& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 646-647 (1969). The Court
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing
power.' FTC v. Brach & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960);
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968).
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54,
65 (1968)."

B

The legislative history falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that there is an exemption for state
purchases of "commodities" for "resale." There is nothing
whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or in
the floor debates, focusing on the issue. 18 Some members of
Congress were aware of the possibility that the Act would
apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however,
were concerned not with state purchases, but with possible
limitations on the Federal Government. The most relevant
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's principal
draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House Judiciary
18
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, repeatedly emphasizes
that Congress in 1936 did not focus specifically on the issue presented here.
See post, at 6, 7, and nn. 10, 14, 15. This may well be true, as the likelihood of state entities competing in the private sector was remote in 1936.
It cannot be contended, however, that Congress specifically intended to allow the competition at issue here. In any event, the absence of congressional focus is immaterial where the plain language applies. See, e. g.,
Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 339 (1941); De Lima v. Bidwell,
182 U. S. 1, 197 (1901); South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U. S., at
356-358.
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Committee. 19 Although the testimony is ambiguous on the
application of the Act to state purchases for consumption, one
conclusion is certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the
Act would apply to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at
least some circumstances. 00 Thus, his comments directly
"[Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting
of discounts to the United States Government?
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so....
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts ....
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be
barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this: T"M Federal Government is
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns ....
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy.
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders?
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality.
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you?
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the
Government.
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden: No.
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any
c"Maper than t"My would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case.
If t"M two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say t"Mn
that t"Mfact that one is operated by t"M city does not save it from t"M b~iilioil.,_.,..
,.......
Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. before t"M House Committee on t"M Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20&-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
1935 Hearings].
,., JUSTICE STEVENS agrees that state and local governments may be
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contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all
such purchasing. 21 In the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by
an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive markets with congressionally approved price advantages. 22
"purchasers" within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. See post,
at 1. He joins in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent, however, on the basis of a
novel theory: that state and local agencies may never be in "competition"
with private parties within the meaning of the Act. See ibid. This, of
course, is an economic fiction: If in fact a State participates in the private
retail pharmaceutical market, it is clear that it is competing with the private participants. JUSTICE STEVENS relies on one statement by witness
Teegarden in the 1935 House hearings, but attaches no significance to a
further statement by the same witness: "In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case. If the two
hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then that the fact
that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill." See 1995
Hearings, supra n. 19, at 209.
21
Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House committee~ He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions.
See 1995 Hearings, supra n. 19, at 249. He then posed the question
whether ''the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be construed to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition ... will further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." /d., at 250.
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the RobinsonPatman Act was pending before Congress, the Court stated that it could
''perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, allembracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553,
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of
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Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legislative events and decisions of district courts confirm that
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an
exemption for the Federal Government's purchases. The existence of
such an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp.,
312 U. S. 600, 604--605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the
Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover,
Teegarden clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not compete with private purchasing. That assumption, however, is inapplicable
here.
22
Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op.
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act,
the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so provided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make
such statutes applicable to the Government....
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and,
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as
applicable to Government contracts.
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General clarified that his
reference was to ''the Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons
"for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U.S. 415, 425
(1928), in which the Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates
to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicability to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales.
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas.
(CCH) ~ 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937).

'•e
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state purchases are outside the scope of the Act.
therefore to these subsequent events.

13

We turn

A
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman
Act held in the late 1960s. 28 Testimony before the House
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
Representative Patman ''presumed that the [United States] Attorney
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions."
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 168 (1938). See also W. Patman,
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attorney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpreting-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the
Act to define ''purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951);
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney General's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act. For example, in 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961, Representative Keogh also unsuccessfully introduced bills to extend the Act to federal purchases only for resale. See H. R. 430, 87th Cong. , 1st Sess.
(1961); H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 722, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1957); H. R. 5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Representative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: purchases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional governmantal functions. For the Department of Justice's most recent statements regarding an exemption or immunity for state enterprises, see note 37, infra.
11
The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases depends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that perform the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right.
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industry indicated that the Act did not cover price discrimination in favor of state hospitals, 24 and Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority
over transactions involving state health care programs. 25 It
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the state agency competed with private retailers, although he was aware of such practices by institutional purchasers. 25 Other statements expressed little I ·
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (suggesting that § 13c does not include government agencies), with 81 Cong.
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette,
435 U. S., at 397, n. 14 (§ 13c includes ''public libraries," which "are, by
definition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S.,
at 18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We
need not address this issue here.
10
See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings
Before the Special Subcommittee on Smatl Business and the RobinsonPatman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); id. , at 623 (Harold Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association);
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on
Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 1fr.16
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC
Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'l Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State purchases "probably" exempt). But see id., at 80 (remarks of Charles Fort,
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act
may prohibit this practice"); id., at 86 (same). There also was testimony
that institutional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than
do retail pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition,
see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292.
•See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra, n. 23, at 74.
• After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail druggists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, state, and private group
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more than informed, interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's
passage. 27 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 22.
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices
for retailers and government customers "is extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manufacturers seem . . . violative of the Robinson-Patman Act
.... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommittee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory
prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful.
The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly worded
health care programs; (ii) the Federal Government's ability to purchase
from drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and
(iii) instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpatients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category,
which involved § 13c issues. I d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most similar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon.
n Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the failure of
the Subcommittee report to rely on it for its conclusions-"the views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See,
e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U. S. 102, 117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U. S. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192,
200, n. 7 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act
are in no sense part of the legislative history.").
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statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the mandate
of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfavored retail druggists." I d., at 79. This unexceptional
opinion, however, simply says that private institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this
case.~

B
Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent
University 31-32. There are serious infirmities in these
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held nor suggested
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 29 (ii) the number of judicial decisions even considering the Act's application to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 30 (iii)
18
The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,"' H. R. Rep.
No. 1983, supra n. 23, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction
of § 13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress.
21
Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 397, n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19,
n. 10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S.
508, 513 (1972).
10
The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to state
purchases. See nn. 31-33, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually all

I
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respondents cite no court of appeals decision that has expressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision
below; (iv) some of the district court cases upon which respondents rely are simply inapposite; 31 (v) it is not clear that
any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in
the private market; 32 and (vi) there are several cases that
lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after
"nearly four decades of litigation").
11
See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving Federal Government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney General's opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790,
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices),
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) (Act inapplicable because there was
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely), aff'd on opinion below, 234
F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD
Ky. 1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding the Act
inapplicable because "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of
property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), aff'd, 132
F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether RobinsonPatman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780
(1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F.
Supp., at 16.
•cr. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094
(Utah, Sept. 6, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss
with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state agencies), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint
insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers subject to
discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association v. Ab-

-,.
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suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state
purchases for resale purposes. 83 This judicial track record is I
in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases
cited, n. 27, supra.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of
various commentators and executive officials. But the most
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question presented is unsettled; 34 others are not necessarily inconsistent
bott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore., Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral
opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied),
vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has suggested in an alternative holding that there is an exemption for state purchases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
No. 4--66--5, slip op. at 4-5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion),
aff'd, 378 F. 2d 212, 21&-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University
within scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called governmental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All ofthese cases
predate our decision in City of Lafayette.
• See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332
(ED Ark. 1980), aff'd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CAS 1981) (per curiam); ChampaignUrbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281,
286-287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases,
state agencies might face an opposite result), aff'd, 632 F. 2d 680 (CA7
1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81
F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption
for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable,
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637-641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v.
Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), aff'd, 351 F. 2d 851,
858-859 (CA91965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp.
v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439,
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency exempt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other
business corporations) .
.. See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 &
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski,
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unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing in the private
retail market with a price advantage. 38
VI
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote.
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it certainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of policy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper
Corp. 312 U. -8., 600, 606 (1941).
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and
impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern
Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is
replete with references to the economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other large organizations for resale in
competition with the small, local retailers. There is no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think that
18
The dissent of JUSTICE O'CONNOR relies in large part, not on the
words of the statute, or its legislative history, but on assertions that a
"general consensus [existed] in the legal and business communities that
sales to governmental entities are not covered by the Robinson-Patman
Act." Post, at 9. See also post, at 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). JUSTICE
O'CONNOR is correct that some in the business and legal community did
think that an exemption existed for all state purchases. See post, at
12-14, nn. 19 and 20. But to say there is a "consensus" is to disregard the
opinion of commentators, see n. 34, supra; the views expressed that the
Act is applicable to state purchases, see infra, at 11, and n. 22, 18, and n.
36; and the most recent, relevant opinion of the Department of Justice, see
infra, at 18, and n. 37. It is more accurate to say that this was an unsettled question of federal law that demanded this Court's attention.
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with our holding; 86 and in some cases they support it. 36
Thus, Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a universally held interpretation of the Act. 37
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developmentswhether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) (''there is
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to
purchases by state and local governments."); F . Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962).
16
Some deal only with sales to the Federal Government. See Letter
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in [1973-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) n4,642. Almost
all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962).
111
See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977);
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with private enterprise, it is subject to Act).
17
In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25,
the Department of Justice stated:
"The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to engage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activities of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the federal government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned
enterprise to the same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commercial transactions in the market."
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890
(1977). Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F. 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the charter of a
ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign activity that
would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine) .
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congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small
businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest competitor of them all. 39 To create an exemption here clearly
would be contrary to the intent of Congress.
VII
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

• Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1995 Hearings,
supra, n. 17, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection
of private rights").
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the sale of phannaceutical
products to state and local government hospitals for resale in
competition with private retail phannacies is exempt from
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
I
Petitioner, a trade association of retail phannacists and
phannacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama,
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members'
claims. Respondents are 15 pharmaceutical manufacturers,
the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the
Cooper Green Hospital Phannacy. The University operates
a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school.
Located in the University's medical center are two phannacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, existing as
a public corporation under Alabama law.
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15
U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26, for alleged violations of § 2(a) and (f) of
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the RobinsonPatman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) and
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(f). Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's
two phannacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Phannacy at
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital
phannacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation
of § 2(0 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct
competition with privately owned phannacies. Petitioner
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. a
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that state purchases • are exempt as a matter of law from the
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that
local retail phannacies had been injured by the challenged
price discrimination and that at least some of the state purSection 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between difl'erent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .... "
1
Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section."
1
Section 13c provides:
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit."
• "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and
its agencies.
1
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chases were not exempt under § 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, without regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 6
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of
federal law. --U.S.-- (1982). We now reverse.
II

The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for
use in traditional governmental functions.' Rather, the
'The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t)he
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from
the District Court's decision.
• Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bi8hop of Chicago,
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably" an attribute of state sovereignty. See EEOC v. Wyoming, U. S. - , (1983); Hcxkl v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation A11ociation, Inc., 452 U. S. 264,
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S.
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain state purchases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional
governmental functions, those purchases must be protected on a case-by-
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issue before us is limited to state purchases for the purpose of
competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of
discriminatory prices-in the retail market. 7
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental functions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not apply where a State has
chosen to compete in the private retail market.

III
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory language-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C.§§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of
this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Lauisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U. S. 389, 413, and n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion).
' Special solicitude for the plight of indigents is a traditional concern of
state and local governments. If, in special circumstances, sales were
made by a State to a class of indigents, the question presented, that we
need not decide, is whether such sales are "in competition" with private
enterprise. The District Court correctly assumed that the private and
state phannacies in this case are "competing pharmacies." 656 F. 2d, at
98. See also note 8, infra.
'The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be
covered by the § 13c exemption. See n. 3, mpra, and accompanying text.
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption would
support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchasing for
their own use. See n. 20, infra.
'The words "person" and "persons" are used repeatedly in the antitrust
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15.
•See, e. g., Gecrrgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "per-
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Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example,
we stated without qualification that ''the definition of 'person'
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than
the Robinson-Patman Act. I% Such a distinction ignores the
specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discusson" under§ 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person"
within the meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Act). See also Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a ''person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act).
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v.
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R.
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the applicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U.S. C. §41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act." City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435
U. S., at 401 n. 19.
11
The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word ''person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
11
The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of ''persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act.

'I
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sion of the all-inclusive nature of the tenn "person." 435
U.S., at 397, n. 14. We do not perceive any reason to construe the word ''person" in that Act any differently than we
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends," and it is undisputed that the Clayton Act applies to states. See Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-261 (1972). 14 In sum,
the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that there is
no exemption for state purchases to compete with private
11
Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state
that "[t)he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply
without repetition to the tenns concerned where they appear in this bill,
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R.
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen.
Logan) ("[M)any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act contains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by
the courts."). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do."); id., at 3119
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson-Patman bill is to strengthen
Clayton Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same).
u JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, questions our use of
antitrust cases to define a word common to the antitrust laws. She would
distinguish all of these cases uniformly holding States to be included in the
word "persons," because none has held "that States or local governments
are persons for purposes of exposure to liability as purchasers under the
provisions of the Clayton Act." Post, at 4 (emphasis in original). The dissent takes no notice, however, of our decision last term in Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 56 (1982), in which
the Court stated that the antitrust laws, "like other federal laws imposing
civil or criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course apply to municipalities
as well as to other corporate entities." No authority is cited for the dissent's distinction between "persons" entitled to sue under the antitrust
laws and "persons" subject to suit under those laws.

I
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enterprise.

IV
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and history of the Act. An exammation of the legislative purpose
and history here reveals no such contrary intention.

A
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the

antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities
might restrain or monopolize commercial interc.ourse among
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 16 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, ~1 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the
antitrust laws. ld., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 18 In City of
Lafayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in compe11
See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 312-313
(1978) (noting "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust
laws") (applying Shennan Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville
Ialand Farms, Inc. v. American Cryatal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236
(1948) ("[Shennan] Act is comprehensive in its tenns and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added).
11
See, e. g., Natiooal Gerimedical HoB'pital & Gerontology Center v.
Blue CroBB, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398,
399; Abbott Labora.toriea v. Portland Retail Druggista Aaan., Inc., 425
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United Statea v. National Aaan. of Securitiea Dealers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975).
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tition with a private utility, we held that no exemption for
local governments would be implied. The Court emphasized
the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic
choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as they
are to assure maximum benefits for the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the
broader interests of national economic well-being than are
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S.,
at 403. See also id., at 408. 17
These principles, and the purposes they further, have been
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman
Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail ~gists Assn., Inc., 425

u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976):

"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws,
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain
17
In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing pennits any large, relatively
efticient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of seale. But to the
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from taxation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the RobinsonPatman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this ease. Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers
will su1fer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient,
private retail distribution systems.
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Lims, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 646-647 (1969). The Court
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing
power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960);
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968).
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54,
65 (1968)."
B
The legislative history falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that there is an exemption for state
purchases of "commodities" for "resale." There is nothing
whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or in
the floor debates, focusing on the issue. 18 Some members of
Congress were aware of the possibility that the Act would
apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however,
were concerned not with state purchases, but with possible
limitations on the Federal Government. The most relevant
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's principal
draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House Judiciary
Committee. 11 Although the testimony is ambiguous on the

\

11

JUSTICE O'CoNNOR's dissenting opinion repeatedly emphasizes that
Congress in 1936 did not focus specifically on the issue presented here.
See post, at 6, 7, and nn. 10, 14, 15. This may well be true, as the likelihood of state entities competing in the private sector was remote in 1936.
It cannot be contended, however, that Congress specifically intended to allow the competition at issue here. In any event, the absence of congressional focus is immaterial where the plain language appli~
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S.
~
);
Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 339 (1941); De Lime, v. idwell,
182 u. s. 1, 197 (1901).
11
[Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting
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application of the Act to state purchases for consumption, one
conclusion is certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the
Act would apply to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at
least some circumstances .., Thus, his comments directly
of discounts to the United States Government?
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so....
[Rep.) Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts ....
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to
the present bill would be halTed-that is, the present law-would be
barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Gavernment iB
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns....
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy.
[Rep.) Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Go¥rnment orders?
[Rep.) Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality.
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
[Rep.) Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you?
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the
Government.
[Rep.) Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden: No.
[Rep.) Hancock: Would they or could they aell to a city koapital any
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned lwapital, under this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case.
If the two koapitals are in competition with each other, I ahou.ld aay then
tMt the fact that one iB operated by the city does not aave it from the bill.
If they are not in competition with each other, then they are in a different
sphere.
The facts of the situation are not present upon which to predicate a discrimination in the nature of the case. I do not see that that question becomes any different under this bill from what it is under the present section
2 of the Clayton Act, for that bill also prohibits discrimination generally in
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contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all
such purchasing. 11 In the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by
an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive markets with congressionally approved price advantages. 11
the same tenns that this does. But it dift'ers in the breadth of the exceptions. That is the only dift'erence between the two bills.
Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. before the HOU8e Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. ~209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
1935 Hearings].
• JUSTICE STEVENS agrees that state and local governments may be
"purchasers" within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. See post,
at 1. He joins in JUSTICE O'CoNNOR's dissent, however, on the basis of a
novel theory: that state and local agencies may never be in "competition"
with private parties within the meaning of the Act. See ibid. This is an\
economic fiction: If in fact a State participates in the private retail pharmaceutieal market, it competes with the private participants. JusTICE STEVENS relies on one statement by witness Teegarden in the 1935 House
hearings, but attaches no significance to a further statement by the same
witness: "In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions
of fact in a particular case. If the two hospitals are in competition with
each other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city
does not save it from the bill." See 1935 Hearings, supra n. 19, at 209
(emphasis added).
11
Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House committee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra n. 19, at 249. He then posed the question
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be construed to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by
American jurisprudence from the common law . . .. " But he also noted
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition . . . will further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." I d., at 250.
All the eases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the RobinsonPatman Act was pending before Congress, the Court stated that it could
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the

I
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Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legislative events and decisions of district courts confirm that
sovereign by its own statute) 80 as to exempt a business carried on by a
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, allembracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553,
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an
exemption for the Federal Government's purchases. The existence of
such an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp.,
312 U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the
Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover,
Teegarden clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not compete with private purchasing. That assumption, however, is inapplicable
here.
• Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op.
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act,
the Attorney General explained:
[S)tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so provided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make
such statutes applicable to the Government. . . .
The [Robinson-Patman Act) merely amended the [Clayton Act) ... and,
in 80 far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as
applicable to Government contracts.
ld., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General clarified that his
reference was to "the Federal Government," ilnd., and gave other reasons
"for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425
(1928), in which the Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates
to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicability to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
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state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn
therefore to these subsequent events.

A
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman
Act held in the late 1960s. 18 Testimony before the House
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939) Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales.
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939) Trade Cas.
(CCH), 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States) Attorney
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions."
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 168 (1938). See also W. Patman,
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attorney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpreting-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951);
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney General's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act. For example, in 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961, Representative Keogh also unsuccessfully introduced bills to extend the Act to federal purchases only for resale. See H. R. 430, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 722, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1957); H. R. 5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Representative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: purchases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional governmantal functions. For the Department of Justice's most recent statements regarding an exemption or immunity for state enterprises, see note 37, infra.
•The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary
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industry indicated that the Act did not cover price discrimination in favor of state hospitals, 14 and Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority
over transactions involving state health care programs. 26 It
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the state agency competed with private retailers, although he was aware of such practices by ininstitutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases depends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that perform the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right.
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (suggesting that § 13c does not include government agencies), with 81 Cong.
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette,
435 U. S., at 397, n. 14 (§13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by
definition, operated by local government"); Abbott Labcrratories, 425 U. S.,
at 18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We
need not address this issue here .
.. See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the RobinsonPatman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); id., at 623 (Harold Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association);
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on
Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 1&-16
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC
Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'! Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State purchases "probably" exempt). But see id., at 80 (remarks of Charles Fort,
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act
may prohibit this practice"); id., at 86 (same). There also was testimony
that institutional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than
do retail pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition,
see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292.
•See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra, n. 23, at 74.
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stitutional purchasers. • Other statements expressed little
more than informed, interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's
passage. 17 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 22.
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices
for retailers and government customers ''is extremely substantial" and ''not always fully explainable by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manufacturers seem ... violative of the Robinson-Patman Act
. . . ." Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommit• After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further questions for Chainnan Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail druggists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, state, and private group
health care programs; (ii) the Federal Government's ability to purchase
from drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and
(iii) instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpatients or even nonpatients." /d., at 73. In his response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category,
which involved § 13c issues. /d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most similar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon.
17
Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the failure of
the Subcommittee report to rely on it for its conclusions-"the views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one. " United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See,
e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commi&Bion v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U. S. 102, 117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U. S. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192,
200, n. 7 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act
are in no sense part of the legislative history.").
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tee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory
prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful.
The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly worded
statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the mandate
of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfavored retail druggists." ld., at 79. This unexceptional
opinion, however, simply says that private institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this
case. 28
. B
Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either § 2(a) or § 2(0, when the discriminatory price involved a
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent
University 31-32. There are serious infirmities in these
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held nor suggested
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 28 (ii) the number of judicial decisions even considering the Act's application to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 80 (iii)
• The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'" H. R. Rep.
No. 1983, supra n. 23, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction
of § 13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress.
• Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 397, n. 14; Abbott Laboratmies, 425 U. S., at 18-19,
n. 10; Califarnia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S.
508, 513 (1972).

• The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished
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respondents cite no court of appeals decision that has expressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision
below; (iv) some of the district court cases upon which respondents rely are simply inapposite; 11 (v) it is not clear that
any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in
the private market; 12 and (vi) there are several cases that
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to state
purchases. See nn. 31-83, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually all
lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Capp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after
"nearly four decades of litigation").
11
See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) , 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving Federal Government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney General's opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790,
~799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices),
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Broum-Forman Distillers
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) (Act inapplicable because there was
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely), aff'd on opinion below, 234
F. 2d 959 (CA2) (:per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD
Ky. 1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding the Act
inapplicable because "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of
property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be engaged in lnA.ying and ruelling that article") (emphasis supplied), aff'd, 132
F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether RobinsonPatman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780
(1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F.
Supp., at 16.
•ct. Mountain View Ph.arrruu:y v. Abbott Labcrratories, No. C-77~
(Utah, Sept. 6, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss
with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state agen-
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suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state
purchases for resale purposes. a This judicial track record is
in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases
cited, n. 27, supra.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of
various commentators and executive officials. But the most
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question presented is unsettled; u others are not necessarily inconsistent
cies), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint
insufficient because it failed to identify products or purcllasers subject to
di8criminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore., Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral
opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied),
vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has suggested in an alternative holding that there is an exemption for state purchases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
No. 4-66-5, slip op. at 4-5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion),
aff'd, 378 F. 2d 212, 21~216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University
within scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called governmental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases
predate our decision in City of Lafayette.
• See Burge v. Bryant Public School Di8trict, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-832
(ED Ark. 1980), aff'd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA81981) (per curiam); ChampaignUrbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281,
~287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases,
state agencies might face an opposite result), aff'd, 632 F. 2d 680 (CA7
1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81
F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption
for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable,
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637-641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v.
Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), aff'd, 351 F. 2d 851,
858-859 (CA91965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp.
v. NaBsau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439,
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency exempt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other
business corporations).
.. See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 &;
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with our holding; 16 and in some cases they support it. •
Thus, Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a universally held interpretation of the Act. 17
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developmentswhether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt purSupp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J . Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is
some confiict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act§ 4.12 (1962).
• Some deal only with sales to the Federal Government. See Letter
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in [197~2] Trade Cas. (CCH) ,74,642. Almost
all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962).
•See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977);
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with private enterprise, it is subject to Act).
wr In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25,
the Department of Justice stated:
"The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to engage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activities of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the federal government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned
enterprise to the same standards requir{ed] of all who engage in commercial transactions in the market."
Reprinted in Antit1'U8t E:temptiom and Immunities: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the HOU8e of Repreaentativea, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890
(1977). Cf. Victory Tmnaport Inc. v. ComiBaria General de Abasteci. mientoay Tmnaportes, 336 F . 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the charter of a
ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign activity that
would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine).
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chases by a State for the purpose of competing in the private
retail market with a price advantage. •

VI
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote.
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it certainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of policy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper
Corp. 312 U. S., 600, 606 (1941).
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and
impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern
Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is
replete with references to the economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other large organizations for resale in
competition with the small, local retailers. There is no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think that
•The dissent of JUSTICE O'CoNNOR relies in large part, not on the
words of the statute, or its legislative history, but on assertions that a
"general consensus [existed] in the legal and business communities that
sales to governmental entities are not covered by the Robinson-Patman
Act." Post, at 9. See also post, at 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). JUSTICE
O'CONNOR is correct that some in the business and legal community did
think that an exemption existed for all state purchases. See post, at
12-14, nn. 19 and 20. But to say there is a "consensus" is to disregard the
opinion of commentators, see n. 34, .upra; the views expressed that the
Act is applicable to state purchases, see .upra, at 10, 12-13 n. 22, and 19,
and n. 37; and the most recent, relevant opinion of the Department of Justice, see .upra, at 19, and n. 37. It is more accurate to say that this was
an unsettled question of federal law that demanded this Court's attention.

I
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congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small
businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest competitor of them all. • To create an exemption here clearly
·would be contrary to the intent of Congress.
VII
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

• Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings,
I'Upra, n. 20, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection
of private rights").
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JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES ET AL.
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APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[February - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical
products to state and local government hospitals for resale in
competition with private retail pharmacies is exempt from
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
I

Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama,
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members'
claims. Respondents are 15 pharmaceutical manufacturers,
the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the
Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University operates
a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school.
Located in the University's medical center are two pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, existing as
a public corporation under Alabama law.
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15
U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the RobinsonPatman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) and
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(f). Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation
of § 2(f) 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 3
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged
price discrimination and that at least some of the state pur'Section 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States . . . , and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . .. ."
2
Section 2(f), 15 U.S. C. § 13(f), provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section."
8
Section 13c provides:
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities , public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit."
' "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and
its agencies.
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chases were not exempt under§ 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, without regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 5
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of
federal law. --U.S.-- (1982). · We now reverse.
II

The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for
use in traditional governmental functions. 6 Rather, the
The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from
the District Court's decision.
6
Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably" an attribute of state sovereignty. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest
that Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause powers
when they are engaged in proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v.
Terminal Railway, 377 U. S. 184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain state purchases from the Act's limitations, such as
for consumption in traditional governmental functions, those purchases
must be protected on a case-by-case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisi5
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issue before us is limited to state purchases for the purpose of
competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of
discriminatory prices-in the retail market. 7
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental functions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not apply where a State has
chosen to compete in the private retail market.

III
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory language-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of
this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 413, and n. 42 (1978) (plurality
opinion).
7
Special solicitude for the plight of indigents is a traditional concern of
state and local governments. If, in special circumstances, sales were
made by a State to a class of indigents, the question presented, that we
need not decide, would be whether such sales are "in competition" with private enterprise. The District Court correctly assumed that the private
and state pharmacies in this case are "competing pharmacies." 656 F. 2d,
at 98. See also note 8, infra.
8
The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be
covered by the § 13c exemption. See n. 3, supra, and accompanying text.
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption would
support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchasing for
their own use. See n. 20, infra.
• The words "person" and "persons" are used repeatedly in the antitrust
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15.
10
See, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "per-
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Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example,
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person'
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than
the Robinson-Patman Act. 12 Such a distinction ignores the
specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discusson" under§ 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person"
within the meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Act). See also Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a "person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act).
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.' " City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v.
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R.
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the applicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act.'' City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435
U. S., at 401 n. 19.
11
The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers.").
12
The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act.

I'
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sion of the all-inclusive nature of the tenn "person." 435
U. S., at 397, n. 14. We do not perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in that Act any differently than we
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends, 13 and it is undisputed that the Clayton Act applies to states. See Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-261 (1972). 14 In sum,
the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that there is
no exemption for state purchases to compete with private
13
Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill,
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R.
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen.
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act contains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration.
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by
the courts.''). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do.''); id., at 3119
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson-Patman bill is to strengthen
Clayton Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same).
14
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, questions our use of
antitrust cases to define a word common to the antitrust laws. She would
distinguish all of these cases uniformly holding States to be included in the
word "persons," because none has held "that States or local governments
are persons for purposes of exposure to liability as purchasers under the
provisions of the Clayton Act.'' Post, at 4 (emphasis in original). The dissent takes no notice, however, of our decision last term in Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 56 (1982), in which
the Court stated that the antitrust laws, "like other federal laws imposing
civil or criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course apply to municipalities
as well as to other corporate entities.'' No authority is cited for the dissent's distinction between "persons" entitled to sue under the antitrust
laws and "persons" subject to suit under those laws .

•, r
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enterprise.
IV
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and history of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose
and history here reveals no such contrary intention.
A
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944)J5 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the
antitrust laws. I d., at 787 (citing United States v. P hiladelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 16 In City of
Lafayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in compe15
See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312-313
(1978) (noting "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added).
16
See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398,
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975).
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tition with a private utility, we held that no exemption for
local governments would be implied. The Court emphasized
the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic
choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as they
are to assure maximum benefits for the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the
broader interests of national economic well-being than are
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S.,
at 403. See also id., at 408. 17
These principles, and the purposes they further, have been
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman
Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425

u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976):

"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws,
and Rob'inson-Patman in particular, are to be construed
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application
are to be construed strictly. United States v. M eKes son
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain
17
In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from taxation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the RobinsonPatman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient,
private retail distribution systems.
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Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 646--647 (1969). The Court
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing
power.' FTC v. Brach & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960);
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968).
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54,
65 (1968)."

B
The legislative history falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that there is an exemption for state
purchases of "commodities" for "resale." There is nothing
whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or in
the floor debates, focusing on the issue. 18 Some members of
Congress were aware of the possibility that the Act would
apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however,
were concerned not with state purchases, but with possible
limitations on the Federal Government. The most relevant
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's principal
draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House Judiciary
Committee. 19 Although the testimony is ambiguous on the
8
' JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion repeatedly emphasizes that
Congress in 1936 did not focus specifically on the issue presented here.
See post, at 6, 7, and nn. 10, 14, 15. This may we.ll be true, as the likelihood of state entities competing in the private sector was remote in 1936.
It cannot be contended, however, that Congress specifically intended to
allow the competition at issue here. In any event, the absence of congressional focus is immaterial where the plain language applies. See, e. g.,
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U. S. 533, 551H>58
(1944); Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 339 (1941); De Lima v.
Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 197 (1901).
9
' [Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting
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application of the Act to state purchases for consumption, one
conclusion is certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the
Act would apply to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at
least some circumstances. 20 Thus, his comments directly
of discounts to the United States Government?
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so....
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts ....
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be
barred by that bill.
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns....
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . .. They
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy.
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders?
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality.
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not.
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you?
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the
Government.
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality?
Mr. Teegarden: No.
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill?
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case.
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill.
If they are not in competition with each other, then they are in a different
sphere.
The facts of the situation are not present upon which to predicate a discrimination in the nature of the case. I do not see that that question becomes any different under this bill from what it is under the present section
2 of the Clayton Act, for that bill also prohibits discrimination generally in
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contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all
such purchasing. 21 In the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by
an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive markets with congressionally approved price advantages. 22
the same terms that this does. But it differs in the breadth of the exceptions. That is the only difference between the two bills.
Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208--209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
1935 Hearings].
20
JUSTICE STEVENS agrees that state and local governments may be "purchasers" within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. See post, at 1.
He joins in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent, however, on the basis of a novel
theory: that state and local agencies may never be in "competition" with
private parties within the meaning of the Act. See ibid. This is an economic fiction: If in fact a State participates in the private retail pharmaceutical market, it competes with the private participants. JUSTICE STEVENS relies on one statement by witness Teegarden in the 1935 House
hearings, but attaches no significance to a further statement by the same
witness: "In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions
of fact in a particular case. If the two hospitals are in competition with
each other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city
does not save it from the bill." See 1935 Hearings, supra n. 19, at 209
(emphasis added).
21
Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House committee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions.
See 1935 Hearings, supra n. 19, at 249. He then posed the question
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be construed to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition ... will further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." !d., at 250.
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the RobinsonPatman Act was pending before Congress, the Court stated that it could
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the
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v
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legislative events and decisions of district courts confirm that
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, allembracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553,
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an
exemption for the Federal Government's purchases. The existence of
such an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp.,
312 U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the
Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover,
Teegarden clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not compete with private purchasing. That assumption, however, is inapplicable
here.
22
Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op.
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act,
the Attorney General explained:
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so provided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make
such statutes applicable to the Government... .
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] . .. and,
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as
applicable to Government contracts.
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General clarified that his
reference was to "the Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons
"for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U.S. 415, 425
(1928), in which the Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates
to a federal corporation that competed with private enterprise.
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicability to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the
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state purchases are outside the scope of the Act.
therefore to these subsequent events.

13

We turn

A
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman
Act held in the late 1960s. 23 Testimony before the House
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales.
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas.
(CCH) ~ 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937).
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions."
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 168 (1938). See also W. Patman,
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attorney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpreting-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951);
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney General's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act. For example, in 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961, Representative Keogh also unsuccessfully introduced bills to extend the Act to federal purchases only for resale. See H. R. 430, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 722, 85th Con g., 1st
Sess. (1957); H. R. 5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Representative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: purchases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than
purchases for use in traditional governmantal functions. For the Department of Justice's most recent statements regarding an exemption or immunity for state enterprises, see note 37, infra.
23
The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary
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industry indicated that the Act did not cover price discrimination in favor of state hospitals, 24 and Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority
over transactions involving state health care programs. 25 It
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the state agency competed with private retailers, although he was aware of such practices by ininstitutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases depends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that perform the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right.
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (suggesting that § 13c does not include government agencies), with 81 Cong.
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette,
435 U. S., at 397, n. 14 (§ 13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by
definition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S.,
at 18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We
need not address this issue here.
24
See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the RobinsonPatman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); id., at 623 (Harold Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association);
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on
Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 15-16
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC
Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'! Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State purchases "probably" exempt). But see id., at 80 (remarks of Charles Fort,
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act
may prohibit this practice"); id., at 86 (same). There also was testimony
that institutional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than
do retail pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition,
see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292.
25
See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra, n. 23, at 74.
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stitutional purchasers. 26 Other statements expressed little
more than informed, interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's
passage. 27 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 22.
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices
for retailers and government customers "is extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983,
90th Gong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manufacturers seem ... violative of the Robinson-Patman Act
... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommit26
After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail druggists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, state, and private group
health care programs; (ii) the Federal Government's ability to purchase
from drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and
(iii) instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpatients or even nonpatients." I d., at 73. In his response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category,
which involved§ 13c issues. I d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most similar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon.
-n Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the failure of
the Subcommittee report to rely on it for its conclusions-"the views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See,
e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U. S. 102, 117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U. S. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192,
200, n. 7 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act
are in no sense part of the legislative history.").
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tee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory
prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful.
The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly worded
statement: "There is no basis apparent ... why the mandate
of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfavored retail druggists." ld., at 79. This unexceptional
opinion, however, simply says that private institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this
case. 28
B
Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent
University 31-32. There are serious infirmities in these
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held nor suggested
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 29 (ii) the number of judicial decisions even considering the Act's application to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 30 (iii)
28
The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'" H. R. Rep. No.
1983, supra n. 23, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction of
§ 13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress.
29
Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 397, n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19,
n. 10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S.
508, 513 (1972).
80
The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished
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respondents cite no court of appeals decision that has expressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision
below; (iv) some of the district court cases upon which respondents rely are simply inapposite; 31 (v) it is not clear that
any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in
the private market; 32 and (vi) there are several cases that
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to state
purchases. See nn. 31-33, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually all
lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after
"nearly four decades of litigation").
8
'See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving Federal Government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney General's opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790,
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices),
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) (Act inapplicable because there was
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely), aff'd on opinion below, 234
F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD
Ky. 1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding the Act
inapplicable because "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of
property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), affd, 132
F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether RobinsonPatman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780
(1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F .
Supp., at 16.
82
Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-()094
(Utah, Sept. 6, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss
with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state agen-
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suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state
purchases for resale purposes. 33 This judicial track record is
in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases
cited, n. 27, supra.
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of
various commentators and executive officials. But the most
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question presented is unsettled; 34 others are not necessarily inconsistent
cies), affd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint
insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers subject to
discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association v. Ab·
bott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore., Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral
opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied),
vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has suggested in an alternative holding that there is an exemption for state purchases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
No. 4-66-5, slip op. at 4-5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion),
affd, 378 F. 2d 212, 215-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University
within scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called governmental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases
predate our decision in City of Lafayette.
33
See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); ChampaignUrbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281,
286-287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases,
state agencies might face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 680 (CA7
1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81
F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption
for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable,
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637-641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v.
Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d 851,
858-859 (CA91965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp.
v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439,
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency exempt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other
business corporations).
34
See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 &
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with our holding; 35 and in some cases they support it. 36
Thus, Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a universally held interpretation of the Act. 37
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developmentswhether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt purSupp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962).
35
Some deal only with sales to the Federal Government. See Letter
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in [1973-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~74,642. Almost
all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962).
36
See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977);
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with private enterprise, it is subject to Act).
37
In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25,
the Department of Justice stated:
"The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to engage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activities of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the federal government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned
enterprise to the same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commercial transactions in the market."
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890
(1977). Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F. 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the charter of a
ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign activity that
would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine).
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chases by a State for the purpose of competing in the private
retail market with a price advantage. 38
VI
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote.
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it certainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of policy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper
Corp. 312 U. S., 600, 606 (1941).
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and
impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern
Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is
replete with references to the economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other large organizations for resale in
competition with the small, local retailers. There is no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think that
38

The dissent of JusTICE O'CONNOR relies in large part, not on the
words of the statute, or its legislative history, but on assertions that a
"general consensus [existed] in the legal and business communities that
sales to governmental entities are not covered by the Robinson-Patman
Act." Post, at 9. See also post, at 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). JUSTICE
O'CONNOR is correct that some in the business and legal community did
think that an exemption existed for all state purchases. See post, at
12-14, nn. 19 and 20. But to say there is a "consensus" is to disregard the
opinion of commentators, see n. 34, supra; the views expressed that the
Act is applicable to state purchases, see supra, at 10, 12-13 n. 22, and 19,
and n. 37; and the most recent, relevant opinion of the Department of Justice, see supra, at 19, and n. 37. It is more accurate to say that this was-an unsettled question of federal law that demanded this Court's attention.
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congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small
businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest competitor of them all. 39 To create an exemption here clearly
would be contrary to the intent of Congress.
VII
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings,
supra, n. 20, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection
of private rights").
39

